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This dissertation is an inquiry into spatial aspects of control, resistance and 
communication in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), as revealed by the 
architecture of its ships. The architectural type of the retourschip or 
“homeward bounder” is described and the history of its development, 1602-
1795 is traced, with special attention paid to the period 1740-1783, when the 
richest records concerning ship design were produced and the ships reached 
their most standardized forms.  
 
The retourschip was one of the highest technological achievements of its day 
and was used as an emblem for military and mercantile power by the VOC. 
The ship’s role and meaning as an armature for the VOC’s ideological 
constructs is examined. Ships also, in Paul Gilroy’s words, constituted 
"microcultural, micro-political systems," with their own social and spatial 
orders. These orders are explored, along with their ideological uses as 
structuring models for VOC society. Changes to the spatial design of the 
retourschip through the period of the VOC’s operation are linked to changes in 
the social structure aboard and to changes in the status of VOC mariners, 
officers and captains.  
  
Finally, the effects and effectiveness of the retourschip as a structuring model 
are interrogated using several mutinies, with special attention paid to the 1763 
mutiny on the retourschip Nijenburg. The role of shipboard space in structuring 
mutinous actions is explored, as is the role of mutinies in forming the society 
of VOC mariners. Through the records of Admiralty and colonial court trials 
the socio-spatial order aboard the Nijenburg is closely examined both under 
the command of its VOC-appointed captain and under that of the mutineers, 
and the two conditions compared. Mutineers are shown to appropriate and 
subvert the VOC’s socio-spatial organization, while trial records are shown to 
reconstruct the social categories of the ship, incorporating mutiny into the 
Company’s dominant discourse. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In truth, a man-of-war is a city afloat, with long avenues set out with guns 
instead of trees, and numerous shady lanes, courts, and by-ways. The 
quarter-deck is a grand square, park, or parade ground, with a great 
Pittsfield elm, in the shape of the mainmast, at one end, and fronted at the 
other by the palace of the Commodore's cabin. 
Or, rather, a man-of-war is a lofty, walled, and garrisoned town, like 
Quebec, where the thoroughfares are mostly ramparts, and peaceable 
citizens meet armed sentries at every corner. 
Or it is like the lodging-houses in Paris, turned upside down; the first floor, 
or deck, being rented by a lord; the second, by a select club of gentlemen; 
the third, by crowds of artisans; and the fourth, by a whole rabble of 
common people. 
For even thus is it in a frigate, where the commander has a whole cabin to 
himself and the spar-deck, the lieutenants their wardroom underneath, and 
the mass of sailors swing their hammocks under all. 
And with its long rows of port-hole casements, each revealing the muzzle 
of a cannon, a man-of-war resembles a three-story house in a suspicious 
part of the town, with a basement of indefinite depth, and ugly-looking 
fellows gazing out at the windows. 
Herman Melville: White-jacket or, The World in a Man-of-war (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
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When I began my research into Dutch East India Company (hereafter VOC) 
ships, I was fortunate to be guided around the replica of the Batavia by Ad van 
der Zee, who at the time was wrapping up his part in the ongoing building of 
another replica, of the seventeenth century warship Zeven Provincieen.1 Ad had 
shown me around the many interior spaces of the Batavia, which were largely 
empty and undecorated, and had patiently answered my naïve questions 
about construction, timber, seaworthiness, the research underpinning the 
project and the prospects for building further replicas. Finally I approached 
the question on which I thought I might be able to bring some analysis to bear: 
I asked him about the use of space aboard, regarding which I had only been 
able to glean a few clues from the replica. He replied that, as I had observed, 
the Batavia was largely an empty shell and he hoped one day to be able to 
change that: to present the ship as HMS Victory is presented at Portsmouth, 
filled with the equipment its crewmen needed to carry out their tasks—charts 
in the captain’s cabin, saws and medicines in the doctor’s and, unlike the 
Victory, a rabbit warren of bunks throughout the lower deck, giving some 
impression of how the crew would have lived aboard on the way to the Indies. 
                                                
1 VOC stands for Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East India Company): it 
appears on some of the Company’s documents as its logotype and has become the 
standard abbreviation for the Company used in historiography. Some historical 
sources also use O. I. C. (Oost-Indische Compagnie or East India Company) or refer 
simply to the loffelycke Compagnie (honorable company). Both the Batavia and the 
Zeven Provincieen are projects of the Bataviawerf, a shipbuilding facility for replica 
seventeenth century ships, using traditional methods, based in Lelystad, Netherlands. 
The former takes as its inspiration the Batavia built in 1628, one of the largest VOC 
ships of its time, which was made famous by the bloody mutiny among its crew 
following its wrecking on the Houtman Abrolhos in 1629. The Zeven Provincieen was 
the flagship used by legendary Admiralty commander Michiel de Ruyter during the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War.  
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The goal of presenting the ship as a living, working environment, or rather as 
a kind of ethnographic village useful for discussing the lives of historical 
mariners, has been a common one in maritime history for a long time. The 
works of Richard Dana and Herman Melville provide daunting antecedents 
for such an ethnographic approach, filled with individuals and their stories, 
their interactions and professional dispositions, their territories and domains 
and myriad negotiations with the formal structures of discipline that bound 
them all together into ships’ crews.2 White Jacket, a portrait of a nineteenth 
century warship in action drawn from Melville’s own experiences, offers a 
model for what an ethnography of American maritime military life could be, 
seen through the eyes of an exceptional observer, philosopher and writer, for 
all that it is presented as a work of fiction. A similar impulse can be seen in 
those books and museum exhibits concerned with the social milieu and 
history of the VOC, which commonly attempt to bring the ship to life through 
its equipment and functions, or through cutaway diagrams that people the 
ships with representative figures, such as sailors, musicians and craftsmen.3 
                                                
2 Dana, R. H: Two Years Before the Mast: a personal narrative of life at sea, (Los Angeles: 
Ward Ritchie Press, 1964). Melville: White Jacket. Bercaw Edwards, M. K: “‘An Old 
Sailor’s Lament’: Herman Melville, the Stone Fleet, and the Judgment of History” in 
Melville the Poet, special issue ed. Elizabeth Renker and Douglass Robillard. 
Leviathan: A Journal of Melville Studies, 9 (October 2007), 51-64. 
3 Jacobs, E: De Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. (Amsterdam: Teleacnot, 1997). 
Ketting, H (Sr.): Prins Willem: Een Zeventiende-Eeuwse Oostindiëvaarder. (Bussum: De 
Boer Maritiem, 1979). Akveld, L: The Colourful World of the VOC: national anniversary 
book VOC 1602 2002. (Bussum: THOTH, 2002). The best-known examples of these 
cutaway diagrams depict vessels of the Royal Navy: Lavery, B: Nelson’s navy: the 
ships, men, and organisation, 1793-1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1989). 
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The reasons for this approach are clear: it enables the viewer to see that the 
living, working environment is an important part of the social history of 
mariners or, conversely, it adds a human voice to an otherwise mute replica 
ship. It can also bring the ship into multiple contexts: VOC ships were home to 
a great variety of skilled professionals and vital functions, from sail-making 
and gunnery to smithing, carpentry, surgery and cooking. Each of these 
functions had its own proper “workroom,” which could be represented by its 
particular collection of tools. The juxtaposition of such workrooms reveals the 
ship as a miniature city of professions and specializations.  
 
Such presentations harbor several dangers, however. First, they tend to 
describe without asking questions. Joe Flatman has remarked on the lack of 
theoretical concerns applied to maritime archaeology in general: with a few 
exceptions the same has been true of the studies of VOC mariners’ life.4 Such 
studies typically present the culture and environment of seamen as self-
contained and self-evident, traditional and eternal. This criticism has been 
aimed, with some justification, at the foundational work of J. De Hullu; it is 
partially answered in the more critical ethnographic studies by Ketting and 
van Gelder, which focus on the society and culture of VOC seafarers.5 Even 
                                                
4 Flatman, J: “Cultural Biographies, Cognitive Landscapes and Dirty Old Bits of Boat: 
‘Theory’ in Maritime Archaeology,” International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 32. 2, 
(November 2003), 143-157. 
5 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie: vijf 
artikelen studie over de werkgelegenheid bij de VOC (Groningen, 1980). Gelder, R. van: 
Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) (Nijmegen, 1997) 
Gelder, R van: Naporra’s omweg: het leven van een VOC-matroos (1731-1793). 
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these last studies have a timeless quality to them, however: they accept the 
categories of shipboard life and VOC ships in particular rather uncritically, 
taking for their ethnographic village all ships of the VOC indiscriminately. 
They also assume a certain set of environmental constants: the social space 
and design of the ships is embedded but largely uncommented in their stories 
of a holistic, distinct, floating culture. 
 
The shipboard spaces through which VOC servants moved underwent 
significant changes over the two centuries of the Company’s operation. This 
dissertation is an inquiry into those spatial changes and their effects on the 
role the spatial environment played in forming the character and world of the 
VOC. It treats the ships of the VOC as works of social architecture: living, 
working, society-reproducing environments that both expressed and 
constituted the institution of the Company. The dissertation also 
problematizes the category of “the ships of the VOC,” comparing the 
characteristics and discourses of this category with case studies involving 
individual ships under highly particular circumstances. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
(Amsterdam: Atlas, 2003). Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk en rebellie aan boord van Oost-
Indiëvaarders (1595-1650) (Aksant, Amsterdam, 2002). 
Herman Ketting has stated that his intention in writing his book on VOC mariners’ 
life was to provide for the Company something like Knut Weibust’s Deep Sea Sailors , 
an ethnographic portrait of seamen that encompasses memoirs, anecdotes and 
sayings. Herman Ketting, Jr: personal communication. Weibust, K: Deep Sea Sailors: a 
study in maritime ethnology (Stockholm: Nordiska museet, 1969). 
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In some ways this study is a response to Miles Ogborn’s book Indian Ink, 
which traces a variety of ways in which practices around documents, 
document-making, and place-making combined to shape the English East 
India Company, its outlook and its image.6 The present work attempts a 
similar exercise on a more modest scale: it investigates how the VOC 
conceived its ships and how the ships themselves helped define the Company, 
its culture, its ambitions, its networks  and its public face, creating a distinct 
entity, Jan Compagnie, that mediated between Europe and the East Indies 
without really reflecting either. Where Ogborn’s study ranges from letters of 
embassy, carried aboard literal ships of state, to the merchant’s ledger and 
office, policing a boundary between private and corporate trade, and even to 
the stock market report and its home in the coffee houses of the City of 
London, this study explores the various meanings and identities of ships as 
symbols, as living and working spaces, and as cultural environments that 
encoded a mode or method for understanding and interacting with the Indies 
world, which had a profound effect on the development and conduct of the 
VOC through two centuries.  
 
The commonly-deployed category of “the VOC’s ships” is not as clear or 
simple as it first appears, however: as soon as I started to ask questions 
regarding individual vessels I found it unraveling into distinctions and 
exceptions. The more I researched the more I came to see the category as both 
                                                
6 Ogborn, M: Indian Ink: script and print in the making of the English East India Company. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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deeply problematic and unexamined in literature on the VOC. “The 
Company’s ships,” in sources such as Van Dam’s Beschryvinge van de Oost-
Indische Compagnie were neither specific ships nor the gamut of ships the 
Company operated but rather a “typical” image of a particular subset of ships: 
the retourschepen or “homeward bounders,” which served the routes that 
accounted most directly for the VOC’s profits, shuttling between the ports in 
the Dutch Republic and the principal factory ports in the East: Batavia (now 
Jakarta), on the north coast of Java; Galle, in Sri Lanka; Hughly, in Bengal; and 
Canton, in China.7 This “typical” view pervaded popular literature, paintings 
and the Company’s own records and ledgers. The category further stood not 
only for a certain kind of Company ship, it also represented a certain static, 
iconic view of it and its society, and an attitude to seamen and ships in 
general. I realized that, if I were to write about a subject as diaphanous and 
difficult to pin down in concrete records as the relation between space and 
society, I would have to deal with the implications of this category and read 
specific shipboard situations in light of, or against, the “typifying” view in 
entailed.  
 
                                                
7 A wide variety of terms have been used to describe the ships that shuttled on the 
“return” or “homeward” routes between Europe and the East Indies, including “East 
Indiamen,” “homeward bounders” and a number of technical classifications based on 
the ships’ lines, sizes, armament and functions. Such ships typically combined heavy 
armament with large cargo capacity and crew complement, falling somewhere 
between shorter-range traders and warships in their construction. I have chosen to 
use the terms retourschip (singular) and retourschepen (plural) for these vessels, 
following the usage of the resolutions of the Company’s ruling council. Dam, P van: 
Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie: uitgegeven door Dr F. W. Stapel. (’s-
Gravenhage, 1927). 
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The Company operated at various times an enormous variety of  kinds and 
sizes of ships for many different purposes, both on the “homeward” routes 
and in an extensive intra-Asian trade web.8 Information regarding most of 
these kinds of ships is both extremely scarce and rather slippery; names of 
ship types, such as pinas, fregatschip, spiegelschip, oorlogschip and retourschip 
were applied inconsistently: a single ship might be given different 
classifications in different places, and the terms themselves appear to have 
shifted in meaning over time.9 The simple fact of the ships’ variety, however, 
is not apparent in most histories of the Company, which have followed the 
lead of the Company’s own records in treating them as interchangeable 
modules of transport in a trading system or, more often, as instruments of 
power and therefore implicitly as the largest classes of retourschepen: those 
which were used to displace the Portuguese during the expansion of the 
seventeenth century and which were eventually overmastered by the 
ship/weapons of other East India Companies during the eighteenth century. 
Where ships have been invoked in the teleological account of the Company’s 
rise and fall, it is as weapons or as long-haul bulk transports, they have been 
                                                
8 I owe this insight primarily to Robert Parthesius’ study of intra-Asian VOC voyages 
and to Herman Ketting’s Fluitschepen voor de VOC, which offers some differentiation 
of the home-constructed fleet. Parthesius, R: Dutch ships in tropical waters: the 
development of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) shipping network in Asia 1595-1660. 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010). Ketting, H (Jr.): Fluitschepen voor de 
VOC: balanceren tussen oncostelijckheijt en duursaemheijt. (Zaltbommel: Aprilis, 2007). 
9 Parthesius: Dutch ships. Daalder, R: Schepen van de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam, 
Zutphen: Stichting Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Walburg Pers, 2005). 
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considered either neutrally, as mere carrying capacity, or as signs of the 
Company’s decline, locked in a fossilized stasis, failing to keep up with 
developments in shipbuilding among the Company’s competitors.10  
 
I have, rather reluctantly, likewise come to focus on these retourschepen, partly 
in recognition of their historical significance and partly because the richest, 
most detailed sources—those necessary for investigating space—almost 
always concern them. Retourschepen represented the highest technological 
achievements of their day. They were accordingly used as emblems for the 
military and mercantile strength of the Dutch Republic. As symbols of the 
VOC’s power, its methods and its ambitions they fulfilled one of the common 
functions of architecture: they supported an ideological program, presenting 
the Company to its own servants, its directors, its shareholders, its 
competitors and sometimes unwilling trade partners. Retourschepen were also 
the most socially and spatially complex of the Company’s ships: memoirs and 
other accounts of shipboard life are rich with spatial details. It is evident that 
considerable thought went into their spatial design and division and that 
efforts were made to replicate such designs across their class. We may 
                                                
10 Gaastra states that the Company’s shipping network operated well and did not 
contribute significantly to the VOC’s decline. The more nuanced account of shipping 
history in the introductory volume of Bruijn, Gaastra and Schoffer’s catalogue of 
Dutch-Asiatic voyages lists a number of advances used on other companies’ ships 
and notes that the VOC failed to adopt the same measures, resulting in comparatively 
longer voyage times and higher per-voyage costs. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India 
Company: expansion and decline (Leiden: 2003). Bruijn, J. R Gaastra, F. S, Schoeffer, I: 
Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries (The Hague, 1979) 
[hereafter DAS I]. 
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therefore speak of a spatial idiom that was, indeed, typical to retourschepen. 
Sociospatial aspects of their design have often been overlooked, however, 
since, as machines, their hulls and rigging were already shaped both by the 
inflexible demands of wind, sea, and construction materials, and by the need 
for adaptability, to multiple missions and uses of their spaces, to house men, 
animals, cargo, weapons and other materiel as any particular voyage 
demanded. This dissertation is, therefore, partly an attempt to bring attention 
to such design, to differentiate it from the anti-analytical, non-category of 
“tradition.”  
 
Ships as architectural history  
Ships have been curiously absent from the historiography devoted to 
architecture since the eighteenth century, although they were clearly 
considered a branch of architecture by important writers from the fifteenth to 
the seventeenth centuries: Alberti started but did not finish a treatise on ships; 
closer to the period of interest for this dissertation, Joseph Furttenbach 
showed no qualms regarding including a whole volume dedicated to ships in 
his three-volume study of Universal Architecture.11  
 
                                                
11 According to Anthony Grafton, Alberti’s unfinished and lost manuscript was titled 
Navis (the ship). Grafton, A: Leon Battista Alberti: master builder of the Italian 
Renaissance. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 249. Furttenbach, J: Architectura 
Martialis, Architectura Navalis, Architectura Universalis. (1629-1635. Reprinted 
Hildesheim: Olms, 1975). Wegener Sleeswyk, A: “Joseph Furttenbach en de 
‘hollandische Nave’,” Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 17.1 (1998),  3-15. 
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Shipbuilders have also been keen to identify themselves as architects. The 
Portuguese “naval architect,” João Baptista Lavanha quoted Alberti’s 
definition of an architect as one capable of uniting building with discourse, 
and claimed this status for the shipwright in the introduction of his treatise.12 
seventeenth century works on shipbuilding by Witsen and Van Yk adopted a 
format and genealogy familiar from contemporary architectural treatises. 
Where the latter might trace the roots of architecture to the building of the first 
Temple of Solomon, Witsen and Van Yk adopted Noah’s Ark as their 
progenitor, and followed the same trajectory through Greek and Roman 
antecedents to their contemporary world, differing from the architectural 
pattern only in that they also devoted sections to “Indian” ships, including 
Chinese junks and the royal dragon boats of Siam.13  
 
Architecture and shipbuilding both underwent a contested and gradual 
transition from craftsmanship to draftsmanship between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth centuries.14 This process seems to have pulled the two disciplines in 
different directions: naval architecture came to be defined as a branch of 
                                                
12 Lavanha’s First Book on Naval Architecture. Lavanha, J. B: Livro Primeiro da 
Architectura Naval, trans. R. A. Barker, (Facsimile edition: Academia de Marinha, 
Lisbon, 1996). Barker comments that Lavanha appears to be the first author to use the 
term “naval architecture.”  
13 Yk, C. van, Voorstad, A, Claesz ten Hoorn, J. & Luiken, J: De Nederlandsche Scheeps-
bouw-konst Open Gestelt. (Rotterdam, 1697, reprinted Delft: SPD, 1981). Nicolaas 
Witsen. Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. Ofte Aaloude en Hedendaagsche 
Scheeps-bouw en Bestier (Amsterdam, 1671, reprinted Franeker: Van Wijnen, 1994). 
14 McGee, D: “From Craftsmanship to Draftsmanship: Naval Architecture and the 
Three Traditions of Early Modern Design” Technology and Culture 40.2 (1999) 209-236.  
 12 
hydrodynamic engineering during the eighteenth century, following the 
publication of Bouguer’s “Treatise on Ships” in 1746 and Euler’s “A Complete 
Theory of the Construction and Maneuvering of Vessels” in 1773.15 Treatises 
on shipbuilding had, since Lavanha, been principally concerned with 
proportions and engineering concerns, with relatively little attention paid to 
interior spatial division. After Euler, however, the focus on engineering 
rendered all other concerns extraneous to the profession of the naval architect. 
Perhaps because naval architecture became defined in this way, those aspects 
of the design of ships devoted to the social use of space, communication, 
presentation and spatial experience have tended to evade discussion, among 
both architects and naval architects, with some notable exceptions. The vogue 
for ocean liners around the turn of the twentieth century extended into 
architecture schools: liners symbolized a world of progressive, built wonders 
in the era immediately before the jet-liner and airport took over this role. 
According to Jean-Louis Cohen’s introduction to Le Corbusier’s Vers une 
architecture, Corbusier adopted “the ocean liner” as a nick-name, and was 
                                                
15 Bouguer, P, Murray, M: A treatise on ship-building and navigation: in three parts.... 
(Paris: Jombert, 1746, trans. Ann Arbor  Mi.: UMI Books on Demand, 2004). Euler, 
Leonard. Theorie Complete de la Construction et de la Manoeuvre des Vaisseaux ...  (St 
Petersburg: Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1773). Ferreiro, L. D: Ships and Science: 
the Birth of Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution, 1600–1800 (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2007). The implication that naval architects ceased to consider non-
engineering problems is of course false. Nonetheless, Ferrreiro makes a compelling 
case that engineering became the naval architect’s chief focus, first in France and later 
in the rest of Europe. Ships had also appeared in Italian treatises on machines, 
principally as supports for various kinds of ingenious devices. Di Giorgio, F: Treatise 
of Architecture and Machines (ca. 1480, Facsimile edition: Giunti, Florence 1979). 
Marcus Popplow: “Why Draw Pictures of Machines? The Social Contexts of Early 
Modern Machine Drawings” in Lefèvre, W: Picturing Machines 1400-1700 (Cambridge  
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 17-51 
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inspired by Camille Mauclair’s Trois Crises de l’Art Actuel to praise the liner’s 
“honest expression,” identifying it with his vision of the house as a machine.16 
Liner companies have also advertised the luxury of their ships by employing 
famous architects to increase their interiors:  Renzo Piano’s designs for the 
Regal Princess provide a recent example, while Gio Ponti’s features on liner 
interiors in the magazine Domus, between 1929 and 1957, showed them as 
examples not only of fine architecture but also of the emergent discipline of 
industrial design.17  
 
In one regard, the question of the relationship between shipbuilding and the 
profession of the architect is clearly important for an architectural history of 
the ship. If, however, we regard architectural history more broadly as the 
study of the built domain—if we adopt something like Spiro Kostof’s 
definition of architecture as “the act of making places” and architectural 
history as a part of “the study of the social, economic, and technological 
systems of human history”—then professional distinctions, or even intentions, 
                                                
16 “…cette maison a locataires se presente comme… un paquebot prêt a partir” [“this 
house for rental presents itself… as an ocean liner ready to depart”] Mauclair, C: Trois 
Crises de l’Art Actuel. (Paris: E. Fasquelle, 1906), 222. Quoted in Jean-Louis Cohen’s 
Introduction for Corbusier, Cohen, J-L & Goodman, J: Toward an Architecture (Los 
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2007), 14 . 
17 Piano’s interior designs are cited at the Regal Princess’ information webpage: 
http://www.cruiseweb.com/PRINCESS-SHIP-REGAL.HTM Accessed 1 June 2011. 
“Gio Ponti published our ships in Domus for almost 30 years… believing strongly 
that ship interiors represented ground for experimentation and inspiration for the 
most beautiful earth-bound architecture and a launch pad for “Industrial Design”.” 
Caterina Frisone: “The Architecture of the Great Ships,” Domus, 5 December 2008. 
http://www.domusweb.it/en/architecture/the-architecture-of-the-great-ships/ 
Accessed: 7 June 2011. 
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become secondary to addressing the places so made and their roles in 
“shaping communities.”18  
 
The question of whether architecture, or “place making,” actually affects social 
formation remains open. The point has been assumed or argued extensively 
over the past century and more, with recourse to phenomenological, 
sociological, ethnographic and ethno-archaeological approaches.19 Although 
interesting, thoughtful, inspirational work has come out of phenomenological 
approaches I find my own efforts influenced principally by theories of social 
production and practice, since these seem to me most likely to yield some 
attestable results (with the caveat that attesting such results in a milieu more 
than two centuries in the past poses its own challenges).20 What is not in doubt 
is that architecture is used to communicate social behaviors and expectations, 
from prisons designed to terrorize or discipline to stores designed to train the 
                                                
18 Kostof’s definition or some variation on it has become widely accepted. Kostof, S: A 
History of Architecture: settings and rituals (Oxford, New York: OUP 1985), 7, 15.  
19 Lawrence and Low have provided a useful survey of this enormous field of 
literature. Lawrence, D. L. & Low, S. M: "The Built Environment and Spatial Form" 
Annual Review of Anthropology (1990) 19, 453-505. Much recent phenomenological 
work has been influenced by Heidegger and Yi-Fu Tuan. Schatzki, T. R: Martin 
Heidegger: theorist of space (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007). Yi-Fu Tuan: "Place: An 
Experiential Perspective" Geographical Review, 65.2 (Apr., 1975), 151-165. 
20 Gieryn, T. F: "What Buildings Do," Theory and Society, 31.1 (Feb., 2002), 35-74. King, 
A. D: Buildings and Society: essays on the social development of the built environment 
(London: Routledge, 1984). Turner, T: “The Social Skin,” in J. Cherfas & R. Lewin 
(eds.), Not Work Alone: A Cross-cultural View of Activities Superfluous to Survival 
(London, Temple Smith, 1980). Lefebvre, H. The production of space. (Oxford, 
Cambridge  Mass.: Blackwell, 1991). Bourdieu, P: Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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associations and categories of their customers.21 The focus of the dissertation 
has therefore been more on those discourses that the Company propagated 
through its ships than on the social milieu or experience of mariners. 
 
As closed, hierarchical environments with rich traditions, ships offer a strong 
and highly articulated case for the part space might play in what Dell Upton 
has described as “shaping and… ‘annotating’ social action.”22 Accounts of 
shipboard life offer means for examining how habitus, occupation and place-
making affect the ways architectural spaces are apprehended and understood, 
how the built domain relates to exercises of power and authority, and how 
various kinds of space are represented. Vilhelm Aubert has drawn a parallel 
between ships and other highly regimented, institutionalized settings, in 
which status is often explicitly correlated with access to and ownership of 
particular spaces, as in military and ecclesiastical orders, hospitals, prisons, 
factories, and workplaces generally.23 To this interpretation of institutional 
space I should like to add theoretical lenses provided by Anthony King and 
Upton, regarding the formation of global spaces of identity and capital, and 
                                                
21 Halliday, S: Newgate: London’s prototype of hell. (Stroud: Sutton, 2006). Foucault, M: 
Discipline and Punish (New York, 1979). Weinberger, D: Everything is miscellaneous: the 
power of the new digital disorder (New York: Times Books, 2007). Weinberger begins his 
exploration of searchable media with a discussion of the spatial design and testing of 
Staples stores, to the end of suggesting to customers all those products which might 
be necessary to using the one product they already knew they needed, through the 
paths customers use to navigate the stores. 
22 Upton, D: Architecture in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 11. 
23 Aubert, V: The Hidden Society. (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1965). 
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the relationship between architecture and everyday life as elements in the 
constitution of culture.24 By examining shipboard space as a factor in the 
development of the VOC, this dissertation will attempt to provide a 
“spatialized history,” such as that which Henri Lefebvre and Stuart Elden 
have called for.25 The development of the VOC ship as a type created a novel 
genre of space, which played an important part in the history of industrial 
capitalism and labor, of European expansion and of colonialism. 
 
Significance for the history of European expansion 
In addition to architectural history several other fields of historical inquiry 
have informed the present work, which is intended in turn to contribute to 
these fields.  
 
First, VOC shipboard order is of obvious interest to the burgeoning fields of 
oceanic history, or what Marcus Rediker terms “history on the sea,” and of 
maritime-focused historical geography, as outlined by Lambert, Martins and 
Ogborn.26 The omission of the ship from most histories of global capital is 
                                                
24 King, A. D: The Bungalow. The Production of a Global Culture (London ; Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). Upton, D: “Architecture in Everyday Life” New 
Literary History, Vol. 33, No. 4, Everyday Life (Autumn, 2002), pp. 707-723.  
25Lefebvre: Production of Space. Elden, S: “Between Marx and Heidegger: Politics, 
Philosophy and Lefebvre's The Production of Space” Antipode 36.1, (Jan. 2004). 
26 Rediker, M. B: “Toward a People’s History of the Sea,” in Killingray, D, and 
National Maritime Museum (Great Britain). Maritime empires: British imperial maritime 
trade in the nineteenth century (Woodbridge, Rochester; Boydell Press & National 
Maritime Museum, 2004). Lambert, D, Martins, L & Ogborn, M: “Currents, Visions 
and Voyages: historical geographies of the sea” Journal of Historical Geography 32 
(2006), 479-493. 
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bizarre, since it played a central role in organizing labor along industrial lines, 
prompting the formation of standing pools of skilled and semi-skilled 
mariners in Europe and elsewhere, while maritime workers occupy an 
important place in the history of the working class and radical labor 
movements.27 Ships were the backbone of the VOC and other European East 
India Companies: as the primary means of doing business they both mirrored 
and helped form the particular institution of the chartered company and more 
generally that of “the mercantile system” of capitalism.28 Ships did not only 
form the physical links that tied economic centers and peripheries together, 
they also provided a prototype for systems of migrant labor and a portable 
working culture, distinct from the “home” cultures of all those who 
participated in it, which facilitated novel organizations and labor relations.29 
The East India ship, then, represents a novel social formation created for the 
purpose of supporting emergent global trade, giving it great importance both 
to the history of European expansion and to that of globalization.  
 
 
                                                
27 Thompson, E. The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth  Penguin, 
1968). Linebaugh, P & Rediker, M. B: The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, 
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2000). 
28 Smith, A: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by 
Sálvio M. Soares. (MetaLibri, 2007), v.1.0p. http://metalibri.wikidot.com/title:an-
inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of  Accessed 5 July 2011. 
29 Ewald, J. J: “Crossers of the Sea: Slaves, Freedmen, and Other Migrants in the 
Northwestern Indian Ocean, c. 1750-1914” American Historical Review, 105. 1 (Feb. 
2000) 69-91. Rediker, M. B: Between the devil and the deep blue sea: merchant seamen, 
pirates, and the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, 1987).  
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Second, the ship is vital to a “history of infrastructure” approach to European 
expansion: one which pays attention to those concrete forms into which 
capital was poured and which in turn shaped its development, 
complementing histories of ideas and of economic relations in explaining the 
construction and logic of mercantile and colonial systems.30 The first ships sent 
from the Netherlands to the East Indies, between 1595 and roughly 1610, 
followed Portuguese routes and replicated something of the Portuguese 
experience of exploration: their mortality rates were high, they ran afoul of 
reefs and strong currents, and they took four or five years to execute a round 
trip, dealing with producers of pepper and other spices on an ad hoc basis.31 
By 1660 this haphazard scheme had been transformed into a regular business, 
capable of feeding Amsterdam’s markets with a constant flow of Indies 
products. More efficient routes had been discovered and formalized, supply 
depots had been established at Batavia and the Cape of Good Hope, voyage 
times had been reduced (with some exceptions) to a two year round trip, and 
shipboard mortality had been reduced to less than 5% per voyage.32 The 
VOC’s ships mobilized capital and persons on a massive scale. Considering 
only the routes from Europe to the Indies, between the so-called 
voorcompagnieen (“pre-companies”) that began sailing in 1595 and the final 
VOC sending of 1795, 4722 voyages set out from the Netherlands, carrying a 
                                                
30 For the term “history of infrastructure” I am indebted to Andrew Cooper, of the 
British Library department of India Office Records. 
31 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company.  
32 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company 
 19 
total of roughly one million persons to the East.33 These voyages were 
conducted on 2219 separate vessels, of which 1450 were built in the 
Company’s shipyards.34 Building the ships was itself a mammoth project, 
made possible only by industrial methods of production and resource 
gathering, which had been developed in the Netherlands during the sixteenth 
century, when the country had built a reputation as Europe’s single most 
important supplier of ships and seafarers.35  The VOC expanded the existing 
shipbuilding capacity enormously: the largest of the Company’s shipyards, at 
Oostenburg in Amsterdam, was Europe’s biggest manufacturing facility at the 
time of its construction in 1660.36 By the end of the eighteenth century it 
employed up to 1300 people, while the Company as a whole was the single 
largest employer in the Dutch Republic.37  
 
                                                
33 The term voorcompagnie (“pre-company”) carries an unfortunate teleological 
connotation, reducing early Dutch efforts at Indies sea trade to a mere anticipation of 
the VOC. It has, however, become the standard term for referring to the period 1595-
1602, originating with the VOC’s directors to designate those companies which 
predated and were later consolidated into the VOC. Bruijn, J. R Gaastra, F. S, 
Schoeffer, I: Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries (The 
Hague, 1979), II [Hereafter DAS II]. Lucassen, J: "A Multinational and its Labor Force: 
The Dutch East India Company, 1595–1795” International Labor and Working-Class 
History, 66 (25 Feb 2005): 12-39. 
34 DAS II, Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
35 Barbour, V: “Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century” in 
Emmer, P & Gaastra, F. S. (eds): The organisation of interoceanic trade in European 
Expansion, 1450-1800 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996). 
36 Kist, J. B et al: Van VOC tot Werkspoor. Het Amsterdamse industrieterrein Oostenburg 
(Utrecht 1986).  
37 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. Kist, J. B: Van VOC tot Werkspoor. 
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The ship, as the fundamental infrastructural unit of the VOC, had a profound 
effect on the Company’s development and generally that of European 
expansion. Ships have long been recognized as representing an important 
moment in the development of labor and “working class history,” as places 
where collective work was disciplined into repetitive, ritualized schemes, 
while the laborers who worked them formed a mobile class, to be deployed 
wherever the emergent colonial network required them.38 A detailed 
understanding of the distinctive shipboard space and society of the East Indies 
retourschip, formed to deal with long voyages and special hazards, is 
important to understanding both the micro-networks of relations that 
composed the ship as a working unit and the proto-colonial, world-spanning 
networks in which ships acted.  
 
John Law has explored the role a set of reefs off the west coast of Africa played 
in producing the Portuguese as master mariners with a world-wide reach 
during the late fifteenth century: passing these reefs required advances in 
navigation and adjustments to ship forms away from small, shallow coasting 
vessels toward large hulls that could support long voyages out of sight of 
land.39 The reefs constituted thresholds of technology, of scale and of unit cost, 
                                                
38 Schaeffer, R. K: The Chains of Bondage Broke: the proletarianization of seafaring labor, 
1600-1800 (unpublished diss., SUNY Binghamton, 1984). Ewald: “crossers of the sea.” 
39 Law, J: “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the 
Portuguese Route to India” in J. Law (Ed.) Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of 
Knowledge? (Sociological Review Monograph 32. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1986). 234-263. 
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i.e. of centralization of resources. Beyond these thresholds the whole maritime 
world lay open: the ships that finally made it into the Indian Ocean were 
incidentally equipped for bulk trade, warfare and voyages to any point on the 
globe. The East India trading ship likewise can be said to have played a role in 
creating a global system of trade and capitalism centered on Europe, and to 
have laid the foundations for colonial expansion.  
 
In some regard we can say that the large trading ship invented the chartered 
East India company. Its capacious hold made a system of profitable maritime 
bulk trade possible, which could not have been supported or systematized by 
land-based methods of transport, while its capacity as a firing platform for 
guns allowed for an extension of the powers of European states onto the sea 
that had no equivalent among the states that lined the Indian Ocean.40 On the 
other hand, the large scale commerce it permitted also scaled its demands: in 
requiring great quantities of supplies and manpower the ship gave rise to a 
certain size and complexity of support organization, comparable in size to that 
of the largest of the Dutch admiralties and greater in the variety of its needs. A 
fleet of East Indies ships, capable of displacing the Portuguese and resisting 
English incursions, demanded an unprecedented basis in capital, while the 
skills it demanded (of shipbuilding, navigation, cartography, metalworking 
and coordination) required a level both of industrialization and management 
that would test even the Dutch Republic through the first half of the 
                                                
40 Pearson, M. N: The Indian Ocean (London, New York: Routledge, 2003).  
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seventeenth century. The problem of raising the required capital and 
organizing industries in order to support a regular supply of ships led directly 
to the development of the European joint-stock corporation. As massive 
repositories of capital and labor power, we may suppose that ships also 
demanded a certain pace of trade: the behemoth, once built, required constant 
feeding, its empty hold a scourge to merchant captain-generals tasked with 
bringing back hundreds of tons of spices to fund the Republic’s economic and 
war efforts. 
 
The physical dimensions of the VOC ship (especially the draft but also the 
length and required maneuvering space) also determined the set of possible 
port locations and anchorages in Patria and in the Indies, thereby fixing the 
nodes of the Company’s networks and yielding further demands, for repair 
yards and ship parts, for cargo transfer and warehouse facilities. A certain 
self-sufficiency was required of ships in the Indies because of the costs of 
developing infrastructure around them from materials that were themselves 
largely shipped from Patria. The earning potential of a VOC retourschip was 
great enough to prompt the creation of novel support industries in the 
Republic, however, including the semi-submersible ship “camels,” which 
floated retourschepen and warships constructed in Amsterdam over the 
shallows and sandbanks of the Zuiderzee, at a cost comparable to the 
construction of the ships themselves.41 
                                                
41 Yk, C. van: De De Nederlandsche Scheeps-bouw-konst. Hoving, A.J. 1991. "Ship Camels 
and Water Ships." Model Shipwright 76: 32-36. 
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Moreover, the ability of the ocean-going ship to move hundreds of tons of 
goods from the Indies to Europe without intermediate landfall gave rise to a 
novel approach to supplying European markets, especially for high value, low 
bulk goods such as spices. Steensgaard notes that in the early 1750s ‘exotic’ 
commodities from the Americas and Asia made up roughly 46% of imports 
and exports in Britain, and perhaps 20-25% in the Netherlands, of which 
roughly half in each case came from Indian Ocean suppliers.42 On the one 
hand , in the environment of Europe in the sixteenth century, of competing 
states and expansionist economies, the opportunity to make money through 
the transport of valuable goods quickly turned into a competitive necessity, 
such that the East India ship developed a self-sustaining momentum as a tool 
of economics and statecraft. On the other, the ship offered the potential for a 
radical reconfiguring of European markets. 
 
Rene Barendse has shown that spices and other Asian goods continued to be 
carried successfully overland through the seventeenth century by the same 
networks that had supplied them for centuries before the advent of Vasco da 
Gama. But the ship offered a dream of radically reduced costs per ton of goods 
and, perhaps more importantly, of the ability to monopolize the entire 
European spice trade by being able to supply sufficient goods to satisfy 
                                                
42 Steensgaard, N: “The Growth and Composition of the Long-distance Trade of 
England and the Dutch Republic before 1750” in Tracy, J. D. (ed): The Rise of Merchant 
Empires: long-distance trade in the early modern world, 1350-1750 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 255-286: 277. 
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demand in the whole market. The implications of this were far-reaching. First, 
through its large warehouse capacity, Amsterdam could become an important 
centre of price regulation for any commodities brought to Europe from Asia. 
This goal was of immediate importance to the Republic in its war of 
independence from Spain: it had a direct bearing on the supply of money, and 
therefore military resources, the Republic could command. It also appealed to 
the zero-sum logic of mercantile capitalism: at the time of the Company’s 
formation the Dutch were locked out of a trading cartel for many goods which 
was centered on Spain. Every clove or nutmeg that Amsterdam could supply 
to a finite European demand was taken straight out of the profits of the cartel 
that bankrolled Spain’s war efforts. 
 
Woodruff Smith has pointed out a second reason for desiring such a 
monopoly, which was tied to the networks that built the ship in the first place 
and suggests that a deeper restructuring of European trade was at stake.43 
Smith has emphasized that the core goal of the VOC was not profit-
maximizing but market command. The VOC was to avoid price-cutting wars 
of economic competition through careful market control, maintaining a stable, 
reasonable price for its products that discouraged adventurers. Smith states 
that this goal of regulation was tied to a financial policy based around spices 
rather than bullion as the currency of inter-state trade. The Dutch Republic 
relied on bulk imports from central Europe, delivered via the Baltic, for its 
                                                
43 Smith, W. D: Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800 (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
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daily bread, meats and other necessities, including ship timbers. Spices were 
seen by Dutch merchants as the ideal trading currency for supplying these 
wants, since the Republic could control their supply, rather than relying on 
silver, over which the Spain had exerted a powerful influence since the 
sixteenth century. Dutch merchant houses—which were tied to the network of 
city corporations and therefore the government—could control spice prices, 
keeping them stable across multiple years through monopolistic control, 
achieved through large-scale warehousing and regular shipments from the 
Indies. 
 
The features of the ship were ideally suited to this sort of monopolistic 
activity. The ship’s isolation, the relative ease with which it could be tracked, 
and the mutual surveillance among its crew combined to create an 
environment that could be policed, made accountable and visible. In contrast 
with transport across land or with networks in which goods were passed 
through multiple hands between source and destination, the ship promised 
quantifiable, discrete deliveries of goods via approved agents, substantially 
reducing the risk of leaking spices, personnel or information along the way. 
 
First spaces of colonialism  
Most of all, VOC ships were instrumental in forming and propagating the 
structures of European expansion, which would develop into colonialism. I 
have termed the Company’s ships “first spaces of colonialism,” both because 
they introduced roughly a million ordinary workers drawn from around 
 26 
Europe to the Company’s proto-colonial project and because in their social 
structure, rendered  modular and portable, repeated across the Company’s 
network, they provided a prototype for colonial productive societies.  
 
Although it has been argued that the VOC had an aversion to colonies, 
resisting rather than planting Dutch settlements in the Indies, it was certainly 
at least a proto-colonial organization, its period of operation a “prelude” to the 
extensive system of plantation colonies that expanded across the Netherlands 
East Indies during the nineteenth century.44 Gaastra has described the 
Company as a “reluctant imperialist,” one which, despite regular protests 
against permanent settlement, maintained an establishment of between 
twenty and twenty-five thousand servants in the Indies during the eighteenth 
century.45 Ships played a variety of important roles in supporting this 
imperialism. In place of an “age of partnership” between Indian Ocean polities 
and European companies, Markus Vink has characterized their relations as 
negotiating a “balance of blackmail.”46 This balance was determined by the 
relative wealth, military strength and freedom of agency the VOC and its 
                                                
44 Goor, J. van: Prelude to Colonialism: the Dutch in Asia (Hilversum: Uitgeverij 
Verloren, 2004), 9. Van Goor notes Batavia and the Cape colony as exceptions to the 
“strictly business” factory-based, minimal colonialism the VOC practiced across most 
of its network.  
45 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 65. 
46 Vink, M: “A match made in Heaven? World-system Analysis and 'Dutch Indian 
Ocean' Studies.” In van Veen, E, and Leonard Blussé (eds.) Rivalry and Conflict. 
European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries 
(Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005), 267-314. 
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negotiating partners could bring to bear. In the Company’s first decades it 
principally sought spices from a set of small island polities: its armed trading 
ships were capable of forcing negotiations with these partners, and in the case 
of the Banda islands exterminating them, to replace them with the Company’s 
first plantation colony.47 More frequently ships were used to meddle in wars 
between Indies powers, alongside the Company’s money and soldiers, 
supporting the Company’s allies against their rivals and overseeing a 
judicious balance of power “so that no warrior… can rise, and oppress 
neighboring rulers,/ and stand in the light of Batavia’s happiness.”48 The 
steady growth of settlements at the Cape, at Batavia and at other centers such 
as Colombo; growing commitments to infrastructural elements such as schools  
and tax offices; growing populations of “Eurasian” children of settlers, who 
acted as clerks and supercargoes in the VOC’s intra-Asian shipping network; 
and the symbiosis of Chinese and other Indies planters with Company 
governors in the umland of Batavia through the eighteenth century all suggest 
that a form of colonial settlement was part of the Company’s modus operandi, 
no matter how unofficial that part might have been.49 And shipping networks, 
                                                
47 The full story is given in a highly entertaining but far from neutral form in Milton, 
G: Nathaniel’s Nutmeg, or, The True and Incredible Adventures of the Spice Trader who 
Changed the Course of History (New York: Farrar  Straus and Giroux, 1999). Gaastra, F. 
S. Dutch East India Company. 
48 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 60, 87. The quotation is from Joannes 
Antonides van der Goes’ poem, de Ystroom, translated in E. du Perron: De muze van 
Jan Compagnie: Overzichtelijke verzameling van Nederlands-Oostindiese belletrie uit de 
Compagniestijd (1600-1780) (Bandoeng 1948), 20, quoted in Goor, J. van: Prelude. 10 
49 For a discussion of the development of Colombo see Remco Raben’s dissertation: 
Batavia and Colombo. Lodowijk Wagenaar’s work on Galle shows the steady growth 
that occurred even at what was avowedly a secondary port for the VOC’s networks. 
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methods and infrastructure established by the VOC also formed an important 
part of the foundation on which nineteenth century colonial expansion would 
build, in organizing, gathering and delivering the Company’s goods, and later 
the products of the “cultivation system,” to markets in Europe.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion I define the VOC’s colonialism as a form of 
exploitation or expropriation in which one group, composed of directors and 
shareholders, exploited several others, including the Company’s mariners and 
other shipboard servants, as well as native people of the East Indies, for the 
purpose of extracting profits.50 The methods of expropriation were 
fundamentally those of mercantile capitalism, combining state-like 
sovereignty and powers of coercion with ruthless, monopolistic profit-seeking 
                                                                                                                                       
Raben, R: Batavia and Colombo: the ethnic and spatial order of two colonial cities 1600-1800 
(unpublished diss. University of Leiden, 1996). Wagenaar, L: Galle, VOC-Vestiging in 
Ceylon. Beschrijving van een koloniale samenleving aan de voravond van de Singalese 
opstand tegen het Nederlandse gezag, 1760 (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994). On 
schools and taxes see Goor, J van: Prelude, 23. Jean Gelman Taylor’s Social World of 
Batavia provides a portrait of the lives of VOC governors and high officials at Batavia, 
documenting their migration from the fort and factory to large “estates” in the 
hinterland, which developed in the nineteenth century into plantations. Leonard 
Blusse has lead a considerable research program into the non-European contributions 
to the life and economy of Batavia, which might be termed “conjoint communities.” 
Taylor, J. G: The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in colonial Indonesia. 
(Madison  Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). Blusse, J L:  Strange Company: 
Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and Dutch in VOC Batavia (Leiden: KITLV 
Verhandelingen Ser No, 122, 1988). 
50Kohn describes the relationship of exploitation as one occurring between states. 
Kohn, Margaret, "Colonialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/colonialism/. Accessed 10 
June, 2011. In this case the VOC stands as a kind of pseudo-state actor, with many of 
the powers of a fully-fledged sovereign state, expropriating labor and goods from 
many non-state actors.  
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and continuous attempts to reduce the costs of labor by reducing the rights of 
laborers. Colonialism is here distinguished from mercantile capitalism by a 
preoccupation with the maintenance of boundaries between different 
communities of different status within the enterprise, and by the Company’s 
concern to keep its mariners captive in a “third space,” defined and 
maintained by the VOC, where the Company could command their labor and 
prevent their seeking alternatives to its order, either from the legal and 
cultural systems of the Dutch Republic or from those found in the Indies.51  
 
The establishment of colonial spaces ashore in the Indies was dependent on 
first “colonizing” the ships, that is, establishing a self-reproducing system for 
organizing expropriated labor. That the Company expropriated labor, both in 
the Indies and from Europe, is not in doubt: an extensive secondary industry 
of crimps, who tricked or forced men onto VOC ships, often through 
fraudulent debts, operated in the Republic’s port cities and extended far 
beyond its borders.52 Far more of the Company’s men were simply 
                                                
51 “Third space” here refers to Anthony King’s “third cultures:” novel cultural 
formations that form within colonial situations, that are distinct from the native 
culture of the colonizers, the colonized, and any simple hybrid of the two. King, A. D: 
Colonial Urban Development: culture, social power and environment (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1976). On the topic of “colonial space” I am also guided by Bernard 
Cohn’s writings on the epistemology particular to colonialism and by John Noyes’ 
thesis on the creation of frontiers and emptiness in colonial territory-making, as 
necessary steps both for claiming such territory and maintaining discipline among 
colonists. Cohn, B: Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge (Princeton 1996). Noyes, J: 
Colonial Space: spatiality in the discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1915. (New 
York: Routledge, 1992).  
52 Royen, P. C. van: “The ‘national’ maritime labour market. Looking for common 
characteristics” and Davids, K: “Maritime labour in the Netherlands, 1570-1870,” in 
Royen, P. C. van, Bruijn, J. R. & Lucassen, J. (eds.), “Those Emblems of Hell”? European 
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economically dispossessed, being victims of a wider expropriation, whether 
they were driven off their land through cartelization in the Republic (a process 
that had similar results to those of enclosure in England during the same 
period), or displaced by wars or changes to the labor market.53 Such newly 
migrant workers came from as far afield as Scandinavia, France, various 
German and central European states, and the Mediterranean; they were 
attracted by the promise of higher wages and growing employment in the 
Republic, which indeed owed much of its success to just such migrations and 
networks.54  
 
Once aboard ship this labor was organized according to structures 
characteristic of colonialism, such that the ships might be considered 
laboratories for colonial methods and orders, providing the model for an 
institutional culture and social structure that was replicated across the 
Company’s factories, from Japan to Persia and the Cape. The isolation of the 
                                                                                                                                       
sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570-1870, Research in Maritime History 13 (St. 
John’s, Newfoundland 1997) 1-9; 41-71.  
53 Such economic refugees were by no means the Company’s only recruits: Lucassen 
has shown  both how the extension of the polder system displaced a large workforce 
and prompted unskilled labor migration in the 1600s and how the Company drew 
from extensive networks of skilled maritime workers through the Baltic and 
Scandinavia for skilled mariners. Lucassen, J: “A Multinational and its Labor Force: 
The Dutch East India Company, 1595–1795” International Labor and Working-Class 
History, 66: 12-39 (Cambridge University Press 25 Feb 2005). Davids, C. A & Lucassen, 
J: A Miracle Mirrored: the Dutch Republic in European perspective. (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On expropriation and migrant labor in the 
period more generally, see Linebaugh & Rediker: The Many-headed Hydra.   
54 Israel, J: Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740. (Oxford, New York: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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ship and the length of the voyage to the Indies required a certain organization 
of food and water, medicines and labor, as well as a high degree of 
sovereignty and a system of laws special to its operation and command, which 
were exported in many cases directly from the ship into the Company’s 
possessions on land, through the transfer of the ships’ councils to the first 
factory-forts and trading enclaves.55  
 
Rigid social boundaries separated the groups to be exploited from those that 
benefited from the exploitation. These boundaries did not merely separate 
metropole (those who remained in the Republic) from colony (those who 
served the Company in the Indies). They were also ramified through the 
Company’s hierarchies, aboard ships and in the Company’s factories ashore, 
so as to maintain separate classes within the colonial capitalist endeavor, such 
that in each location a class of relative privilege and freedom confronted one 
of relative immiseration and subjection. In each case the privileged social layer 
was identified by visible markers of its higher status—initially expressed 
principally through conspicuous consumption, later through uniforms, and 
always in the hierarchy of spaces occupied aboard ship.56 The privileged layer 
was generally composed of named individuals, who were consulted in the 
policies and operations of the Company and ship, while the layer charged 
with the execution of those operations was composed of interchangeable 
                                                
55 Raben: Batavia and Colombo. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 66-68. 
56 Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on 
Board, 1602-1795,”The Mariner’s Mirror 49. 2 (May 1963), 81-104. 
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workers, treated as a standing resource of labor, whether this distinction 
pertained to the organization of the Company as a whole, of the ship, or of the 
ropes on the foredeck. These boundaries were expressed in ranks and pay 
grades invented and controlled by the Company’s directors. They were not 
based on nationality (although they tended to privilege Hollanders and 
Zeelanders relative to others), nor precisely on race (although race played a 
role in the Indies, regarding the highest rank a Company servant could attain), 
nor on social classes operating in the Republic, nor strictly on professional 
expertise.57 Instead they were formed from complexes of all these elements, 
which were naturalized through the shipboard spatial and social structure, 
such that a worker’s physical place aboard defined his rights, status and peer 
group, and further associated him with a stereotypical character and set of 
social norms proper to his station. 
 
The social structure described thus far is very much like that common to 
military organizations, of which the VOC was certainly an example.58 Despite 
                                                
57 Mutiny trial records show frequent mismatches between pay grades and the 
experience claimed by mariners. Crimineele Procedures by, mitsgaders voor en ten 
overstaan van de Hogen Scheeps Krygsraad in Texel gehouden, tegens sommige der 
Muitelingen van het O. I. Schip Neyenburg, in den voorleeden jaare 1763, uit Texel naar 
Batavia uitgevaren. (Amsterdam: Petrus Schouten, 1764). 
58 The basic “company” unit of the standard military encampment, described by 
Simon Stevin, bears a striking resemblance to that of the retourschip, being composed 
of two long, parallel lines of quarters for the men, crossed at one end by a larger tent 
for the officers, recalling the spatial organization of starboard and larboard watches 
on a ship’s gun deck, with the officers occupying a saloon to the rear. The interior 
arrangements of VOC and Admiralty ships  of the eighteenth century were quite 
different from one another, however, partly because the former was arranged around 
maintaining a clear and functional cargo hold, while the latter, carrying far less cargo, 
was arranged around maintaining a clear and functional gun deck. Stevin, S. & 
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its foundation on private capital the VOC was very much an arm of state 
power, furthering the Republic’s interests through both warfare and 
enforcement: as a patrimonial entity in service to the States General the 
Company occupied a role very much like the Republic’s independent 
Admiralties.59 The Company’s ships were unique, however, in enforcing 
boundaries that were special to Indies trade, similar to those discussed by Ann 
Stoler: they both connected and divided Europe and the Indies, separating 
directors’ decisions from their consequences, respectable burghers from acts of 
wanton violence and piracy in foreign seas, and shareholders’ capital and 
dividends from the full costs of the Companies’ enterprises.60 On a practical 
level the VOC’s ships acted as a filter between the Republic and its colonial 
enclaves, allowing desired products through but preventing the inappropriate 
passage of persons or reporting in either direction.  
                                                                                                                                       
Schukking, W. H (ed.): The principal works of Simon Stevin. Vol. 4, The Art of War 
(Amsterdam: C.V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1964), 280. Ab Hoving: personal 
communication. Lavery, B: The Ship of the Line. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1983). 
59 Israel, J: Dutch Primacy, 411. Enforcement pertained to the Company’s monopoly on 
trade between the Indies and Republic and to the pass system, which in theory 
supported monopolies on certain trade routes and commodities within the Indies 
networks. In practice, efforts to dictate trade routes were mostly effective only on 
European pass-issuers’ own populations: Gaastra notes that, depending on the treaty 
relations in effect between European powers at any particular moment, passes from 
different countries’ companies might serve more or less interchangeably to protect 
ships en route, and Asian shippers could choose the ones that offered the most 
attractive terms. Ironically, then, this emblem of European mercantilist protectionism 
sometimes obeyed the laws of free market competition. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India 
Company, 120. 
60 Stoler, A. L: “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the 
Boundaries of Rule” in Dirks, N. B. (ed.): Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992).  
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Rediker has noted how the slave ship generated “whites” and “blacks” out of 
motley crews drawn from across Europe and captives from across west Africa, 
respectively.61 VOC shipboard order, with its common work practices, 
experiences and strictly controlled social relations, likewise transformed the 
Company’s men into a coherent and distinct category of European Company 
servants. The ships then brought these servants into limited contact with 
Indies civilizations while acting as a space apart from the Indies, keeping them 
separate from the people with which they traded, thereby laying the 
groundwork for relations of colonialism between these European servants and 
Indies populations, and also producing the European servants themselves as 
wholly dependent colonial subjects. Such a literal separation might dissolve in 
the Indies, where the VOC’s ships became multi-ethnic, plural societies in 
motion, anticipating similar social formations on land. The VOC resisted using 
Indies-born personnel on its Europe-bound ships until chronic shortages of 
manpower forced its hand in the later eighteenth century, however, thereby 
retaining a resolutely European face within Europe until well into the 
eighteenth century, as well as a distinctively European shipboard culture that 
was replicated with every “outward” (from Europe) voyage.62  
 
 
                                                
61 Rediker, M. B: The slave ship: a human history. (New York: Viking, 2007). 
62 Lucassen, J: “A multinational.” Royen: “The ‘national’ maritime labour market.” 
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Likewise, the VOC controlled the access of Europeans to the Indies, since it 
(theoretically, at least) held a monopoly on Dutch seafaring east of the Cape. 
Only VOC servants and occasionally their wives were permitted to take the 
voyage to Batavia, wives being more strictly controlled after the Company’s 
first decades.63 The contrast with migration of the Chinese population to 
Batavia is marked: the latter was encouraged on a large scale, forming a settler 
population of both male and female émigrés.64  
 
Finally, VOC ships played a part in forming the conception of colonial society 
spread in the Republic during what Parry has termed the “age of 
reconnaissance,” with consequences for the whole colonial period.65 In the 
seventeenth century the Company’s ships were deployed as symbols by 
Calvinist preachers in pamphlets, treatises and prayer books, some of which 
were published and distributed by the VOC for audiences in both Europe and 
the Indies.66 These works presented well-governed merchant ships as 
exemplary models for ordered, productive and pious societies, within a 
                                                
63 Early memoirs and the records of the Batavia mutiny show a considerable presence 
for women aboard VOC vessels. By the eighteenth century, however, the only women  
found aboard were attached to high-ranking Company officers, as family members or 
servants. Jean Gelman Taylor has shown how the restriction on transporting women 
from the Republic lead to a distinctive colonial culture at Batavia of intermarriage 
among governors’ families and other high-ranking Company servants, the women in 
these strategic unions being supplied from the Indies, frequently as freed slaves. 
Ketting, H: Leven, werk. Taylor: The Social World of Batavia. 
64 Blusse: Strange Company. Ota Atsushi: Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in 
West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830 (Brill, Leiden, 2006). 
65 Parry, J. The Age of Reconnaissance (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1963). 
66 For a full discussion see chapter 4. 
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discourse that used the ship as a metaphor for the (Reformed) Christian’s 
journey through life.67 Less obviously but no less importantly, shipboard 
experience informed every soldier, sailor, clerk, merchant and governor who 
served in the Indies, as well as every Dutch author who described the Indies 
during the Company’s tenure, since they all necessarily passed through a 
period of several months or years immersed in what Paul Gilroy has described 
as the ships’ "microcultural, micro-political systems."68 Following Van Leur’s 
famous complaint that the history of Southeast Asia has been written “from 
the deck of a ship,” VOC ships provided the idiom through which writers 
such as Valentijn and Stavorinus viewed both European and non-European 
ship-borne societies, and that their influence must persist today, however 
obliquely, in historians’ works on seafaring societies of South, Southeast and 
East Asia that draw on those writings.69 This dissertation aims to contribute to 
an understanding of the cultural background that informed such classic texts. 
                                                
67 Goedde, L. O: “Convention, Realism, and the Interpretation of Dutch and Flemish 
Tempest Painting” Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art, 16. 2/3 (1986), 
139-149. 
68 Gilroy, P: The Black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
69 Leur, J. C. van: Indonesian Trade and Society: essays in Asian social and economic history 
by J.C. van Leur (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1967). Tony Day has observed that it is 
never exactly clear just what kind of ship Van Leur intends in this formula: the 
steamship,  the indigenous peddling trader of which he wrote, or earlier ship of 
colonization, but that in all cases the perspective of each author remains bound to 
their home culture. It is my contention that an understanding of the ship itself as a 
world apart with its own distinctive social and cultural order is a necessary part of 
the project of growing critically aware of such cultural inflections. Day, T: “Second 
Thoughts about a History of Batavia” Indonesia, 38 (Oct., 1984), 147-161. Valentijn, F: 
Oud en Nieuw Oost-indiën (Amsterdam: J.C. Van Kesteren & Zoon, 1862). Stavorinus, 
J. S: Voyages to the East Indies (London: Dawsons, 1969). 
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Concerns informing the shape of the argument 
Histories of the period of European expansion, and of the VOC in particular, 
tend to get caught up in arguments regarding teleological accounts of the 
“triumph of the west” and the spread of free market capitalism or 
“modernity.” Although I claim an important place and a generative role for 
ships in the development of European capitalism and colonialism I do not 
wish to bind this study to any such arguments. It is emphatically not my 
intention to suggest that the development of colonialism or capitalism were 
unique in world history, nor to compare European against Asian shipping or 
organization, nor Dutch methods of colonialism against those of other 
European powers.70 Following Barendse and Gunder Frank, I would argue 
rather that the Company’s ships enabled northern Europeans to increase their 
stake in the large and vital Asian trading system.71 The ships drew on and 
moved through extensive networks of supply, finance, shipping and labor 
borrowed from the Indies and from across Europe: their transformative 
potential could not have been realized without these networks.72 Neither do I 
                                                
70 Subrahmanyam has detailed how historiography of European expansion has 
tended to pit “modern” Dutch and British actors against less “modern” Portuguese 
and Indians. Subrahmanyam, S: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700 (London: 
Longman, 1993). 
71 Gunder Frank, A: ReOrient: global economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998). Barendse, R. J: “Trade and State in the Arabian Seas: A Survey 
from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century” Journal of World History 11.2 (2000) 173-
225.  
72 Subrahmanyam, S: “Of Imarat and Tijarat: Asian Merchants and State Power in the 
Western Indian Ocean, 1400 to 1750” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 
37, No.4. (Oct., 1995), 750-780. Bayly,  C. A. & Subrahmanyam, S: “Portfolio-capitalists 
and the Political Economy of Early Modern India,” in Merchants, Markets and the State 
in Early Modern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 242-65. On the 
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think it appropriate to tie the ship to “great confinement” arguments, nor to 
consider it a Panopticon-like agent in the formation of modern, disciplined 
society.73 The VOC ship certainly contributed to disciplinary aspects of the 
Company’s society. It is notable, also, that at the time of the VOC’s 
establishment there was a great expansion of the system of workhouses in 
Amsterdam, with both institutions offering solutions to the “problem” of the 
urban poor, through disciplined living and working environments.74 There is 
little evidence, however, that VOC mariners retained their shipboard 
identities outside the terms of their service, or that shipboard order 
contributed greatly to the orderliness of societies at its ports of call. If anything 
the opposite appears to be true, the port and its brothels providing mirror 
heterotopias for the ship and its discipline.75 Finally, although I attempt to deal 
with the everyday lives of ordinary VOC seamen, I have deliberately not 
presented this study as a “history from below” or “history 2,” centered on 
mutineers and others rendered mute by dominant discourses.76 I have avoided 
                                                                                                                                       
importance of warehousing and hinterland networks, see Antunes, C: “Amsterdam 
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73 Foucault: Discipline and Punish. 
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this approach partly because, despite the spatial organization aboard ships, 
categories of “above” and “below” shift when the ship reaches land: when the 
master is reintegrated in a society in which he is required merely to execute 
the decisions of merchants and directors, or when a lowly soldier publishes 
his own narrative on returning home, which casts him as an observing, 
assessing protagonist.77 Instead I have attempted to pay equal attention to the 
whole society aboard the ship, and to include the social, representational and 
physical contexts of shipboard environments and something of their meanings 
for all of the ship’s inhabitants. 
 
My reasons for concentrating on the VOC and particularly on the case of the 
Nijenburg mutiny are rather methodological and practical. The VOC’s place in 
the great economic and cultural efflorescence that took place in the Dutch 
Republic during the seventeenth century is well known.78 For the purposes of 
this study, however, the most interesting period falls between 1750 and 1780, a 
period economic historians associate firmly with the ascendancy of London 
and the decisive decline of Amsterdam. Records for this unfashionable period 
of VOC history show a remarkable unity, completeness and discipline when 
compared with those of other periods and companies. The system of 
                                                
77 Gelder, R van: Naporra’s omweg. Bruijn, J. R: Commanders of Dutch East India Ships in 
the eighteenth Century (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011). 
78 Schama, S: The Embarrassment of Riches: an interpretation of Dutch culture in the Golden 
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shipbuilding and operation organized during this period was remarkably 
coherent, allowing one to speak of VOC practices and resolutions with more 
confidence than is possible regarding, for instance, the English East India 
Company, with its myriad independent shipyards, ship husbands and 
individually recruited crews.79 Further, the unprecedented centralization and 
standardization of the VOC’s shipbuilding, sailing, business and record-
keeping practices between 1750 and 1780 allow more to be understood and 
generalized, with greater confidence, regarding the forms of the Company’s 
retourschepen during this period than those of any other ship type or any other 
period. Such records are useful both for themselves and for providing a 
coherent frame for the individual and extraordinary documents that form the 
basis of this study.  
 
Taking advantage of this unusual resource I have deliberately limited my 
research data and conclusions to a few coherent sets of records, addressing 
specific shipboard situations in order to present differences and contradictions 
clearly, in order to subject the generalized accounts of VOC shipboard life that 
already exist to a scrutiny that only an approach from case studies can 
provide. There are advantages to such an approach: rather than submerging 
points of distinction between ships and situations in a generalized narrative of 
vague, eternal “traditions,” they can be highlighted and examined, in order to 
interrogate common views on the subject. There is also a cost to this approach, 
                                                
79 Sutton, J: Lords of the East: the East India Company and its ships (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1981). 
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however: I have not been able to render as evocative or encompassing a story 
as I might have with a more omnivorous method, which would have allowed 
me to include anecdotes and details from many voyages, showing 
cartographic research conducted on the quarterdeck or scientific or political 
discussions between shipmasters, merchants and passengers in the saloon.80 
 
The structure of chapters follows the case study approach by first defining the 
class of ships under discussion, examining their typical or canonical 
characteristics, interrogating the description thus obtained in the light of 
atypical cases, and exploring the ways in which even accounts of the atypical 
might be bent to normative ends. Chapter one deals with the “typical” ship as 
an idea or imagined entity (or entities, since the typical ship evolved over 
time). Charting its evolution as  a discourse and an ideology, and as an 
architectural, social and sociospatial type, or mode of building and of 
understanding and inhabiting built space. This chapter draws on Anthony 
King’s and Eve Blau’s works on the evolution, global spread and adaptation of 
types, especially on King’s analyses of the bungalow and the villa, which 
shows how each type developed to house a specific institution or mode of 
existence and in turn carried certain relations and modes of being with it into 
                                                
80 The rare diaries of female passengers show a consciousness regarding the whole society of 
the ship that is illuminating, regarding how a retourschip looked to an outsider, but also 
difficult to read “around.” Barend-van Haeften, M: Op Reis Met De VOC: De Openhartige 
Dagboeken Van De Zusters Lammens En Swellengrebel. Linschoten-Vereeniging 95. 
(Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1996). 
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different contexts.81 Like the bungalow, the type of the VOC ship encoded 
particular rules for behavior among those that inhabited it and for discourse 
among those who have discussed it down to the present, affecting discussions 
of shipboard spaces, of the Company and of the proto-colonial project it 
represented. During the Company’s operation the type informed the building 
and disciplining of individual ships, the expectations and experiences of 
Company servants and the social identities and reputations of those servants 
aboard and ashore. In some sense, then, this chapter might be considered 
analogous to a view of the ship “from without,” as it is always shown in  
contemporary paintings: as an object in the Company’s cultural landscape and 
a metonym for the Company as an institution and its institutionalized 
behaviors.  
 
Chapter two, on the spaces aboard the typical ship, might be considered a 
view “from within,” concerned with the physical environments and social 
subdivisions that the ship provided to its inhabitants.82 The design of 
                                                
81 Eve Blau’s Red Vienna provides a partial model for the approach taken here: her 
discussion of the Gemeindebau in interwar Vienna addresses the effects of this 
distinctive type of apartment building and the political agendas that surrounded it, 
on political discourse, on the social identities of its inhabitants and other Viennese, 
and on the images and narratives presented regarding the inhabitants in the popular 
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(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). 
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is the way it appears in paintings, as an object on which meanings can be hung. 
Viewed “from within” the ship itself takes on the character of a context for the 
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the distant observer has been remarked in the re-presentation of Islamic urban 
features as monuments. Carruthers, K. D. B: “Architecture is Space: the space-positive 
tradition” Journal of Architectural Education 39:3 (spring 1986), 17-33. 
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shipboard space is analyzed alongside the architecture of systems of authority 
used aboard, the latter being derived both from the Company’s Articles of 
Employment and from a largely unacknowledged body of seafaring spatial 
traditions. Certain sets of social relations were considered characteristic of the 
VOC ship, between members of the ship’s council, between the officers and 
men, and between soldiers and sailors. The chapter explores how space use 
contributed to the VOC’s social order and especially to control, resistance and 
communication aboard the Company’s vessels.83  
 
Against this typical image, in chapter three I pose a number of case studies of 
ships under the atypical condition of mutiny. Reports from mutinies 
simultaneously offer some of the very few sources available on the use and 
arrangement of space aboard VOC ships and a kind of counter-discourse to 
the Company’s standard or typical account of shipboard order. Space leaves 
few explicit traces in the archives of commercial institutions. In particular 
everyday spatial practices tend to go undiscussed: it is this quality that Pierre 
Bourdieu and others have claimed lends space its power to influence social 
relations and behaviors.84 It is only on rare occasions, and especially in 
moments of crisis, that the “hidden” factor of space is brought into discussion 
and the “black box” of the ship’s everyday operation is opened.85 The fact that 
                                                
83 Gilroy: Black Atlantic. 
84 Bourdieu: Outline. 
85 The term “hidden society,” referring to specific institutional relations, stems from 
Aubert: The Hidden Society, that of the “black box” from Callon, M. & Latour, B: 
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much of what we know regarding shipboard space is drawn from such crises 
offers an analytical challenge. First, mutiny records concentrate on the 
extraordinary or deviant as that which is worthy of note or which might be 
used to apportion guilt. Second, the questions asked at trials and the reception 
of their answers cling to the comprehensible: a set of ideas or opinions 
informed by the Company’s official categories of good and bad order. One 
mutiny in particular generated a large volume of complex and contradictory 
records: that on the ship Nijenburg, which was seized by a small group of 
soldiers in 1763 and diverted from its course toward Asia, landing instead at 
Brazil and French Guiana. Testimonies were gathered from over a hundred 
witnesses to and participants in the events of the mutiny and its aftermath. 
The Nijenburg therefore provides unique opportunities for the critical analysis 
of a particular shipboard situation, from multiple perspectives.  
 
Published narratives of mutinies and other VOC disasters tend to follow a 
particular trajectory, containing details that identify them as adventure yarns 
and a certain construction of events, which they share with official accounts. 
One effect of the construction characteristic of the genre is to incorporate the 
crises described into official discourses: one may speak of the institution of the 
Company striving to make sense of aberrant events and to employ them in its 
programs, such that mutiny, too, became incorporated in the type.  
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The work is necessarily incomplete. Were it to be pursued to its logical 
conclusion, I should have to research all accounts of VOC voyages and vessels, 
in order to produce a monograph that kept them all distinct and finally drew a 
new synthesis from them, hedged about with endless exceptions and caveats. I 
have also fallen some distance short of the program for architectural history 
set out by Spiro Kostof.86 Although the ship appears to offer a nicely self-
contained world, I have not been able to address every corner of it. In 
particular, technical aspects of construction, the masts and rigging, and the 
decorative carving that formed each ship’s most distinctive designed 
statements have all been given short shrift. This is partly because others have 
covered technical aspects better than I could: I have tried to make use of their 
work where it has had a clear bearing on shipboard society. Regarding the 
rigging, which was certainly a complex working environment, apart from 
technical descriptions I have not found sufficient evidence to form 
conclusions: we know that men hid in the rigging during mutinies and that, 
because grenades were stored at the mast tops, these played an important part 
in the defense of the ship. As the most visible part of the ship from a distance 
(and especially from the “middle distance” that characterized ship paintings 
in the seventeenth century), rigging clearly had representational value: the 
flagpole of the Company’s enclave at Deshima, for instance, took the form of a 
ship’s mast rigged with stays and a top. Trial testimonies, however, rarely 
refer to the complex web-work above the decks, and since these form my 
                                                
86 Kostof: “the study of what we built” in Kostof, S: A History of Architecture, 3-19. 
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primary body of evidence I have left this space for another study. Decorative 
woodwork likewise formed an important part of the presentation of the ship: 
its continued presence on VOC ships, despite the Company directors’  
continued protestations regarding its cost, suggests that it served some 
important function, but I have found no fresh evidence to supplement the 
studies already extant.87 It has further not always been possible to speak of 
ships as they were, rather than as they should have been; no complete VOC 
ships survive to this day, and the written accounts we have of life aboard are 
all the products of memory, assembled long after the facts recounted, for the 
benefit of courts or paying readers.88 All the available evidence, including 
models, plans, charters, logs, memoirs and paintings falls into the category of 
discourse regarding the ship, much of it also having been produced by the 
Company. I have not been able to see around this discourse to any posited 
                                                
87 Schokkenbroek, J: Kunst op het water: Nederlandse scheepssier, 1650-1850 (Amsterdam, 
Zutphen: Stichting Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Walburg Pers, 1995). Ships’ 
names fall in  the same category of deliberate statements intended to affect how the 
individual ship was read. Bruijn, Gaastra & Schoffer note a shift from principally 
patriotic  names, such as ‘t Wapen van Amsterdam (the Arms of Amsterdam), or 
Eendracht (unity) to names of personal significance to Company directors, 
commemorating their family members (e.g. Vrouwe Petronella or Jonge Lieve) and their 
properties (e.g. Huis ter Velsen). Such work is clearly of importance to a study of the 
public image of the Company and the position of its ships in that image. I have not 
been able to draw a clear link, however, between these concerns and the social 
structure operating aboard the ships. DAS I. 
88 The historical record for these artifacts is instead composed first of descriptions—
text, drawings and models—and therefore of discourses about the ships, and second 
of fragments of wrecks, which must generally be reconstructed according to the 
descriptions. Some more-or-less complete hulls have been found, including notably 
that of the Amsterdam, which remains buried in sand off the south coast of England. 
If excavated this wreck would considerably advance our knowledge of the fabric of 
VOC ships. Nonetheless, even the Amsterdam could not provide a complete record 
of the class of VOC ships. 
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“true” or “authentic” ship, but I have attempted to address the available 
material directly and critically, as evidence for how the VOC ship was 
conceived and perceived during its time of operation.
 48 
CHAPTER 1: THE TYPICAL SHIP 
 
On types and stereotypes: the class and the instance. 
Between 1913 and 1914, Johannes de Hullu published five articles on 
shipboard life in the Dutch United East Indies Company (VOC), which have 
largely set the agenda and terms of debate for all subsequent studies.89 These 
articles were remarkable, pioneering efforts of scholarship, which drew 
together a variety of sources to produce a synthetic portrait of the Company 
seaman and his world: like Melville’s White Jacket they deployed details and 
anecdotes judiciously to evoke a sailor’s world.90  
 
The danger of such portraits is that they tend to obscure the ways in which 
they are constructed; they appear to be complete and self-sufficient 
explanations of their subjects. In the case of de Hullu’s articles this danger was 
compounded by the fact that the mariner merchant-warriors he described 
were already subject to a good deal of essentializing, as components of the 
                                                
89 In many cases de Hullu’s work is simply adopted as a template for the social aspect 
of later studies; Bonke’s Jonge Lieve follows de Hullu’s schema faithfully. Hermann 
Ketting’s recent Leven, Werk, despite a more self-consciously ethnographic  approach 
remains heavily indebted to de Hullu in its depiction of sailors’ lives, its selection of 
topics and its organization. Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen der 
Oost-Indische Compagnie: vijf artikelen studie over de werkgelegenheid bij de VOC 
(Groningen, 1980). Bonke, H: De Zeven Reizen van de Jonge Lieve: biografie van een VOC-
schip, 1760-1781 (Nijmegen: SUN, 1999). Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk en rebellie aan 
boord van Oost-Indiëvaarders (1595-1650) (Aksant, Amsterdam, 2002). 
90 Melville, H: White-jacket or, The World in a Man-of-war (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970).  
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Dutch national narrative.91 Nationalist influences aside, de Hullu’s portrait 
relies on, and replicates, the construction of a category or class of ships and of 
seafaring: that is, of a “typical” VOC ship, which is identified both as 
homogenous and as recognizably different from other kinds of ships, 
including warships, independent merchantmen and the ships of other East 
India companies. This “typical” ship shares some of the characteristics of Max 
Weber’s ideal type: it is constructed from a number of interested viewpoints in 
order to emphasize its distinctiveness. Where Weber’s ideal type was intended 
to stand as a declaration of the author’s stance, however, the “typical” VOC 
ship fails to declare the viewpoints from which it is constructed, standing 
instead as the proper object of analysis and understanding, both substituting 
itself for detailed case studies and declared individual perspectives, and acting 
as a filter through which such studies are read into maritime historiography.92   
 
The creation of such a class is an inevitable and necessary part of the 
historian’s work: the ability to answer general questions about the Company’s 
                                                
91 Both the VOC and its sister West-Indische Compagnie (hereafter WIC) have had a 
significant influence on the national image of the Netherlands: several VOC servants 
and directors were regarded as national heroes during de Hullu’s time, including Jan 
Pieterzsoon Coen and Admirals Michiel de Ruyter.  
92 Weber posited the ideal type as an answer to the ethical problem of the 
impossibility of objectivity in historical analysis; in place of an objective stance he 
advocated a declared position of interest in social science work, that would make the 
writer’s own value positions clearly evident: "An ideal type is formed by the one-
sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great 
many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those onesidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct". Weber, M: “Objectivity in 
Social Science and Social Policy” in Weber, M. The methodology of the social sciences, 
trans. Shils, E. A. & Finch, A. H. (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949).  
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operations relies on the building of models of typical behaviors and 
conditions. Moreover, individual primary sources never provide complete 
descriptions of ships, shipboard societies or social structures; at best they offer 
“thick” descriptions, couched in specialized, idiosyncratic language and 
heavily filtered through the reporters’ own expectations, of whatever was 
notable in a particular circumstance.93 “Typical” or normal models of 
shipboard society, such as those offered by de Hullu, are therefore regularly 
used to “fill in the blanks” and aid interpretation of allusive accounts and 
isolated incidents. Such a class or model brings a number of problems with it, 
however: being “typical,” it is inevitably normative and stereotyping; it is 
supposed to offer a comparative lens for the researcher’s interpretations but it 
also acts as an explanation and as a yardstick for assessing the information in 
specific accounts, naturalizing some features of shipboard society and 
marginalizing others.  
 
The worst excesses of this normative/stereotyping tendency are well known 
in the field of maritime history, which has been described as showing a 
peculiar susceptibility to mythologizing and romanticizing tendencies. 
Flatman has described a “Hornblower complex” affecting much British 
maritime historiography, composed of an emphasis on heroic individual sea 
                                                
93 Geertz, C: "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30. 
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officers and a generally dystopian view of the hardships of shipboard life.94 
The equivalent impulse in Dutch historiography on the VOC might be termed 
a “Bontekoe complex,” after the most widely-known of all VOC ship-
masters.95 On the one hand, this model emphasizes consultation and collective 
decision-making among the officers as signs of a “gentler,” more enlightened, 
liberal system than the proverbial tyranny of the British navy.96 On the other 
                                                
94 “Hornblower complex” refers to the heroic British naval officer of Forester’s 
Napoleonic novels, a character who displays gentlemanly instincts in a crass and 
brutish environment. N. A. M. Rodger notes that these novels were written within a 
genre, exemplified most famously by the novels of Tobias Smollett. Flatman uses the 
term for the tendency among Anglophone authors to assume that all shipboard life 
was essentially like certain famous cases of abuse of authority recorded in the Royal 
Navy during the Napoleonic wars. Rodger describes his book, The Wooden World, as 
an attempt partly to counteract the dominant, overly harsh view of the British Navy, 
noting that its many victories “are frankly difficult to account for if the Navy was run 
as a sort of concentration camp.” Greg Dening traces some part of the “complex” to a 
certain auto-mythologizing, “theatrical” consciousness apparently at work in the late 
eighteenth century among Naval officers and the class of society ashore that 
constituted “the public,” shown in participants’ accounts and testimony regarding 
the mutiny on the Bounty. Flatman, J: “Cultural Biographies, Cognitive Landscapes 
and Dirty Old Bits of Boat: ‘Theory’ in Maritime Archaeology,” International Journal of 
Nautical Archaeology 32. 2, (November 2003), 143-157. Rodger, N. A. M. The Wooden 
World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986); 13. 
Dening, G: Mr Bligh’s Bad Language: passion, power, and theater on the Bounty 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
95 Bontekoe’s account was published for the first time in 1646 and became an 
immediate fixture in Dutch literature and children’s literature, giving rise to a genre 
of derivative works. Bontekoe. W. Y: Journal or Memorable description of the East Indian 
Voyage, 1618-25, trans. C. B. Bodde-Hodgkinson & P. Geyl (Routledge: London, 1929). 
96 A generally benign, liberal and egalitarian view of Dutch “Golden Age” culture 
informs e.g. Simon Schama’s The Embarrassment of Riches and, although it has been 
questioned in colonial contexts, appears to retain a strong influence on Dutch 
maritime historiography. Pieter Geyl, in his introduction to an English edition of 
Bontekoe’s Voyage, emphasizes both Bontekoe’s own use of “gentle words” with his 
crews and the moderating influence of Dutch political traditions:  “the system of 
Councils, which pervaded the whole service of the Company as it did the 
government of the Dutch Republic, encouraged methods of deliberation and 
consultation rather than command. In a general way it ma be said that the Dutch as a 
nation were, and are, more easily led than driven” Geyl, P: “Introduction” in 
Bontekoe: Journal, 5. Schama, S: The Embarrassment of Riches: an interpretation of Dutch 
culture in the Golden Age. (New York: Knopf, 1987).  
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hand, the model presents an extremely negative view of the raw recruits that 
filled the Company’s lowest ranks—a view inherited directly from the 
writings of the Company’s first generation of governors and admiral-
generals.97 Other consequences of the adoption of a “typical” model are less 
immediately apparent, but no less important: since such a model is a 
composite entity derived from many sources, representing a conglomeration 
of attitudes and interests from many authors, it does not necessarily resemble 
either any specific individual ship or the view of any of the ship’s occupants. 
All recorded ships and voyages might therefore be said to deviate from the 
typical model in one way or another—a point that will recur throughout this 
analysis.  
 
Unfortunately, de Hullu does not offer an account of how his understanding 
of the VOC ship is constructed, and none has been provided by subsequent 
authors who have built their own studies on his foundations. Mixing archival 
research with a raft of common cultural assumptions, proverbs and popular 
literature, the resulting model of shipboard society presents a number of 
                                                
97 The negative assessment of Company sailors and especially soldiers can be seen in 
Pieter Both’s missives but appears most clearly in J. P. Coen’s 1620 description of the 
lower orders of Company servants (particularly those who had completed their 
service and had elected to settle in Batavia) as lowlife scum. This image has been 
repeated, largely without commentary, in later historiography. A. C. J. Vermuelen 
summed up “contemporary opinion” regarding Company servants by describing the 
VOC as “a great refuge for spoilt brats, bankrupts, failed students, cashiers, brokers, 
tenants, bailiffs, informers and suchlike rakes” Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-
Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on Board, 1602-1795,”The Mariners 
mirror 49. 2 (May 1963), 81-104. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company: expansion and 
decline (Leiden: 2003). Vermeulen, A. C. J: “The people on board” in Emmer, P. & 
Gaastra, F. S. (eds.): The organisation of interoceanic trade in European Expansion, 1450-
1800 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996). 
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uncertainties, both regarding its sources and its applicability.98 Regarding the 
social historiography of the British navy, N. A. M. Rodger has lamented the 
continued grip of “the assumption, still widespread in the teeth of all 
probability, that nothing ever changed, so that something that can be shown to 
have happened once in, say, 1690, may be assumed to have been common at 
any period from the Restoration to the Regency.”99 The same criticism can be 
leveled at de Hullu’s articles and much of the historiography based on them, 
with several consequences. First, de Hullu’s model presents the two centuries 
of the VOC’s operation as a single, largely unchanging moment, which is, 
moreover, dominated by an image of the Company from the glorious first 
decades of its expansion, during the Dutch “golden age,” before about 1680. 
Changes in shipboard arrangement and society are therefore obscured, 
especially if those changes occurred during the less ennobling, and less 
thoroughly explored, eighteenth century.100 Second, the model has multiple 
narratives submerged in it, including the views of individual Company 
                                                
98 Bruijn and Lucassen note the poverty of footnotes in de Hullu’s articles, and have 
done a great deal retrospectively to mitigate the problem in their 1980 edition of his 
works on the VOC. The articles resist complete annotation, however, and are largely 
uncritical regarding the sources from which they draw: in an introduction the editors 
note that he approached the material largely without any historical questions in 
mind. Bruijn, J. R. & Lucassen, J: “Introduction” in Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen 
J., Op de Schepen. 9 
99 Rodger, N. A. M: The Wooden World, 12 
100 In their introductory comments Bruijn and Lucassen note de Hullu’s heavy 
reliance on the Company’s early history (which spans the Dutch “golden age”) and 
his tendency to take interested official accounts at face value, especially regarding 
revolts and tensions among sailors. Bruijn, J. R. & Lucassen, J: “Introduction” in 
Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen. Hermann Ketting, who explicitly 
limits his study to the VOC’s first 50 years, draws a more nuanced but broadly 
similar portrait of VOC shipboard society. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk. 
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directors and of judges in VOC courts, mixed with popular ideas regarding 
the character of mariners (drawn from accounts of the Dutch Admiralties, 
independent merchants and other chartered companies) and debates, current 
in the first part of the twentieth century, regarding maritime—especially 
naval—security and discipline.101 Finally, the model tends to subsume all the 
individual cases that inform it: by frequently extrapolating general conditions 
from single events, de Hullu provides no means for assessing whether any 
particular practice was common or unusual, or for understanding the 
potential for variability in practices between ships. If a case is not presented as 
aberrant, involving courts and punishment, it is absorbed into the normative 
order; there is no room for a more complex examination of what might be 
termed “approved methods” and “acceptable improvisations.” 
 
The typical ship is not, however, purely a historian’s construct. An awareness 
of VOC ships as a class is clearly present in the Company’s own records, while 
both implicit and explicit codes of behavior for the proper conduct of VOC 
voyages can be seen informing social norms and legal decisions aboard and in 
the courts. Standardized routes, working practices and, in the eighteenth 
                                                
101 The continued importance of the VOC mariner, popularly “Jan Compagnie,” in 
forming the image of the Dutch seaman during the period can be seen in J C 
Mollema’s 1933 account of the 1763 mutiny on the VOC ship Nijenburg. Mollema was 
prompted to write his account by another mutiny: that aboard the warship Zeven 
Provincieen in February 1933; his introduction on shipboard life and the powder keg 
of tensions found aboard every ship that sometimes leads to mutiny assumes that the 
characters of the mariners, the shipboard conditions and the experiences of the two 
mutinies, separated by a century and a half, are essentially the same. Mollema: Een 
Muiterij in de achtiende Eeuw: het afloopen van het Oost-Indische Compagnieschip Nijenborg 
in 1763 (Haarlem, 1933). 
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century, deck plans enabled the directors to reduce the “most complex 
machine of the epoch” to a book-keeping shorthand, in which ships and their 
crews could be understood as exchangeable logistical elements in the 
Company’s business.102 A model of the typical ship was vital to the creation of 
regularized labor relations and a uniform understanding of shipboard society 
that could function on all the Company’s vessels to produce a stable, 
adaptable network, staffed by a standing pool of labor. As part of its corporate 
identity the Company adopted an archetypal armed trading ship under sail as 
its defining image, which it placed at the centre of its arms and on most of its 
publications in the form of a print mark. Tracing the history of the Company’s 
own printed production in Patria and at Batavia, Landwehr has found a fixed, 
essentialized image of the ship, which remained unchanged on documents 
produced from 1672 to 1791, despite some considerable changes in the 
appearance of actual ships over the period (Figure 1.1: VOC printmark, 
Amsterdam Chamber,1672. Figure 1.2: VOC printmark, Middelburg 
Chamber,1789).103 
                                                
102 Pérez-Mallaína, P. Spain’s Men of the Sea: daily life on the Indies fleets in the sixteenth 
century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 63. The description of the 
ship as a machine is a common trope in literature on the Companies from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth century.  
103 The 1672 printmark is from a copy of the Company’s Articles, printed at 
Amsterdam. VOC 364. The 1789 print mark is from an extensive volume of 
documents relating to ships of the Middelburg Chamber, compiled in the Company’s 
last days. VOC 4952. The 1672 mark more closely resembles the VOC’s arms, 
established in 1626, featuring Neptune and Europa as supporting figures. The 
supporters on the later arms are unidentified, but appear to represent the arts of 
navigation and seamanship, a variation on the original mark, versions of which 
continued in use until the Company’s collapse. Landwehr, J: VOC: a bibliography of 
publications relating to the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1800 (Utrecht: HES 
Publishers, 1991), XV-XXX. 
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Figure 1.1: VOC printmark, Amsterdam Chamber, 1672. 
 
Figure 1.2: VOC printmark, Middelburg Chamber, 1789. 
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This chapter is intended to build an understanding of the typical ship 
forwarded by the Company’s directors and set down in Company records, to 
disentangle it from the description found in de Hullu’s account, and to trace 
its historical development, its representation in various genres of the 
Company’s writing, and the changing regard in which it was held during the 
Company’s history. Several purposes are served by this disentangling, which 
involves the separation of a normative model from the practical impact that 
model might have had on actual ships. The first purpose is to examine the 
motivations that produced the model as a “form of knowledge,” in order to 
understand the model’s structure and its ideological payload. The second is to 
separate the properties assigned to the general class of VOC ships from the 
conditions that obtained aboard any specific vessel, helping to define and 
clarify individual ships as objects of study on their own terms. The typical 
ship can be seen as a sign of a unified enterprise; a mobile office and 
instrument that represented the Company across its far-flung network, 
signifying the imagined community of the Company.104 In presenting a 
uniform sociospatial order, the typical ship served as a disciplinary 
technology for producing an ideology of the uniform Company servant—the 
                                                
104 The ideological function of the ship may be compared to that of the English East 
India Company (EIC) factory office and ledger book, which served to discipline EIC 
merchants’ activities, to open a space for the Company’s business distinct from the 
private business of the merchant-ambassador,  and to present an image of a unified 
endeavor, linking together the individuals working in its distributed factories around 
Asia. Ogborn, M: Indian Ink: script and print in the making of the English East India 
Company. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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figure of Jan Compagnie. The third purpose is to provide a clear idea of the 
normative order, which is needed if one is to understand the nature of 
transgressions, modes of resistance or strategies for accommodation regarding 
that order. Yvonne Brink has found, through her reading of VOC maps of the 
Cape settlement, that the Company worked to produce and disseminate an 
image of rational and unitary order, reflected in its presentation, to Company 
servants and elite audiences, of a highly formalized street-plan of the 
settlement, showing offices and residences but excluding the less regular, less 
gridded and “rational” farmsteads built by discharged Company servants, 
who settled “independently.” In her study of surviving farmsteads she 
describes some ways in which the settlers’ own place-making orders acted as 
forms of resistance to the Company—as ways of living respectably beyond the 
Company’s hegemonic rules.105 No equivalent body of physical evidence exists 
for seamen’s spaces aboard the Company’s ships. The written records that 
offer the richest sources in their place are court proceedings, memoirs and 
journals, all of which present heavily filtered accounts of shipboard space and 
its reception by mariners. Such records presuppose a reader with a detailed 
understanding, both of the expectations of officialdom and the normal 
practices of everyday seamanship. A grasp of the model of the typical ship is 
needed to understand the language in which seamen’s communicative acts—
including disobedience and outright rebellion—were couched. 
                                                
105 Yvonne Brink: “Figuring the Cultural Landscape: Land, Identity and Material 
Culture at the Cape in the Eighteenth Century,” The South African Archaeological 
Bulletin, 52.166 (Dec. 1997), 105-112. 
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The typical ship, then, might properly be termed a “discursive formation” 
applied to the Company’s ships, in which case it would be useful to establish 
who, within the Company, acted as the authors of this formation.106 On the 
one hand, clerks, record-keepers, factory governors and ship captains 
distributed around the VOC’s networks were all involved in constructing and 
reproducing the typical ship, and the interests of these various groups can 
hardly be condensed into a single voice. Julia Adams has characterized the 
VOC as a multi-headed entity, with often contentious relations between the 
the Seventeen Lords, or Gentlemen, of the ruling council (hereafter referred to 
as the Heren Zeventien or Heren XVII), and the Governors (particularly those at 
Batavia) who ruled the Company’s eastern possessions as semi-independent 
fiefdoms.107 The reporting of business from the Eastern offices to Patria was a 
highly politicized affair, and there is reason to suppose a “hidden transcript” 
underlying the reports (delivered annually in indigestible bricks of data), 
which would serve to mask ways in which operations in Asia might have 
                                                
106 The terms “discursive formation” and “discourse” have come to mean many 
different things: here I intend the rather old-fashioned sense of a group of statements, 
representing an interested viewpoint that “refer to the same object, are made in the 
same enunciative modality, share a system of conceptual organization and share 
similar themes and theories”, rather than any of the broader senses in which the term 
has been used, which mostly refer to what Foucault described as “non-discursive 
domains.” R. Keith Sawyer “A Discourse on Discourse: an archeological history of an 
intellectual concept” Cultural Studies 16.3 (2002), 433-456, quoting Michel Foucault, 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). 
107 Adams, Julia. 1996. “Principals and Agents, Colonials and Company Men: the 
decay of colonial control in the Dutch East Indies.” American Sociological Review 61.1 
(February): 12-28. 
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deviated from the Heren XVII’s instructions.108 On the other hand, my concern 
here is with the dominant discourse that informed record-keeping, which, 
even if it amounted only to an ideology of uniformity, nonetheless formed 
“the book,” or doctrine by which VOC ships were supposed to be constructed 
and operated. The authors of this dominant discourse, who lent it their 
authority, were all located at the Company’s head offices in the Republic.109 
These were Heren XVII, the Haags Besogne (a council tasked with overseeing 
supplies and logistical support), and the offices of the equipagemeesters, who 
were responsible for supplying and maintaining the fleet. The typical ship 
primarily reflected the concerns of these bodies. 
 
Constructing the typical ship 
How, then, did the Company develop its model of the typical ship, and how 
did that model differ from extant methods of ship operation? The first point to 
note is that the model developed over a long period and was adapted to some 
extent in dialogue with changes in the forms and technologies of the ships 
                                                
108 The annual reports from Batavia are listed in the archive as Overgekomen Brieven en 
Papieren, and form an unindexed, highly heterogeneous mass of fragmentary records. 
I have borrowed the category of the “hidden transcript” from James Scott’s Weapons 
of the Weak: while the Council of the Indies at Batavia can hardly be described as a 
“weak” agent, its foot-dragging, under- and over-reporting and the opacity of many 
of its records are reminiscent of the methods of resistance Scott describes and were a 
source of continual frustration to the Heren XVII. Friction and mutual suspicion were 
rife between the head offices in Batavia and The Hague. Gaastra notes that fiscaals 
(auditors) sent from Patria to investigate the Indies factories tended not to survive 
long enough to report on their findings. Scott, J: Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of 
peasant resistance. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East 
India Company, 101.  
109 Foucault, M: "What is an Author?", in Bouchard, D. F. & Simon, S. (eds.): Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 124-127. 
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themselves, such that the ships that were considered “typical” changed 
substantially through the Company’s history. Although some aspects of ship 
operation and manning were established in the Company’s first decades, 
efforts to standardize the physical forms of the ships continued well into the 
eighteenth century, leading to changes in the vessels themselves and, to a 
lesser extent, in their representation in the Company’s records. The result of 
this is that some representations of typical ships from the Company’s first 
decades do not match closely with the much more tightly defined type of the 
retourschip that appears in the more detailed eighteenth century records. The 
second, related point to be borne in mind is that the typical ship was written 
into the Company’s records at least partly retrospectively; as a model or 
discourse applied to ships it reflected a certain conception of the ships’ 
physical forms, their norms of operation and their functions in the Company’s 
business that served the interests of the discourse’s authors over time. 
 
In charting the development of the model of the typical ship it is worth 
dwelling on the period of transition between the voorcompagnieen (“pre-
companies”) and the VOC because it was during this period that certain stable 
institutions of the Company’s operation (in particular the Articles of 
employment) were established, and also during this period that the ships and 
their social environment went through their phase of most rapid transition. At 
the same time, we find the view or discourse of the typical ship, as a uniform 
entity produced under VOC control, substantially constructed in later 
documents with special reference to this period. In particular, in van Dam’s 
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Description of the Company, written between 1693 and 1701, the ships of the pre-
companies and of the first VOC fleets are cited as the prototypes for all 
subsequent Company shipping such that, whatever the nature of the typical 
ship came to be in later years, it was understood to be identical with that of 
the first Company ships.110 The idea of simple continuity put forward by van 
Dam seems to have survived in subsequent scholarship, even though the 
status, interior layout, and operational paradigms of the Company’s ships 
changed greatly within the first few decades. I believe this discourse of 
continuity has gone unremarked partly because shipboard culture has been 
assumed to be unchanging and partly because continuity itself tends to be 
treated as unremarkable in historical accounts. An ideology of continuity 
becomes remarkable, however, when the circumstances surrounding that 
supposed continuity change as they did in the first half of the seventeenth 
century. 
 
The remainder of this chapter outlines a chronology of the development of the 
model and discussions of several methods by which the Company made 
fundamental changes to the organization of its shipping and the status of its 
mariners, which served to define and distinguish VOC ships, and which 
affected the autonomy and acceptable variability of ships, their masters and 
their crewmen, and the methods by which they were recorded and 
                                                
110 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. Uitgegeven door Dr F. W. 
Stapel. (’s-Gravenhage, 1927-43). I.1  
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represented. Finally, the ideological uses of the typical ship, imagined as a 
continuation of the pioneering voorcompagnie ship, are considered. 
 
Chronology  
Several narratives and chronologies are bound up in the development of the 
typical ship, but for the purpose of periodization here four distinct moments 
can be identified. The first is that of the voorcompagnieen and the Company’s 
first years, from 1595 to roughly 1620, when what might be termed a “pre-
company paradigm” was in effect. This moment ended with the establishment 
of multiple factories in the Indies, which largely overthrew the paradigm, led 
to changes in the nature of VOC labor and ushered in a second period defined 
by the coexistence of two separate networks, one serving the retour (return or 
homeward) route between the Netherlands and the Indies, the other serving 
the Company’s intra-Asian trade web. The third period might be termed that 
of standardization, beginning between the construction of the Company’s 
huge shipyards at Amsterdam in 1660 and the declaration of standard rates 
for retourschepen in 1697, and ending in the 1780s with the disastrous Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War. During this period ever-more-standardized East Indiamen 
came to dominate the return voyage between the Netherlands and the Indies, 
with the larger two rates all but eliminating other ships on the return route 
between 1740 and 1780: it was in this period that the typical ship reached its 
most standard form and its greatest  influence.111 The final period, during 
                                                
111 Before 1742 in addition to the three rates then in use we find some other vessels 
being built and sailed on the return route, including fluits and smaller hoekers and 
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which standardization gave way to improvisation and desperation, lasted 
from ca. 1781 to the cessation of VOC shipping operations in 1795.  
 
The periodization given here does not accord with those set forward for the 
Company’s operational history in general, nor even with that suggested by 
Ketting, which specifically addresses the organization and rationalization of 
VOC shipboard space.112 The reason for this discrepancy is the difference in 
the intention of this study from its predecessors. Ketting offers an 
ethnography of the early VOC ship that charts the replacement of 
“traditional” shipboard social modes and norms with a distinctive Company-
created social order, a process that was significantly completed by the 1640s. 
The terms of Ketting’s enquiry are sociological, being concerned with the 
character of the average or representative VOC mariner.113 In contrast the 
                                                                                                                                       
hekboots. Between 1742 and 1784 very few of these other craft entered service: the 
numbers of non-rated vessels declined as older craft were retired from service. Out of 
the total of 1169 voyages to the Indies undertaken between 1750 and 1780, less than 
5% deviated in tonnage from the two dominant rates. DAS II. 
112 Gaastra’s account of the Company’s operations remains the most nuanced and 
thoughtful available: it tracks the VOC’s financial fortunes in order both to trace and 
to critique a teleological account of the Company’s “expansion and decline.” Gaastra 
has stated, however, that he considers the VOC’s shipping operations to have been 
adequate, and not a significant factor in the Company’s decline and bankruptcy at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. Ketting, H. 
(Jr.): Leven, werk. 
113 Where Rediker uses the stereotyping term “Jack Tar” to describe the gamut of 
Anglo-American merchant seamen in the first half of the eighteenth century, Ketting 
does not use the problematic “Jan Compagnie” to encompass his average VOC 
mariners. Nonetheless, like de Hullu he deals with both the ships and the mariners as 
general classes or stereotypical figures, making it difficult to tease apart elements of 
specific biography and of general discourse regarding both in his work. Rediker, M; 
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk. 
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typical ship periodized here is largely a bureaucratic model, created for the 
consumption and use of the Company’s directors and shareholders, and for 
the publics of the Company’s servants, its competitors, and the Republic.114 
 
1. The pre-company paradigm 
Between 1595 and 1602 a total of 65 ships departed the Dutch Republic with 
the purpose of trespassing on the Portuguese monopoly then in effect and 
bringing pepper and other spices from their sources in South and Southeast 
Asia to the markets in Amsterdam.115 These ships sailed in flotillas of up to 
four ships for a variety of companies, which retrospectively have been labeled 
“pre-companies:” fore-runners to the VOC. We know relatively little about the 
physical forms of these ships. They operated according to a common 
paradigm, however, which influenced the kinds of ships used and their 
manner of operation, and which informed the VOC’s fleets during the 
Company’s first expansion and explorations until the establishment of the 
depot at Batavia in 1619.  
 
 
                                                
114 Ketting ends his study of VOC shipboard space around 1650 because he identifies 
this moment as one where the personnel serving aboard change in character, from 
predominantly Dutch-speakers with some maritime experience to a mixed 
complement heavily biased toward German-speakers from inland provinces with no 
prior seafaring knowledge. This shift, coupled with the increasing institutionalization 
of the space on models dictated from the Heren XVII makes the VOC less interesting 
to Ketting’s approach to the ship as a site for ethnography and the exploration of 
cultural tradition, in the vein of Wiebust’s Deep Sea Sailors. Ketting, H. (Jr.): private 
communication. Weibust, K: Deep Sea Sailors. 
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This “pre-company paradigm” was partly borrowed from Spanish and 
Portuguese models of East Indies trading and partly created in reaction 
against those models. It profoundly affected the methods of Indies trading 
adopted by the Dutch and other European East India companies and therefore 
also the ships and societies that carried out the Indies trade, setting a course 
for interaction between the Netherlands and the Indies the effects of which 
can still be felt today. 
 
The pre-company paradigm consisted of opportunistic privateering combined 
with largely unrestricted movement and trade, all at the discretion of the 
Admiral-generals who commanded the pre-company flotillas. Each of the pre-
companies was formed to execute a discrete venture of exploration capped by 
a return to Patria with goods: the paradigm therefore involved temporally 
limited engagements with the Indies and swift realization of the profits of 
engagement on return, in both financial and social capital.116 After 1619 and 
the establishment of Batavia, the VOC changed its methods of business 
markedly. Nonetheless the paradigm had a continuing influence on how the 
VOC’s business was presented by figures such as van Dam, and subsequently 
                                                                                                                                       
115 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 17. 
116 By conducting voyages into a realm of risk and bearing the promise of an exchange 
of that risk for tangible reward, the pre-companies participated in an idiom or 
tradition of adventurous sailing that stretches back in literary history at least to 
Homer’s and Apollonius’ epic sea tales. Apollonius Rhodius: The Argonautica 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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on the historiography of the VOC, particularly regarding how its ships have 
been imagined.117  
 
The paradigm was shaped by a number of factors, including the ongoing war 
of independence that followed the declaration of the Dutch Republic and its 
separation from Habsburg Spain, developments in naval technology and the 
state of knowledge in the Republic regarding the Indies.  
 
The war 
The war, which began in 1568 and (despite some extended periods of truce) 
continued until the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, strongly affected the status and 
social meaning of seafaring in the Republic. In its first years the emerging 
Republic relied on coalitions of private citizens and corporations to provide 
both its revenue and its armed forces.118 Privateering accordingly became an 
important cornerstone of the defense of the Republic, and a respectable, 
patriotic activity for burgher families.119 At the same time, trade as a source of 
                                                
117 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1, 456-496.  
118 Israel, J: The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic world, 1606-1661 (Oxford, New York: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1982). Sicking, L. Neptune and the 
Netherlands: state, economy, and war at sea in the Renaissance (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2004). 
119 The so-called “sea beggars,” named after the “beggarly” Netherlands nobles who 
instigated the revolt, became symbols of pride both for the Republic and for the 
protestant cause. Villiers, P: "Privateering and North Sea Conflict, c.1500-1715," and 
Sicking, L: “State and Non-State Violence at Sea: Privateering in the Habsburg 
Netherlands” in Starkey, D, & Hahn-Pedersen, M: Bridging Troubled Waters: Conflict 
and Co-operation in the North Sea Region since 1550. The 7th North Sea History Conference. 
(Esbjerg: Fiskeri-og Søfartsmuseets, 2005), 17-30 and 31-44 respectively. 
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revenue took on national importance: the Republic needed to increase its trade 
and income, specifically at the expense of Spain, in order to secure its 
independence.  
 
The unification of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580 had significant 
consequences for the Portuguese aristocracy and for the trading world of the 
Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century.120 One such consequence was 
that the Portuguese Carreira da India and its monopoly on Indies trade became 
strategic factors in the Dutch war of independence, especially after Dutch 
merchants were closed out of the trade in the Carreira’s spices by a cartel of 
Spanish, Portuguese and Italian merchants backed by German financiers. In 
1585 the Spanish crown increased its pressure on Dutch merchant interests by 
confiscating all the Dutch ships at Lisbon, which were engaged in buying the 
Carreira’s goods.121  
 
The pre-companies were formed to bypass the cartel by acquiring their own 
sources of spices in the Indies and, if necessary, fighting in order to trade. 
They were therefore able to combine their own profit seeking with the 
                                                
120 Dobbin, C: Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: conjoint communities in the making of the 
world-economy, 1570-1940 (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), 200-202.  
121 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 17. Lisbon and Antwerp, and later 
Amsterdam, were seen as being involved in direct competition for hosting European 
sea-trade. Antunes, C: “Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1710: Urban links and trade 
networks in the Early Modern period,” in van Veen, E, and Leonard Blussé (eds.) 
Rivalry and Conflict. European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth Centuries (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005). 
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interests of the emergent Republic to form the paradigmatic example of what 
Adam Smith termed “the mercantile system,” combining the roles of 
privateers and revenue-generating merchants.122 The rhetoric of the first 
voyages cast the “opening of the Indies” in patriotic terms, the right to engage 
in the spice trade being described as an element of national destiny, the spices 
themselves as treasures to be wrested from the enemy.123  
 
Van Linschoten’s critique  
The pre-companies were also shaped by the state of knowledge and 
perceptions in the Netherlands regarding the East India trade at the turn of 
the seventeenth century. 
 
The publication of Jan van Linschoten’s famous Itinerario in 1585 provided a 
prescriptive idea of the typical East Indies voyage and a primer on the 
methods and trading world of the Portuguese Carreira da India for an audience 
of Dutch would-be Indies entrepreneurs.124 Many institutional features of both 
                                                
122 Smith, A: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by 
Sálvio M. Soares. (MetaLibri, 2007), v.1.0p. http://metalibri.wikidot.com/title:an-
inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of  Accessed 5 July 2011. 
123 Udemans, G: ‘t geestelyck roer van ‘t coopmans schip... (Amsterdam, 1638. Reprinted 
Leiden: IDC, 1980). This narrative, of the noble and national “mercantile spirit” of the 
Dutch, which required only the “freedom to trade” in order to prevail, has continued 
in Dutch historiography into the twentieth century: Hoogenberk cites Spanish efforts 
to stifle this spirit as a major cause for the formation of the VOC. Hoogenberk, H: De 
Rechtsvoorschriften Voor De Vaart Op Oost-Indië, 1595-1620. (Utrecht: Kemink, 1940), 3. 
124 The Itinerario was published in 1585 as a work of what might be called industrial 
espionage, offering descriptions of a number of aspects of the Indies trade the 
Portuguese attempted to keep secret, including information regarding those parts of 
the Indies with which the Portuguese traded, the principal products to be found 
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the pre-companies and the VOC showed Van Linschoten’s influence, which 
can be seen in the wordings of the commissions of pre-company “Admiral-
generals,” in the Articles that governed their voyages, in the goods and 
destinations that were prioritized and in the sizes of the largest ships used.125 
The Itinerario did not, however, provide a blueprint for the pre-companies: 
mixing detailed description of the operation and characteristics of Portuguese 
East Indiamen with a critique of Portuguese methods, pointing out where the 
Iberians wasted resources, incurred unnecessary risks and impeded the 
delivery of trade goods, it rather provided a theory of good and bad methods 
of East Indies voyaging, illustrated with cautionary tales of ships, filled with 
spices, capsized by poor management and undisciplined trading practices.126  
 
                                                                                                                                       
there, and the methods of navigation the Portuguese used. Burnell, A. C. & P. A. Tiele 
(eds): The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies, from the Old English 
Translation of 1598. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1988). 
125 The voorcompagnies’ inheritance of methods from the Portuguese described in the 
Intinerario is most striking in the setting of terms for profit sailing, or “private trade,” 
with the seamen’s chests acting as the limiting factor for all but the senior officers, the 
size of this chest being set at four spans width and height and seven spans length. 
The largest ships operated by the Carreira da India appear comparable in size with the 
largest Dutch ships throughout VOC history, capable of carrying 400 to 500 men, and 
as heavily laden with money, victuals, wine and oil on the outbound journey as they 
were with Asian trade goods on the return. Burnell & Tiele, Linschoten II, 230; I, 10.  
126 Van Linschoten was particularly critical of the way in which overloading 
endangered the rich cargoes of the homeward-bound fleets, a problem he attributed 
to the practice of profit-sailing through the appointing of cargo space to crewmen and 
officers as a major part of their remuneration, a point that the VOC would take up 
eagerly. Burnell & Tiele, Linschoten II. 
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The ships as physical and social entities 
Regarding the ships themselves, under the pre-company paradigm they bore a 
heavy legal and ideological load, combining the functions of a warship, an 
embassy and a law court along with those of exploration, trade, and 
transportation.  
 
Aubert and Arnor have described the ship at sea as an instance of what Erving 
Goffman termed the “total institution:” a closed society, comparable to a 
prison or mental hospital, that contains both inmates and their custodians, and 
that supplies all the needs of its inhabitants, who therefore never have to 
venture outside it and instead form their social worlds within it, producing a 
society apart from the outside world, which generally contains categories and 
hierarchies that do not translate easily beyond the institution’s walls.127 
Although the idea that all ships necessarily partake of this “total” nature has 
been challenged, certain aspects of the East India ship seem peculiarly well 
suited to a “total institution” approach.128  
 
                                                
127 Aubert, V. & Arner, O,  The Ship as a Social System. (Oslo 1962). Goffman, E: “the 
characteristics of total institutions,” in Asylums (1961), 14-28; 148-9. 
128 Heidi Gerstenberger, in her study of German coastal traders and fishermen, has 
found that the men involved in these trades generally had well-developed social lives 
ashore and spent much of their time in social situations ashore. The total institution 
therefore did not fit the shipboard populations she studied. VOC ships, however, 
showed many of the features Goffman cited as typically “total,” including long 
periods spent within the institution, isolation and strongly institutionalized 
hierarchies. Gerstenberger, H: “Men Apart: The Concept of "Total Institution" and the 
Analysis of Seafaring” International Journal of Maritime History, VIII. 1 (June 1996), 173-
182. 
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The ship as a social unit 
The pre-company ship moved beyond the legal sphere in which Dutch 
merchants had previously operated, in order to project the Republic’s 
commercial and military interests into areas of world trade that had 
previously been the exclusive province of the Spanish and Portuguese. 
Accordingly, the pre-company ships became sites of broad autonomy and 
limited sovereignty, their admiral-generals endowed, through charters 
granted by the Prince or the States General, with the rights to try and execute 
their mariners, to make war and peace with foreign powers and to conduct 
business as they wished in the Indies, as representatives of the Republic’s 
interests, if not quite as ambassadors for the States General.129  
 
The extraordinary powers of the admiral-generals were couched within 
familiar idioms of authority; in common with other classes of Dutch merchant 
shipping, the command structures of pre-company ships mimicked those of 
the other “patrimonial” entities that made up the Republic (including towns, 
guilds and other corporations). While at sea ships were ruled by councils of 
officers, which reached resolutions, at least nominally, via majority 
                                                
129 Hoogenberk, H: Rechtsvoorschriften. A similar situation is described for the first 
English EIC generals by Miles Ogborn. In the latter case, however, the role of the 
general as an ambassador for the Queen was clearer: ships carried letters from the 
Queen, addressed to various Indies rulers, which formally identified the named 
generals as her emissaries, wielding her authority and to be respected as parts of her 
sovereign character. In comparison, Prins Maurits’ letters were modest: he stated only 
that the merchants were not to be hindered, or gave formal permission for them to 
attack Iberian ships wherever they were encountered. Ogborn, M: Indian Ink. 
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consensus.130 As floating corporations the pre-company ships therefore acted 
as autonomous social units, using the same political language as other limited-
sovereignty, patrimonial entities ashore.131 The ship therefore presented a 
microcosm of both the Company and the corporate or patrimonial State, its 
Admiral-general, and by extension the Seventeen Gentlemen of the VOC’s 
ruling council, appearing as a sovereign authority. 
 
The spaceship metaphor 
In addition to providing an image as discrete social units and national 
metonyms, the pre-company ships acted as symbols of expansion and 
discovery. As the most advanced machines of their day, combining 
sophisticated construction, navigation and labor organization, they 
represented the prowess and capability of the Republic pitted against the 
challenge of world exploration. In his study of the technological challenges 
faced by the Portuguese in reaching the East Indies in the sixteenth century, 
John Law describes the  Portuguese achievement as, “a combination of social 
and technical engineering in an environment filled with indifferent or overtly 
                                                
130 Adams, J: "Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early 
Modern Dutch Development" Comparative Studies in Society and History, 36.2 (Apr., 
1994), 319-355. Adams, J: The Familial State: ruling families and merchant capitalism in 
early modern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
131 Manguin, P-Y: “Shipshape Societies: boat symbolism and political systems in 
insular southeast asia”in David G marr & A C Milner, eds: Southeast Asia in the 9th to 
14th centuries (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1986) 187-213. The idea 
of the “ship of state,” common since Plato, speaks to a similar impulse in European 
thought. 
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hostile physical and social actors.”132 In describing the waters beyond Europe 
as “a hostile and dissociating world” he joins a long list of authors who have 
compared the ships sent to the East Indies with spaceships: state of the art 
technological wonders that allowed a precarious sort of access to a world 
beyond the familiar.133 
 
The spaceship metaphor, although it is anachronistic, may be valuable in 
understanding the ways in which the pre-company and early VOC ships have 
been used as exemplary prototypes, both by Company writers and by 
historians. At the Company’s inception the ships were understood to be 
entering a hostile environment, where they would face dangers from foreign 
ships, natural hazards such as storms and reefs, and Indies pirates and 
smugglers. The demands of exploration shaped the outfitting and design of 
the ships that were chosen: they were made to be as self-sufficient as possible.  
                                                
132 Law, J: “On the Social Explanation of Technical Change: The Case of the 
Portuguese Maritime Expansion” Technology and Culture, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), 
pp. 227-252. 
133 Pérez-Mallaína uses the spaceship metaphor to describe sixteenth century Iberian 
vessels. It also appears in Ketting’s and Gawronski’s accounts of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century VOC ships and in Stinchcombe’s analysis of Captain Cook’s late 
eighteenth century voyages. Pérez-Mallaína, P. Spain’s Men of the Sea: daily life on the 
Indies fleets in the sixteenth century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk. Gawronski, J: De “Equipagie” van de Hollandia en de 
Amsterdam: VOC-bedrijvigheid in 18de-eeuws Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1996).  Arthur L. 
Stinchcombe: “The Sociology of Exploration: Captain Cook and the Exploring Ship as 
a Social System,” Working Paper Series (Symbolic Boundaries Research Network, ASA, 
2001). http://educ.jmu.edu/~brysonbp/symbound/papers2001/StinchCook.html  
Accessed 7 July 2011. More generally, the metaphor is frequently employed on tours 
of restored or reconstructed sailing ships as diverse as the retourschip Batavia at 
Lelystad in the Netherlands and the whaler Charles W. Morgan at Mystic Seaport, 
Connecticut.  
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This self-sufficiency included minimizing contact with the Indies themselves: 
the ships were expected to travel to the spiceries without the need for landfall 
along the way, to act as homes for the crews while their cargoes were collected 
from various scattered sources, and to bring those cargoes home, all without 
depending on the Indies themselves for anything other than the specific goods 
desired and the one resource that could not be carried in sufficient quantities: 
drinking water.134 Part of the ship’s function was to separate its crew from the 
lands and peoples they traded with. Before the founding of a permanent depot 
at Batavia outbound ships were supposed to carry enough food for their crews 
for three years, working on the assumption that no resupply (apart from 
water) would be possible outside Europe. This requirement was reduced to 15 
months in 1649 and to nine months in 1669, since the Cape colony and other 
establishments allowed resupply to be guaranteed, progressively shortening 
and making more predictable the maximum voyage lengths undertaken by 
VOC mariners.135  
 
                                                
134 Water was the one resource of which the ship simply could not carry enough: 
expeditions to unfamiliar shores in search of water and the native encounters and 
attendant dangers they entailed form a major strand in the voyage accounts of 
Bontekoe, Middleton and Lancaster, among others. Bontekoe. W. Y: Journal. Purchas, 
S: Hakluytus posthumus, or, Purchas his Pilgrimes: contayning a history of the world in sea 
voyages and lande travells by Englishmen and others. Extra series (Hakluyt Society), no. 
14-30 (Glasgow: J. MacLehose and Sons, 1905-07). 
135Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1, 512-515. 
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The combination of social self-sufficiency and isolation afforded by the pre-
company ship held clear advantages for the Company’s high officials in their 
dealings with ordinary crewmen: locked on the ship, and into long contracts, 
the crew would better tolerate poor conditions, focused on the reward that 
awaited them on mustering out. Desertion was a well-known bargaining tool 
among merchant-seamen in the Atlantic, and appeared (at least to Linschoten) 
also to be a problem for the Carreira da India.136 To the extent, then, that the 
ship could be kept as a closed system and society and the Indies could be 
presented as a frightening, alien environment, the type of the retourschip 
could aid the Company in maintaining control over its staff in the East. 
 
Military technology 
Finally, the new mercantile bellicosity of the Dutch revolt and the “opening of 
the Indies” coincided with a significant moment in the development of 
military and shipbuilding technologies. At the end of the sixteenth century the 
armed merchantman represented the state of the art in warship design. The 
storied English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 had demonstrated to 
contemporary satisfaction that English and similar Dutch merchant galleons of 
moderate sizes were capable of overcoming the much larger Spanish war- and 
treasure-ships. This demonstration was confirmed during the early years of 
the Dutch revolt by the privateers known as the Sea Beggars and, most 
                                                
136 Rediker, M. B: Between the Devil. Burnell & Tiele: Linschoten. 
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famously, by Piet Heyn’s capture of the Spanish silver fleet in 1628.137 The 
faster Dutch and English galleons, although significantly smaller than the 
Iberian Indiamen, combined heavy armaments with capacious holds, allowing 
room both for the enormous quantities of supplies required to support long 
exploration voyages and the large cargoes required to make globe-spanning 
endeavors profitable. The galleon therefore emerged as the ideal vehicle for 
the pre-company paradigm: a combined merchant-warship, capable of 
exporting the Republic’s commercial and military might together around the 
world’s oceans.  
 
The ideological form of the East Indiaman 
The demands of the pre-company paradigm required a particular kind, or 
range, of ships: large, independently-operating, self-sufficient and warlike. 
This image of the merchant-warship was a very attractive one for the directors 
of the fledging VOC, just as the image of the pre-companies was highly 
attractive as an idiom for understanding their business. By encroaching on 
Spanish and Portuguese empires and making a fortune through trade, the pre-
company enacted successes that could be read, ideologically and to some 
                                                
137 News of the defeat of the Spanish armada spread to the Indian Ocean quickly. 
Subrahmanyam reports how English captains received congratulations on their 
victory in southeast Asia in 1591. Subrahmanyam, S: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 
1500-1700 (London: Longman, 1993), 59. Piet Heyn’s seizure of the Spanish silver fleet 
in 1628 made him a national hero in the Netherlands: he was lauded at the time by 
Calvinist pamphleteers. The event was celebrated again in the nineteenth century in a 
nationalist song, “De Zilvervloot,” by J. P. Heije, which remains popular today. 
Spranckhuysen, D: Triumphe van weghen de Gheluckighe ende Over-rijcke Victorie welcke 
de Heere onse God [...] Verleent Heeft aen de Vlote vande West-Indische Compagnie, onder 
het Beleydt vanden Heer Generael Pieter Pietersz. Heyn (Delft: pr. J.A. Kloeting, 1629). 
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extent materially, as the successes of the Republic. By taking profits away 
from the Republic’s enemies, the pre-companies built a reputation for patriotic 
heroism as they made money.  
 
The large and heavily armed merchant-warship therefore became a potent 
device for the VOC, representing simultaneously both the mercantile and 
military strength of the Dutch. The use of the image of the merchant-warship 
was not limited to its appearance on the Company’s arms and printmarks: it 
was to be found on the Company’s ships themselves, which borrowed from 
the dress of contemporary warships, adopting the Republic’s red lion as their 
uniform figurehead and gilt-work on their stern galleries. VOC ships were 
therefore easily confused with the ships of the Republic’s admiralties (Figure 
1.3: Detail from Jacob van Strij: The yacht of the Rotterdam VOC-Chamber 
greets a Rotterdam VOC ship and a Netherlands warship in the roadstead of 
Hellevoetsluis, 1790. The VOC ship is on the right). 
 
The ideological importance of the merchant-warship seems to have made it 
desirable even after its mission and functions had changed, and after the 
window of coincidence between merchant vessel and warship had closed. 
During the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-4), the development of line-of-battle 
tactics effected a separation between the demands of trading and fighting.138 
                                                
138 Gardiner, R. & Lavery, B: The Line of Battle: The Sailing Warship, 1650-1840. (London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 1992). 
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Figure 1.3: Detail from Jacob van Strij: Het jacht van de Kamer Rotterdam van de 
Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) begroet een Rotterdamse Oostindiëvaarder 
en een Nederlands oorlogsschip op de rede van Hellevoetsluis. (The yacht of the 
Rotterdam VOC-Chamber greets a Rotterdam VOC ship and a Netherlands 
warship in the roadstead of Hellevoetsluis), 1790. collection of the Maritiem 
Museum Prins Hendrick, Rotterdam. The VOC ship is on the right. 
 
Purpose-built warships, which had heavy interior bracing that severely 
limited their cargo capacity, abruptly rendered the retourschip obsolete as a 
primary weapon of war in Europe.139 In subsequent conflicts the VOC’s 
merchant-warships proved vulnerable to capture by men of war, such that by 
the fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-4) British warships were able effectively to 
                                                
139 Gardiner, R: The Line of Battle, 11-15. Deane, A. & Lavery, B. (ed.): Deaneʾs Doctrine 
of Naval Architecture, 1670 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1981). 
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stop VOC ships shuttling between the Indies and Patria. Nonetheless, the 
ships depicted on the VOC’s print marks remained curiously uniform 
throughout two centuries of use, failing to keep up with significant changes 
both in the physical appearance and practical functions of the ships they 
represented, while the VOC’s officers came to wear uniforms in imitation of 
the Netherlands’ admiralties in the second half of the eighteenth century, long 
after their practical contribution to the Republic’s navale macht was past.140 
 
The best ship is whatever ship you can get 
It should not be imagined, however, that all pre-company or early VOC ships 
really conformed to the profile of the merchant-warship. Even during the 
VOC’s first years there was a clear difference between the ideological form of 
the East India ship and the vessels that actually made up the fleet. The 
merchant-warship that appears in later sources (especially Van Dam) as the 
archetypal East Indiaman was generally the flagship of a motley flotilla of 
vessels that varied widely in size and type, including fluits, kats and the 
galleon’s lighter, faster relative the jacht. This last classification, essentially a 
                                                
140 Lewis Mumford observed that institutions in decline tend to produce the most 
extravagant, and perhaps expressive and significant, monuments, the solidity of the 
architecture attempting to make up for the shakiness of the institution, rather than 
reflecting its true state. In this case an image of reliable invariability took the place of 
novel monumentality, and was bolstered by external signs of power. In the 1780s 
William Hickey observed “the officers in the Company’s service all receiving their 
commissions from the States-General and wearing the uniform of their Navy, a blue 
coat with scarlet facings, richly laced, waistcoat and breeches also of scarlet.” 
Mumford, L: The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938). Hickey, W. & 
Spencer, A. (ed): Memoirs of William Hickey, 1749-1809  (4 vols, London 1919), vol. II, 
224. Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life 
on Board, 1602-1795,” Mariner’s Mirror 49. 2 (May 1963), 81-104; 87. 
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smaller galleon with narrower lines and a correspondingly reduced cargo 
capacity, has received much attention because of its use on voyages of 
exploration. Jachts including the Halve Maen in which Henry Hudson explored 
the river that bears his name; the Duyfken, which was the first Dutch ship to 
sail along the coast of Australia; and Abel Tasman’s Heemskerck have all been 
the subjects of extensive discussions and more or less speculative 
reconstructions.141 The case of Tasman’s ships shows how the ideal exploration 
ship was whatever ship could be procured: his flotilla consisted of a fast, 
defensible jacht and a slow, capacious fluit in convoy. 
 
2. The establishment of factories and the retour route 
The establishment of the VOC as a persistent chartered corporation in 1602 
changed both the business environment of Dutch trading in the East Indies 
and the organization of the ships that conducted the trade, requiring standard 
methods of operation for the first time and an understanding of the VOC ship 
as a class of merchant shipping, rather than a specific vessel.  
 
During the company’s first years, however, it generally formalized and 
intensified the modes of operation of the pre-companies. The VOC was 
                                                
141 The reconstruction of the Halve Maen is a floating museum on the Hudson, 
operated by the New Netherland Museum. 
http://www.halfmoonreplica.org/livinghistory.htm 
http://www.newnetherland.org/ Accessed 7 July 2011. The Duyfken replica was 
built as a work of experimental archaeology to test the possible performance 
characteristics of early seventeenth century ships. Burningham, N: "Experimental 
Archaeology: Reconstructing Duyfken," Nautical Research Journal, 46.4 (2001): 220-231. 
Hoving, A. J. & Emke, C: The Ships of Abel Tasman (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000). 
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formed in order to follow the pre-companies’ program, but on a unified 
footing, to avoid competition between Dutch interests. The Company was to 
coordinate and discipline the many overlapping strategies and interests of the 
pre-companies, to transform their unpredictable commercial winnings into a 
steady supply of spices for the markets in Amsterdam: in short, it was to 
provide a univocal, responsible actor on behalf of the Republic in the Indies.142   
 
The VOC differed from the pre-companies markedly in its systematization 
and standardization of practices. Where the pre-companies engaged in 
opportunistic privateering, the East and West India Companies were formed 
with military functions explicitly stated in their charters.143 Where the pre-
companies followed Linschoten’s geography of trade, interloping in existing 
Portuguese networks, the VOC set out to exclude the Portuguese from those 
networks and systematically to explore the spiceries, forming trade relations 
around and between the Iberian establishments. Most importantly, where the 
pre-companies were organized around single voyages and might not own 
their ships, the VOC was intended to ensure a regular supply of ships, crews 
and resources for continuous trading. in order to build a regular Dutch 
presence in the Indies that could displace other European presences.144 
                                                
142 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
143 Hoogenberk, H: Rechtsvoorschriften. Heijer, H. J. den: De Geschiedenis van de WIC 
(Zutphen: Walburg. 1994). 
144 Regularity and repeatability of uniform methods and practices were highly valued 
by the Heren XVII. The actual spread of such ‘rational’ methods in the Company’s 
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The practical needs of the VOC were fundamentally different from those of 
the pre-companies: to the extent that the pre-companies acted as proofs of the 
concept of Dutch trading in the Indies, their direct profits were of secondary 
importance to their simply succeeding in returning to Patria with cargoes. The 
VOC would need to replicate those successes while maximizing profits, 
minimizing costs and establishing repeatable methods. From the moment of 
the VOC’s establishment, therefore, a gap can be observed between the image 
and ideology of the “typical” ship inherited from the pre-company paradigm 
and the practical reality of labor relations aboard VOC ships, which became 
less autonomous, less egalitarian and more centrally organized and 
accountable.  
 
Shareholder trust and standard reporting 
Two novel factors, unknown to the pre-companies, further contributed to an 
urge to standardize methods for business  and operation under the VOC. 
 
The first was the structure of the Company’s relations with its investors. 
Seamen and investors in the voyages of the pre-companies understood their 
enterprises as sui generis, original undertakings of discovery and adventure 
that would require their own structures of power, contracts and rules (even 
though the Spanish and Portuguese, and not a few Dutch mariners on those 
                                                                                                                                       
practice is less clear: Meilink-Roelofsz, M: Hoe Rationeel was de Organisatie van de 
Nederlandse Oost-Indische Compagnie? (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1982). 
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Iberian ships, had been taking the route to the Indies for nearly a century by 
the time of those first Dutch-originated voyages).145 The unit of control and 
analysis for the pre-companies was the individual voyage/expedition: the 
success of each venture could be measured directly in the value of the cargo 
brought back and the single payment disbursed to the stockholders at the 
dissolution of the company.  
 
Further, the pre-companies were generally associated with individuals—the 
entrepreneurs and investors who established them, or the Admiral-generals 
who commanded their flotillas, where these were separate persons.146 As a 
result, in the event that a pre-company invested in developing methods for 
repeating its successes, that investment tended to be incorporated into the 
reputation of the successful Admiral-general, rather than abstracted into an 
institutional practice.147 Conversely, if investors were unhappy with the 
                                                
145 Following Vasco da Gama’s pioneering voyage in 1498, the Carreira da India 
quickly instituted regular links between Lisbon and Goa that were capable of meeting 
the European spice market’s demands. Over 2242 metric tons of goods were shipped 
from Indian Ocean ports to Lisbon in 1518. Subrahmanyam has compared Lisbon  to 
Genoa in the sixteenth century, as a multi-cultural, cosmopolitan port that drew 
expertise from the shipping centers around Europe, employing large numbers of 
mariners from the Southern Netherlands and, prior to 1580, from Holland and 
Zeeland. Subrahmanyam, S: The Portuguese Empire, 63, 40. 
146 Hoogenberk provides the text of some patents from Prins Maurits for pre-company 
generals, as well as patents issued in the early years of the Company. They show the 
personal nature of authority clearly, being issued to named individuals, and also the 
evolving basis of authority on which the Company conducted business, with both the 
Prince and the States General issuing patents for Company voyages in the first 
decade. Hoogenberk, H: Rechtsvoorschriften, 232-250. 
147 Admiral Jacob Cornelisz. Van Neck provides an example: his reputation was made 
via a highly successful first voyage, begun in 1598 and returned in 1600, which 
yielded 400% profit over investment. He  went on to a high position in the fledgling 
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performance of a pre-company, they simply declined to invest in future 
ventures undertaken by the same entrepreneurs. 
 
VOC shares, on the other hand, were to pay annual dividends in perpetuity, 
those dividends being calculated against the anticipated costs of continuing 
business.148 In the VOC’s first years the costs of growing the Company, 
fighting off the rival Portuguese and English companies and establishing 
supply lines were so high that no dividends were paid until the 1630s and 
were frequently delinquent for more than a decade thereafter.149 VOC shares 
therefore demanded greater trust from their holders over longer periods than 
pre-company shares had.  
 
The second factor was the suspicion with which investors in the fledgling 
Republic’s various cities viewed one another. The cities of the Netherlands 
had a long history of economic and political competition among themselves, 
and  networks of trust remained much stronger within cities than between 
them within the Republic. Shifts in relative status between cities that occurred 
as consequences of the war frequently increased resentments and tensions 
                                                                                                                                       
VOC and eventually became mayor of Amsterdam, 1622-6. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East 
India Company. 
148 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
149 The Company initially paid dividends in cloves, the value of which it suppressed 
through its own auctions. Sustained pressure from investors eventually yielded cash 
dividends in 1645, after the Company had been trading for 43 years. Gaastra, F. S. 
Dutch East India Company, 28. 
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among the cities, their corporations and their burgher investors.150 The unity 
forced on the seven independent provinces was fragile and contested. The pre-
companies were therefore generally strongly identified with their home cities, 
bringing together investors who were already associated through long-
standing alliances, as representatives of burgher families, which frequently 
also held positions on their city councils. The word “United” in United East 
India Company referred to its novel bringing together of investors from six of 
the Republic’s foremost seafaring cities: Amsterdam, Middelburg, Rotterdam, 
Hoorn, Enkhuizen and Delft, each city’s interests being represented by a 
voting Chamber. These Chambers organized their own accounts and 
expenses, and inspected the overall accounts of the Company closely, 
primarily in order to be assured that they each received a proportional share 
of overall profits based on each city’s investment in the Company’s capital.  
 
Both the strength of city-Chamber-based identity among the Company’s 
directors and the mutual suspicion between Chambers can be seen in the 
organization of the Company’s ruling council, the Heren XVII. Each Chamber 
was to be represented on this council according to the capital its city had 
contributed during the Company’s establishment, with the proviso that no 
single chamber should hold a majority. The four “lesser” chambers therefore 
each received one seat, these being “balanced” by an equal number of seats 
held by the much richer Middelburg Chamber, and the total being “balanced” 
                                                
150 Geyl, P: History of the Dutch-speaking Peoples: 1555-1648. (London: Phoenix, 2001). 
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by the Amsterdam Chamber, which had provided more than half the initial 
capital. This yielded 16 seats: a seventeenth seat, rotating among the “lesser” 
chambers, was added to keep Amsterdam’s power in check. Through this 
scheme a certain proportional relationship between the Chambers became 
enshrined in the Company’s structure: further investments by the Chambers 
in any form was supposed to maintain this proportion. 
 
The result was an environment of increased oversight and reporting of all 
aspects of the VOC’s business, particularly regarding the costs of operation 
and purchase of assets.151 Standard methods of bookkeeping, shipbuilding and 
management were enforced among the Chambers as part of their collective 
efforts to prevent any individual chamber gaining an advantage over the 
others, since a failure of equal accounting would have both economic and 
political consequences. The various but commensurable accounts of the six 
Chambers were kept proportional by a strict “equalization” performed 
annually, based on the profits realized by the auctions of goods brought back 
from the Indies.  
 
Ships stood at the centre of these “equalizing” calculations: they formed the 
Company’s largest fixed assets in its first decades, such that the reporting and 
                                                
151 Jongh, M. de: “Shareholder Activists Avant La Lettre: The Complaining 
Shareholders in the Dutch East India Company” in Duker, M., Pieterse, R. & Schild, 
A.J.P. (eds.): Welberaden (Fetsschrift of the research department of the Supreme Court 
of The Netherlands 2009) Accessed August 2009 at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275305. 
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justification of expenditure on ships became one of the major concerns of the 
VOC’s ruling council.152 Shipbuilding was also organized and funded through 
the individual Chambers and conducted on the wharves of the six cities: each 
ship was therefore associated first with its home city and was expected to 
carry cargo principally for its own Chamber.153 Ships were also notoriously 
difficult to standardize. The fundamental measure of a ship for accounting 
purposes was its cargo capacity, measured in tuns (standard size barrels, from 
which the term “ton” derives) or corn lasts.154 This capacity was both difficult 
to measure and not tightly controlled during shipbuilding until the eighteenth 
century, when standard plans were introduced and rates based on tonnage 
enforced.155   
 
Contradictions  
Regarding shipboard society, the Company revealed a number of tensions 
between contradictory impulses that were concealed under the pre-
companies. Where the pre-company ship operated autonomously under a 
single authority, which was carried aboard, the VOC ship was required to 
                                                
152 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
153 The association between city and chamber was sometimes increased by the naming 
of the ship. In the early decades many ships bore the names or arms of their home 
city. Often the schipper or senior merchant also hailed from the sponsoring 
Chamber’s city. 
154 One cornlast was equivalent to two Amsterdam tuns/tons, which are similar to the 
modern Register Ton, a volume of 100 cubic feet. DAS I.  
155 Hoving, A. J, Lemmers, A, Gerritsma, J, Harpen N. T. van, Lantau T,  Zwijndregt P. 
P. van: In Tekening Gebracht: de achtiende-eeuwse scheepsbouwers en hun ontwerpmethoden 
(Amsterdam: de Bataafsche Leeuw, 2001). 
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operate under a scheme of limited autonomy and on behalf of a large 
organization the head of which remained in the Netherlands. Where the pre-
company mariner was a junior partner who shared equally and 
entrepreneurially in the risk and rewards of trade, the VOC mariner was an 
employee charged with maintaining the corporate monopoly and forbidden 
from trading in those goods reserved for the VOC’s monopoly. These 
contradictions would make the paradigm into a two-edged sword for the 
Company, both attractive as an image of the Company’s activities and 
dangerous as a model that did not always accord with the Company’s 
changing needs.  
 
Wage labor  
First, the pre-companies generally offered greater shared risks and rewards, 
and more egalitarian distributions of the latter between the investors, officers 
and crews than would be found later under the VOC. Wage labor, in which 
the amount of profit from a voyage was decoupled from the compensation of 
the crew, was well established as the norm among merchant seamen in the 
North Atlantic by the seventeenth century, but for ventures that involved 
extraordinary risks or unpredictable profits the older practice of share- or 
profit-sailing remained in use.156 Privateering and piracy, in particular, tended 
to operate on the basis of proportional shares rather than regular wages, with 
                                                
156 Jackson, R. P: “From Profit-Sailing to Wage-Sailing: Mediterranean Owner-
Captains and their Crews during the Medieval Commercial Revolution,” Journal of 
European Economic History, 18. 3 (Winter, 1989),  605-628. 
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investors, ship masters and ordinary crewmen all receiving comparable 
remuneration.157 The pre-companies generally followed some kind of profit-
sailing schema, paying their mariners via a share either in the total company 
profit or in the cargo space of the ship, a portion of which each mariner could 
use for his own trade goods. Such profit sharing was incrementally abolished 
under the VOC, since it interfered with the Company’s monopoly charter. 
 
Entrepreneurship vs. monopoly 
Regarding private trade as an aspect of profit-sailing, the contradictory 
impulses to individual entrepreneurship and the voyage as a collective 
endeavor appear to have been effectively bound together within the context of 
the pre-company voyage, the fortunes of the ship being tied tangibly to those 
of individual mariners and associated metonymically with the emergent 
national fortune. Long contracts in the Indies, during which a mariner would 
potentially serve aboard more than one ship, made the divergence of interests 
between the entrepreneurial mariner and the monopolistic Company more 
apparent. 
 
Linschoten was critical of the individual interests that structured Portuguese 
trade, which he observed both among supercargoes and captains and among 
                                                
157 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. Peter T. Leeson: “An-arrgh-chy: The Law 
and Economics of Pirate Organization,” Journal of Political Economy. 115.6, (Oct. 2007): 
1049. 
 91 
lowly sailors and loaders.158 Seeing that each participant on a voyage was 
granted limited personal trading rights, and that the consequence of this was 
chronic, dangerous overloading of the ships on their return voyages, 
Linschoten wrote against uncontrolled autonomous trading and models that 
emphasized the individual business interests of mariners. Instead he 
recommended rationalized regimes of central control for Dutch trade, 
understanding the end beneficiaries of such trade to be burgher investors and 
town corporations, and through them, the Republic as a whole, rather than the 
personnel on the ships.159 Linschoten’s critique presented the tradition of 
private entrepreneurship by those aboard the ships as a problem for collective 
Dutch efforts in the Indies. The pre-companies accordingly sought various 
compromises between the interests of individual mariners and those of their 
investors, placing strict limits on individual trade by allowing only a clearly 
delimited space aboard for each man’s private hoard of cargo, sometimes 
combining this with the expedient of making each participant in the voyage a 
share-holder in the collective contents of the hold.  
 
The individual entrepreneurship that held an ambivalent position in 
Linschoten’s analysis would become a necessary evil for the VOC; while the 
                                                
158 Burnell & Tiele: Linschoten. Pérez-Mallaína has offered a portrait of the Spanish 
mariner that emphasizes patron-client relations as a feature of Spanish culture, in 
which each man was considered responsible for his own welfare and upkeep as a 
matter of course and of pride, such that even cooking aboard was decentralized, since 
no man would suffer the indignity of serving others in the kitchen. Pérez-Mallaína, P. 
Spain’s Men of the Sea. 
159 Burnell & Tiele: Linschoten. 
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Company struggled to maintain its monopolies on Indies goods, the prospect 
of making a fortune out of such trade was one of the main attractions of 
recruitment for merchants and other officers. Ultimately it was the ordinary 
mariners whom the VOC steadily excluded: whereas, under the Portuguese 
system and the pre-companies, mariners were junior partners in the 
enterprise, under the VOC their share in the hold was replaced by regular 
wages, while the space allotted for their own trade shrank steadily, became 
ever more restricted, with only goods in which the Company itself did not 
deal being permitted, and was periodically threatened with removal 
altogether.160  
 
The effect of permanent factories  
The practical impact of these changes in the Company’s methods and 
priorities was limited during the VOC’s first years by the fact that the ships 
continued to operate on a basis of individual voyages, and the crews that were 
sent to the Indies, regardless of their contract terms, returned with their ships 
to the Republic at the end of each voyage, generally lasting about three years. 
This changed with the establishment of permanent factories at Batavia and 
Galle, on Japan and in Bengal during the 1620s.  
 
From the central factory/depot at Batavia the VOC was able to build up an 
                                                
160 Blusse records an incident in which such a threat was resisted by the Chinese 
population in Batavia, who feared loss of income from their private trading with 
VOC servants. Blusse, J L:  Strange Company, 127. 
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extensive intra-Asian trade network, which fundamentally changed the 
Company’s operations and the work experience of its mariners. It became 
possible for the first time to establish a standing pool of labor at the factories, 
in order to operate this network. For the first time the Company’s demand for 
manpower was decoupled from the requirements of sending three fleets 
annually on roundtrip expeditions, and for the first time returning ships could 
be optimally loaded with Indies goods, rather than being required to bring 
back to Patria all of the men who had survived the rigors of the voyages. It 
also became possible to optimize the Company’s shipping operations, since 
the many different routes of the intra-Asian network could be served by a 
variety of specialized ships adapted to meet their particular demands. 161 
 
The creation of a standing pool of labor 
The establishment of a standing pool of labor in the Indies wrought far-
reaching changes on the Company and presumably made a significant 
difference in shipboard life. After 1620 as a matter of course the entire crew of 
a ship arriving at Batavia would be reassigned off the ship that had carried 
them from the Netherlands, in order to spend their full contract periods 
serving in the intra-Asian network and its associated military operations. The 
                                                
161 Robert Parthesius gives some sense of the complexity and variety involved: he 
draws 11 broad categories of ships from the partial and ambiguous entries found in 
the harbormasters’ records of a number of Asian factories, including several 
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Dutch or mixed crews. Parthesius, R: Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The development of 
the Dutch East India Company (VOC) shipping network in Asia, 1595-1660 (Amsterdam: 
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Articles cited in van Dam state that, as in the Carreira da India, Company 
servants would be allowed back home only at the end of their contracts, which 
were eventually standardized at five years, and on the condition that more 
than half of their wages remained in escrow with the Company, to be paid off 
only when the men reached the head offices of the Chamber with which they 
had enlisted.162 The expedition-based gesellschaft of the pre-company paradigm 
was therefore shattered: whatever characteristics of the total institution might 
have pertained to the outward-bound voyage, they were canceled as the 
mariners, soldiers and officers were separated and decanted into an Indies 
labor network where they would have to adapt to new ships and shipmates 
repeatedly for the duration of their service in the Indies.163 Or, perhaps, they 
were transferred on arrival at Batavia from one institution (the outward 
bound ship) into another (the Indies network), very frequently spending a 
long transitional period in a third institution: the Batavia hospital.164 
 
The retourschip and the ships it obscured 
The establishment of factories led rapidly to the creation of two largely 
separate shipping networks, one connecting Batavia with the Republic, the 
other connecting the Company’s factories in the Indies with each other.  
                                                
162 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.2, 555-604. 
163 Goffman, E: “the characteristics of total institutions,” in Asylums (1961), 14-28; 148-
9. 
164 Brug, P. H. van der: Malaria en Malaise: de VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw 
(Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994).   
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The largest and most heavily armed ships were reserved for the most 
dangerous route – that between Patria and Batavia.  For this route the pre-
companies’ charismatic armed trader flagships provided the best mixture of 
cargo capacity, seaworthiness and defensive capability; they accordingly 
provided the model for the retourschepen that came to be seen as the 
Company’s “typical” ships, eventually representing shipping in the 
Company’s records to the exclusion of all other ship types.  
 
Recent work by Robert Parthesius, Gerrit Knaap, Els Jacobs, Herman Ketting 
and others has thrown some light on the bewildering variety and complexity 
of the fleet left out of this typical/retourschip model, which served the intra-
Asian shipping network, as well as the great variety of business methods used 
by the Company in Asia for shipping its goods.165  
 
                                                
165 Knaap’s surveys of harbormaster records at Makassar and along the pasisir coast of 
Java in particular show the great mixture of ship types and sizes used in Java Sea 
shipping, involving both products intended for the Company and wholly 
independent trade: they throw light on the logistical needs of the Company in 
addition to the business of shipping commodities ultimately bound for Europe, as 
well as the various ethnicities of the shippers who supplied those needs. Jacobs’ 
survey of the intra-Asian network likewise draws attention to the variety of goods 
carried for the Company beyond the list of items the Company sold at auctions in 
Amsterdam, including saltpeter, tin and whelk shells, all of which were vital 
components in intra-Asian commerce. Knaap, G. J. & Sutherland, H: Monsoon traders: 
ships, skippers and commodities in eighteenth-century Makassar. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2004). Knaap, G. J: Shallow waters, rising tide: shipping and trade in Java around 1775 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996). Jacobs, E: Merchant in Asia: the trade of the Dutch East 
India Company during the eighteenth century. (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 
Universiteit Leiden, 2006). Parthesius: Dutch Ships. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Fluitschepen voor 
de VOC: balanceren tussen oncostelijckheijt en duursaemheijt. (Zaltbommel: Aprilis, 2007). 
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Parthesius has shown that during the company’s first 60 years it operated a 
fleet of 529 ships exclusively within this intra-Asian network, equaling the 
number of vessels used in the same period on the retour route (the overall 
tonnage of the intra-Asian fleet being very much lower, however).166 
Parthesius has also outlined in some detail the history of the Company’s 
policies regarding its intra-Asian fleet between the establishment of Batavia 
(1619) and 1660.167 In doing so, he sheds light on the moment of emergence of 
the retourschip as the canonical type of the VOC ship.  
 
Governor General Jan Pieterszoon Coen established Batavia with the intention 
of using it as the central depot for an extensive intra-Asian network.168 
Observing a complex web of demands and dependencies in the Indies, Coen 
envisioned a Company-operated trade web that would find and supply the 
optimal  chain of products to the optimal series of commodity suppliers, with 
the intention of minimizing the final cost of spices to the Company in the form 
of bullion. In 1619 he proposed the creation of the network in a letter to the 
directors in Patria, in which he stated its aim and scope baldly:  
Guserat [Gujarati] textiles must be traded for pepper and gold on the shores 
of Sumatra; pepper from Banten for reals and textiles from the coast (of 
Coromandel); Chinese goods and gold for sandalwood, pepper and reals; 
silver can be got from Japan for Chinese goods; the textiles of the 
Coromandel coast for spices, other merchandise and pieces of eight; pieces 
of eight from Arabia for spices and other small goods, making sure that one 
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compensates the other, and that all is done in ships without money from 
the Netherlands.169  
Shipping goods within this web required a wide variety of vessel types and 
sizes: many of the desired goods were only available in small quantities, 
poorly suited to the ships of 500 tons or more that the Company regularly 
used on its voyages between Batavia and Patria, or accessing them required 
shallow-draft vessels that could enter silted harbours and venture far up 
rivers.  
 
For the safest, most regular routes, fluits, with their boxy hulls and narrow, 
easily-managed decks, were adopted as the most efficient bulk carriers, as 
they had been a century earlier on the Baltic.170 These were joined by 
katschepen,  chialoupen, fregatten, boyers, junks, schuyten, orembaeyen, 
waterprauwen, schouwen, pantchiallangs and other types, such that by the early 
1680s retourschips formed a decided minority of the vessels found at Batavia.171  
 
                                                
169 Coen, J. P, letter to the Directors, Aug 1619, in Colenbrander, H. T: Jan Pietersz. 
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In the same period, however, this variety of intra-Asian ships was 
systematically ignored in the records used in Patria. The intra-Asian fleet wa 
dismissed as consisting chiefly of small or old ships of little value, while 
directors’ resolutions made a point of controlling the production and use of 
large ships—those of 120 Amsterdam feet in length or more—which were to 
be built only in the Company’s shipyards in the Republic, from European 
materials and, after the creation of uniform rates in 1697, according to specific 
designs.172  The description of the ships built and operated in the Indies, as 
small and relatively insignificant in the Company’s finances, appears to be 
undermined in van Dam’s Description of the Company, which includes vessels 
of up to 114 feet in length and considerable capacity being built and repaired 
on the island of Onrust in Batavia’s bay, a practice criticized because of the 
greater expense of materials and labour in the Indies compared with Patria.173 
 
A number of factors contributed to the relative invisibility of intra-Asian ships 
in the Company’s records compared with the retourschepen. First, the intra-
Asian fleet was restricted to operating in the waters over which the Company 
                                                
172 Among the “ships of little value” were counted those retourschepen that were 
deemed to old and insufficiently seaworthy to be used on the retour route: these 
generally remained in service in the Indies, transporting goods around the spice 
islands or maintaining the Dutch blockade of Goa, sometimes for many years. 
Parthesius, R., Millar, K, & Jeffery, W: “Preliminary Report on the Excavation of the 
Seventeenth-Century Anglo-Dutch East-Indiaman Avondster in Bay of Galle, Sri 
Lanka” International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 34. 2 (1990), 216-237. Parthesius: 
Dutch Ships, 169. DAS I, Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, III, 172-180. 
173 Van Dam recommended ceasing the building of all ships greater than 60 feet 
length in the Indies, because of the high costs and the loss of labor in Patria to Indies 
competition. Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1, 453  
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had been granted a monopoly charter: that is, to waters beyond the confines of 
the Atlantic, which was defined as ending at the Cape of Good Hope and the 
Straits of Magellan.174 This restriction was due largely to the aforementioned 
“equalization” between Chambers, which served to separate retourschepen 
functionally from all other Company ship types. The cargo capacities of 
retourschepen were a matter of great interest to the Company’s directors, since 
the equalization was calculated on profits realized from goods carried to 
Europe aboard those ships. The Chamber that built and maintained any 
individual retourschip had a strong interest in controlling both the ship’s costs 
and its own share of the cargo space it represented. In contrast, ships supplied 
to the intra-Asian network represented costs sunk into the Company’s shared 
infrastructure—cogs in a machine dedicated to filling up the retourschip. Their 
capacities were not tightly controlled, as those of the retourschip were, because 
their cargoes were effectively valueless in the eyes of the Chambers and ruling 
council until such time as they were decanted into a retourschip and conveyed 
to Patria. These ships were therefore not subjected to the scrutiny applied by 
the Company’s ruling council to ships that sailed to and from Europe: they 
were the responsibility only of the Council of the Indies at Batavia.  
                                                
174 The limits of the monopoly charter appear to have been taken as boundaries for the 
Company’s sovereign authority, since VOC ships were the only Dutch ships 
permitted within the monopoly zone. Philip Stern has described a similar boundary 
of presumed sovereignty for the English East India Company, beginning sometimes 
at the Cape and sometimes at the latitude of St. Helena, beyond which the EIC’s 
authority was absolute. Accodrding to Stern crossing this boundary sometimes 
changed the missions of EIC ships, since secret instructions, carried from Patria, 
would be unsealed as the ship crossed the boundary. Hoogenberk, H: De 
Rechtsvoorschriften. Stern, P. J: “Politics and Ideology in the Early East India 
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Second, relations between the High Command at Batavia and the ruling 
councils in Patria were often difficult: “smuggling” – that is, running private 
trading operations on the side – was known to be common practice among 
factory governors in the Indies, and various kinds of resistance were common 
between the company’s “two heads,” including selective over- and under-
reporting of Intra-Asian business. It was simply not in the interests of the 
Indies governors to divulge much detail regarding the capacities and 
movements of their fleets. Pieter van Dam, the Advocate or secretary to the 
Heren XVII in the second half of the seventeenth century, dispatched several 
fiscaals to the Indies factories to learn about what they were not reporting. 
Among these, one named Nieuwstad made measurements of some of the 
larger vessels that called at Batavia in the early 1680s. In Nieuwstad’s report 
we find several substantial ships, of over 120 feet length, which are not 
accounted for in the records of vessels sent from the Republic: their origins 
remain unknown.175 These were in addition to the very many “Small craft” 
(that is under about 110 feet long) that were built at various company centers 
in the East Indies, generally from European materials, including Russian and 
central European oak and Scandinavian pine, imported for the purpose.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
Company-State: The Case of St Helena, 1673-1709” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 35.1 (March 2007), 1-23. Stern, P. J: personal communication. 
175 These include the Boers van Amsterdam (126’), Coeverden (150’), and the jacht Capelle 
(137’). VOC 1457c. 
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The lack of uniformity, or even of recognizable classes, of ship types and sizes 
in the Intra-Asian fleet also serves to obscure their characteristics. Although 
some familiar type names, such as fluits, jachts and chialoups, recur frequently 
in the records, Parthesius has noted that such types were not standardized 
during the period and a single type name could be applied to a broad array of 
different functions of ships, while a single ship might be listed under various 
type classifications in the records of various ports.  
 
Further, ships could enter service in the intra-Asian network through being 
built in company shipyards, through capture from foreign powers 
(particularly but not limited to other European East India concerns) or 
through purchase in the Indies. It seems likely that ships from such diverse 
sources were given types “of convenience” in Company records, while the 
terms “prahu,” “pantjalang” and, vaguest of all, “schip,” all of which we find 
being built and repaired at the Company’s yards at Batavia, might stretch to 
cover any kind of otherwise-unclassifiable craft. 
 
Coen’s influence 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen appears to have played an important role in defining the 
retourschip both as a distinct type and as the Company’s archetypal type of 
vessel. As the architect and chief proponent of the intra-Asian network in the 
Company’s first years Coen initially contributed to the diversity of Dutch 
ships in the Indies, demanding that a wide variety of vessels be permanently 
stationed there to support Batavia and the other factories that he anticipated 
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stretching from the Cape to Japan. In the years immediately following the 
establishment of Batavia Coen envisioned a migration of Dutch colonists from 
reputable families to people the new town and supply reliable crews for the 
intra-Asian vessels and routes. He shifted his policy in the mid 1620s, 
however, to favoring the divesting of intra-Asian shipping to the Chinese 
population of Batavia, concentrating the Company’s resources instead on the 
Europe-Indies “return.” It was during this period that the term retourschip 
entered the Company’s records.176 A brief hiatus in the flow of ships leaving 
the Republic for permanent deployment in the Indies resulted, which 
resumed, however, on Coen’s death in 1629, after which the Company again 
picked up and expanded its intra-Asian shipping concerns: as a result demand 
for a variety of ships from the Netherlands to serve the intra-Asian network 
continued throughout the rest of the Company’s history.177 This hiatus appears 
significant as marking the moment when the retourschip entered the 
Company’s language and was established as the archetypal and, briefly, only 
important type of VOC ship. It would take many decades for distinctive 
retourschepen to fill the Company’s networks, however, or for them to exclude 
other ship types from the retour route. 
 
                                                
176 Parthesius: Dutch Ships. 
177 The steady expansion in the number and size of Indies factories is recorded by 
Gaastra, with 25 major factories operating at the peak of the network in the 1680s: the 
hiatus noted by Parthesius cannot be detected in Gaastra’s figures, which only deal in 
the flow of persons per decade. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 85-95. 
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Thus it was exactly during a period of diversification in the Company’s 
operations, shipping missions, and ship types that the “typical” ship came to 
mean only one form, the retourschip, which served to mask that diversification 
in the Company’s records, particularly from observers in Europe. 
 
The retourschip and the pre-company paradigm 
The concentration on the return to Patria, and the eventual evolution of the 
retourschip as the “typical” ship, can be seen as parts of an attempt to 
domesticate the pre-company paradigm and the expectations it generated into 
forms congenial to the VOC’s needs. The use of the retourschip in images, 
popular narratives and Company records to represent the type of the VOC 
ship supported an idea of continuity between the operational paradigm of the 
pre-companies and that of the VOC; it tended to obscure both the formation 
and operation of the intra-Asian network and changes in the Company’s labor 
relations, such that these are only now being explored by historians.178  
 
Continued reference to the pre-company paradigm’s fundamental 
components—the self-sufficiency of the ship in the Indies and the settling of 
                                                
178 Jacobs: Merchant in Asia. Parthesius: Dutch Ships. Lucassen, J: “A Multinational and 
its Labor Force: The Dutch East India Company, 1595–1795” International Labor and 
Working-Class History, 66 (25 Feb 2005), 12-39. Despite increased attention currently 
being paid to the business of the intra-Asian network, the ships that operated it have 
so far remained obscure. The Colourful World of the VOC, a general introduction to the 
Company published for the 400 year anniversary, even though it included a large 
section on intra-Asian trade, limited its discussion of VOC ships to the retourschepen, 
which it described as the Company’s “workhorses.” Akveld, L, & Jacobs, E (eds.): The 
Colourful World of the VOC: national anniversary book VOC 1602 2002 (Bussum: Thoth, 
2002). 
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accounts promised by return—supported a mode of deferred freedom and 
reward for mariners during their contract periods: the moment of return to 
Europe retained its carnival gloss through the withholding of over half of each 
mariner’s wages, which were paid out in a lump sum that formed a kind of 
surrogate treasure, associated with, but not practically tied to, the auctioning 
of the returning ship’s cargo. The isolation of the crew on the ship helped limit 
the mariner’s engagement with and investment in the Indies. Through 
isolation and the withholding of wages a mariner’s five year contract, which 
involved multiple journeys within the Indies and multiple purchases and sales 
of cargoes, was recast as a single voyage event, while the VOC’s mariners 
were converted from junior partners in a cooperative trading enterprise into 
employee-servants who held no direct stake in the Company’s profitability 
and no direct interest in the routes they plied. 
 
The casting of the contract period as a single adventure may also have 
contributed to the “lords of six weeks” phenomenon that formed an important 
part of the VOC seaman’s reputation in the Netherlands.179 This phenomenon 
consisted of an extended binge of feasting, drinking and whoring indulged by 
some VOC seafarers on receipt of their wages in Patria. The stereotypical VOC 
seaman ended his binge back in debt on the streets of Amsterdam, seeking to 
sign on for a second East Indies voyage to pay off his creditors. Just how 
prevalent this pattern really was among seafarers is a matter of debate. The 
                                                
179 Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on 
Board, 1602-1795,”The Mariners mirror 49. 2 (May 1963), 81-104. 
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trope clearly served Company interests, however: to the extent that the 
Company’s seamen could be persuaded to perform the part of irresponsible, 
debt-incurring wastrels ashore, they could be kept desperate and short of 
options beyond the VOC, bonded to the Company at perpetually preferential 
rates. Moreover, the more of their wages they spent in port cities in the 
Republic, the less VOC seamen might extract from its patrimonial economy. A 
bad reputation for its seamen in Patria may also have helped the Company 
indirectly: reportedly ship masters in the fishing fleets and shorter cargo 
carrying trades were reluctant to take VOC men because of their rough 
manners and unreliability: a reputation as an adventurer did not necessarily 
serve a mariner back in the bosom of civilized, domestic sea-work.  
 
3. Standardization  
Sources for the physical forms of retourschepen during the Company’s early 
years are scarce: although the type and function of the retourschip had been 
established in the Company’s records in the 1620s there is little evidence that 
ships identified by the type conformed to a distinct, consistent plan or size.180 
This changed between 1660 and 1750, however, during what I am calling the 
period of standardization, when the retourschip seems to have changed 
                                                
180 DAS shows a considerable variation among ships returning to the Netherlands 
between 1620 and 1680,  many of which were unclassified or marked interchangeably 
as retourschepen or spiegelschepen (ships with flat, decorated transoms): they range in 
capacity from 120 to 1210 tons. The lower tonnages have generally been identified (in 
DAS and Parthesius) as smaller ship types such as the jacht and fluit, which are 
sometimes marked among the in return fleets, along with a few vessels of less than 
100 tons, marked as hoekers and bootjes. DAS III.  
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incrementally from a functional classification to a set of standard vessels. The 
result was the production, by 1750, of plans and specifications describing three 
classes or rates of vessels, all retourschepen, which were intended to stand as 
the models on which all further VOC production of ships would be based. 
Following 1750 the records of ships sent to the Indies show great uniformity, 
almost all of them conforming to the larger two of these rates, until 1782 when 
the disastrous Fourth Anglo-Dutch War forced a radical revision of VOC 
shipping strategy.181 
 
The story of this standardization reflects the attempts by the Heren XVII 
simultaneously to understand and control the characteristics of the  ships they 
commissioned and deployed. These simultaneous attempts were played out in 
documents – reports, resolutions, manuals and plans, created to describe and 
define the forms of the ships for the Heren XVII, for shipbuilders and for the 
Company’s records.  
 
Increasing documentation 
The reason for the steady increase in the documentation of the ships and the 
centralizing of control over them in the hands of the Company’s ruling 
council, over considerably more than a century of operations, is not 
completely clear. A number of scholars have commented on such attempts 
toward a controlling understanding from the center of power as characteristic 
                                                
181 DAS II. Dillo, I. G: De Nadagen Van De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1783-1795: 
Schepen En Zeevarenden. (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1992).  
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of the enlightenment moment in European history. The efforts of the Heren 
XVII could be understood as early manifestations of an urge toward what 
Foucault termed “power-knowledge,” and therefore fitted into a teleological 
account of enlightenment as early examples of the spread of ideas among 
ruling elites regarding rational power, hegemony and the engineered consent 
of the governed.182 The efforts certainly aimed at disciplining and rationalizing 
the ways in which Company ships were built and used. The production of 
standard units of trade and control can also be understood as part of an urge 
toward what James Scott has called “legibility,” and Latour and Callon have 
called “black boxing,” consisting of attempts to conform the objects of control 
to a simplified scheme, easy to notate in centralized records, which allows for 
the strategic planning of mass actions on those objects so as to yield 
predictable results.183 Scott in particular has pointed out that centrally-
controlled, ‘rationalist’ projects (of which the VOC certainly stands as an 
example) tend to produce views of the world over which they exercise power  
composed of standardized units and subjects, as part of the replacing of local 
                                                
182 Power here is defined following Foucault, as interpreted by Stuart Elden: “Power 
is not domination, it is the ability to get things done: it’s creative, constructive. It only 
manifests in action, rather than being held passively” Elden, S: Mapping the Present; 
Heidegger, Foucault and the project of  spatial history (London, New York: Continuum, 
2001), 105-6. 
183 Scott, J. C: Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
have Failed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Callon, M. & Latour, B: 
“Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure reality and how 
sociologists help them to do so.” in Knorr-Cetina, K. D. & Cicourel, A. V. (Eds.) 
Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-
Sociologies. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 277-303. 
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knowledge with “documentary facts.”184 Such a tendency might be seen in the 
Heren XVII’s attempts to contain Company ship design in plans subject to its 
own review, rather than trusting in the time-tested skills of its master 
shipbuilders, who worked without plans or detailed oversight. 
 
Such explanations tend to abstract ruling elites to single entities, however—to 
“black box” them for the purpose of understanding vertical relations of 
power. They do not effectively account for multiple centers of power within 
an organization, for power struggles within the center(s), or for the ways in 
which power-knowledge could be passed from one ruler to another, such as 
between the Chambers, the ruling council and the Indies factories, or from 
sitting directors to their successors. 
 
The Heren XVII were accountable to their shareholders, the broad group of 
bewindhebbers or directors among the six Chambers, and to the Staten 
Generaal, which held the keys to their trade monopoly in the Indies. They 
were, moreover, closely tied to these extra-Company interests, since many of 
them also sat on governing councils including the Staten Generaal or had close 
                                                
184 Scott: Seeing Like a State. The stolid attachment of the VOC to a centralized model, 
while other companies (notably the English EIC) adopted adaptive, internally-
competitive models, has been noted (Steensgaard, N: “The Growth and Composition 
of the Long-distance Trade of England and the Dutch Republic before 1750” in Tracy, 
J. D. (ed): The Rise of Merchant Empires: long-distance trade in the early modern world, 
1350-1750 (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 255-286: 277. Furber, H: Rival Empires 
of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976). 
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relatives there.185 Through the eighteenth century the Company’s rising costs 
and sinking profits prompted growing unease among these groups, which 
manifested particularly at those moments when the Company’s monopoly 
charter was due for review and renegotiation.186 The most extensive reform 
and complete description of the Company’s ships was tied to such a 
renegotiation, as part of Governor-General van Imhoff’s extensive redress of 
the Company in 1742.187 Increased reporting might simply have reflected 
dwindling confidence in the ability of the Company to resolve its own 
problems. 
 
Finally, it seems that over time more explicit knowledge regarding the 
Company’s operations was required because implicit or local knowledge 
among the directors could no longer be assumed. The single most important 
document for charting the Heren XVII’s knowledge and understanding of 
Company affairs is Pieter van Dam’s five-volume Description of the Company, 
written nearly a century after the Company’s establishment.188 Van Dam was 
the Company’s Advocate, the senior secretary to the Heren XVII, “the only 
                                                
185 Adams, J: The Familial State: ruling families and merchant capitalism in early modern 
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
186 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company? Steur, J. J: Herstel of Ondergang. De 
voorstellen tot redress van de VOC 1740-1795 (Utrecht: HES Uitg, 1984).  
187 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. See Kist for renegotiation. 
188 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, 
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permanent functionary at the highest level” of Company policy-making.189 The 
Description, commissioned in 1693 and delivered in 1701, drew on van Dam’s 
50 years’ service with the VOC and outlined the Company’s holdings and 
factories, its trade goods and assets, the terms of its charter and by-laws,  and 
its shipping and shipbuilding; it offered a complete manual for VOC 
operations, for the use of the Heren XVII and, presumably, for the instruction 
of directors newly appointed to the council. Its value as a working document 
and as an encapsulation of the power-knowledge of the directors can be seen 
in the fact that it was kept under lock and key in the ruling council’s chambers 
until the dissolution of the Company.190 Adams has identified a sociological 
shift among the Company’s directors during the “periwig period” of the 
eighteenth century away from men actively engaged in the business of 
shipping and selling commodities to rentiers who inherited their directorships 
along with their country houses.191 Later generations, being more distant from 
the business and culture of seafaring, may have needed more training. This in 
turn required a formalization of knowledge and increased reliance on 
documents, such as the Description, prepared by expert functionaries in the 
Company.192 
                                                
189 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 151 
190 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1 ix.  
191 Adams: The Familial State. 
192 This formalization is analogous to the process described by James Scott in Seeing 
Like a State, in which many forms and systems of implicit, local knowledge, which he 
groups together as metis, are reorganized into a uniform code of teachable, 
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Toward a complete description 
Van Dam’s Description played an important role in the history of VOC ships. 
As a collection of documents drawn from the Company’s archives it offers an 
apparently authoritative account of VOC shipbuilding to 1700, encompassing 
the besteks (charters or specifications) by which the first purpose-made VOC 
ships were built and subsequent modifications to those specifications up to the 
time of writing. As an index of the knowledge of the Heren XVII regarding 
VOC ships in 1700 it is unrivalled. 
 
The account offered in the Description is far from disinterested, however: it 
was prepared at the same time as what appears to be the pivot of the “period 
of standardization:” the declaration of the first set of VOC rates, in 1697.193 The 
system of rating ships according to their size and firepower originated with 
the navies of England and France. When first introduced these rates described 
general categories of ships that could be expected to fulfill similar roles, as 
floating fortresses, cruisers or scouts.194 In the 1670s, however, both the English 
                                                                                                                                       
theoretical, but decidedly partial knowledge, which he terms techne. Scott: Seeing Like 
a State. 
193 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1, 456. 
194 The highly diverse fleet of the English navy was divided into six rates in 1633. The 
first establishment laid down detailed specifications to standardize the building of 
new ships in these rates in 1677. In France, Colbert set out similar specifications for 
Navy rates in 1674. The Dutch case is more complex, with little standardization 
between the five Admiralties. In 1737 the shipwright and sometime spy Blaise 
Ollivier observed that eight different, somewhat variable, categories of warships were 
known in the Netherlands, but that these were organized for administrative and 
strategic purposes into five rates. Gardiner: Line of Battle 14-16. Ollivier, B & Roberts, 
D. H: Eighteenth Century Shipbuilding: remarks on the navies of the dockyards in 1737 
(Rotherfield: Jean Boudriot Publications, 1992), 203.   
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and French navies began to standardize their rates, such that by the middle of 
the eighteenth century the term “a Royal Navy ship of the third rate” 
described a specific type of vessel, following a standard hull, rigging, 
armament, crew complement and victualing.195 The VOC rates took the form 
of detailed specifications for three particular vessels, all retourschepen, which 
were essentially identical in their proportions, lines and function, differing 
only in their overall sizes, and which could, given their uniformity, be given in 
shorthand simply by referring to their lengths: of 160, 145 and 130 Amsterdam 
feet. These rates were intended to provide the standard by which all future 
VOC ships were to be built in Patria, with the exception of some few smaller 
                                                
195 The shift from general classification to close specification in naval rates in the 1670s 
appears to have been catalyzed by a sharp increase in naval shipbuilding, required to 
replace losses suffered during the second and third Anglo-Dutch wars, which 
prompted an arms race in shipbuilding around the Atlantic seaboard of Europe. The 
commissioning of large numbers of ships at a time, and the need to negotiate their 
costs through governmental institutions, lead to greater standardization in order both 
to simplify such negotiations and to increase the accountability of shipbuilders and 
navy boards. The diary of Samuel Pepys shows how such negotiations, in which the 
king and Parliament participated, could pose personal risks: Pepys, as comptroller of 
the navy, maintained careful records of all such negotiations against the day he might 
be called to account for the performance of his ships in battle. Dening states that by 
the late eighteenth century British navy rates were so specific and well understood 
that they implied distinct modes of leadership, discipline and communication, and 
were considered in the judgments of Admiralty courts, specifically in the trials 
following the famous mutiny on the Bounty. Gardiner:  Line of Battle, 14-26. Pepys, S. 
& Wheatley, H. B. (ed:): Diary of Samuel Pepys — Complete 1660 N.S. (London: George 
Bell & Sons, 1893), accessed via Project Gutenberg, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4125 on 7/5/2010; June seventeenth, 1667 (in 
which Pepys prepares the letters of his office “against a black day to defend the office 
with and myself”), June nineteenth, 1667  (in which Pepys presents his papers in 
court, while ordering his personal property removed from the office, anticipating that 
he might be turned from witness to defendant while offering deposition). Dening, G: 
Mr Bligh’s Bad Language: passion, power, and theater on the Bounty (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The precision with which manning and 
victualing requirements were specified in 1789 for the Bounty, a naval “armed 
transport” below the sixth rate, can be seen in John McKay, Anatomy of the Ship, The 
Armed Transport Bounty. (1989. London: Conway Maritime Press). 
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fluits and other special-function vessels, to be negotiated individually by the 
Chambers and the Heren XVII.196 
 
The rates mark a shift in emphasis in the Heren XVII’s efforts from gathering 
information regarding the VOC’s ships to dictating and improving their 
forms, frequently over the objections of shipbuilders, shipmasters and 
merchants serving in the Indies.197 Van Dam’s Description presents the rates as 
the natural outgrowths of a tradition established in the first years of the 
Company, of building ships according to besteks or charters: sets of uniform 
specifications to be followed by the master shipwright in order to yield ships 
with the desired proportions. Their physical characteristics are presented as 
the outcome of incremental improvements in ship design and directorial 
oversight through the seventeenth century.198 Outside van Dam’s own 
writings, however, the story appears more complex, contested and contingent. 
In the early 1680s a report by one Hendrik Decquer, commissioned by the 
Heren XVII, on the forms and sizes of actual VOC ships showed that even on 
the retour route the fleet was highly diverse, including many types of vessels 
other than retourschepen, and quite unlike the limited picture offered in van 
                                                
196 DAS I, 42. Hoving A. J, Witsen, N, Weerdt G. A. de: Nicolaes Witsens Scheeps-bouw-
konst Open Gestelt (Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, cop. 1994). Hoving: In Tekening 
Gebracht. 
197 Kist, B: “VOC shipbuilding Policy 1740-1750” in Gawronski, J.K: Hollandia 
Compendium: a contribution to the history, archeology, classification and lexicography of a 
150 ft. Dutch East Indiaman (1740-1750) (Amsterdam: Rijks Museum, 1992), 34-75. 
198 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1.  
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Dam.199 In 1671, however, the retourschip was presented as the Dutch trading 
vessel par excellence, used not only by the VOC but more generally by extra-
European Dutch traders, in a manual on Dutch methods of shipbuilding and 
maritime command written by the mayor of Amsterdam, Nicolaes Witsen.200  
 
The report and the manual offer very different perspectives on the form and 
construction of VOC ships, despite both issuing from authoritative sources 
related to the Company directors. They might be said to represent different 
epistemologies, based respectively on data and on models, that informed the 
Heren XVII. 
 
First steps to standardization 
It is doubtful whether it would have been possible, or even thinkable, to 
produce either Decquer’s or Witsen’s standardizing accounts, however, 
without the previous construction of the Oostenburg shipyards in 
Amsterdam, the largest industrial production facility in the world on its 
completion in 1660.201  At Oostenburg, raw materials from all over Europe 
were processed into as many as eight ships a year, together with all of their 
                                                
199 AN Collectie Hudde, 22-23: Decquer, H: Middelen om Uit te Vinden de Ware Ladinge 
der Scheepen na hare Groote {Means for Determining the Possible Capacities of Ships 
From Their Dimensions), (1685) VOC 1431, 1442, 1457c. 
200 Nicolaas Witsen. Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. Ofte Aaloude en 
Hedendaagsche Scheeps-bouw en Bestier, (Amsterdam, 1671, reprinted Franeker: Van 
Wijnen, 1994). 
201 Kist, J. B et al: Van VOC tot Werkspoor. Het Amsterdamse industrieterrein Oostenburg 
(Utrecht Matrijs, 1986).  
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necessary equipment, including ropes, sails, clothing, tableware and 
decorative carving.202 
 
Massive investment in Oostenburg and the smaller yards of the minor 
chambers during the 1650s and 1660s allowed the VOC to realize a long-
standing policy goal of building all its ships in-house, within facilities wholly 
controlled by the Heren XVII.203 Centralization of the Amsterdam chamber’s 
ship production at Oostenburg allowed for a greater standardization of parts 
and a move toward early assembly-line methods. While multiple ships with 
the same broad characteristics stood on the stocks together, it was easy to see 
that standardization of parts – especially of metalwork, would aid production 
and maintenance. Moreover, the centralization of the Oostenburg yards 
facilitated oversight by the Company’s directors and made shipwrights 
                                                
202 Ship production numbers are compiled from a survey of outward bound 
Amsterdam chamber vessels built between 1670 and 1680. DAS II. Much of the minor 
equipment was contracted out to independent suppliers, who were not infrequently 
related to Company directors or well-placed servants. All of these materials were, 
however, assembled and administrated through the Oostenburg offices, such that the 
facility can be considered a complete shipbuilding and –supplying one-stop shop. 
Jerzy Gawronski has explored the rich web of business relations and contracts that 
linked Amsterdam tailors, tanners, farmers, glaziers and more in the supplying of the 
Amsterdam and Hollandia in the mid eighteenth century. Gawronski, J: De 
“Equipagie” van de Hollandia en de Amsterdam: VOC-bedrijvigheid in 18de-eeuws 
Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1996). 
203 Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge, I.1, 456-496. Amsterdam was only required to provide 
half of the Company’s ships, the remaining chambers were required to supply the 
other half, in proportion to their share in the Company’s initial investment and 
profits. Differences between VOC shipyards have received relatively little attention, 
however. Oostenburg appears to have played a large role in setting standards for 
shipbuilding and rendering ships visible to the Company’s directors. Kist: van VOC to 
Werkspoor. 
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available to them for consultation on demand.204   
 
Nicolaes Witsen  
This last feature of the yards was used extensively by Nicolaes Witsen in the 
preparation of his shipbuilding manual. Witsen’s manual is important to the 
development of the “typical” VOC ship because it spelled out for the first 
time, for a lay audience, the method of building, the characteristics and the 
operation of such a ship, which he termed a pinas.205  
Writing for the economic and ruling elite of Amsterdam as a prominent city 
                                                
204 Kist: van VOC to Werkspoor. 
205 Some explanation of this simple statement is in order, since Witsen does not 
explicitly call his pinas a retourschip, and in general usage in the Dutch Republic at the 
time the term pinas was applied, like most ship classifications, unsystematically to a 
wide range of vessels. Hoving has built a considerable case for interpreting Witsen’s 
pinas as narrowly describing the VOC retourschip as a distinctive class of vessels, 
comparing it with contemporary models of known VOC ships. The term pinas was 
further used interchangeably within the VOC at the close of the seventeenth century 
with retourschip. Witsen does identify his pinas as a vessel suitable for Indies voyages, 
citing “Curacao, Aleppo, Guinea or elsewhere” as typical ports of call. This causes 
some confusion, however, since of these ports, the Indies destinations are all in the 
Atlantic realm, i.e. WIC territory, and in general the WIC operated ships of lower 
tonnage than the VOC. It would therefore be extremely useful as a means for 
verifying the association of Witsen’s pinas specifically with an East India ship to be 
able to gauge its cargo capacity (tonnage). It is not possible from Witsen’s 
instructions, however, to derive the tonnage of the pinas described with any accuracy. 
Going on length alone, Witsen’s pinas, at 134 Amsterdam feet, would have been 
comparable to a VOC second rate retourschip of the eighteenth century, which varied 
over time between 130 and 140 feet. Hoving points out, however, that van Dam and 
other contemporary sources mention wide variation in tonnages for the same lengths 
of ship, such that an absolutely positive identification remains elusive. For the 
purposes of the current discussion the question of specificity to the VOC is made 
moot, however, by Witsen’s more general claim for his pinas, that it represents all 
Dutch-built ships of its size, a set that includes the subset of retourschepen. Hoving: 
Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst, 22, 36, 39-42. Hoving, A. J: "A seventeenth-
Century Dutch 134-foot Pinas: A Reconstruction after Aeloude en Hedendaegse 
Scheepsbouw en Bestier by Nicolaes Witsen 1671." IJNA 17.4 (1988), 331-338. Heijer, 
H. J. den: De geschiedenis van de WIC. DAS I. 
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father and statesman, Witsen aimed his work at his fellow gentlemen burghers 
who wished to know about the industry they funded and which supported 
their families.206 The book was compiled, however, through long association 
with the shipwrights working at Oostenburg.207 Witsen was the ideal figure for 
presenting the knowledge of these shipwrights to the polite society of 
Amsterdam: his credentials as a man of creditworthy opinions were 
impeccable.208 Prior to serving as burgermeester (mayor) of Amsterdam Witsen 
had been a governor in the VOC; later, when Peter the Great visited 
Amsterdam in order to learn shipbuilding at Oostenburg yards, Witsen was 
                                                
206 Hoving notes that while Witsen’s text appears generally accurate it lacks much 
technical information that would have been essential for completing actual ships. In 
contrast, the Rotterdam shipbuilder Van Yk’s scheeps-bouw-konst open gesteld is 
evidently addressed to his fellow shipwrights, being couched in their familiar 
technical language and offering concise but complete instructions as to the 
preparation, treatment and joining of wooden baulks. Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens 
scheeps-bouw-konst. Yk, C. van, Voorstad, A, Claesz ten Hoorn, J, Luiken, J, De 
Nederlandsche Scheeps-bouw-konst Open Gestelt. Vertoonende naar wat Regel, of 
Evenredenheyd, in Nederland Meest Alle Scheepen Werden Gebouwd… (Rotterdam, 1697, 
reprinted Delft: SPD, 1981).  
207 Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst. 
208 In his discussion of the sociology of scientific knowledge in eighteenth century 
England, Steven Shapin has noted that “what underwrote assent to knowledge claims  
was the word of a gentleman.” Drawing on Shapin’s model of the generation of 
assent through the collection of the opinions of creditworthy sponsors, I contend that 
Witsen’s involvement in writing about shipbuilding was vital to the reception of the 
topic as a worthy one for discussion in Amsterdam polite society. Few other 
individuals commanded such social capital: Witsen served as the burgermeester of 
Amsterdam 13 times and was appointed to the council for Amsterdam’s defense 
during the second Anglo-Dutch War in 1672. He was also known as a prominent 
member of Amsterdam’s intelligentsia, with a lively interest in engineering and 
practical arts, and as a skilled negotiator, being appointed later in his career 
ambassador to Russia and to England. Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst, 23. 
Shapin, S: “The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England” Isis. 79. 3, A 
Special Issue on Artifact and Experiment. (Sep., 1988), pp. 373-404. Whether the 
Oostenburg yards could be considered an institutional “house of experiment,” a 
proving ground for ideas seeking acceptance in broader Amsterdam society, is 
beyond the scope of the current work. 
 118 
chosen to act as his mentor.209  
 
Witsen’s discussion of shipbuilding is accordingly framed for an intellectual 
audience, with a structure similar to contemporary architectural treatises. 
Beginning with a universal history of shipbuilding, in which Noah’s Ark takes 
the place of the Temple of Solomon as the primordial model of the 
shipwright’s art, it contains discussions of Roman, contemporary European, 
Turkish and Indies traditions, all presented as introductory material for his 
detailed treatment of the technical principles of contemporary Dutch 
shipbuilding.210  
 
With sections on the organization of shipyards and on the acquisition of 
suitable timbers and other materials, Witsen’s book was the first to address the 
business and practicalities of both shipbuilding and the commanding of ships 
as suitable concerns for the genteel society to which the Company’s directors 
belonged. The book is also notable for setting out for the first time something 
approaching a theory of Dutch shipbuilding and command, with considerable 
detail on the history and laws of the latter; the complete work forming an 
instruction manual for the Dutch elite regarding what to expect from ships 
                                                
209 Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst, 23 
210 Nicolaas Witsen: Architectura Navalis. A discussion of Villalpando’s 1572 
description of the Temple of Solomon as the supposedly perfect structure, 
comparable with the human body as a basis for correct proportion and measurement, 
can be found in Evers, Bernd, Christof Thoenes, Kunstbibliothek (Berlin, and 
Germany). Architectural theory: from the Renaissance to the present: 89 essays on 117 
treatises (Taschen, 2003), 366-377.   
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and what they ought to know about them. 
 
Witsen’s book provides a unique look into the form, image and public 
understanding of the retourschip in the seventeenth century. Not only does it 
provide the most complete description of Dutch shipbuilding practices 
available to historians for the period, it also offered a unique glimpse of VOC 
ships to the seventeenth century Dutch public, one rich in detail from 
otherwise unpublished shipwrights’ manuals and shipyard accounts. Of 
particular interest for this study, it was the first publication to provide sections 
and plans that show the division of interior spaces alongside the more usual 
concentration on the structure, strength and hydrodynamics of the hull.  
 
Most importantly, however, Witsen unambiguously presented his pinas not 
only as an exemplary model of and for VOC ships but as “the true model for 
all ships of the time;” an appropriate basis for a general theory of shipbuilding 
from which a wide range of other vessels could be derived.211 Witsen’s pinas 
stands as the epitome of the retourschip as armed trader or merchant galleon, 
related both to the oorlogsjachten (fast warships) used by the VOC’s explorers 
in the early seventeenth century and the larger, heavier ships termed pinassen 
that plied the retour route at the end of the century.212 Although it was 
                                                
211 Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst, 22. 
212 The terms oorlogsjacht and pinas were used interchangeably to describe, for 
instance, the flagships of explorers Olivier van Noort in 1598, and Abel Tasman in the 
1630s and 1640s. Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst, 304-5.  
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constructed for trade rather than war, with internal bracing sacrificed to the 
interests of tonnage, its lines and armament were most comparable to those of 
a fregat (frigate), the class of relatively light, fast warships that served as the 
main workhorses of the Dutch Admiralties in the second half of the 
seventeenth century.213  
 
Decquer and Nieuwstad 
For all its unique detail and meticulous research, however, Witsen’s book did 
not deal with any actually extant vessels: it described the kinds of ships 
understood to be constructed for the VOC, but not the state of the VOC fleet 
itself. The knowledge that the Heren XVII actually possessed regarding the 
Company’s ships can be read in the reports they commissioned in the early 
1680s from Decquer and Nieuwstad, two fiscaals who were dispatched to the 
docks of Amsterdam and Batavia respectively in order to observe, measure 
and assess the Company’s vessels.214  
                                                
213 Hoving derived these lines, that suggest a comparatively fast-sailing ship, rather 
than a vessel built principally for hold space, from reconstructing Witsen’s pinas as a 
model. At the time of Witsen’s writing the term fregat denoted any light and fast 
warship, with up to 50 guns, carried on one or two decks. The term supplanted pinas 
in the Dutch Admiralties during the first two Anglo-Dutch wars in the 1650s to 1670s, 
to describe ships of broadly similar characteristics and functions. These ships were 
capable of fighting alongside heavier “ships of the line,” the heaviest carrying as 
many as 112 guns on up to three decks. The VOC adopted the term fregat from the 
Dutch admiralties to describe its retourschepen in the early eighteenth century, 
replacing pinas as the dominant classification. Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-
konst, 37. Gardiner: The Line of Battle.   
214 The office of fiscaal might best be translated “auditor.” The VOC employed fiscaals 
throughout its operation, sending them to assist in court cases and audit Indies 
factories, as well as shipping production in Patria. Decquer: Middelen. Nieuwstad’s 
reports were not published. They are found in the Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren, 
1680-82, AN VOC 1431, 1442 and 1457. 
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In particular, the reports show that the directors as a group knew very little 
about the forms of their ships; Decquer’s introduction states that he was 
tasked with describing the Company’s ships for the directors, to increase their 
understanding of the fleet. His description includes accepted methods for 
loading ships with barrels and loose goods (possibly anticipating efficiency-
maximizing debates about wasted interstitial space in the holds).  
 
The reports also make plain that the cargo hold was the primary shipboard 
space the Heren XVII were eager to standardize and render legible, to oversee 
and control. Decquer’s and Nieuwstad’s reports were commissioned primarily 
in order to find out the cargo capacities (tonnages) of Company ships in 
service. The stated reasons for the investigation were, on the one hand,  to 
ensure safe and efficient loading of vessels, such that the Heren XVII might 
better understand how many vessels were required to maintain the 
Company’s shipping capacity, and on the other, to assess the possible extent 
of smuggling within the Company and deter it through closer control of hold 
space.215 We can thus see that the urge to standardize the Company’s fleet 
began in defense of the Company’s monopoly against the illicit trade of its 
servants.  
 
Even given this limited brief, however, Decquer found it impossible to render 
                                                
215 The introduction of Decquer’s report clearly states  the intention to prevent “het 
onoordentelyk en zoo nageeligh misbruik van’s Compagnies scheepen” (the disorderly 
misuse of the Company’s ships). Decquer: Middelen, 2.  
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a full and reliable account of the fleet, because of the variety in size and form 
of the ships he encountered. The situation Nieuwstad encountered at Batavia 
was even harder to generalize, since it included ships of the intra-Asian fleet. 
Decquer eventually reported on a sampling of 14 more or less representative 
vessels, which included a wide variety of mariner’s classifications (including 
fluits, jachts, pinassen, kats and Spiegel-schepen), from which he derived an 
apparently reliable method of calculating hold capacity, given accurate 
measurements of a ships’ length and breadth, and the depth of its hold.216  
 
Decquer’s report contains one further remarkable feature that suggests an 
attempt to build a theory of the Company’s ships, to impose an orderly, 
typical view on highly heterogeneous data, and that anticipates the imposition 
of rates. In describing the Company’s ships Decquer attempted to resolve 
them into four basic, typical models based on their tonnages, thereby creating 
the first ordering of VOC ships into homogenous classes based on size.217 
These classes were represented with deck plans, which provide one of the first 
accounts of the placement and size of non-cargo spaces, such as galleys and 
supply-rooms, aboard VOC vessels. The reliability of these plans when 
applied to any specific, individual ship cannot be assessed, although it is clear 
from the report that they exclude vessel types such as the fluit and the kat, 
                                                
216 Decquer’s calculation remained in use through the remainder of the Company’s 
history. Tested against a number of models and wreck sites it has been assessed 
reasonably reliable. Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst. DAS I. 
217 Decquer: Middelen. 
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which required separate illustration.218 Nonetheless, the urge to find a typical 
solution to the problem of representing a diverse fleet is apparent. 
 
The rates 
Given this context, it can be seen that the idea of rates describing standardized 
vessels was far from revolutionary in 1697. There had even been requests from 
the Council of the Indies for “no more than some few rates” because serving a 
limited variety of retourschepen made both repairs and loading easier in the 
Indies.219 The degree to which the rates of 1697 really determined Company 
shipbuilding in the early eighteenth century remains somewhat unclear, 
however: the introduction of rates began a period of conflict over ship design 
and frequent revisions to the rates that lasted from 1697 to 1749.  
 
As for the degree to which actual vessels conformed to the rates, the 
archaeological record to date does not provide sufficient information to 
resolve the distance between description and reality. Ab Hoving has noted, 
however, that half-models of the last ships built by the Company in 1795 did 
not correspond with the plans of the most recent revision of the rates, drawn 
in 1750. The plans were the result of a protracted battle within the Company 
to introduce lines influenced by British shipbuilding philosophy. The models, 
however, showed very traditionally Dutch curves, suggesting that some 
                                                
218 Decquer: Middelen. 
219 DAS I, 41. 
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resistance, or undocumented revision, was being practiced in the Company’s 
shipbuilding, outside the framework of the Heren XVII’s pronouncements.220  
 
The rates and resistance to them has commonly been discussed as a contest 
between the Company’s master shipwrights and the Heren XVII.221 
Determining the rates, and with them, the conceptual form of the East 
Indiaman, involved several other parties, however, including the directors of 
the Company’s six chambers, who were charged with financing and 
supplying the VOC’s ships, the Staten Generaal, which granted the Company’s 
monopoly charter, and the shipmasters who commanded the vessels. 
Moreover, the 1697 rates did not specify how ships were to be built; they only 
stated how large they had to be and the relative proportions of their parts. 
Although they necessarily entailed an increase in the power of formal 
knowledge in the hands of the Heren XVII relative to that of the shipbuilder’s 
traditional know-how, in practical terms they acted more to restrict the choices 
of those who commissioned ships than the practices of those who built 
them.222  
 
The primary source of resistance to the 1697 rates appears to have been the 
governors of the Company’s individual chambers. A review of ships built in 
                                                
220 Hoving, A. J: personal communication. 
221 DAS I. 
222 Hoving: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst; Ollivier: eighteenth century shipbuilding. 
Scott: techne and metis, Seeing Like a State. 
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the years after 1697 shows that although the rates dominated the reporting of 
which ships were produced, some smaller vessels continued to be produced, 
and among the rated ships, small variations between the Chambers emerged. 
Alterations to the rates in 1714, making the ships broader and a little 
shallower, reflected the practice already in effect in some of the Chambers’ 
yards.223 One reason for this variation between ships may have been shipyard 
directors and Chambers attempting to “game the system,” making ships 
subtly larger than their specifications in order to carry more cargo for their 
own Chamber.224 Another reason was local differences  between shipyards, 
such as narrow lock gates and shallows in the Zuiderzee  or on upriver 
reaches where the yards of Delft and Rotterdam were located, which also 
imposed their own restrictions, preventing the largest of the rates from being 
built by any Chamber except Zeeland in the 1720s.225  
 
The existence of formal rates also provided a target for fault-finding when 
disasters overcame Company fleets. Following the loss at Table Bay of 10 
                                                
223 DAS I, 43-47. 
224 The practice lead famously to the breaking up of two ships on the stocks, on 
discovery that they were too large to be launched into the scheldt, prompting 
Tieleman’s 1747 poem: Treurdicht wegens het Wonderlyk Omstorten, van een Nieuw OIC 
schip (elegy on the toppling of a new-built ship). MMPH Ladenkast 20S. 
225 The rates of 1697 all had the same relative proportions between length, breadth 
and the height of the hold, the length to width ratio being 4:1 and the height of the 
hold being roughly 42% of the width. The first rate was 160 feet long, the second 145 
feet and the third 130 feet long. Following Witsen’s design scheme, proportions 
would be maintained strictly throughout ships of different sizes, such that the heights 
between decks, of doors and mast steps and anchor bitts would all be different 
between rates according to the difference in length. DAS I, 43-47. 
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outward-bound ships in 1722 and of eight returning ships in 1737, reforms of 
the Company’s rates were demanded. The latter loss was financially far worse 
for the Company, since the ships were laden with nearly two million guilders 
worth of Indies goods.226 The reason for the sinkings at Table Bay was well 
known: seasonal severe winds made Table Bay an unsafe anchorage from 
April to mid July, when storm surge could break the hold of anchors on the 
bottom of the bay, dashing the ships against the coast.227 Nonetheless, some 
hitherto unidentified fault was suspected in the design of the rates, or, rather, 
in the modifications of 1714.228 
 
Van Imhoff and the standard retourschip 
The combined crises of the loss of ships and cargo in 1737 and the massacre of 
the Chinese population of Batavia and outbreak of a Chinese revolt across 
northern Java in 1740 joined more general anxieties regarding sinking profits, 
growing competition and corrupt mismanagement in the Indies. These events 
made political elites in the Netherlands seriously question the East India 
                                                
226 The story of the disaster is quoted from an unidentified 1784 book detailing the life 
of one Herr Allemann in The Cape monthly magazine. J. C. Juta, 1872. Boeseken, A. J: 
Jan van Riebeeck en Sy Gesin (Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers. 1974). 
227 The fact that the one surviving ship was saved by the quick thinking of the first 
mate, who ordered a number of cannons to be dropped down the anchor cable to 
hold the anchor down, did nothing to dissuade the Heren XVII of the idea that the 
ships themselves were faulty. Cape monthly. 
228 DAS I, 45. 
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Company’s ability to deal with its own problems.229 
 
These crises coincided with the periodic expiration of the Company’s 
monopoly charter and the need for its renewal by the Staten Generaal in 1742. 
The Staten Generaal made renewal of the charter contingent on a general 
reform of the Company’s operations, ushering in the period of Gustaf Van 
Imhoff’s redress, the full scope and consequences of which are beyond the 
bounds of this discussion.  
 
Van Imhoff proposed a complete overhaul both of the rates themselves and 
their method of construction, leading to a sharp increase in the formal 
specification both of the ship and its manner of operation in 1742. There 
followed a protracted struggle between, on one side, Van Imhoff and Charles 
Bentam, the English shipwright he retained and, on the other side, the Dutch 
shipwrights who were supposed to implement the new rates.  
 
At the turn of the eighteenth century shipwrights in the Netherlands 
maintained a high degree of autonomy relative to their counterparts in Britain, 
France and Iberia, where standard plans and drawings, expanding 
bureaucratic control and the practice of “whole moulding” had weakened the 
individual shipwright’s power relative to the institutions in which he worked, 
                                                
229 Ota Atsushi: Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the 
Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830 (Brill, Leiden, 2006). Blusse: Strange Company. Steur, 
J. J: Herstel of Ondergang. 
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in a process of formalizing and rationalizing shipwrightry that began in the 
sixteenth century and continued well into the nineteenth.230 The organization 
and standardizing influence of the Oostenburg yards did not reduce the 
authority of the master shipwrights in Amsterdam, who continued to build by 
eye and by tradition, without drawn plans or pre-set moulds.231 They were 
able to guard their local knowledge because they built ships that matched the 
Company’s specifications faster and cheaper than they could be built 
anywhere else in Europe.232 Van Imhoff’s proposal would introduce English 
methods to the Company’s yards, however, severely curtailing the autonomy 
of the master shipwrights and potentially threatening the basis of their 
expertise. As early as 1727 English shipwrights had been employed in the 
Amsterdam Admiralty yards, where they had introduced scale plans and 
standard moulds, in order to ensure that warships made at the yards would 
conform in practice to the lines set down by their rates.233 Van Imhoff’s new 
rates, commissioned from Bentam, included plans, moulds and scale models, 
to be distributed to each of the six VOC yards in order to ensure compliance 
                                                
230 McGee, D: “From Craftsmanship to Draftsmanship: Naval Architecture and the 
Three Traditions of Early Modern Design” Technology and Culture 40.2 (1999) 209-236. 
For more on the ship builders’ disputes in England in the eighteenth century, see 
Roberts, L, Schaffer, S & Dear, P: The mindful hand: inquiry and invention from the late 
Renaissance to early industrialisation. (Amsterdam, Bristol: KNAW, 2007). 
231 In Rotterdam some moves toward formal plans were made as early as 1727, by 
master shipwright P. van Zwijndregt. There is no indication, however, that van 
Zwijndregt was required to tender such plans to the Chamber or that they acted as 
restrictions on his shipbuilding practice. Hoving et. Al: In Tekening Gebracht. 
232 Barbour, V: “Dutch and English Merchant Shipping.”  
233 Hoving et. Al: In Tekening Gebracht. 
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both with the Englishman’s specifications and with his methods (Figure 1.4: 
Bentam’s drawing for a first rate ship of 150 feet length, 1742).234  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Charles Bentam’s drawing for a first rate ship of 150 feet length, 
1742. Collection of the Scheepvaartmuseum, Amsterdam. 
 
The new rates were significantly different from everything that had come 
before them, being narrower for their length and somewhat deeper but lighter 
built than ships of the Dutch tradition. They were criticized both by VOC 
shipwrights and shipmasters over the five years after their introduction, for 
exhibiting several bad sailing flaws. By 1749 they had been extensively 
revised, through input from the Company’s shipwrights, governors and 
merchants in the Indies, and from designs taken from two French ships 
captured in 1746.235 In 1749 new rates were issued, ostensibly still based on 
Van Imhoff’s rates of 1742, and on the basis of these rates the Company’s 
retourschepen reached their most standardized and stable forms, which lasted 
                                                
234 Kist, B: “A short discussion.” 
235 Kist, B: “A short discussion.” 
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until the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in the 1780s.236  
 
As stated above, it remains unclear to what extent ships built after 1749 
conformed to Van Imhoff’s plans. The period of Van Imhoff’s redress is 
remarkable, however, for the degree to which the design of retourschepen 
became a matter of open debate, between the Heren XVII, the directors and 
shipwrights and shipmasters, such that the most detailed records, providing 
the clearest image of shipboard space and organization, emerge during the 
period 1742-1750. Where resistance to the rates of 1697 took the form of 
quietly-implemented design changes that eventually became the norm, 
resistance to the rates of 1742 was expressed openly and documented, and the 
image of the VOC ship was challenged and reworked. Conceptually, then, in 
terms of its received image, the standardized ship of 1749 had no competitors 
until the 1780s, and although it lost its hegemony, it remained unrevised until 
the end of Company operations in 1795. We can thus state that the plans of 
1749 provided an accurate representation of the standard East India ship, as 
understood, at least, by the Heren XVII, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. 
 
                                                
236 Dillo, I. G: De Nadagen. 
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4. The end of standardization and the age of improvisation  
The fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-4) broke the continuity of the Company’s 
trading operations and shipbuilding, and greatly reduced its fleet. The VOC 
lost a number of important Indies factories: those that remained became places 
of defensive retreat rather than expansion. The war also introduced Dutch 
naval vessels to the Indian Ocean for the first time, breaking the VOC’s claim 
to exclusive presence. Despite the involvement of the naval forces, however, 
the incursion of British vessels into Dutch harbors and over Dutch trade routes 
simply could not be resisted: the Dutch navy, long outstripped by those of 
Britain and France, was reduced to escort and convoy duty for a limited subset 
of the VOC’s ships.237  
 
For the purposes of this study the period after 1780 is one in which the type of 
the retourschip declined, together with the business idiom of the VOC. 
Retourschepen continued to operate, but during the war were shown to be 
vulnerable and almost completely ineffective in returning rich Indies cargoes 
to Patria. Several strategies were attempted to deal with the military threat 
from Britain. VOC trade was masked under the flags of foreign nations, using 
ship types not associated with the Company, and involved lengthy diversions 
into neutral harbors or along novel routes. The use of warships as escorts was 
limited: in addition many small ships were employed to spread out the risk to 
                                                
237 Dillo, I. G: De Nadagen. 
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returning cargoes.238 In general, it can be said that the previous age of 
standardization entirely gave way to one of improvisation and adaptation to 
external factors the Company could neither control nor meet directly.  
 
After the war some efforts were made to rebuild the Company’s fleet of 
retourschepen. These ships were expensive to build and maintain, however: 
given the Company’s large debts consequent on the war, they had to be 
supplemented by cheaper vessels. The craft that best fitted the new, 
impoverished and improvisational character of the VOC’s enterprise were 
fluits, hoekers, kats and pinks, vessels adapted for fishing and cargo carrying 
over shorter distances, notably on the safe Baltic routes (Figure 1.5: section of a 
katschip, from Decquer, 1682). These were pressed into service during the war 
to serve on the retour route.239 The adoption of these simpler, smaller ships was 
a rational design response to the changed circumstances of the East India 
trade. Virtually unarmed and capable of operating with a minimal crew, they 
represented a much smaller and more focused investment than the retourschip 
had done: they were the simplest craft the Company could deploy with a 
reasonable hope of retrieving cargo from the Indies. 
                                                
238 Dillo, I. G: De Nadagen. 
239 DAS I. Pinks are not closely described in the VOC’s records: the model assumed 
here is drawn from the plans provided by shipwright Fredrik af Chapman in his 
widely-distributed 1768 work on European merchant shipping. Chapman, F. 
Architectura Navalis Mercatoria (Bielefeld; Berlin: Delius/Klasing, 1968).   
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Figure 1.5: Section of a katschip, an inexpensive trading vessel of 115 feet 
length, from Decquer: Middelen, 1682. AN Collectie Hudde 22.3. 
 
Given the ineffectiveness of Dutch sea power during the war and the relative 
stability provided by British naval presence in the Indian Ocean afterward, 
these ships can be seen as a response to a trading environment brought more 
into line with that of the more lawful and peaceful Baltic or north Atlantic: 
environments in which the key to Dutch success had been vessels that were 
cheap to build, crew and maintain, most notably fluits and katschepen.240 Before 
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War the Company’s attachment to the retourschip had 
been criticized as a sign of decadent conservatism, of a failure to keep up with 
changes in the business environment brought about by other companies.241 
The smaller ships offered efficiency in place of tradition. 
                                                
240 The pink’s predecessor, the fluit, has been used by historians as an index of the 
safety of trading environments, its relative cheapness being bought at the expense of 
defenses. Before 1780 the fluit was considered adequate for many intra-Asian routes 
but not for carrying the return cargoes, which attracted pirates, privateers and, 
during wartime, the naval vessels of foreign powers. Barbour, V: “Dutch and English 
Merchant Shipping.” Ketting: fluytschepen. 
241 DAS I. 
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I would suggest, however, that the retourschip represented an entirely different 
model of Indies trade: it supported the infrastructural requirements and 
ideational models of the Chartered Company mode: one of limited, armed 
interaction with the Indies for the purpose of extracting commodities, under 
which the French Compagnie des Indes operated until it was ousted by the 
English East India Company, and which the latter was to pursue until the 
1840s, when it was finally supplanted by outright colonialism.242 The use of 
hoekers and pinks on the retour route betokened a desperate measure by a 
company that was essentially bankrupt; it was incapable of supporting the 
“mercantilist” Chartered Company mode; to the extent that it was heralded as 
a new method of business in the VOC, it represented an abandonment of that 
mode. In practical terms, the smaller ships could not replace the retourschip in 
three important ways: they could not act as warships in conflicts between the 
Company’s suppliers in the Indies, they could not adequately transport troops 
between factories in the Indies to support those same conflicts, and they could 
not carry the very large numbers of men that the Company continued to 
require in order to support its Asian networks in the face of devastating 
wastage from malaria and other tropical diseases.  
                                                
242 French East India ships showed a substantially similar form and spatial division to 
those of the VOC between 1720 and 1770, being easily mistaken for warships under 
sail, while the English East India Company supported a variety of trading ships with 
purpose-built warships. Boudriot, J: Compagnie des Indes 1720-1770. (Editions 
A.N.C.R.E., 1993). Boudriot, J: The Seventy-four Gun Ship: a practical treatise on the art of naval 
architecture, trans. Roberts, D. H. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986-1988), vols. 2, 4. -), 
vols. 2, 4. Sutton, J: The East India Company's Maritime Service, 1746-1834: Masters of the 
Eastern Seas (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2010).  
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Enormous manpower was required to support the idiom of expansionist, 
armed trade that characterized the Chartered Companies: to build up 
infrastructure, to maintain trade webs, to defend forts and administer ports, to 
negotiate diversifying trades and changing priorities for products in Asia and 
in Europe. As long as the VOC intended to expand or maintain its extensive 
holdings in Asia it would require such continual feeding with men: a 
requirement that was exacerbated by the famously high mortality at Batavia in 
the later eighteenth century, when more than half of all new recruits died 
within six months of arrival.243 Hoekers and pinks could not support this 
demand in the 1780s and 1790s: to the extent that they took over from 
retourschepen, they eroded the ability of the VOC to sustain its investment in 
the East. When the colonial project was picked up again and intensified in the 
nineteenth century, it was in the context of a new Dutch state and a model of 
intensive commodity production on Dutch administered lands. This new 
formation, which required direct state involvement and deliberate settlement, 
also required quite different modes of shipping.244 
 
                                                
243 Blusse, L: “An Insane Administration and Insanitary Town: The Dutch East India 
Company and Batavia 1619-1799,  in Betts, R. F., Ross, R., Telkamp, G. J (eds.): 
Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1985). Brug, P. H. van: Malaria en Malaise. 
244 Eyck van Heslinga, E. S. van: Van Compagnie Naar Koopvaardij: De 
Scheepvaartverbinding Van De Bataafse Republiek Met De Koloniën in Azië 1795-1806. 
Hollandse historische reeks 9. (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988). 
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Conclusion 
I have dwelt at great length on the type of the retourschip and on the issue of 
which ships were considered typical because I believe it is necessary to 
understand in order to understand both how individual ships the whole VOC 
fleet were perceived. It is necessary not only for the trivial reason that the 
direct evidence contained in the archives and in wreck sites regarding 
individual vessels is always too fragmentary and incomplete to support a 
coherent account without the armature of the typical ship to hold it together 
for the historian and the archaeologist. It is also indispensable because a 
common understanding and consciousness of the type and its normative 
function informed the understandings of Company directors, shipmasters, 
shipwrights, officers, and all those making and hearing depositions in the 
court records that inform later parts of this dissertation.  
 
As a type, the retourschip entailed a certain division and use of space, a certain 
set of social relations and code of behaviors between the ranks and functions 
of its many crewmen, a certain standard method of operation and certain 
expectations regarding the nature of service aboard, of contract terms, of 
relations with the Indies and of individual involvement in the VOC’s 
collective enterprise. Critically, the type informed how specific ships and 
voyages were read, even when those specific cases deviated from it. 
Throughout its history the Company employed a great variety of ships, many 
of which did not conform closely to the retourschip, especially within the intra-
Asian fleet, while even the most standardized of retourschepen underwent 
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significant changes in spatial layout and manning from voyage to voyage. 
Nonetheless, all these variable ships and situations were apprehended, at least 
in official documents and court records, as conforming to a certain typical 
model. This model should not be seen as unitary through time: it was the 
object of constant negotiation. Moreover, the retourschip was not the only 
normative model the Company employed: the fluit, the pink and the directors’ 
jacht also appear in the Company’s records as distinctive types with their own 
social organizations.245 But where ship types and differences were unmarked, 
where general rules for the Company were concerned, where “the Company’s 
ships” were invoked, the retourschip provided the implicit, assumed standard 
against which difference had to be asserted. In court, deponents referred to the 
retourschip’s spaces and social relations in order to express their testimony in 
terms of a common language. These same deponents were questioned and 
judged according to an assumed sociospatial idiom which entered the realm of 
discourse only when it was violated. 
 
The model replaces the data 
The “silent” (or “hegemonic”) character of the type poses challenges for the 
historian; as the typical ship has been naturalized in directors’ and historians’ 
discourses, so it has tended to evade discussion, while structuring 
understandings of shipboard orders and events. The typical ship allowed for a 
streamlining of records, permitting Company bookkeepers to be ignorant of 
                                                
245 Ketting: fluytschepen. 
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shipboard operations and ships to be reduced to strings of numbers: quantities 
of crew and cargo. By providing readymade explanations and a fabric to fill in 
the gaps between sources, the model of the typical ship can lead to an 
exaggerated impression of a common culture between ships and shipping 
traditions. Ketting points out a number of cases of “exceptional” behaviors 
from his scouring of early company records, where a seaman was recorded as 
sharing his bunk with his wife against the assumption that no women were 
allowed among the crew; where passengers and junior officers carried on 
liaisons below decks and subverted the Company’s structures of command.246 
In light of such exceptions, Ketting has questioned to what extent such 
unexpected behaviors point to a great variation in norms between ships; 
whether they invalidate the typical models, and what kind of latitude was 
given VOC seamen to improvise their own rules and schemas.247 Although we 
can identify these cases as falling outside the normative model, that model 
does not help us to assess just how uncommon or “aberrant” they are.  
 
The model replaces the Company and the Indies 
As an entity, constructed at a particular time by particular authors but made 
to appear the eternal product of an authorless tradition, the typical ship recalls 
Benedict Anderson’s discussion of the supposedly eternal nation.248 The VOC 
                                                
246 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk. 
247 Ketting: personal communication.  
248 Anderson, B. R. o’G: Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism (London, New York: Verso, 1983). 
 139 
ship shares some other characteristics with the nation: in its first decades the 
Company possessed no lands in the East, its ships formed its only “sovereign 
territory.”249 As factory settlements were established, these inherited their 
command structures from the model of the ship, implicitly confirming the 
ship as the basic model of the VOC polity (just as Pierre-Yves Manguin has 
identified the ship as a model for the basic social unit in maritime Southeast 
Asia), even as it was subordinated to land-based authorities.250 Perhaps most 
importantly, however, the ship rather than the factory remained the visible 
face and dominant image of the Company in the Republic. As the Company’s 
correspondence and products bore the image of the ship, so the ship could 
stand for the imagined geo-body of the Company—a mobile body, ferrying 
spices and treasures from the East and also a distributed, serialized body, at 
once acting uniformly across the unimaginable spaces of the Indies, holding 
them within its commercial web, and reducible to the physical constraints of 
the individual hull, captain and crew, presenting an orderly and above all 
European image of profit-making enterprise for the Company’s directors, 
shareholders and sponsors in the Netherlands government.251   
                                                
249 Pieter Geyl makes this point explicitly in his introduction to Bontekoe’s Journal, 
calling the Governor General and Council of the Indies “an itinerant government… 
[which] could be said to be on their own territory only when they were on board 
ship” Geyl, P: “Introduction” in Bontekoe, W. Y: Journal, 10. 
250 Manguin, P-Y: “Shipshape Societies: boat symbolism and political systems in 
insular southeast Asia” in Marr, D. G. & Milner, A. C. (eds.): Southeast Asia in the 9th to 
14th centuries (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1986), 187-213. 
251 In Siam Mapped Thongchai Winichakel charts how cartographic representation and 
instruction gave a physical presence to the emerging boundaries of Siam, 
constructing a “geo-body” for the nation, a feature assumed in European 
nationalisms, which, however, formed a novel conception in Siamese understandings 
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By standing in for the whole apparatus of government, extractions and 
territorial control, and by recalling the pre-company paradigm of venture and 
return, the retourschip served to mask the degree to which the Company 
became an organization of the Indies. Over the two centuries of its operation 
large populations of Company servants and their dependents accumulated at 
the main factories in the East, the number of active European servants in the 
Indies growing to nearly 25,000 by 1783.252 In the eighteenth century this total 
included men recruited in Europe, the Asian-born children of previous 
generations of Company servants and large numbers of Chinese and other 
Asian sailors, principally drawn from levies.253  Until the later eighteenth 
century, both Asian-born Europeans and Chinese sailors were restricted to 
serving in the intra-Asian network and prevented from traveling west of the 
Cape. The public face of Jan Compagnie in the Netherlands therefore 
remained that of a European man who had journeyed to the East and returned 
with goods he had won there, rather than that of an Asian or mixed-heritage 
man who came to Europe to sell his own production.254 By using the 
                                                                                                                                       
of the polity, based on the model of the Mandala State, a set of concentric relations 
centered on the king. Thongchai Winichakel: Siam Mapped: a history of the geo-body of a 
nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).  
252 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company, 87. 
253 Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. Taylor, J. G: The Social World of Batavia: 
Europeans and Eurasians in colonial Indonesia. (Madison  Wis: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2009); Lucassen states that in 1791 roughly two thirds of the Company’s 
seamen were of Asian origin. Lucassen: “A multinational and its labor force.” 
254 Lucassen: “A multinational and its labor force.” 
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retourschip as its mark of identity, the Company could obscure not only its 
intra-Asian fleet but its entire establishment in the Indies from its European 
consumers and shareholders. 
 
Historical agency of the ship and the type  
The pre-company paradigm and its effects on the retourschip also played 
important roles in shaping the physical form of the Company’s establishment 
in the East. To a large extent the VOC inherited the paradigm from the 
Portuguese, not only via Linschoten’s Itinerario but also through the relations 
and expectations the Portuguese had established among their trading partners 
around the Indian Ocean.255 Thomas Roe, English ambassador to the Mughal 
Court in the early seventeenth century, stated baldly that the idiom of trade in 
the Indies necessarily involved the show and use of arms, because: “onely for 
a little feare wee were entertained, but for our trade or any thing we being not 
at all respected.”256 The pursuit of armed trade via its principal vector, the 
trader-warship, demanded the transportation of hundreds of men non-stop 
for up to 15 months and the return of a quantity of cargo sufficient to justify 
the enterprise. These demands gave rise to a certain set of parameters for both 
ships and ports, which in turn dictated the contours of the Company’s 
networks. Such parameters included deep-water harbors or standing 
                                                
255 Subrahmanyam, S: “Taking Stock of the Franks: South Asian views of Europeans 
and Europe, 1500-1800,” Indian Economic & Social History Review, 42.1 (2005), 69-100. 
256 Roe, T. Sir, & Fryer, J: Travels in India in the Seventeenth Century (New Delhi: Asian 
Educational Services, 1993), 33. 
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infrastructures such as cargo lighters that could overcome the silty shallows 
that surrounded many Indies riverine ports; warehouses sufficient for 
gathering the large supplies of spices required to make their voyages 
profitable; and facilities for supporting and maintaining both the ships 
themselves (since they were frequently damaged en route) and the large crews 
that operated them.  
 
The production of trader-warships further took on its own momentum: the 
commercial strength of Dutch shipbuilding lay in the volume of ships the 
Netherlands produced and the speed with which they were finished.257 The 
Republic’s unmatched shipbuilding capacity provided one of the chief 
advantages the VOC enjoyed over its competitors in its first decades.258 The 
efficiency of high-volume production was achieved not only through the 
construction of massive shipyards such as Oostenburg but also through the 
creation of networks and secondary industries for supplying the materials 
suitable to such ships. The Company’s supply chains brought together timber 
from the Baltic ports, Scandinavia and the upper Rhine, a domestic 
metalworking industry, and seamen both from around the Atlantic seaboard 
                                                
257 Smith, A: Wealth of Nations, Barbour, V: “Dutch and English Merchant Shipping.” 
258 Milton’s Nathaniel’s Nutmeg paints a clear and vivid picture of the relationship 
between shipbuilding capacity and influence in the Indies: where the English 
Company through the first quarter of the seventeenth century had difficulty sending 
a single ship to the Banda islands, sole source of mace and nutmeg, every two years, 
the VOC maintained a fleet at Bantam, and later Batavia, that could act as a base for 
military operations around the spiceries. Milton, G: Nathaniel’s Nutmeg, or, The True 
and Incredible Adventures of the Spice Trader who Changed the Course of History (New 
York: Farrar  Straus and Giroux, 1999). 
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of Europe and from landlocked provinces of Germany and central Europe.259 
Each of these supply chains worked toward a known product, in the case of 
Baltic timber involving specialist scouts, who sought out trees with specific 
shapes in order to provide particular timbers for well-understood classes of 
vessels. Each also fed the economy of the Republic: teleological accounts of the 
fall of the VOC tend to emphasize its ever-growing expenditure, while 
ignoring the contribution that expenditure made to the Republic as a whole.260  
 
The price of efficiency, however, was inflexibility. The chief economic virtue of 
the standard retourschip was that it made shipping a known cost. Its chief vice 
was that it made shipping a fixed cost, and kept questions from being asked 
about the source of that cost and how to remedy it. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century the English East India Company was able partially to 
separate its protection and shipping costs, using British navy support in the 
Indian Ocean and a variety of both heavily- and lightly-armed merchant ships. 
The VOC could not follow suit, partly because the monopoly status on which 
it depended had been granted on the basis of the pre-company paradigm, 
which assumed that the Company’s ships would be able to provide their own 
                                                
259 Davids, C. A & Lucassen, J: A Miracle Mirrored: the Dutch Republic in European 
perspective. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
260 Woodruff Smith suggests that the ultimate purpose of the Dutch spice trade may 
have been the stabilization of trade relations with Eastern Europe, which supplied 
both timbers and grain to the Republic. Smith states that the VOC was concerned to 
stabilize the prices for spices such that those commodities might be used as currency 
in persistent contracts for grain and other basic food products grown in Poland. 
Smith, W. D: Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800 (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
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protection and extend the power of the State alongside its economic interests. 
While the paradigm held, the retourschip was the ideal vehicle for carrying 
both its physical and its ideological freight. The paradigm relied on a certain 
conception of the Indies, however, as a space beyond the control of any 
European power: a mare librum of open competition that offered risk and 
reward in equal measure. As British control spread across the Indian Ocean 
this space-beyond-control was steadily excluded, and the retourschip lost its 
niche. 
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CHAPTER 2: SPACE ABOARD THE TYPICAL SHIP 
 
This chapter undertakes an analysis of the spatial orders operating aboard the 
type of the VOC retourschip in order to examine how they contributed to 
producing the social structures that the Company relied upon to conduct its 
business in the Indies. Since the chapter deals with the type it necessarily deals 
principally with representations and discourses of the retourschip rather than 
with individual ships. These representations have been drawn from a variety 
of sources, including shipbuilders’ plans, accounts by Company directors and 
financial officers, and the memoirs of soldiers and sailors. They are necessarily 
dominated, however, by the agendas of the  Company’s elites, who had the 
power to render their descriptions into prescriptions for how ships should be 
made and operated, and who were able to assimilate non-elite voices into their 
own ordering narratives.261 The chapter also leans heavily on the work of 
historians, archaeologists and sociologists who have contributed, since the 
Company’s founding, to an ever more complex but still largely homogeneous 
and canonizing view of the ship, its society and the meanings assigned to its 
various spaces.  
 
 
                                                
261 Vilhelm Aubert makes the point that when policy-makers play the parts of 
sociologists it is impossible to pry their understanding of society apart from their 
domination of it; a point later elaborated into Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge. 
Aubert, V: The Hidden Society. (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1965), 22. Foucault, M: 
The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1971). 
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In the twentieth century, the deep sea sailing ship has come to be discussed 
alongside a number of other institutions, including boarding schools, asylums, 
prisons and factories.262 Goffman described such “total” institutions as 
forming worlds unto themselves that deliberately isolate their inmates from 
the wider world outside their walls.263 The purpose of this isolation is to 
enable the institutions to act as crucibles for working changes on their 
inhabitants, fitting them for social and professional roles tied to the specific 
purpose of the institution, and most of all for institutional life. Accordingly, 
such institutions provide the minimum necessary means of living for their 
inmates, while eradicating all markers of extra-institutional affiliation, 
allowing for a “purification of identity” built around the needs and identity of 
the institution.264  Foucault has termed such institutions “heterotopias:” places 
where the ordinary rules of society are “represented, challenged and 
overturned,” the ship itself providing “the heterotopia par excellence,” its 
inmates exchanging the various disciplinary regimes found ashore for an 
equally but differently restrictive shipboard regimen.265 Aubert and Arnor 
have listed a number of characteristics of sailing ships that are common to 
“total” institutions, including strict discipline, a rigid social hierarchy and a 
clear separation between two broad classes of inmates, termed “inhabitants” 
                                                
262 Goffman, E: “the characteristics of total institutions,” in Asylums (New York: 
Anchor books,1961), 14-28; 148-9. 
263 Goffman, E: “the characteristics of total institutions” 
264 Aubert: The Hidden Society 245. 
265 Foucault, M: “Of Other Spaces,” Diacritics 16 (Spring 1986), 22–27. 
 147 
and “visitors,” who exert some measure of control over the shared 
environment and are controlled by it, respectively.266 
 
The focus of this chapter is on this final point: it compares the spatial 
organization of the retourschip with those of other institutions in order to 
characterize the ship as an institution and to explore the role played by the 
space of the ship in forming the institution of the Company. A variety of 
theoretical lenses are applied in order to examine the work done by shipboard 
spatial organization in constituting the proper relations between Company 
servants, the means of operating the ship and recognized modes of resistance 
and back-channel communication. 
 
Methods 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the analysis of a type is different in 
important ways from that of an individual vessel. How then might we 
examine typical space and what should we expect such an analysis to tell us?  
 
In his study of the bungalow, Anthony King describes how architectural types 
develop in order to house, encode, spread and reproduce social institutions.267 
                                                
266 Aubert, V. & Arner, O,  The Ship as a Social System. (Oslo 1962). Aubert: The Hidden 
Society. This division of inmates into visitors and inhabitants forms a cornerstone of 
Markus’ sociospatial analysis of a range of total institutions. Markus, T: Buildings and 
Power: Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
267 King, A. D: The Bungalow. The Production of a Global Culture (London ; Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 
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By shaping practices they reproduce modes of behavior, territoriality and 
existence. The bungalow, although it changed its pattern and meaning many 
times, always entailed a separation from its surroundings in the form of a 
distinct spatial compound: it stood generally for a life apart, whether that 
aloofness suited the social structures of the British colonies in Africa or the 
suburbs of London.268 Considered in this way the type is related to Barthes’ 
“myth:” it naturalizes and enwraps a narrative that makes coherent a set of 
social relations or ideas.269 We may therefore ask what sort of institution the 
retourschip embodied and what social relations it naturalized. 
 
Related to its production of social categories, the type further encodes a 
cognitive scheme that organizes the world, selects what is important from 
what can usefully be ignored, and allows agents to take action. Giddens has 
described such cognitive schemes  as providing an umwelt, or perception of 
the world, which forms both “a defensive carapace,” filtering and sorting 
experience to exclude dissonant elements, and “the means whereby [the 
subject is] able to get on with the affairs of day-to-day life:” that is, a basis for 
determining appropriate actions.270 The following analysis is intended 
therefore partly to tease out the Company’s systems of classification from its 
                                                
268 King, A. D: The Bungalow, 1 
269 Dovey, K: Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form (London: Routledge, 1999).  
33. Barthes, R: Mythologies, trans. Lavers, A. (London, Paladin, 1972). 
270 Giddens, A: Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 40, 187. 
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shipboard space, and partly to see how such systems were expressed in spatial 
features and relations, to ask what and how the spaces taught Company 
seafarers regarding the cognitive schemes proper to their enterprise. 
 
Finally the type essentializes the complex of social relations and ideas it 
houses into a prototype or model of and for individual buildings, by which 
they might be understood and against which the individual example is 
measured.271 Where the model encompasses the entire ship as a unit it 
provides an exemplary standard of “shipshape” order. Models also exist for 
subdivisions of the ship, however, forming spatial domains with separate 
meanings, the officers and their spaces being subject to different standards 
and rules from the men. The meanings of such domains could change, 
depending on the actors involved and their circumstances, and on the 
relations and rituals in play. The officers’ saloon carried one set of meanings 
for the sailor brought before the ship’s council for disciplinary hearings and 
another for the merchant’s wife or maid who might lodge there as a guest. 
This is the level at which most accounts of shipboard life begin; with a 
mapping out of social distinctions between groups aboard expressed in the 
circumstances and performances of their habitation, like that described by 
Melville in White Jacket, between the open, airy souls that tended the topsails, 
the dour, ungenerous denizens of the lower decks and the officers who 
                                                
271 Here I use the term “prototype” loosely, to mean the image held in mind whenever 
the term “ship” was discussed in Company records. 
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slipped their “quarterdeck faces” on and off as occasion demanded.272 The 
VOC ship may not present as complex and ritualized an entity as Melville’s 
frigate. It was further never blessed with as vivid a recorder as Dana proved 
for the American merchant service.273 Nonetheless, a spatial analysis based on 
the anecdotes of shipboard life provided by de Hullu and Ketting can 
illuminate the roles of particular places in the micropolitics that operated 
aboard.  
 
The three fields of inquiry identified above bear some relation to Lefebvre’s 
categories of perceived, conceived and “lived” space.274 Lefebvre’s categories 
address the ordering of space (a) through working and living practices, (b) 
through representations and descriptions that support cognitive schemes of 
classification and hierarchies, and (c) through the ascription of ritual 
meanings, respectively. Although each of these aspects of spatial analysis is 
supported by some theoretical work, no single author or body of theory 
provides a method for dealing with all of them. I will therefore be combining a 
rather eclectic collection of methods to address the ship’s spaces. Further, the 
uses and meanings of the ship’s spaces are constituted not only by the 
behaviors and performances associated with them but also by the physical 
                                                
272 Melville, H: White-jacket or, The World in a Man-of-war (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970).  
273 Dana, R. H: Two Years Before the Mast: a personal narrative of life at sea, (Los Angeles: 
Ward Ritchie Press, 1964). 
274 Lefebvre, H. The production of space. (Oxford, Cambridge  Mass.: Blackwell, 1991).  
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forms and equipment or furniture that articulate them. A total architectural 
analysis of the ship, encompassing materials, decoration, sight lines, access to 
light and air flow, and other environmental factors, is therefore required in 
order to form an adequate account of the meanings of shipboard spaces. My 
primary means for dealing with these features will be to identify those that 
appear necessary to the coherence of the type and examine how they 
contribute to “an assemblage of interrelated dialectics” in order to define and 
characterize the spaces aboard.275 
 
Sources on shipboard space 
In order to understand the spatial and architectural order of the retourschip it is 
necessary to reconstruct its interior spatial division and partitioning. 
Unfortunately this is one of the most speculative and difficult aspects of VOC 
ship reconstruction. 
 
On the negative side, as noted in the previous chapter, the retourschip presents 
something of a moving target, undergoing various changes through the 
Company’s history. Moreover, no thorough or complete records for interior 
divisions exist in the archives, even after Van Imhoff’s redress of VOC 
shipbuilding between 1742 and 1750, when deck plans became part of the 
                                                
275 Kim Dovey identifies several such dialectics that appear relevant to the ship, 
delimiting inside/outside (referring to social groups and access), local/global, 
home/journey, private/public and, following Deleuze and Guattari, 
striated/smooth. Dovey, K: Framing Places, 56. Deleuze, G, Guattari, F & Massumi, B: 
A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia (London: Athlone Press, 1988). 
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shipbuilding process.276 No complete VOC wreck has been excavated 
sufficiently to permit a full reconstruction of its interior partitions.277 Even if 
such an excavation were conducted its utility for defining the type of the ship 
over the Company’s history might be limited. Before the first formal rates of 
1697 there appears to have been considerable variation in shipbuilding 
methods and norms, shown in the surveys of Company ships conducted by 
Decquer and Nieuwstad in the 1680s.278 After van Imhoff’s reforms the outline 
of ship hulls were standardized, as were the arrangement of cabins on the 
quarterdeck and the number and dimensions of capstans. Beyond these 
points, however, we know that throughout the Company’s history its ships 
underwent significant spatial re-ordering between voyages, with interior 
partitions being added, removed or shifted, the better to accommodate each 
voyage’s particular balance of cargo, crew and passengers, such that any 
reconstruction would necessarily be limited in its applicability across the 
fleet.279  
                                                
276 Ab Hoving has identified some plans drawn by Van Zwijndreght in 1727. Plans 
were not generally adopted, however, until Van Imhoff employed Chales Bentam 
during the redress of 1742-50. Hoving, A. J, Lemmers, A, Gerritsma, J, Harpen N. T. 
van, Lantau T,  Zwijndregt P. P. van: In Tekening Gebracht: de achtiende-eeuwse 
scheepsbouwers en hun ontwerpmethoden (Amsterdam: de Bataafsche Leeuw, 2001). 
277 The largely complete wreck of the Amsterdam remains buried in mud off the south 
coast of England: to date the foundation devoted to the preservation of the wreck has 
not managed to raise sufficient funds to attempt a full excavation. Rooij, H. H. van, 
Gawronski, J: VOC-schip Amsterdam: gebleeven, op de kust van Sussex tusschen Hastings 
en Beachyhead gestrand (Haarlem: H. J. W. Becht, 1989), 72. 
278 AN Collectie Hudde, 22-23: Decquer, H: Middelen om Uit te Vinden de Ware Ladinge 
der Scheepen na hare Groote, (1685). 
279 In particular, partitions were often added to the cargo hold to separate those goods 
destined for different Chambers from one another. To date only one drawing has 
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On the positive side, we know that some characteristic features of the type 
were in place from the Company’s first decades, since charter documents 
(besteks) dating back at least to 1593 mention the lower deck, koebrug, gun 
room and other elements.280 Witsen indicated in 1670 that the general layout of 
ships was consistent across different scales, while paintings and models 
produced during the seventeenth century show largely consistent numbers 
and placement of external features that hint at similar interior spatial 
arrangements.281  
 
Periodization  
In order to focus the discussion of spatial order and address the ways in which 
the evolution of the type changed I have therefore identified two distinct 
“moments” for analysis, which show important differences. The first moment 
belongs to the most commonly studied period of  VOC history; the “golden 
                                                                                                                                       
been found that shows the layout of partitions so added to a ship for its return 
voyage. Jerzy Gawronski: personal communication. 
280 Ab Hoving provides the bestek, or charter, for a pinas of 85 Amsterdam feet. This 
vessel was smaller  and lighter than the later retourschepen; following Witsen it would 
have resembled its larger brethren closely in all ways but scale, however. Hoving, A. 
J, Emke, C,  Sigmond, P,  Weerd, G. de, Het schip van Willem Barents: een hypothetische 
reconstructie van een laat-zestiende-eeuws jacht (Hilversum: Verloren, 2004), 128. Hoving 
A. J, Witsen, N, Weerdt G. A. de: Nicolaes Witsens Scheeps-bouw-konst Open Gestelt 
(Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, cop. 1994).  
281 These include the fore- and stern-castles, gun ports and details of rigging, which 
are broadly similar to those of English ships at the same period. Daalder, R: Schepen 
van de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam, Zutphen: Stichting Nederlands 
Scheepvaartmuseum, Walburg Pers, 2005). Sigmond, J. P & Kloek, W. Th: Sea Battles 
and Naval Heroes in the seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, 
Nieuw Amsterdam, 2007). 
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age” of the middle seventeenth century, and is most closely described in 
Witsen’s Aeloude.282 The second moment is that of governor van Imhoff’s 
redress, from 1742 to 1750, during which unprecedented documentation of the 
Company’s new, standardized methods of shipbuilding was generated. This 
moment is supported both by ship plans and models, and by evidence from 
two largely intact wrecks, those of the Hollandia (built and wrecked in 1742) 
and the Amsterdam (built and wrecked in 1749).283 
 
Model vessels 
There is a secondary, but non-trivial, reason for choosing these two specific 
moments for a comparative study: each has been the subject of a large, 
multidisciplinary research project resulting in the creation of a full-size replica 
ship, the first moment being represented by the Batavia, built under the 
direction of Willem Voss and completed in 1985, the second by the Amsterdam, 
built by the Stichting Amsterdam Bouwt Oostindiëvaarder between 1985 and 
1990.284 Each project prompted and collected a large body of research, aimed 
                                                
282 Witsen, N: Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. Ofte Aaloude en Hedendaagsche 
Scheeps-bouw en Bestier, (Amsterdam, 1671, reprinted Franeker: Van Wijnen, 1994). 
283 Gawronski, J: De “Equipagie” van de Hollandia en de Amsterdam: VOC-
bedrijvigheid in 18de-eeuws Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1996). Gawronski, J.K: 
Hollandia Compendium: a contribution to the history, archeology, classification and 
lexicography of a 150 ft. Dutch East Indiaman (1740-1750) (Amsterdam: Rijks Museum, 
1992). Rooij, H. H. van & Gawronski, J: VOC-schip Amsterdam. 
284 Each project involved a large team of researchers and shipbuilders. Each is also the 
subject of some controversy, regarding both the construction methods used and the 
final product. Both replicas are open to the public, the Batavia at the Bataviawerf in 
Lelystad, Netherlands, the Amsterdam  beside the Scheepvaartmuseum in 
Amsterdam, Netherlands. Parthesius, R, Roeper, V. & Wagenaar, L (eds.): De Batavia 
te Water (Amsterdam- De Bataafsche Leeuw 1995). Vos, W., Parthesius, R et al: Batavia 
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specifically at aiding a complete reconstruction of a vessel. Such 
reconstruction projects are of incalculable value as means for raising 
questions, especially regarding technical details of construction and practical 
matters of spatial arrangement, which tend otherwise to go unasked.285 The 
replicas themselves cannot necessarily be taken as authoritative statements 
regarding the forms of particular historic ships: both acknowledged errors in 
the building of each replica and some significant filling-in of detail from 
varied sources require the researcher to approach them critically and 
cautiously.286 Nonetheless the replicas help considerably with the challenging 
task of visualizing the structures and grasping the relations between their 
component spaces, whether in pursuit of practical conclusions regarding their 
use or of some more nebulous sense of their aura or psychological impact on 
the viewer. Regarding the purpose of this chapter, each replica may also be 
                                                                                                                                       
cahier 1-5 (Lelystad: Stichting Nederland bouwt VOC-Retourschip, 1990-1994). 
Research and experimental archaeology devoted to seventeenth century shipbuilding 
continues at Bataviawerf, in the current project, to build a replica of the warship 
Zeven Provincieen, which served as Michiel de Ruyter’s flagship during the Second 
Anglo-Dutch War. Zee, A. van der & Klein, A: “De Zeven Provincieen: building a 
replica of a famous Dutch warship,” Nautical Research Journal 50.4 (Winter 2005), 1-8.  
285 Swogger, J-G: “Image and Interpretation: The Tyranny of Representation?” in 
Hodder, I. (ed.): Towards Reflexive Method in Archaeology: the Example at Catalhoyuk 
(Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, University of 
Cambridge, 2000), 143-152.  
286 Ad van der Zee: personal communication. Among the acknowledged errors in the 
Batavia replica, the addition of round gun ports under the quarterdeck and the 
significant overbuilding of the koebrug are obvious examples. The Amsterdam 
replica presents a much more challenging case, being built from tropical Iroko wood 
rather than historically-appropriate oak, and suffering from considerable distortions 
especially in the heights between decks, with the officers’ cabins being significantly 
shortened in order to compensate for an oversized hold and lower deck, while 
presenting a consistent external appearance. Jerzy Gawronski: personal 
communication.  
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approached as an attempt to recreate a type rather than a particular vessel, 
through the assembly of typical features. The two replicas mentioned above 
therefore contribute significantly to the following spatial analysis, 
supplemented by further sources where the replicas appear to offer atypical or 
incomplete evidence. Where the terms “Batavia subtype” and “Hollandia 
subtype” are used, they refer to the evidence provided by the reconstructions 
and to retourschepen of their respective moments. 
 
Of the two replicas, that of the Batavia is necessarily based on a broader 
synthesis of wider-ranging sources. No primary documents exist that describe 
the physical form of the ship that the current Batavia purports to replicate, 
while the fragments of the wreck that have been found show nothing of the 
ship’s interior.287 The replica has therefore been assembled out of models, such 
as that of the Prins Willem, contemporary paintings and prints, such as those 
by the Van de Veldes, and descriptions such as those by Bontekoe, Both and 
Coen, along with largely achronic statements regarding shipboard order, from 
Van Dam’s Beschryvinge and de Hullu’s articles.288 As a result the replica is 
                                                
287 Green, J. N: The Loss of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie Retourschip Batavia, 
Western Australia 1629: an excavation report and catalogue of artefacts (Oxford, England: 
B.A.R., 1989). 
288 Ketting, H (Sr.): Prins Willem: Een Zeventiende-Eeuwse Oostindiëvaarder. (De Boer 
maritiem. Bussum: Unieboek, 1979). Kamer, H. N: Het VOC-Retourschip: een panorama 
van de 17de- en 18de-eeuwse Nederlandse scheepsbouw (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche 
Leeuw, 1995). Parthesius et al: De Batavia te  water. Daalder, R: Maritieme Meesters: 
scheepvaart op tekeningen 1600-1800 (Haarlem, Amsterdam: Nederlands 
Scheepvaartmuseum, 1997). Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. 
Uitgegeven door Dr F. W. Stapel. (’s-Gravenhage, 1927-43). Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, 
Lucassen J., Op de Schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie: vijf artikelen studie over de 
werkgelegenheid bij de VOC (Groningen, 1980).  
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ambiguous in two ways. First the boundaries of the moment it represents are 
difficult to trace, stretching over most of the seventeenth century. Second, the 
replica comprises a series of selections from palettes of options, which show 
variance on important points, including whether the decks should be 
continuous or staggered fore-and-aft, or flat or curved up at the ends, and the 
number and arrangement of cabins on the quarterdeck.289 The following 
sections and plans drawn from the replica may therefore be taken only as a 
partial description of a possible ship. That ship closely resembles Ab Hoving’s 
reconstruction of Witsen’s “typical” pinas, differing only in some details 
incidental to the argument.290 
 
The finished Amsterdam replica deviated significantly from the research on 
which it was based. That research is best represented instead by the 
longitudinal section and deck plans prepared for the Hollandia Compendium 
(Figures 2.1, 2.5 & 2.6. Section and deck plans of the Hollandia 
                                                
289 These synthesizing works include the models demonstrating Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam construction methods by Ab Hoving, the full size replica ship Batavia, 
illustrated books derived from models built during the seventeenth century, and a 
series of speculative reconstructions of the ships of famous seventeenth century 
explorers, also by Hoving. Hoving A. J, Witsen, N, Weerdt G. A. de: Nicolaes Witsens 
Scheeps-bouw-konst Open Gestelt (Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, cop. 1994). Hoving, 
A. J. & Emke, C: The Ships of Abel Tasman (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000). Hoving et al: 
Het schip van Willem Barents. 
290 The most obvious differences are among the cabins on the quarterdeck (including 
the addition of a small cabin on the poop deck of the replica) and the placement of 
gun ports: Hoving devotes a more generous section of the front of the ship to storage 
for supplies than does Voss’ team, excluding guns from the space under the 
forecastle. Other differences are of degree rather than kind: Hoving’s gun room is 
more generous than on the Batavia, and he provides hints of some cabins subdividing 
the forward part of the saloon. Hoving et al: Nicolaes Witsens scheeps-bouw-konst. 
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reconstruction).291 These plans were drawn from a model built to support 
Bentam’s revised first rate retourschip in 1742.292 The Batavia and Hollandia 
sections used in the present work (Figure 2.1) have been adapted for clarity by 
the author from drawings in the Batavia Cahiers and Hollandia Compendium, 
respectively.293 Deck plans for the Batavia replica (Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) are 
the author’s drawings, interpreted from the section and from direct 
observation of the replica.  
 
 
                                                
291 Drawn by A. Hoekstra, from research data compiled by Ab Hoving and Jerzy 
Gawronski. Gawronski, J.K: Hollandia Compendium. 
292 Ab Hoving: personal communication. The model contains several partitions of 
unknown purpose. These have been greyed on the plans reproduced in the present 
work. 
293 The present author has removed extraneous detail from Hoekstra’s section of the 
Hollandia to clarify the spaces aboard and recolored the masts, anchor bitts and other 
features grey to indicate that these only partially obstruct movement. The Batavia 
section has been extensively adapted from a drawing in the Batavia Cahiers to the 
same ends as those for the Hollandia, to clarify the separate spaces and draw a 
distinction between partial and total obstructions. Gawronski: Hollandia Compendium. 
Vos et al: Batavia Cahiers. 
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Figure 2.7: Extract from Van Zwijndregt’s plan of the “second” (upper) deck of 
the Noord Nieuw Landt (1750), showing the galleries, which contained the 
officers’ toilets, and a staircase connecting the saloon with the captain’s cabin. 
Maritiem Museum Prins Hendrick, Rotterdam, Netherlands. T1127-16. 
 
The Hollandia plans reveal much detail concerning interior division but are not 
complete: details including the stern galleries are missing. Galleries are 
shown, however, on deck plans drawn by VOC shipwright Pieter van 
Zwijndrecht in 1750 for the Noord Nieuw Landt, a second rate that conforms to 
the 1749 revision of Bentam’s 1742 design (Figure 2.7: P. van Zwijndrecht: 
Second (upper) deck of the VOC ship Noord Nieuw Landt, 1750: detail).294  
                                                
294 Bentam’s first and second rates were very similar in design and lines. The second 
rate, however, was criticized for instability and lack of seaworthiness. Having seen 
the new ships performing in Asia, van Imhoff suggested the lengthening of this rate 
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The first and second rates were essentially the same except for their overall 
scale: the two rates differed in length by 6.7% (10 Amsterdam feet) and in 
most other proportions by 9% to 9.5%. The arrangement of features such as 
quarterdeck cabins are known to have been the same between the rates. In 
common with other contemporary ships’ plans, the plan of the Noord Nieuw 
Landt shows the lack of attention paid to interior spatial divisions by 
shipwrights. Partitions must be inferred from the positions of the capstan, 
pumps and other fixed equipment. Further, no plans exist for the upper decks: 
the forecastle, quarterdeck and poop deck.  
 
The lower and upper decks were vital to the ship’s overall structural integrity: 
the “knees” that fastened the decks to the outer hull were among the strongest 
and most difficult to obtain elements in the whole ship.295 These elements are 
therefore well recorded in shipbuilding manuals and in plans such as those by 
van Zwijndregt. Superstructures above the upper deck were less important to 
the survival of the ship and therefore to the business of master shipbuilders: 
they were correspondingly more prone to variation and adaptation between 
                                                                                                                                       
from 136’ to 140’. Kist, B: “VOC shipbuilding Policy 1740-1750” in Gawronski, J.K: 
Hollandia Compendium, 34-75. 
69. Pieter van Zwijndrecht’s plan for the Noord Nieuw Landt, a 140’ East Indiaman 
reflects this lengthening, but is otherwise comparable with an undated 136’ plan he 
also penned, held at Maritiem Museum Prins Hendrick, Rotterdam (MMPH 1180-19). 
The plans for the lower and upper decks of the Noord Nieuw Landt are MMPH 
T1127-15 and T1127-16, respectively.   
295 Ab Hoving, personal communication. 
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voyages. Even more ephemeral was the koebrug (orlop), where outward-
bound soldiers were quartered: the framework on which this deck rested 
provided important bracing for the hull. The planking of the deck was 
regularly removed on return voyages, however, to maximize the space for 
valuable cargo.  
 
In the sections shown in Figure 2.1, grey indicates features that only partially 
obstructed access: the most significant of these were doors that could be 
locked to control access physically. The masts, bitts (reinforced posts to which 
the anchors were attached), and capstans (the winches manned by up to 40 
men at a time, used for raising and lowering the cargo, anchors, spars and 
sections of masts) were vital to the ship’s operation but served as landmarks 
rather than as structuring obstructions. In the plans shown in Figures 2.5 and 
2.6 grey is used to indicate doors and features that are present in Bentam’s 
model and therefore reproduced in the Hollandia Compendium plans, but which 
do not accord with written descriptions of contemporary ships, in particular 
the divisions shown on the lower deck immediately fore and aft of the 
galley/steward’s pantry and mainmast, which if present on actual ships 
would significantly change the space of the lower deck. The status of these 
partitions is unclear—whether they represent some feature of Bentam’s design 
or artifacts of the model builder’s methods or serve some other function is 
unknown. 
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Technical differences 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 the partitioning of space aboard the Batavia and 
Hollandia subtypes is similar. A number of small differences between the two 
indicate changes in the institution of the retourschip that will be explored 
below. Three significant technical differences between the subtypes strongly 
affected the spatial order aboard in various ways and require special 
explanation: those concerning the steering gear, the capstans and the orlop. 
 
Dutch ships in the seventeenth century were generally steered using a 
whipstaff: a vertical lever attached to the tiller and operated by one or more 
sailors in a space variously known as the schans (fortress), stuurplecht (steering 
platform) or pothuis (steerage), according to instructions shouted by an officer 
observing from the quarterdeck.296 In order for these instructions to be passed 
to the helmsmen an opening was added to the quarterdeck with a roof raised 
over it, through which the steersmen might hear and possibly see the officers 
(shown immediately to the left of the number 2 on Figure 2.1).  
 
English translations for the distinctive room devoted to the whipstaff are all 
rather vague and unsatisfactory, referring merely to “the place of steering.” I 
                                                
296 Beylen, J. van: “stuurplecht,” “pothuis,” “schans” in Zeilvaart Lexicon: Viertalig 
Maritiem Woordenboek. (Weesp: De Boer Maritiem, 1985). According to van Beylen the 
term schans (fortress) refers more generally to the sterncastle of ships, and therefore 
the defensible officers’ quarters, being a term carried over from the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries when such castles formed a physically distinct part of the ship’s 
structure. The term is used by Witsen interchangeably with stuurplecht to refer to the 
steering platform, however. Witsen, N: Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. 
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have therefore retained the Dutch schans to identify this space because of its 
dual function in the Batavia subtype, both as the place from which the rudder 
was controlled and as one of the first lines of defense for the officers’ spaces 
against those of the men. One important way in which the Batavia replica 
differs from the Hollandia subtype is that the former shows several features 
intended to aid the defense of the officers’ quarters against those of the men. 
The main access from the upper deck to the quarterdeck is hampered by a 
banister rail that an attacking or mutinying man would have to climb over in 
order to gain an equal footing on the officers’ domain. The schans shows a 
boundary zone in these defensive works: access from the men’s part of the 
ship is hampered by lockable doors and the placement of stairways directly 
behind those doors so as to break the impetus of a charge.297 Access from the 
schans to the saloon is likewise controlled via lockable doors, such that the 
space falls within the defensible realm of the rear of the ship but outside the 
officers’ private quarters. Control of the steering gear was related to control of 
the ship both practically and metaphorically: to have the helm was equated 
with the practice of command. Although they rarely took the whipstaff or 
wheel themselves the captain’s closest lieutenants, the mates, were addressed 
as stuursman or steersman. Further, on all European ships of the period which 
showed separation of spaces and functions into rooms with a hierarchy of 
access, the spaces occupied by the steering gear were among the first to be 
restricted and made defensible. The tiller, which both whipstaff and wheel 
                                                
297 Ad van der Zee: personal communication. 
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controlled, was confined in the gunroom together with other sensitive items 
such as the gunpowder and fuses, and placed under the protection of the 
master gunner. Members of the general crew were admitted to the gunroom to 
lay hands directly on the tiller only in extremis, during severe storms and high 
winds, when the whipstaff and wheel proved too weak to control the 
rudder.298  
 
In 1725 the whipstaff was replaced on VOC ships by a wheel mounted on the 
quarterdeck before the cabins, which controlled the tiller through a geared 
system of ropes and pulleys, allowing the helmsmen (usually three in number) 
to steer according to their own observations and rendering the schans 
obsolete.299 Traces of the schans can still be seen in the Hollandia subtype, 
however, in the staircases leading between the wheel and that part of the 
upper deck immediately in front of the door to the kajuit (saloon), which 
became known as the voorkajuit (before-the-saloon) or kerk (chapel). No 
defensive works for the officers’ spaces are found in the Hollandia subtype 
beside doors: the voorkajuit therefore did not carry on the defensive function of 
the schans, and it does not seem always to have been separated from the space 
                                                
298On these occasions steering instructions were passed down from the quarterdeck 
by relays of men. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk En Rebellie Aan Boord Van Oost-
Indiëvaarders (1595-±1650). (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002).  
299 Akveld, L, & Jacobs, E (eds.): The Colourful World of the VOC: national anniversary 
book VOC 1602-2002 (Bussum: Thoth, 2002). 
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under the quarterdeck by partitions or a door of its own.300  Nonetheless, the 
voorkajuit continued to have special importance as a place of gathering for 
religious services and for announcements by the officers before the crew.  
 
Both the capstans and the orlop were redesigned during Governor van 
Imhoff’s redress of the Company’s ships in the 1740s. Van Imhoff chose the 
English shipwright Charles Bentam as the architect of his redress in 1742 
because of a general sense that the VOC was falling behind the highly 
successful English Honourable East India Company.301 Bentam’s program 
involved reforming both the methods of Dutch shipbuilding and the ships 
produced to conform to current English practices: his designs produced ships 
that were clearly modeled on English traditions, as exemplified by the 
merchant ship Falmouth (Figure 2.8: inboard profile of the merchant ship 
Falmouth, built at Blackwall, 1752).  
 
                                                
300 Beylen, J. van: “kerk. “ in Zeilvaart Lexikon. The presence of a “kerk or voorkajuit” 
persisted to the end of the Company. In the late 1780s the Company built ten fast-
sailing, light “packet boats” for the express reason of carrying news and orders 
quickly between Patria and the East. These modest ships  were very different from 
the retourschepen, bearing two masts and carrying a total complement of only 24 men. 
Nonetheless, they numbered a kerk among their spaces, as a separate room between 
the saloon, cabins and space for the general crew with its own door. Tempel, K van 
der: “’Wij hebben amok in ons schip’: Aziaten in opstand tijdens drie terugreizen op 
het einde van de achttiende eeuw” in Muiterij: oproer en berichting op schepen van de 
VOC, Bruijn, J. R & Eyck van Heslinga, E. S. van (eds.), (Haarlem: de Boer Maritime, 
1980), 123-147. 
301 DAS I 
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Figure 2.8: extract from the inboard profile of the merchant ship Falmouth, 
built at Blackwall, 1752, NMM ship plan MSA0069. © National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, London. 
 
These ships had very different lines from those traditionally used by Dutch 
shipwrights, which had been developed to work within the shallow waters of 
the Netherlands.302 Their interiors also differed from traditional Dutch designs 
in several ways.  
 
One of the most significant but rarely discussed of Bentam’s changes was the 
reduction of the orlop. This half-height deck, which was only jury-rigged over 
the cargo hold on outward-bound journeys, was the primary lodging-place 
aboard ship for soldiers who were being transported to the garrisons of the 
Company’s various Indies factories. During the seventeenth century the orlop 
had reportedly stretched the full length of the ship. It was cut down in 
Bentam’s designs, however, to a set of cross braces reinforcing only 30 feet of 
the ship’s length, stretching forward from the mainmast. Fore and aft of this 
platform the cargo hold rose unobstructed to the level of the lower deck. The 
                                                
302 Hoving et al: In Tekening Gebracht. 
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implications of this change for shipboard society are not obvious from the 
records. It is notable, however, that during the 30 years after the radical 
reduction in the orlop’s area, complements of up to 150 soldiers were 
frequently carried aboard first rates.303 If all were indeed carried on the orlop, 
then crowding must have been comparable with that shown on the infamous 
plan of the slave ship Dutton, or on a contemporary British Man of War, with 
each soldier receiving at maximum between seven and eight square feet of 
deck space.304 Bentam’s drawing for the proposed first rate of 1742 (Figure 1.4) 
clearly marks the extent of this reduced orlop: the model on which Figures 2.1, 
2.5 and 2.6 are based does not show an orlop at all, however.305 I have 
therefore added the indication from Bentam’s plans to the section of the 
Hollandia subtype shown in figure 2.1.  
 
By 1746 the English-influenced redesigns were themselves subjected to 
redesign, principally with reference to French, Danish and Swedish models.306 
                                                
303 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. Soldier complements are from 
DAS II. 
304 This figure is derived from the maximum width of the first rate (41 Amsterdam 
feet) and the length of the orlop shown in Bentam’s 1742 drawing. It does not allow 
for interruptions to the space from accessways, equipment or the mainmast. The 
signal difference between the British warship and this calculated figure is that at any 
one time the entire complement of the warship was on duty: Jack Tar’s famous 
eighteen inches of private space therefore expanded to three feet as the hammocks 
either side of him were vacated. Gawronski, J: Hollandia Compendium, 64, Rediker, M. 
B: The slave ship: a human history. (New York: Viking, 2007). Lavery, B: 
“Accommodation” in Gardiner, R. & Lavery, B: The Line of Battle: The Sailing Warship, 
1650-1840. (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992), 145. 
305 Gawronski, J: Hollandia Compendium. 
306 Kist, B: “VOC shipbuilding Policy 1740-1750,” 68. 
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The first casualty of this reassessment of Bentam’s plans was the English habit 
of placing the galley in the forecastle: the galley returned to the lower deck “as 
of old.”307 Other reforms included the addition of a hand-operated ventilation 
pump on the lower deck, for improving air flow around the cargo in the hold, 
in order to reduce spoilage in the tropical heat. In addition, the multiple 
capstans commonly used on VOC ships were reduced to a single, large 
capstan in imitation of captured French ships.  
 
The capstan was one of the most important  machines aboard: a winch used 
for heavy lifting, including raising and lowering the anchor, sails, masts and 
cargo. Operating this winch required the single greatest collective, 
simultaneous effort involved in working the ship: one group of men turned 
the capstan while others maintained tension on the ropes, frequently from the 
deck below, since the capstan generally ran through two decks.308 The 
redesign appears to have doubled the number of handspikes (wooden levers) 
applied to this winch, as well as lengthening each lever, such that more than 
30 men might simultaneously push the winch around, their efforts 
coordinated by rhythmic capstan chanteys.309 The redesign of the capstan had 
several consequences for the space in which it was kept. First, with its levers 
in place the capstan of a first rate occupied a circle 30 feet in diameter, 
                                                
307 AN VOC 7375. 
308 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 113. Ketting, H (Sr.): Prins Willem, 61-3 
309 Beylen, J. van: “kaapstander,” “gangspil“ in Zeilvaart Lexikon.  
 175 
encompassing most of the width of the deck on which it was mounted, leaving 
only a narrow passage to either side. The space accordingly had to be kept free 
of obstructions in case anchors or spars had to be moved at short notice. 
Second, with a large complement of operators, the winch had to be easy to 
access. The capstan was therefore removed from the lower deck and placed 
under the quarterdeck, where it could control ropes on both upper and lower 
decks without the need for ropes to be passed on long, complicated run from 
one deck to another, or for ropes to enter the cargo hold or orlop.310 The result 
was a significant centralizing and rationalizing of work space aboard, which 
will be analyzed below. 
 
Analysis 1. A practice-based approach  
On the topic of practice, or the everyday use of space, I am guided both by 
Foucault’s ideas on canalisation and by Bourdieu’s and Mauss’ ideas regarding 
habitus, with, however, some caveats as to the hegemonic claims made for 
each.311  
 
According to Bourdieu’s practice theory, everyday habits and actions provide 
the framework by which individuals understand and learn about the world 
                                                
310 Gawronski, J: Hollandia Compendium. AN VOC 7375. 
311 Bourdieu, P: "The Kabyle House or The World Reversed," in Bourdieu, P: The Logic 
of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 271-283. Bourdieu, P: Outline of 
a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
Mauss, M: "Techniques of the Body," Economy and Society, 2.1 (1973), 70-88. Foucault, 
M: Discipline and Punish (New York, Pantheon, 1978).  
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and their place in it.312 Bourdieu borrowed the idea of habitus from Mauss, 
who had described it as a system of attitudes and regular movements of the 
body that are associated with particular cultural groups, and which serve to 
reproduce the group’s identity and cohesion.313 Bourdieu expanded these 
“Techniques of the Body” to include the social and built environment and all 
aspects of performance within it, which he described as forming the rules of 
the social “game” that constituted a culture. In particular, Bourdieu contended 
that the arrangement of space teaches individuals the dance or game of social 
integration and relations suitable to their gender and status by deliberately 
placing them in their appropriate milieu and surrounding them with signs 
that showed their station. Foucault emphasized the role of institutional 
programs in producing similar disciplinary results: institutions shape the field 
of possible actions available to their inhabitants such that they are directed to 
conform to those actions, habits and identities that support institutional 
governance.314 
 
Ketting’s account of seafaring life in the Company’s first decades is heavily 
informed by practice approaches: he shows how the seamen’s shared risks 
and responsibilities were clarified both in the ritual of the sea baptism and in 
daily work and habits. On the one hand the sea baptism served to initiate 
                                                
312 Bourdieu, P: Outline of a theory of practice. 
313 Mauss, M: "Techniques of the Body."  
314 Foucault, M: Discipline and Punish. 
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landsmen into the seafarers’ world with a dramatic assertion of seamen’s 
interdependence. On the other, combined, synchronized work at the capstan 
reinforced the need for collective effort without regard to differences of pay or 
experience among the hands.315 Ketting shows likewise how sailors’ jargon 
and distinctive clothing served dual functions; on the one hand  they marked 
the men as seamen and separated them from landsmen, fitting them for 
institutional life: on the other they reinforced distinctions between groups 
aboard and supported the competencies appropriate to particular positions: 
the sailor’s blue smock left his limbs free for climbing, while the surgeon’s 
extravagantly rich costume showed his status, bound to the quarterdeck. 
Likewise the rich lexicon of names for ropes and parts of the ship, once 
mastered, helped sailors operate the ship together promptly and correctly, 
while providing a basis for coterie speech that excluded non-sailors from their 
conversation.316 Most of all, Ketting points to the strict programming of the 
sailor’s daily and weekly routine according to a round of watches, meal times 
and rest times regulated by the tolling of the ship’s bell. Such regimentation is 
of clear relevance to the study of space, since it helped to define the seaman’s 
world, his relations with his shipmates and his interaction with various parts 
of the ship. 
 
                                                
315 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 174. 
316 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 76-80, 135. Bercaw Edwards, M. K: “Sailor talk,” 
paper presented at NASOH 2010 “Maritime Environments,” session: Sea Stories: 
Narrative Experiences Within the Oceanic Realm, Mystic Seaport Museum,13-15 May, 
2010. 
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Applying practice theory to the space of the retourschip presents a number of 
challenges, however. First, the lack of a current, living practice of working 
East Indiamen leaves the researcher only with representations of remembered 
practices as sources: if one follows Bourdieu’s observations regarding habitus 
strictly, then written sources, recorded in memoirs or derived from interviews, 
should provide access to practices only inadvertently or partially: the 
competence of each seafarer in his social and functional roles should rather 
inhibit his ability to report on what he is doing.317 Second, the interpretation of 
practice and the interpretation of cultural categories form a hermeneutic circle; 
in order to understand how bodily movement through the built environment 
reinforced cultural norms, it is necessary to understand how the VOC’s 
seafarers would have interpreted it: where there are gaps in our knowledge of 
the seamen’s system of signs, we may expect to find similar gaps in our 
knowledge of their practices. Third, the ship presents a complex social milieu 
with a large number of status distinctions to be considered. Studying the 
Kabyle house, Bourdieu identified a set of oppositions, between damp and 
dry, dark and light, concealed and open, cool and warm, which together 
produced a female/male binary within the home and which assigned certain 
                                                
317 The pitfalls of using memoirs for these purposes have been explored by Van 
Gelder: such memoirs were written for readers keen for adventure stories and for 
potential land-bound employers; they rarely criticized the VOC openly or failed to 
show their authors in a favorable light and the authors’ rivals in unfavorable ones. 
Gelder, R. van: Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) 
(Nijmegen: SUN, 1997) . Trial testimonies present different, but not lesser, pitfalls. In 
either case the intercession of memory calls written evidence for practice theory into 
some question, even in Bourdieu’s own work. Goodman, J. E: “The Proverbial 
Bourdieu: Habitus and the Politics of Representation in the Ethnography of Kabylia” 
American Anthropologist 105.4 (2003), 782-793. 
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parts of the house to each gender.318 The ship was certainly a gendered space, 
but the system of up to 40 different professional categories and ranks that had 
to be distinguished and clarified appears to have had a much larger influence 
on the spatial order, performances and privileges of shipboard life.319  
 
Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s ideas have also sparked extensive debates 
regarding the power of social structure to shape individual action and the 
extent of the individual’s agency to resist such shaping. Both have been 
interpreted as crediting social institutions with an irresistible hegemonic 
power: since repeated practices operate unconsciously, below the level of 
discourse, they are held not to be susceptible to criticism or resistance.320 The 
retourschip offers a complex case for sustaining claims of non-discursive 
                                                
318 Bourdieu, P: "The Kabyle House or The World Reversed." 
319 Arguably, the performance of gender is heightened in homosocial environments 
such as the ship: aboard traditionally all-male work environments such as oil drilling 
platforms  gender has been identified as an important factor in relations between 
ranks, attitudes to risk taking and accountability for mishaps. Ely, R. J & Meyerson, 
D. E: "An Organizational Approach to Undoing Gender: The unlikely case of offshore 
oil platforms," Research in Organizational Behavior 30 (2010), 3-34. The limitations on 
sources that make space difficult to analyze also pertain to gender on the VOC ship. 
They are compounded for gender, however, by uncertainty as to the presence or 
absence of women aboard, both as passengers and among the crew. Ketting cites 
some cases of men bunking with their wives on the lower deck in the first decades, as 
well as assignations below decks between sailors and the female servants of high 
company officers. It is impossible to determine how widespread such activities were, 
however. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
320 Bourdieu, P: Outline of a theory of practice. Here I use the term “discourse,” like 
Bourdieu’s “field,” to mean that which is available for discussion, and which has a 
clear and coherent program. Bourdieu argues that the submersion of ideas and 
programs into habitus renders them undiscussable or “non-discursive.” R. Keith 
Sawyer “A Discourse on Discourse: an archaeological history of an intellectual 
concept,” Cultural Studies 16.3 (2002) 433-456. 
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hegemony, however, since its spaces and social rituals had to be learned anew, 
rapidly, by every new recruit. Regarding the coercive aspects of canalisation, 
ships of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been described as 
paradigmatic cases of controlled, disciplinary space, where daily life was 
extensively programmed and regimented, and where domination was given 
free rein, through arbitrary corporal punishment attendant on trifling 
infractions and much worse consequences for insubordination.321 Aubert and 
Arnor have characterized seafaring life as suffering under a tyranny of work, 
in which leisure time is collapsed into work time and the quality and 
promptness of a seaman’s work provides the only index of his value.322 In 
consequence, they argue, the seaman tends toward great personal 
responsibility and agency in his work, but an infantilized dependency in non-
work areas, such as the organization of meals.323 Against this regimentation, 
however, the shipboard order allowed for certain modes of resistance and 
anti-hegemonic communication and action that became so well-established 
that they too became “typical.” Idioms or “tactics” of resistance included all 
the categories identified by James Scott in Weapons of the Weak, such as foot-
                                                
321 Schaeffer, R. K: The Chains of Bondage Broke: the proletarianization of seafaring labor, 
1600-1800 (unpublished diss., SUNY Binghamton, 1984). Rediker, M. B: Between the 
devil and the deep blue sea: merchant seamen, pirates, and the Anglo-American maritime 
world, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
322 Aubert, V. & Arner, O,  The Ship as a Social System. 
323 Aubert, V. & Arner, O,  The Ship as a Social System. 
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dragging, the spoiling of work and petty acts of insubordination.324 Resistance 
may also have played a part in some of the ritual of below-decks life described 
by Ketting, including mocking and double entendre-laden performances 
involving barely-masked figures of authority.325 Even the act of mutiny 
showed a common set of tactics, which were evidently reproduced alongside 
the institutional programs as typical of the VOC ship, as shown in the next 
chapter of this dissertation.326  
 
Space syntax  
Ketting’s and Weibust’s studies show how shipboard environments have 
fostered a rich variety of distinctive individual practices and social relations 
and distinctions. My focus is on the overall system of spaces aboard and its 
role in forming shipboard social order, however. To help investigate this I 
have enlisted some aspects of Hillier and Hanson’s space syntax analysis, 
which posits a system of status distinctions between spaces within a 
building.327 Thomas Markus, in his study of institutions and typologies that 
emerged during the Enlightenment, has made extensive use of Hillier and 
Hanson’s “spatial maps” to characterize and differentiate those institutions 
                                                
324 Scott, J: Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985). 
325 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk,  266.  
326 Certeau, M de: The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984). 
327 Hillier, W and Julienne Hanson: The Social Logic of Space (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984).  
 182 
with which the ship is most commonly compared.328 Such “spatial maps” 
reduce the distinct spaces or rooms within a building to a network of 
connections (Figure 2.9: Floor plan and spatial map, from Hillier & Hanson 
1984).  
 
Figure 2.9: Floor plan of a simple building and its corresponding spatial depth 
map, from Hillier and Hanson, 1984.329  
                                                
328 Markus, T: Buildings and Power. The comparison of ships with these particular 
institutions is generally traced to Goffman, although parallels have been drawn 
between ships and prisons at least since Samuel Johnson famously quipped "no man 
will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into jail; for being in a ship 
is being in a jail, with the chance of being drowned." Boswell, J: The Life of Samuel 
Johnson (New York: Modern Library, 1931). Aubert and Arnor adopted Goffman’s 
category of the “total institution” to describe European ships, adding a general 
description of their institutional and spatial characteristics from prehistory to the 
twentieth century. Aubert, V. & Arner, O,  The Ship as a Social System. (Oslo 1962).  
329 The depth map shows the numbered spaces arranged according to how many 
discrete spaces must be passed through to reach them from the building’s entrance. 
E.g: to reach room no. 5 one must pass through 3 intermediate spaces: it is the fourth 
space reached on the shortest path from the entrance, so its depth is 4. Room number 
8 can be reached by multiple paths, but all involve at least 5 intermediate spaces. 
Room 8 therefore has a depth of 6. Hillier, W. & Hanson, J: The Social Logic of Space. 
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In general, spaces closer to the building’s main entrance are taken to be more 
public and more appropriate to casual users of the building. Recalling 
Aubert’s classification of the inmates of institutions, these casual users are 
termed “visitors” and are opposed to the building’s “inhabitants,” who 
occupy spaces farther away from the entrance, or “deeper” in the building’s 
network.330  
 
Spatial maps are therefore taken principally to show both relative accessibility 
and the implicit hierarchies between rooms or spaces. Depth is generally taken 
to indicate both greater privacy and greater power.331 The signal exception to 
this rule lies exactly in those total institutions with which the ship is 
compared, which are considered “inverted:” in these cases the “visitors” are 
powerless inmates, kept at great depth, while the “inhabitants” 
(administrators, wardens and guards) occupy positions closer to the public 
“front” (Figure 2.10: workhouse, schematic plan and spatial map).332  
 
I have employed some aspects of spatial mapping in order to add the ship to 
this comparative project and characterize its place vis-a-vis the other 
institutions so described, paying particular attention to the “spatial narrative,” 
                                                
330 A distinction here is drawn between  the visitor’s entrance or “front” and the staff 
entrance or “back” of an organization. Markus, T: Buildings and Power. 
331 Hillier, W. & Hanson, J: The Social Logic of Space. Markus, T: Buildings and Power. 
332 Hillier, W. & Hanson, J: The Social Logic of Space. Markus, T: Buildings and Power 95-
119. 
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or series of rooms that must be experienced on the way from one part of the 
ship to another.333  
 
 
Figure 2.10: Parish workhouse, St. George’s, Hanover Square, London (1725), 
schematic plan and spatial depth map, from Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 
101. 
 
                                                
333 The example of such a narrative used by Hillier and Hanson is that of the enfilade 
of rooms at Versailles, which separates the king’s apartments from the “public” 
audience chambers. As Dovey has observed, the passage through rooms that lead 
ever “deeper” into the palace’s spatial organization and the consequent power 
differential between the public and private chambers tells only part of the story of 
how the superior status of the king was impressed upon his visitors. The other part, 
invisible to the methods of space syntax, is the complex narrative of mythological and 
planetary figures the visitor walks through on his way to petition the Sun King. 
Dovey, K: Framing Places. Markus, T: Buildings and Power. Hillier, W. & Hanson, J: The 
Social Logic of Space. 
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It is important to bear in mind the limitations of such maps. The meanings of 
buildings, and the reasons for the patterns of connection and access that space 
syntax traces, are based on complex cultural and historical matrices: they refer 
to social structures, discourses and practices that are not themselves revealed 
by space syntax.334 Further, the nature of individual connections between 
spaces is at least as important as the networks they form, and often not 
susceptible to mapping. Hierarchies between spaces and their users are 
informed by many factors, including the bodily attitudes used to enter and 
leave them, changes in the visibility and legibility of particular spaces from 
various points in the network, and the opportunities for surveillance they 
afford.335 
 
Moreover, space syntax maps are not ideally adapted for modeling ships. 
First, they reflect a preoccupation with physical connections and enclosures to 
the exclusion of many other methods for organizing space: they offer no 
means for modeling purely social or legal prohibitions, or for distinguishing 
between lockable doors and open passages that afford sight lines and 
relatively free movement while still conveying social distinctions. Second, 
                                                
334 Osman, K. A & Suliman, M: “The Space Syntax Methodology: fits and misfits” 
Architecture and Comportment/Architecture and Behaviour 10.2, 189-204. 
335 In space syntax terminology the visible horizon of any point in a space is its 
“isovist.” M. Benedikt (1979). "To Take Hold of Space: isovists and isovist fields". 
Environment and Planning B 6: 47–65. Hillier & Hanson 1984. Regarding surveillance 
Markus cites Bentham’s Panopticon prison as a clear case where an asymmetry 
between guards and prisoners regarding their ability to see and be seen supports an 
asymmetry in power. Surveillance proves to be a much more complex and more 
limited issue on the ship. Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 95-119. 
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they build their measurements of “depth” on the foundation of an access point 
between the building and an “outside.” This latter category of space 
constitutes an abstract “ground plane” in space syntax analysis—a neutral 
background, excluded from the topic of the building’s peculiar power 
relations. The assumption that any building rests on such a “neutral” 
foundation is deeply problematic. For the ship in motion, however, “a floating 
piece of space… that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same 
time is given over to the infinity of the sea,” it is simply inapplicable.336 The 
retourschip’s external referents are its boats, other ships, the hazards of the sea 
and its destination: none of these serves to organize the space aboard in a way 
analogous to a street door. There are various ways in which this problem 
might be resolved, each, however, altering the nature of the analysis.  
 
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 are simple maps showing the connections between 
spaces in the Batavia and Hollandia subtypes without any built-in assessments 
of depth or a “ground.”  
 
                                                
336 Foucault, M: “Of Other Spaces.” 
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Three categories of connections were observed in the two subtypes. The first 
category lacks any physical restrictions: access between the spaces is entirely 
open, the spaces themselves being distinguished from one another by name 
and function but not separated by walls or other obstructions. One example of 
such a connection is that between the pit, which was open to the sky, and the 
space under the quarterdeck, which is generally shown on models as a 
continuous run of unpartitioned deck. Such connections might still involve 
social restrictions: for instance, animals that had free reign of the pit were 
penned and prevented from roaming under the quarterdeck or in the 
forecastle. The second category involves hatches or doors that were habitually 
kept open so as to allow free access but that could be closed if circumstances 
demanded, such as when the ship had to be defended against enemies, 
mutineers or a storm. All deck hatches, providing access from one deck to 
another, fall in this category except those that provided access to the hold, 
which were kept locked. The third category divides classes of crewmen from 
one another, and is marked by doors that were habitually kept closed, so as to 
create separate domains aboard. The most well-known and -documented such 
separation was that between officers “up at the back” and men “before the 
(main) mast,” found on all large European sailing ships of the period. This 
division was expressed physically on both subtypes by a partition wall, which 
separated the officers’ domain, roughly the rearmost quarter  of the ship, from 
that of the rest of the crew in a continuous line that stretched from the keel to 
the quarterdeck. The partition marked a boundary of asymmetric rights of 
access: while all inhabitants of the ship were permitted forward of the line, the 
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spaces to its rear were restricted to the use of select groups of officers. 
Lockable doors on the lower and upper decks marked the limits of access: for 
a seaman to cross these boundaries without an explicit summons from an 
officer was itself a punishable offence. 
 
There were two other distinct “domains” with similarly exclusive rights of 
access. The first belonged to the boatswain and his assistants, the junior 
officers charged with coordinating the crew before the mast. The boatswain’s 
traditional place aboard was in the forecastle: this was considered a good 
lodging place for seamen, but they were permitted there only under the 
boatswain’s sufferance. The cable locker and the manger were likewise under 
the control of the boatswain and hold man: like the gun room these spaces 
were devoted to particular functions about the ship—the storage and ordering 
of vital equipment—but also had a certain status as lodging places, reserved 
apart from the general crew for a small expert coterie responsible for the 
equipment.  
 
The second separate domain was that of the steward, the hold crew and the 
cook, who alone had rights of access to the supplies in the hold and the 
steward’s pantry (bottelarij) and galley (kombuis). Only the steward’s domain 
spread over several locations separated by general crew space: on the lower 
deck he was responsible both for general supplies kept in the pantry and for 
the officers’ own food and drink kept beneath the gun room. On the upper 
deck he was responsible for a further small cupboard of supplies and the 
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water vats. None of these spaces afforded lodging: the steward slept together 
with the general crew on the lower deck. Of all the domains aboard the 
steward’s was also the most closely recorded: regulations dedicated to 
controlling access to and use of cargo and supplies accounted for a significant 
portion of the Company’s Articles. Access to the hold was permitted only to 
the steward under supervision by a council of junior officers. Strict accounts 
were kept of every item brought out, its condition and its manner of use, in 
order to prevent both smuggling and the abuse of stores of which stewards 
and masters were so regularly accused.337  
 
From figures 2.11 and 2.12 it can be seen that the spaces of the officers’ domain 
on the Batavia replica form three cul-de-sacs linked by the spaces of the 
general crew. The cul-de-sac on the quarterdeck housed the mates, that on the 
upper deck contained the saloon, which housed the master, merchant and any 
other passengers, and that on the lower deck housed the chief gunner and his 
protégés.338 On the Hollandia subtype the arrangement was similar, except that 
the captain (formerly master) had joined the mates on the quarterdeck. The 
apparent loop offered by the connection through the galleries (which 
                                                
337 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen. Dening recounts how Mr. Fryer, 
shipmaster of the Bounty during the famous mutiny, accused Mr. Bligh in front of 
Dutch authorities of making profits off his purser’s duties. Dening notes that “these 
were telling accusations to the mercantile Dutch, the sort of reprehensible behaviour 
in a  commander they understood” abuse of stores being a commonplace grievance 
on all mercantile and military shipping during the period. Dening, G: Mr Bligh’s Bad 
Language: passion, power, and theater on the Bounty (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 107. 
338 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
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contained the officers’ toilets) is somewhat misleading: the captain might use 
it as such, to travel between his own cabin and the saloon, but access to the 
captain’s cabin was not free for the rest of the officers.  
 
Excluding the officers’ quarters, the space of the general crew formed a loop, 
one end of which fell within the boatswain’s domain. The remainder of this 
loop occupied the middle portions of the lower and upper decks, its center 
falling on the stairs connecting the two decks, which on the Batavia replica are 
placed just outside the schans and on the Hollandia subtype are found in the 
voorkajuit.  
 
This space, comprising all of the area under the quarterdeck but centered on 
the voorkajuit, offers a good candidate for the center of the ship for space 
syntax purposes, or the “ground” from which relative depths might be 
calculated, for several reasons. First, it can be assumed to have seen a great 
deal of traffic and to have been used as a pass-through space for a wide 
variety of seafarers  and purposes. As the site of the main access hatch 
between the upper and lower decks the voorkajuit would have been used by 
men beginning or ending watches and by those going from work to their 
meals. The space under the quarterdeck was also the most multi-functional 
space aboard: on the Hollandia subtype it contained the capstan, the water 
vats, some of the ship’s guns, the medicine chest, access to three decks, and a 
number of mariners’ berths. Regarding the social center of the general crew’s 
portion of the ship, it was one of several spaces used for regular assembly. The 
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galley acted as a focus at mealtimes. Sick mariners were seen by surgeons 
daily in the pit, beside the mainmast: this was also where auctions of dead 
seamen’s belongings were held and corporal punishments were meted out.339 
The voorkajuit, however, stood as the formal center of assembly and the 
speaking-place both for the captain and for the preacher/sick visitor. As such 
it represented the place on the ship where the worlds of the officers and the 
general crew met, the saloon door at its rear separating the space of the 
officers’ work (when they met in council to debate the course or judge 
crewmen) from that of the men.  
 
If the voorkajuit is taken as the “ground,” then depth maps may be derived 
from the two subtypes, as shown in figures 2.13 and 2.14. 
                                                
339 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen. 
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Figure 2.13: Depth map for the Batavia subtype, with exclusive domains 
shaded grey, as in Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.14: Depth map for the Hollandia subtype, with eclusive domains 
shaded grey, as in Figure 2.12. 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the depth maps. First, the separation 
of the officers’ domain from that of the general crew is clearer and more 
consistent on the Hollandia subtype than on the Batavia. The ambiguity of the 
schans, which fell within the defensible region of the officers but was occupied 
by ordinary sailors, was removed, as was the lookout’s (or trumpeter’s) cabin 
 196 
on the poop deck, such that ordinary sailors no longer had any regular 
accommodation aft of the officers’ partition.340 Second, the captain’s  quarters 
on the Hollandia subtype show a very different ordering of spatial priority 
from those on the Batavia.  
 
In his history of the evolution of the English Country House, Mark Girouard 
has described a shift in the spatial presentation of power between the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, and roughly a century later 
elsewhere in Europe.341 Girouard states that prior to this shift the lords of 
estates and fiefdoms in England maintained Great Halls, where they would 
regularly eat together with all their retainers, affirming and reproducing the 
fief as a social unit. During the sixteenth century the lords and a select group 
of courtiers came to withdraw from the Great Hall to private dining rooms 
and lodgings above it, demonstrating a hierarchy of favor through 
opportunities of access to the lord. This process of withdrawing was repeated 
a number of times, resulting eventually in a scheme of progressively smaller, 
more private chambers for ever more select groups of courtiers, as shown in 
Robert Hooke’s 1678 design for Ragley House, where in order to reach the 
lord from the Hall a visitor would have to traverse a saloon, a “withdrawing 
                                                
340 The poop-deck cabin that forms a prominent feature on the Batavia replica is absent 
from Hoving’s reconstruction of Nicolaes Witsen’s pinas. Such cabins can be found, 
however, in several seventeenth-century paintings. Hoving et al: Nicolaes Witsens 
scheeps-bouw-konst. Witsen, N: Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. 
341 Girouard, M: Life in the English Country House: A Social and Architectural History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 10-12. 
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room,” a bedchamber and finally a closet.342 Something similar can be seen in 
the evolution of the Captain’s quarters. In the VOC’s first decades the most 
senior officer aboard its ships was generally the merchant, after whom came 
the master, being the most senior sailing officer. Both of these men lodged in 
the saloon, together with any high-status passengers and sometimes with the 
dominee, or preacher.343 The saloon was also the social center of the officers’ 
part of the ship: the officers gathered there to take meals, to meet in council 
and to plan the ship’s course.344 This arrangement is reflected on the Batavia 
replica. As the meeting point for meals and the sole access point for the 
officers’ toilets, the saloon clearly formed the officers’ “hearth:” it is also 
shown as the largest of the officers’ spaces with the most decoration, including 
glazed windows and built-in benches. In comparison the mates’ cabins on the 
deck above are recreated as modest affairs, for the most part lacking doors, 
furnished with small, unglazed portholes for windows, and subject to periodic 
invasions by sailors using the winch placed within their enclosure on the 
quarterdeck. By the construction of the Hollandia, however, the Heren XVII had 
mandated that the captain should maintain his cabin, which functioned as an 
office and as the centre for navigation and planning, on the quarterdeck 
separate from his bedroom, which might be used for private counsel.345 This 
                                                
342 Girouard, M: Life in the English Country House, 135 
343 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
344 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
345 VOC 7375. 
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arrangement closely follows that of Ragley House, even to the point of 
replicating a “back stairs” access to the Captain’s cabin via the gallery/toilet 
(Figure 2.7), through which messages might be passed without the messenger 
emerging into the public space of the quarterdeck.  
 
The process of withdrawal clearly accords with space syntax models, 
organizing chambers to reflect social hierarchies. The mates’ cabins offer less 
clear examples than the captain’s, since on the Hollandia subtype they occupy a 
level closer to the “ground” of the voorkajuit. The officers’ accommodations 
were, however, also reconfigured to reflect changing standards of privacy and 
potentially to show a growing power distance between levels of hierarchy on 
the ship. The saloon remained the common dining room. Its use as a bedroom 
was restricted, however, to passengers: “visitors” in Hillier and Hanson’s 
terms. Both the preacher and the merchant, if present, were afforded private 
cabins beside this communal space. In addition to withdrawal, Girouard states 
that physical height above the ground reflected high status. The Hollandia 
subtype clarifies this relationship greatly: the captain, occupying the farthest 
cabins to the stern, was placed marginally above the mates by the curvature of 
the decks, while cabins were graded in size to place the largest at the rear, 
forming a tapering corridor behind the wheel that led to the captain’s door, 
centrally placed where he might benefit from the clearest view of the 
quarterdeck available to any of the cabins. The mates, then, were arranged by 
rank with the highest closest to the captain and stern of the ship and the 
lowest farther forward. Merchants continued to outrank captains in the 
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Company hierarchy and to lead councils aboard ships when they were 
present. Their separation from the sailing officers subtly colored their 
positions aboard, however: the “promotion” of ship’s masters to the pseudo-
military rank of captain during Van Imhoff’s redress, and the adoption of 
similarly military-inflected uniforms, was intended to present the Company’s 
ship officers as members of an autonomous, expert cadre.346 The merchant was 
effectively presented as a guest, authoritative, but extraneous to the everyday 
running of the ship.  
 
Third, the dividing line between senior and junior officers was drawn 
explicitly and spatially on the Hollandia subtype. Indigenous ships in the 
Indian Ocean routinely had cabins constructed on them for each voyage, 
according to the numbers of important passengers and high-status seamen 
carried. Portuguese ships followed a similar tradition, without a standardized 
corps of officers or merchant’s agents to fix the numbers of cabins required.347 
The VOC instituted a standard corps of officers from its first Articles, but still 
showed variation during its first decades in the numbers of officers of various 
ranks carried on each ship, their status and the methods for carrying them, as 
                                                
346 Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on 
Board, 1602-1795,”The Mariners Mirror 49.2 (May 1963), 81-104.  
347 Khalilieh, H. S: Islamic Maritime Law: an introduction. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1998). 
Pérez-Mallaína, P. Spain’s Men of the Sea: daily life on the Indies fleets in the sixteenth 
century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Castro, F: "The Pepper 
Wreck, an Early Seventeenth-century Portuguese Indiaman at the Mouth of the Tagus 
River, Portugal," International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 32.1 (2003), 6–23. 
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well as those for accommodating merchant-captains and passengers.348 With 
the formalizing of quarterdeck cabins during Van Imhoff’s redress, the cadre of 
officers was made independent of the specific requirements of individual 
voyages. The gunroom appears in accounts of early voyages to have had a 
status somewhere between that of the officers’ spaces and those of the general 
crew: like the gunroom on a warship it was the domain of the chief gunner 
and served as a training ground for future officers. The spatial maps show it to 
have been entirely separate from the rest of the officers’ spaces, however. The 
chief gunner might eat together with the officers in the saloon, but he lodged 
below. The main points of contact between gunroom and saloon seem to have 
been the weapons that were stored in each, turning each into a space that had 
to be defended against mutiny, and the placement of the officers’ private 
supplies beneath the gunroom’s floor, which may have afforded the trainees 
housed there some opportunities to mix with the society of the saloon above 
their heads. 
 
The most important thing revealed by the depth maps, however, is the parallel 
structures of spaces and hierarchical levels that obtained both for the officers 
and the general crew. Increasing depth correlated with increasing power and 
privacy both behind and in front of the saloon door, with the boatswain and 
his assistants’ superiority over the general seamen expressed in their lodging 
                                                
348 Ship’s councils, the main governing authority aboard VOC ships, were somewhat 
variable in their makeup before about 1650: they might include or exclude figures 
such as the boatswain and the sergeant, who commanded any soldiers carried 
aboard. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
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in the distinct spaces of the forecastle and cable locker, controlling their own 
access between the lower and upper decks independent of that of “the 
people.” Height in the ship also denoted status before the mast, as behind, 
with soldiers at the lowest level and junior officers at the highest. This result is 
surprising only if we consider the ship a sister institution to the prison, 
hospital or asylum, in which case we should expect the officers to occupy 
spaces between the inmates/crew and the ship’s “exterior” access points, or 
alternatively for those junior officers charged with maintaining order (the 
boatswain, sergeant, quartermasters and provost) to occupy a position 
between the men and the senior officers. Instead most of those charged with 
keeping order lodged among the rest of the general crew or maintained an 
aloof position close to the tools of their particular expert trades. The retourschip 
therefore offers a clear dual order, containing two communities that faced 
each other across a clearly defined partition, each containing a sociospatial 
hierarchy arranged in opposition to the other. 
 
Markus identifies one other building type in which administrative and labor 
functions form two bookends around the workers’ living space: the factory, 
for which Markus draws from French examples including the Royal Foundry 
at Le Creusot, Ledoux’s celebrated salt works at Chaux.349 As a space of 
organized labor the retourschip has much in common with the factory; the 
regular rhythms of work and leisure times, the organization of the crew into 
                                                
349 Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 250, 259. 
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work gangs and the need to perform tasks with steady repetition in order to 
“produce” progress toward the destination all recall industrial production 
methods. The ship has moreover been cited as a kind of proto-factory and one 
of the first environments in which proletarian labor occurred.350 There is one 
important way in which the spatial organization of the ship differed from 
those of factories identified by Markus, however: in Markus’ examples the site 
of production is always placed deep within the structure, while 
accommodation for workers is comparatively shallow. The work surfaces of 
the ship, however, being the upper decks and rigging, were the first any 
visitor would encounter and were commonly used by the crew for circulation 
and for accessing other spaces. Indeed, the ship’s living spaces were built 
largely around the demands of its sailing, steering, fighting and cargo-
handling machineries: in order to afford access to the ship’s three masks, all of 
the decks needed to be accessible to the workers, even the quarterdeck, which 
was understood to “belong” to the officers.  
 
Markus’ argument regarding factory structures relies on the correlation 
observed elsewhere between network depth and power, Markus reasons that, 
since the factory's power lies in its productive capacity, it is natural that those 
parts devoted to production should be the deepest. He does not, however, 
offer a practical argument as to why this should be so. It would be perfectly 
possible to place the work surfaces of ships at greater depth than the living 
                                                
350 Schaeffer, R. K: The Chains of Bondage Broke. Rediker, M. B; Between the Devil and the 
Deep Blue Sea.  
 203 
quarters: the points of greatest traffic flow and common access need only be 
moved to lower decks. Such an arrangement was found on passenger and 
cargo ships in the Mediterranean as early as the twelfth century and on 
modern cruise ships and ferries.351 No East Indiamen or European warships 
during the Company's period used this arrangement, however; in all cases the 
locations of greatest traffic, general accessibility and contact with the outside 
world were also the work surfaces, while accommodation was principally 
buried below.352 Finally, despite its relationship with both the total institution 
and the factory, the retourschip’s arrangement does not compare readily with 
the bagne, a hybrid dockside factory-workhouse-prison built in France in the 
middle of the eighteenth century and in French colonies from 1790.353 The 
bagne and the ship both placed inmates’ living quarters at greater depth than 
the production spaces. The bagne otherwise followed the total institution 
model, however, placing the inmates deeper than the administration and 
                                                
351 In his Travels, ibn Jubayr describes a Genoese ship of four decks, tied up at a 
quayside, being loaded via a large opening in the side of the hull. Goods and 
passengers therefore entered the ship without needing to access the decks. The 
opening was sealed shut in stages as the weight of cargo lowered the ship in the 
water, and ultimately completely sealed prior to departure. Similar lateral cargo 
loading methods were used on retourschepen for difficult items such as spare masts 
and spars, which were taken into the lower deck or hold through ports similar to gun 
ports placed at the stern. Ibn Jubayr: The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, trans. R.C.J. Broadhurst 
(London: J. Cape, 1952). Dam, P. van: Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. 
Uitgegeven door Dr F. W. Stapel. (’s-Gravenhage, 1927-43). 
352 The main difference between East Indiamen and warships was that the lower or 
gun deck on the warship was also a work surface, such that accommodation on 
warships was typically concentrated one deck below that on East Indiamen, making 
use of the orlop and hold space, which in the East Indiaman was reserved for cargo. 
Gardiner, R. & Lavery, B: The Line of Battle. 
353 Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 258 
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guards, unlike the ship, on which the living spaces were strongly divided 
between officers and men, but there was some limited sharing of work spaces. 
Indeed, the focus on shared work appears stronger on the ship than in any of 
the other building types discussed, such that the ship must be considered 
according to a work/habitation axis as much as an axis based on status. 
 
Analysis 2. Cognitive schemes 
The ordering and clarifying of work space and functions aboard the retourschip 
played an extremely important part in its organization. Thomas Markus has 
noted that “the study of buildings is one way to understand society… the 
physical structures are translations on the ground of models in the actors’ 
heads.”354 Following King, Markus considers how buildings help to form a 
collective unwelt, by acting as “material classifying devices; they organize 
people, things and ideas in space so as to make conceptual systems 
concrete.”355  
 
The sociospatial order of the ship also served to ‘orient’ and ‘identify’ each of 
its inhabitants—to tell him his place.356 The non-discursive, unconscious effects 
of such concretizing belong to practice theory, above. The embedding of 
conceptual systems in the fabric of the ship also guaranteed those systems a 
                                                
354 Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 26.  
355 Markus, T: Buildings and Power, 19 
356 Dovey, K: Framing Places, 46 
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place in discourses about the ship, however, among both the ship’s inhabitants 
and the Company elite. Susie West has emphasized the need to consider 
simultaneously the effects of practice and reason on the use of space, to 
address how spaces have been imagined as well as how they were used 
physically.357 A cognitive scheme of space might be described as a purposeful 
imagining of its function: a distinctive meaning to be communicated to novice 
users of the space regarding, for instance, those spaces that formed the 
domain of one or another expert user or proprietor. 
 
Addressing the cognitive schemes behind spatial order and place-making has 
generally entailed a turn toward phenomenology, positing a set of effects a 
space might have upon a thinking, perceiving, dwelling subject.358 Such 
exercises applied to an eighteenth century architectural type are necessarily 
highly speculative and prone to essentialism, since any findings must be 
ascribed to a putative collective subject who is not available in the present for 
comment. Such a subject is frequently personalized as “Jack Tar” or “Jan 
Compagnie” or “the common sailor;” he appears in de Hullu’s and Boxer’s 
accounts of the VOC as a character with a recognizable set of attitudes and 
motivations, and in Rediker’s work as the (deliberately stereotyping) 
                                                
357 West, S: “Social Space and the English Country House” in Tarlow, S. & West, S: The 
Familiar Past? Archaeologies of later historical Britain (London, Routledge 1999), 103-122. 
358 Dovey, K: Framing Places. Lawrence, D. L. & Low, S. M: "The Built Environment 
and Spatial Form" Annual Review of Anthropology (1990) 19, 453-505.  
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personification of a class.359 This figure is the invention of a variety of authors 
originating with the Company’s first governors: like the retourschip itself, it is 
the product of a variety of political agendas.360 There is another collective 
subject, however, which communicated impressions and associations 
regarding the ship, and which most of all intended to impart behaviors to 
seafarers based on shipboard order: it is most evident in the Resolutions of the 
Heren XVII and in Pieter van Dam’s Beschryvinge, as the Company’s decision-
making function, which the Company’s directors, supply-masters, 
shipbuilders and masters/captains were required to interpret and implement. 
To the extent one may speak of the Company taking action or displaying a 
will, it is this subject that so acted and willed, receiving reports and demands 
from its shareholders, captains and directors, and smoothing its internal 
debates and controversies into unitary resolutions for publication. This subject 
displayed an active concern for shipboard space as a means to facilitate certain 
kinds of interactions, of discipline, subordination and collective work, and to 
hinder other interactions through control of access. It also clearly set store by 
the communicative aspects of spatial design: in 1763 a debate over the safety 
                                                
359 Hullu, J de, Bruijn, J. R. & Lucassen, J: Op de Schepen. Boxer, C. R: Jan Compagnie in 
war and peace, 1602-1799: a short history of the Dutch East-India Company (Hong Kong: 
Heinemann Asia, 1979). Rediker, M. B: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. 
360 The figure and character of the Company’s sailors has been invoked generally by 
authors hoping to improve them, most famously including the first Governors 
General, Pieter Both and J. P. Coen and, toward the end of the Company’s existence, 
van Kinsbergen and Titsingh. Vermeulen, A. C. J: “The people on board” in Emmer, 
P. & Gaastra, F. S. (eds.): The organisation of interoceanic trade in European Expansion, 
1450-1800 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996). Kinsbergen, J. H. van: Myne Droomen 
(Amsterdam: s.n. 1800). Titsingh, I: "Bedenking over de Schaarsheid van Zeevarende 
Volk" in Hoefnagel, N: Plan of Welmeenende Voorstelling ter Verbetering van Neerlands 
Zee-weezen... (Amsterdam:  Dirk Schuurman, 1779). 
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and capacity of retourschepen focused on whether the VOC should adopt 
gladdeck or “stretched deck” designs, favored by the English and Swedish East 
India Companies, which eliminated the pit around the mainmast and joined 
the foredeck to the quarterdeck in a continuous span (as in Figure 2.8: The 
Falmouth, which was an early example of a stretched deck design).361 Debates 
over gladdeck ships continued for the next 30 years, the advantages of superior 
safety, capacity and waterproofing being pitted against the concern that the 
loss of the quarterdeck as a separate spatial marker would erode the special 
status of the officers: the men working before the mast would be able to 
confront the officers literally on the same level.362 
 
Through the Company’s history the spatial order aboard its ships underwent 
a series of changes alongside the process of standardization outlined in 
Chapter 1; in general the ships of the Company’s later years revealed their 
system of classification more clearly and their spaces were rendered more 
“legible” than those of the first decades. The reasons for this clarification 
appear related to those for standardization: they reproduced an order meant 
to be legible not only to captains and merchants on the quarterdeck but also to 
the landlubber scions of directors’ families and to fresh recruits who had no 
                                                
361 The Zeeland chamber built nine gladdeck retourschepen between 1765 and 1772, after 
which the Heren XVII decided against allowing any more to be built, until 1780 when 
it was left up to each Chamber to decide for itself whether its ships should have pits. 
DAS I, 48-9. 
362 VOC 59, Minutes of the Heren XVII, 18 October 1764. The concern regarding loss of 
officer authority was voiced by Rotterdam shipwright P. van Zwijndregt. DAS I, 48-9. 
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previous maritime experience. In particular the Hollandia subtype appears less 
reliant on assumed seafaring traditions and less amenable to local 
interpretations of the Company’s rules than the ships of the Company’s first 
decades described by Ketting. In its separation of functions the Hollandia 
subtype also more closely resembles contemporary Admiralty vessels, 
contributing to a disciplined and rationalized “shipshape” order that 
emphasized seamen’s professional obligations over the formation of any 
shipboard community, generating a set of spaces, each with their own specific 
instructions. 
 
Division into “workrooms” 
The elite “director’s view” divided the ship and its crew into a series of 
“workrooms,” each dedicated to performing a particular set of tasks for the 
Company and enabled to focus on those tasks because of a certain “functional 
distance” between each workroom and the rest of the ship’s systems and 
occupants.  
 
For the concepts of the “workroom” and “functional distance,” I am indebted 
to Yoko Arisaka’s interpretation of the discussion of space as a cognitive 
category in Heidegger’s Being and Time.363 Where Heidegger referred to a 
                                                
363 This dissertation is not intended as a work of scholarship on Heidegger’s thought. 
Arisaka’s interpretation is assessed and employed only in terms of its applicability to 
shipboard space, without regard for its accuracy regarding Heidegger’s original 
intent or Hubert Dreyfus’ analysis. Arisaka, Y: “On Heidegger's Theory of Space: A 
Critique of Dreyfus” Inquiry 38: 4 (December 1995), 455-467.  
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dasein, or “participating subject” identified with an individual person, I am 
taking the observing and participating subject to be formed from the elite 
collective referred to above, which constituted a kind of “design council” for 
the Company’s ships.  
 
Arisaka’s interpretation revolves around the ideas of “equipment” and the 
“workroom” as fundamental elements in the formation of a spatial 
understanding. “Equipment” is a term applied not only to physical tools but 
also to persons and concepts employed by the subject. Such “equipment” is 
grouped together in a “workroom” (or “region” in Arisaka’s terminology):  a 
classificatory schema produced by the subject for the purpose of organizing 
and using the equipment, which might literally be a room full of tools that 
belong together (such as a kitchen with the tools for preparing food), or more 
figuratively might be a set of associated objects and persons that together 
perform a particular set of tasks.364 According to Arisaka’s interpretation, the 
subject develops a sense of space through the practical use of equipment. 
Through being repeatedly used in combination, certain items of equipment 
are associated together by the subject into workrooms, where they are kept 
“ready-to-hand.” Centered on an interested subject or user, this conception of 
                                                
364 The “workroom” full of “equipment” in this account has a clear affinity with the 
actor-network described by Callon and Latour, being a collection of discrete entities 
deliberately bricolages together in order to perform tasks and overcome challenges. 
Callon, M. & Latour, B: “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure 
reality and how sociologists help them to do so,” in Knorr-Cetina, K. D. & Cicourel, 
A. V. (Eds.) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- 
and Macro-Sociologies. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981),  277-303. 
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space is built around the user’s care rather than any other coordinates. 
“Functional distance” in Arisaka’s interpretation is an instrumental measure 
of the availability or readiness of an item of equipment for use. Something or 
someone that occupies the subject’s attention, for which a use is known and in 
mind, is in Heideggerian jargon “de-severed” or linked to the subject, and 
experienced as “nearer” than items of equipment that have less ready 
application for the subject’s current needs or that are “in the background” or 
“severed” from the subject’s awareness.365 Both “nearness” and “farness” are 
vital functions of the workroom: in order to function and achieve its objectives 
the subject must be able to locate and select the proper equipment, placing 
what is needed “ready-to-hand” and what is unnecessary “far away.” 
Therefore a certain blindness or limitation on the subject’s attention is implied 
by the workroom: each task necessarily involves its own perspective, which is 
actively hampered by the failure to screen out perspectives or equipment 
proper to other tasks. 
 
Within the use-world of a single subject this selection and distancing is a fairly 
simple operation; it corresponds to the concept of “attention.” Where many 
subjects must function together, however, as in communal spaces, they must 
share a common “workroom,” and organize their equipment in a consistent 
                                                
365 This user-centered perspective appears similar to that identified by Hillier and 
Hanson as fundamental to Piaget’s work on the development of spatial cognition in 
children, who were observed to organize the world according to relations of 
proximity, separation, succession, enclosure and contiguity. Hillier, W. & Hanson, J: 
The Social Logic of Space, 47. 
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way. Conversely, a particular ordering of equipment in a communal 
workroom will prompt similar modes of use among all the workroom’s users. 
Arisaka relates this communal associative space specifically to work 
environments:  
In an office, workers orient themselves and move according to the locations 
of desks, computers, pathway, copier, etc.  Each worker has her own sphere 
of de-severance but this is not because she has her own self-centered, 
private space; rather, the region dictates personal de-severance through the 
perspectival givenness of equipment and presence. De-severance is a 
particular, actual perspective derived from the region (the frame of possible 
perspectives).366 
 
Discrete workrooms can be seen clearly expressed on the retourschip, 
compartmentalizing and organizing the objects, spaces and persons aboard by 
status, by their places in the operation of the ship and by their functions for 
the Company. The arrangement of such workrooms not only separated and 
clarified the operations needed to work the ship, they also placed particular 
personnel in positions of authority over them and encouraged the growth of 
exclusive “fiefdoms” in the shipboard order. These workrooms were also 
demarcated spatially: navigation, bookkeeping, sailing, carpentry, sail-making 
and cooking each had its own special space on the ship where its own 
hierarchy of seamen was revealed. Even the casual, menial task of picking 
oakum occupied a particular position on the deck.367 The clearest example of 
such a workroom and its sociospatial effects is found on the foredeck, which 
                                                
366 Arisaka, Y: “On Heidegger's Theory of Space.” 464. 
367 Rediker, M. B; Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. 
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was placed in the boatswain’s care and under his organization. One of the first 
tasks for a new sailing recruit on a ship was to “learn the ropes:” this meant 
entering and adopting the boatswain’s workroom,  memorizing and 
internalizing the precise, mnemonic disposition of the ropes used to handle 
the sails and spars, which were ordered around the foredeck and pit in order 
to be ready to the boatswain’s hand. Novice seamen posed a considerable 
danger to their workmates; if a rope was wrongly placed or the wrong 
belaying pin removed a sail might be loosed or a spar brought crashing to the 
deck.368 The boatswain therefore had sole charge of the ropes and their space 
until the sailors had been taught to emulate his order.  
 
Through the Company’s history many of these workrooms remained the sole 
responsibility of their chiefs or fief-holders: a boatswain’s quality consisted in 
large part of his memory and organizational skills; a poorly organized 
foredeck was therefore a disciplinary problem. The Heren XVII never saw fit to 
issue any resolutions ordering the ropes for him. In the formalizing of officers’ 
cabins discussed above, however, a workroom or operational schema may be 
seen to have been imposed on captains and navigation officers by the 
Company’s highest council, standardizing relations among officers in line 
with the pay hierarchy. Proximity to the stern meant both higher status and a 
shorter distance from the captain, who could summon any officer at will but 
                                                
368 Dana, R. H: Two years before the mast.  
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who kept his first mate, the second in command overall, closest at hand.369 The 
two third mates, the lowest ranked men granted a place on the quarterdeck, 
were comparatively distant both physically and in their functions: they might 
readily be sent into various quarters of the ship to command them locally 
while the captain or first mate remained on the quarterdeck, at the center of 
his own equipment, with his peers ready to hand for consultation.370  
 
The grouping together of functions into “workrooms” aboard was related to 
the organization of the Company’s records, the hierarchy of its officers and 
men, and the arrangement and separation of pay grades. Members of the same 
workroom would be interdependent and capable of replacing one another, 
their pay would form a hierarchy within a certain common scale, and they 
would be expected to form a social unit within the crew.  
 
The separation between workrooms on the other hand contributed to a set of 
useful “functional distances” between various groups, reflected in their 
                                                
369 The captain and first mate were functionally interchangeable under normal sailing 
conditions: when one rested the other took charge of the ship. They nonetheless 
worked in concert for many tasks including navigation and ships’ councils. Ketting, 
H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
370 The separation of the third mates from the rest of the navigation officers is made 
clear in the trial papers for the Nijenburg mutiny: both the third mates were sent 
forward of the mast in their duties, were expected to know something of the 
movements and moods of the men, and were held in some suspicion of fraternizing 
with the mutineers, because of their free and social mixing with the general crew. 
Crimineele Procedures by, mitsgaders voor en ten overstaan van de Hogen Scheeps Krygsraad 
in Texel gehouden, tegens sommige der Muitelingen van het O. I. Schip Neyenburg, in den 
voorleeden jaare 1763, uit Texel naar Batavia uitgevaren. (Amsterdam: Petrus Schouten, 
1764). 
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placement on the ship. Members of different workrooms were permitted or 
even expected to be somewhat ignorant of one another; senior officers were 
not expected to be informed about or responsive to the mood below decks, 
such information being the province of the junior officers, who were elevated 
only contingently from the men with whom they bunked. The ship’s council, 
the main governing body on each VOC ship, consisted of almost exactly the 
group that occupied the officers’ domain and workroom, including any 
merchants aboard, the master and the mates.371 There was one exception: the 
boatswain, who reported on and spoke for the rest of the crew. In this position 
the boatswain acted as the single point of contact between the interests of the 
Company’s commerce, represented by the merchants, the ship’s 
administration, represented by the captain, and its sailors.   
 
The workrooms, once expressed physically as places where expertise was 
gathered and networked together, further provided armatures for secondary 
sets of relationships and associations. In this regard workrooms can be seen to 
be similar to King’s description of architectural typologies such as the 
bungalow; they give social institutions physical forms, which then become 
capable of propagating their own kinds of social institutions. The inclusion of 
the chief surgeon in the workroom of the quarterdeck altered his availability 
to the officers and to the other crewmen: sharing something of the navigation 
officers’ status, authority and distance from the men before the mast, the chief 
                                                
371 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
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surgeon became “severed” from the men, being reserved principally as the 
officers’ doctor. Ketting notes how chief surgeons were remarked on in sailors’ 
and soldiers’ memoirs as presenting a pretentious appearance, dressed 
extravagantly, as though anxious to justify their place among the officers.372  
 
The case of the foredeck and cable locker is more complicated, their 
exclusivity being less strongly enforced. These spaces were distinguished from 
the lower deck, the proper domain of the general crew, by the presence and 
expert organization of the sailing tackle: their inhabitants held a privileged 
association with the proper use of the sailor’s tools. Nonetheless the sailing 
crew themselves formed part of the boatswain’s equipment, the foredeck 
forming perhaps something akin to a “high table” in the “hall” before the 
mast, its occupants eating and sleeping apart from the general mess between 
decks.  
 
Workrooms and discipline 
The bulk of the crew were subdivided into sets of workrooms along two axes. 
First they were divided into watches: units that pertained to the operation of 
the ship and had no bearing on the skills of any but the sailors. Second, they 
were sorted and sometimes segregated by job function and expertise, broadly 
into sailors, soldiers and craftsmen. Both divisions defined fields of 
competition for Company servants, which served to discipline and socialize 
                                                
372 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 89 
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individuals to work within the power structures aboard and to invest their 
own identities in their proper subdivisions.  
 
Watches were expressed not spatially but temporally: the members of a watch 
shared the same sleeping, eating and working schedule. Each watch was 
responsible for running the ship for regular periods of four hours duration. 
VOC ships generally operated on a system of three watches, such that for 
every four hours on duty each man would have eight hours off, each watch 
being on deck for eight hours out of every 24. Sometimes, however, they 
practiced a more arduous two-watch system, in which case the men worked 
four hours on duty, four hours off, for a total of 12 hours a day.373 The watch 
set the tempo of work and the unvarying rhythm of life at sea; as long as the 
ship was in motion there could be no “days off” from sailing.374 Among the 
general crew each watch was further subdivided into a set of baks, groups of 
seven or eight men who ate at a common mess table and were expected to 
support one another in work and when sick, these baks being spread over the 
whole of the lower deck. Watches cross-cut other systems of workrooms on 
the ship: they associated a subdivision of the seamen with certain of the 
officers, surgeons and other support personnel. In Dening’s description of 
                                                
373 There is some evidence for a spatial expression of the two-watch system, these 
being termed “starboard” and “larboard” watches on Royal Navy and American 
merchant ships: that is, associated with the starboard and port sides of the ship. VOC 
watches had no such spatial names, however. Lavery, B: Shipboard Life and 
Organisation, 1731-1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 
374 Rediker quotes a familiar seaman’s saying, that “there are no Sundays at sea.” 
Rediker, M. B; Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. 
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Royal Navy vessels, the division of the men into watches was part of a 
disciplinary scheme to generate competition between them.375 Both the 
starboard and larboard watches were charged with cleaning the decks and 
maintaining an orderly ship. The officers would compare the efforts of the two 
watches in fulfilling this duty and punish those they judged to be doing an 
inferior job or reward those who did an exemplary one. The purpose of such 
an exercise had less to do with an institutional obsession with cleanliness than 
with an obsession with the specter of mutiny: it made each watch the primary 
target of the other’s frustrations, diverting anger away from the institution. 
VOC ships certainly did not approach those of the Navy either in cleanliness 
or in the fostering of divisional pride. Nonetheless it may be seen in mutiny 
records that watches formed firm practical divisions in crews, with the 
members of core groups of mutineers, almost without exception, belonging to 
single watches.  
 
Regarding division by function, the most important one, involving the largest 
groups of men, was that between the sailors and soldiers. These shared a 
traditional enmity that was remarked on repeatedly throughout the 
Company’s history.376 Ketting states that the traditional animosity between the 
sailors and soldiers acted to reinforce solidarity within each group, as well as a 
                                                
375 Dening, G: Mr Bligh’s Bad Language. 
376 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen. Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-
Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on Board, 1602-1795,”The Mariners 
Mirror 49.2 (May 1963), 81-104. 
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Company-based identity between them.377 Sailors, housed together on the 
lower deck, would look down (literally) on soldiers, who had to make do with 
the dark, stuffy and uncomfortably short orlop, crammed into the top few feet 
of the hold. Trapped in this space for up to 23 hours a day, the soldiers were 
nicknamed “hold riders” (kattesporen) by the sailors, after a proverbially 
obdurate and inflexible part of the ship that was permanently fixed to the 
keel.378 The orlop was also tainted by association with unpleasant conditions 
and uses: according to de Hullu its forward end, the manger (hel), apart from 
serving as a store for various bits of ship’s tackle, was also used as a sweat-box 
for sufferers of fever, and was the place where mercury was administered to 
those with venereal diseases.379   Disdain for the soldiers enabled the sailors to 
take some pride in their own superior collective, while the soldiers would 
identify the sailors as their closest enemies and competitors for light, air and 
the better sorts of food.380 In each case resentment and violent impulses were 
directed by each group toward the other, and away from the officers and the 
Company as a whole.381 
 
 
                                                
377 Ketting: Leven, Werk, 23-27.  
378 Hoving: personal communication.  
379 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 27, Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen, 
94. 
380 Gelder, R. van: Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur. Gelder, R van: Naporra’s omweg: het leven 
van een VOC-matroos (1731-1793) (Amsterdam: Atlas, 2003). 
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Rationalization  
As noted above, during the eighteenth century the organization of VOC ships 
underwent an extensive process of rationalization, which aimed to establish 
clear and standardized codes of conduct for the workrooms, to separate their 
functions and to make the operations of the ship clear to recruits and visitors. 
This was achieved partly through an ever-growing set of regulations and 
partly through a redesign of the ship’s spaces and their uses. Rationalization 
was generally phrased as the maintenance of good, workmanlike order and of 
clean and clear decks: that is, of an explicit schema for ordering equipment 
according to the needs of the responsible officer. It also tended to specialize 
both spaces and their occupants, replacing an order reliant on the traditional 
skills of well-rounded, experienced seafarers with one composed of discrete 
operations that could be conducted by industrial workers. 
 
The clearest example of such a workroom-based rationalization is the 
difference in separation of the functions of upper and lower decks between the 
Batavia and Hollandia subtypes. The upper deck, being the primary work 
surface of the ship, was subjected to the greatest number of explicit 
regulations. This space eventually grew a long list of forbidden activities, a 
schedule for regular cleaning and a cadre of low-status “zwabber-kapiteins” 
(mop-captains) responsible for its upkeep at all times.382 The lower deck, 
                                                                                                                                       
381 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
382 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J., Op de Schepen. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk.  
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which was devoted principally to habitation, likewise underwent some 
rationalization. In this case however it was achieved largely through a quiet 
process of elimination of elements rather than through regulations imposed on 
the ship’s inmates. The result was first a loss of equipment from the space and 
later a reduction in the functions it had to serve: a possibly unintentional side-
effect was that both spaces became more easily surveilled through the process.  
 
Work-life axis 
In Ketting’s description of early VOC ships there is already a clear division 
between work space above and living space below decks. This functional 
division appears frequently overturned, however. Seamen often slept on the 
top decks, under the foredeck and in the ship’s boats while the ship was in the 
tropics, in order to take advantage of the greater movement of air there. On 
the other hand heavy, communal work, pumping out the bilges or using the 
capstan to raise the anchor regularly invaded the lower deck space and even 
the orlop.  
 
Ketting documents ways in which the lower deck of the first VOC ships was 
rendered “opaque” to the official gaze. First, it was filled with a 
claustrophobic rabbit warren of carpentry, composed of the bunks and living 
spaces of individual crewmen, each curtained, partitioned and otherwise 
distinguished from the next bunk and from common accessways. This mass of 
woodwork, which is not represented on the Batavia replica, helped to define 
the lower deck as a realm apart from the Company’s formal order. Second, 
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Ketting describes a strong ‘lower class’ social organization and identity among 
ordinary seamen and soldiers, which operated alongside the Company’s 
mandated order, and which had its own logic and cultural practices. He cites a 
number of collective expressions, or rituals, practiced among the general crew 
as indications of a distinct social world operating below decks. These included 
rites of initiation including the running of “gauntlets” through the warren of 
bunks and, when group censure of individuals was called for, of public 
shaming, such as a mocking form of theatrical performance known as 
charivari, which was conducted in semi-secret below decks and out of official 
view.383 Ketting ascribes the origins of these practices to pre-existing seafaring 
traditions, drawn from the coastal communities around Holland.384  
 
The exercise of sailors’ freedom to hold charivari performances can be seen as 
an assertion of their rights over the below-decks space, helping to identify that 
space as belonging to the gesellschaft of the men themselves rather than to the 
Company, even if that gesellschaft was itself part of the Company’s strategy for 
conducting its business. The most striking feature of the typical lower deck to 
visitors’ eyes (and noses) was its extreme uncleanliness, despite the 
Company’s Articles, which stated that the lower deck must be cleaned 
thoroughly each week, with vinegar and the burning of fragrant herbs, as a 
prophylactic against diseases thought to be spread by “foul airs.” The 
                                                
383 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 252-255. 
384 Lucassen, J: "A Multinational and its Labor Force: The Dutch East India Company, 
1595–1795” International Labor and Working-Class History, 66 (25 Feb 2005): 12-39. 
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uncleanliness was attributed to the bad, bestial habits of sailors, their 
unwillingness to use the toilets in the beakhead, and the lack of facilities for 
drying waterlogged clothes and possessions. It also served to mark the space 
as belonging to the sailors, however, and as distinctive of their character. 
 
Aboard the Hollandia subtype the lower deck presents a very different aspect. 
According to Ketting the proliferation of private spaces was swept aside in the 
1640s with the widespread adoption of the hammock, after which lower decks 
came to resemble those of admiralty ships, with a floor area obstructed only 
by the sailors’ sea chests and bak or mess tables, since it was possible to stow 
the hammocks away against the underside of the upper deck when not in use. 
There were clear practical objections to the construction of wooden bunks on 
the lower deck: if enemies were sighted then they had to be torn out and 
thrown overboard (an operation requiring several hours of work), since they 
obscured the gun ports and made it impossible to use the cannons.385 They 
were further credited with spreading diseases, by obstructing the free flow of 
air and allowing noisome airs to collect.386 Following the adoption of 
hammocks the deck was cleared of woodwork, except for partitions used for 
                                                
385 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
386386 Ketting notes that unhealthy airs were thought by Europeans to be the main 
conduit for spreading diseases during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An 
objection more in line with current thinking on contagion is that they likely 
obstructed the flow of water, allowing it to collect and puddle on the lower deck. 
Water runoff was carefully considered during shipbuilding: all decks were cambered 
and fitted with scuppers for drainage, such that on an unobstructed deck water 
would flow easily into the bilges, from where it could be pumped out of the ship. 
Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. Witsen, N: Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. 
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the storage of supplies, to which the sailors had no access. The private space 
allotted to each sailor was accordingly reduced to the inside of his sea chest. 
The VOC ship never reached the condition of those navy ships described by 
Dening, however, where “privacy was not a matter of walls… [but] of 
behavior, closing the windows of one’s soul. The essence of a sailor’s existence 
was to be utterly without space he could call his own, to have all his 
possessions calculated narrowly, to be a totally public man to his peers and to 
be totally public to superiors.”387 Sea-chests continued to be used both for 
legitimate trade and for smuggling and the storage of possessions stolen from 
other seamen, while the men appear to have been subjected to few inspections 
beside those demanded by the Company’s customs agents.388  
 
Over the next century the lower deck also lost some of its non-residential 
functions. Apart from the removal of the capstan, described above, the water 
pumps and even the cannons, which had played a role in promoting 
hammocks, were also removed to the upper deck. In 1690 it had been 
observed that guns on the lower deck could almost never be used on ships 
                                                
387 Dening, G: Mr Bligh’s Bad Language, 28. 
388 Sailors returning to Patria counted the trade items in their sea-chests as an 
important part of their overall payment throughout the Company’s history. Often 
these items infringed on the Company’s monopolies. The trade was so widespread 
and important to the business both of Company sailors and of the Chinese 
community in Batavia that a blind eye was frequently turned. Attempts to stop the 
trade in porcelain in 1695 through heavy excise duties levied in Batavia prompted 
such an outcry among both groups that the Governor General, fearing that the 
Chinese community might migrate elsewhere, was forced to back down. Blusse, L:  
Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and Dutch in VOC Batavia (Leiden: 
KITLV Verhandelingen Ser No. 122, 1988), 127. 
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returning home because the heavy lading placed the gun ports dangerously 
close to the waterline.389 Guns were therefore often stowed as ballast in the 
hold to make the best use of the available space. Moreover, by the second 
Anglo-Dutch War VOC ships had lost their military function within European 
naval engagements. The standard armament was accordingly formally 
reduced in 1744 to 32 guns for a first rate, these being carried on the upper 
deck and in the gunroom.390 After 1744 the main kinds of work conducted on 
the lower deck became those associated with the care and feeding of the men 
and with the repair of a few of the ship’s systems, notably the sails. In this 
clarified, simplified space markers of status differentiation that referred to the 
seamen’s lives ashore were suppressed, as they were in other institutions.391 
Where in Ketting’s description a bunk might conceal private stores, trade 
goods or even a wife, on ships like the Hollandia it was difficult to conceal the 
contents of one’s sea-chest from one’s neighbors.392  
 
 
                                                
389 Decquer: Middelen. 
390 Prior to this date no standard had been established for the number of guns carried. 
At least 50 was common on large ships, however. The Eendracht, the first of the 
Bentam-designed first rates, was recorded carrying 50 guns in 1742. The resolution of 
1744 stated that two guns of 12lbs shot weight were to be carried in the gunroom and 
six more under the quarterdeck; 14 guns of eight lbs “on the deck” (gun ports are 
provided for them on the upper deck in Bentam’s plans and model) and two more on 
the foredeck, with a remaining eight guns of four lbs on the quarterdeck and 10 
swivelguns to be mounted on the top decks when needed. VOC 7374. 
391 Goffman, E: “The moral career of the mental patient,” in Asylums (New York, 
Anchor Books, 1961) 161-9. 
392 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk.  
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What remained was indicative of the directors’ view of their workers. Where 
the officers were placed in individual cells that expressed an explicit 
hierarchy, the men were placed together in a pen shorn of distinguishing 
marks: their interchangeability was laid bare in the seriality of hammocks and 
baks. Arranged in even lines and gathered in work groups around their mess 
tables, nothing prevented the crew from seeing that they too were a standing 
resource, like the supplies in the hold or the orderly ropes on the foredeck: an 
element of the order and machinery of the ship. Those markers of status the 
Company provided were largely invisible and entirely concerned with 
performance: pay grades based on assessments of each man’s usefulness and 
competence, combined in the final decades with seamen’s uniforms that only 
indicated rank in the case of the senior officers. For visible, tangible markers of 
hierarchy among themselves, crewmen could use the space of the lower deck: 
positions close to the centerline of the ship were prized over those at the sides 
for being healthier and airier, on a pattern that mirrored the runoff of water, 
the brightest place being also the driest, while the walls were associated with 
weakness and sickness.393 Membership of a bak that contained experienced 
mariners or junior officers could carry advantages, including better treatment 
from the officers, protection from victimization and greater potential for 
training and promotion. None of these status markers referred to any tradition 
or symbolic system outside the Company’s authorship and authority, 
however: all were built from the spatial and social elements provided by the 
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shipboard order. To the extent they contributed to an environment of 
competition among seamen they also contributed to the Company’s hierarchy 
and program, despite their being entirely unofficial. 
 
Dialectical distinctions 
The workrooms aboard and their status divisions were reinforced by visual 
markers in only a few cases. The relative cleaning schedule of upper and 
lower decks—daily and weekly, respectively—has already been remarked. 
More permanent were the marks that distinguished the officers’ spaces 
visually from those of the men both inside and out. The saloon and officers’ 
cabins were the only places aboard that were routinely painted, the captain’s 
cabin generally being set apart in a characteristic shade of blue thought to 
repel flies.394 In contrast the spaces of the men were coated with a tar that 
contributed to their characteristic smell. The officers’ cabins were also 
provided with furniture: among the equipment carried aboard silver cruet sets 
and fine chairs and tables for the captain’s cabin were frequently mentioned, 
while the men sat on the deck or on their sea-chests.  
 
On the ship’s exterior the one part of the ship that was routinely and 
extravagantly decorated with carved and painted woodwork was the stern, 
specifically the rearward faces of the saloon and officers’ quarters and the 
                                                
394 Horst, A. J. van deer: "Painting and Preserving the Ship in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth Centuries" International Journal of Nautical Archaeology (2001) 30.2 (2001), 
273–278. 
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galleries, which generally featured a great deal of golden-colored paint in 
imitation of the gold leaf used on Admiralty ships.  
 
The resolutions of the Heren XVII routinely decried the money spent on such 
decoration and insisted that no more money was to be wasted in this way.395 
Paintings of retourschepen show a high level of decoration up to the 
Company’s end, however, declining somewhat during the later eighteenth 
century apparently in line with a decline in decoration on warships. The 
reason for this continued practice of decorating the ships against the stated 
wishes of the ruling council is not known: it might be that the individual 
Chambers that paid for the ships considered it important to their dignity and 
relative positions to have their vessels smartly appointed. Alternatively the 
Company’s shipbuilders or equipment-masters might have considered the 
decoration a necessary part of the ships’ completion, or might have insisted 
that their vessels look no less fine than those of the English, French, Danish 
and Swedish Companies. The effect was clear, however: it presented the ships 
as belonging to a proud institution and underlined the similarity in 
organization, character and importance between the retourschepen and the 
warships that defended the Republic.  
 
                                                
395 Schokkenbroek, J: Kunst op het water: Nederlandse scheepssier, 1650-1850 
(Amsterdam, Zutphen: Stichting Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum, Walburg Pers, 
1995). 
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Conclusion  
From the foregoing spatial analysis it can be seen that the retourschip was 
significantly different from most of the institutions with which it is commonly 
compared. Certainly there were aspects of the Company servant’s life which 
resembled the lives of prisoners or hospital inmates. Officers acted as guards, 
to prevent desertion from the ship; physical and social reminders of the 
inmates’ lives outside the Company were suppressed; and both Ketting and 
Van Gelder have compared the welcome that new recruits received on first 
boarding with that experienced by convicts on arriving at a new prison, 
involving physical and verbal abuse from officers and other inmates alike, 
intended to cow the new arrivals and show them their place in abjection.396 As 
a working unit, however, the ship clearly functioned very differently from a 
prison. In its sociospatial arrangement the ship appears to have been closer to 
a factory, except that, unlike the factories described by Markus, on the ship all 
ranks were actively engaged together in the task of sailing, for which they 
used a common “production floor,” this production floor acting as an 
important link between the officers’ and general crews’ respective living 
quarters.   
 
With its dual social order, involving separate and unequal hierarchies of 
power before and aft of the mast, I propose that the retourschip showed a 
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spatial arrangement analogous to the dual nature of some colonial cities, as 
famously described by Janet Abu-Lughod and Anthony King.397 In Abu-
Lughod’s analysis of the two faces of Cairo that were developed during the 
nineteenth century she draws a clear line between the city’s elite, “public” 
face, intended to represent the potential of Egypt to international visitors and 
its own government alike, and its undeveloped, domestic face, which reflected 
the actual economic base and conditions of the country. King has related these 
two faces to two cultures or impulses, oriented toward “global” and “local” 
orders respectively.398 I propose that the retourschip presented a similar 
dichotomy in its dual spatial organization. On the one hand , the standardized 
and hierarchically ordered officers’ spaces presented a uniform face to the 
officers, to the Company’s directors and to any passengers or visitors to the 
ship, who would always be accommodated in the saloon and take their walks 
on the quarterdeck. On the other, the selective blindness of the officers and 
directors to a separate, “traditional,” unofficial lower-deck order recalls 
similar “blind spots” or “dark twins” in Cairo, Delhi or, indeed, the 
Company’s own Batavia.399 
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398 King cites Redfield, R. &  Singer, M. B: The cultural role of cities (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, College Division, 1954) as the origin of a critical dichotomy between 
“technological” and “moral” or “traditional” urban orders. King: "Writing Colonial 
Space.”  
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My concern here is with the structures of colonialism, rather than with its 
racial or ethnic aspects. The ship produced most of these structures from the 
company’s first decades without the involvement of non-European crew 
members, generating categories of servants that functioned like colonists and 
colonized even as it produced all these seafaring servants as Europeans. When 
non-Europeans became involved in the Company’s shipping, particularly on 
the retour route, they were subjected to certain restrictions characteristic of 
racialized colonialism: they were prevented from rising to the ranks of 
officers, they were limited in their duties, paid on different scales and contract 
terms from those of their European counterparts (not always to their 
disadvantage), and most of all they were actively prevented from remaining in 
Europe.400 In most respects, however, they inherited their subordinate, 
dependent roles in the Company’s operational organization from those 
developed for handling European crews. 
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Consultative and executive layers 
The most direct parallel between the Company’s shipboard social order and 
its development of colonial methods of production ashore can be seen in the 
relations between a consultative layer of officers, which participated in 
councils and decided the operations of the ship together, and the general crew, 
which was charged with the execution of those operations and which 
consisted of interchangeable workers, treated as a standing resource of labor. 
These last were typically represented to the consultative layer by a single 
individual who both spoke for and informed on his group of workers. Ashore, 
under the later “cultivation system,” this position might be occupied by a local 
nobleman: in seventeenth and eighteenth century Batavia the head of the 
Chinese council (Kong Koan) filled a similar role.401 Aboard ship there were 
three figures who might fill this role.  
 
Among the officers there were almost as many subdivisions by rank as there 
were personnel. This etiolated hierarchy is characteristic of shipboard 
organizations: in practice it tended to concentrate power in the hands of the 
master or captain, since all the officers constituted a chain of command and 
accountability that ended at the captain’s door. During the Company’s first 
years the master represented “the people” of the ship to the merchant that 
commanded the expedition. After merchants had largely settled at factories 
ashore, the master formed the sole point of contact between the ship and the 
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world outside it.402 He might in this capacity act as a peer with other captains 
or a figure of authority to lesser officers. He always stood in a subordinate 
relation to the merchants and governors ashore and to the administrators to 
whom he had to report in Patria, however. Across the division between 
officers and men the Company used the boatswain as the sole representative 
for the subordinate group, except where soldiers were concerned, in which 
case the sergeant was the representative. The boatswain’s own power 
hierarchy, of seconds, mates, quartermasters and enforcers, was effectively 
invisible to the upper tier of officers as long as operations continued normally.  
 
Finally, fundamentally different sets of concerns affected the officers and the 
men, reflecting the different social worlds in which they moved. Officers 
competed for authority, promotion and influence. They might be involved in 
networks of power both in Patria and the Indies factories, being consulted for 
their expert opinions by directors’ councils or even marrying into the upper 
echelons of Batavia society.403 Before the mast, as shall be seen in the next 
                                                
402 In accounts of several mutinies the captain or master is forced to interact with the 
masters of other ships, encountered at sea, to deflect their suspicions and allow the 
mutinous crew to escape. Where the master cannot be so forced, and the ship 
consequently lacks a proper spokesman, there is the perceived danger that the master 
of the encountered ship will take action against the crew. Bruijn, J. R & Eyck van 
Heslinga, E. S. van (eds.): Muiterij: oproer en berichting op schepen van de VOC 
(Haarlem: de Boer Maritime, 1980). 
403 Kist shows how ship captains were consulted on the performance of Bentam’s 
revised rates in the 1740s, playing an active role in the VOC’s ship design. Kist, B: 
“VOC shipbuilding Policy 1740-1750.” Taylor describes how captains, like merchants, 
could marry into the Batavia elite. Taylor, J. G: The Social World of Batavia: Europeans 
and Eurasians in colonial Indonesia. (Madison  Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2009). 
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chapter, the men’s concerns were rooted much more in the society within the 
ship’s wooden walls: they competed for the resources of food, drink and 
shelter that the Company theoretically made available to all, but which were 
frequently used and abused to establish hierarchy on the lower deck. 
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CHAPTER 3: ATYPICAL CIRCUMSTANCES: THE MUTINY ON THE 
NIJENBURG 
 
In previous chapters I have discussed the space of VOC ships as interpreted 
through the constructed model of the typical ship. This chapter focuses 
instead on the trial records from a single mutiny, which took place on the 
retourschip Nijenburg in 1763, on the way from Patria to the Indies. Using these 
records I have attempted to reconstruct as closely as possible the socio-spatial 
order in operation aboard both before the mutiny, while the ship was under 
the Company’s officers, and afterward, when the mutineers were in 
command.  
 
I have several purposes in mind in comparing the type model with the 
conditions recorded on a particular, interrupted voyage. Case studies, in their 
individuality, reveal problems with such models, as well as something of the 
variation that might be expected among examples of a type. The Nijenburg 
mutiny records, moreover, allow for an examination of a specific moment of 
crisis and its effects on the spaces and dynamics of power, experienced in 
different ways by different individuals and groups involved. The records 
allow a glimpse of how crewmen made their living and working places 
aboard the ship both before and after the mutiny, showing how common 
shipboard socio-spatial structures could be made to support a variety of 
orders and power-holders. 
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Three separate trials followed the Nijenburg mutiny: the detail of their records, 
and the breadth of different viewpoints they contain, provide an unparalleled 
source for conducting a fine-grained analysis of the relationships between 
space, society and power aboard ship. Trial depositions are almost the only 
moments when ordinary crewmen are asked where they were and what they 
were doing at any particular moment during their labors: both the questions 
and answers reveal aspects of social ordering aboard that are missing, not 
only from the accounts of elite passengers or the official logs of merchants and 
captains, but also from the adventure-memoirs that retired Company seamen 
sometimes wrote for genteel European audiences.404 The multiple perspectives 
of ordinary seamen and soldiers reveal the range of experience and the roles 
of information and ignorance aboard. 
 
The Nijenburg mutiny is also one of only a very few VOC uprisings in which 
control of the ship was taken over for an extended period by the mutineers. 
The trial proceedings therefore offer a rare glimpse of the workings of a VOC 
ship both under the uniform work order of the VOC and under an alternative 
order established by the mutineers, which lasted for several weeks, until the 
ship was brought to port. A comparison of the two situations raises questions 
about the nature and purpose of the Company’s shipboard order, and about 
the role of space in maintaining authority aboard. The differences between the 
spatial orders employed by different sets  of masters allows for some 
                                                
404 Gelder, R. van: Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) 
(Nijmegen: SUN, 1997). . 
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conclusions to be drawn about the role of space itself in supporting authority 
and control aboard. 
 
More generally, mutiny trials offer rare moments when details of the day-to-
day running of ships come under investigation. Latour has noted that it is 
only when a machine stops working that we look inside the “black box” of its 
operation.405 At mutiny trials such “black boxes” were opened and aspects of 
shipboard life that generally lay far below the level of discourse became 
matters of explicit discussion, revealing not only the facts of shipboard life but 
also the expectations of authority figures in the courtroom. Mutinies on 
outward-bound vessels present a further unique opportunity to capture the 
typical ship in the process of being reproduced, since on outward voyages 
assorted laborers and nationals from across Europe were actively stuffed into 
the “black boxes” of the Company’s ships, to be transformed into crews 
bearing the identity of Jan Compagnie. Throughout the Company’s history 
only a very small proportion of all its servants enlisted more than once to sail 
to the East: by the eighteenth century very few experienced seamen were 
willing to accept its contract terms.406 The space, society, and uniform work 
order of the VOC ship therefore had to be recreated anew on every outward 
                                                
405 Callon, M. & Latour, B: “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure 
reality and how sociologists help them to do so,” in Knorr-Cetina, K. D. & Cicourel, 
A. V. (Eds.) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- 
and Macro-Sociologies. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981),  277-303. 
406 Lucassen, J: "A Multinational and its Labor Force: The Dutch East India Company, 
1595–1795” International Labor and Working-Class History, 66 (25 Feb 2005): 12-39. 
 237 
bound voyage as novice crewmen—landlubbers “out of the woods for the first 
time, having never seen the sea or salt water”—had to be “shown the ropes,” 
taught not only to operate and maintain the ship as a cohesive body of 
workers but also to comport themselves as Company servants, capable of 
being used anywhere in the VOC’s extensive shipping networks.407 The 
Nijenburg mutiny, which occurred in the final years of the Company’s stable 
operation, between the crises of the Seven Years War and the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War, shows the machinery of the VOC’s recruiting and training tested 
to breaking point.408  
 
The outward-bound VOC mutiny in the eighteenth century 
In order to understand the Nijenburg mutiny and how it was organized it is 
useful to outline the parameters of the problem of outward-bound mutinies in 
                                                
407 The quote is from Isaac Sunderman, VOC memoirist, who complained in 1711 of 
“de dommigheden der landluiden, die eerst uit het Bos komen, en nooit Zee of Zout-
water gesien hebben” (the stupidities of the land-folk, coming for the first time out of 
the forest, having never seen the sea or salt water.” Gelder, R. van: Het Oost-Indisch 
Avontuur, 48. Although this observation had been repeated since the Company’s first 
decades, the severe deterioration in the quality of VOC recruits  during the 
eighteenth century was a matter of public debate in the 1780s and has become a 
byword of VOC historiography. Hoefnagel, N: Plan of Welmeenende Voorstelling ter 
Verbetering van Neerlands Zee-weezen... (Amsterdam:  Dirk Schuurman, 1779) Boxer, 
C.R: 'The Dutch East-Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators, and Life on Board, 
1602-1795', The Mariner's Mirror 49.2 (May 1963), 81-104. Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, 
Lucassen J: Op de Schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie: vijf artikelen studie over de 
werkgelegenheid bij de VOC (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff/Bouma's Boekhuis, 1980). 
408 The impact of the Seven Years War on the VOC has received relatively little 
attention from historians. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, however, suspended VOC 
return shipping for two years and severely damaged the Company’s finances, being 
widely credited as one of the decisive factors leading to the final collapse of the VOC 
in 1795. Dillo, I. G: De Nadagen Van De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1783-1795: 
Schepen En Zeevarenden. (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1992). Gaastra, F: S: The 
Dutch East India Company, Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003). 
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general. This can be done by comparing the mutiny with subsequent revolts 
aboard the Duinenburg (1766), Gerechtigheid (1782), Venus (1782) and Barbestein 
(1786), which shed light on the common causes and methods of mutinies, 
since there are significant similarities between all the cases in the ways the 
mutinies progressed, in the vulnerabilities of the ships, the overall goals of the 
mutineers and their shipboard targets.409 Indeed, the Nijenburg appears in this 
context to open a series of related mutinies that show repeated strains on the 
reproduction of the Company’s shipboard order. 
 
According to Cornelis Lammers’ classification of mutinies, all these cases fit 
the “secession” type, in which mutineers act to sever their work relationship 
with the authorities.410 Even though several involved the theft of the 
Company’s money, ships and cargo, none aimed principally at piracy; the fact 
that these thefts were not primary motives for mutiny can be seen in the lack 
                                                
409 Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, ''’Allons Duytsche Broeders': de muiterijen op 
de 'Nijenburg' in 1763', in J. R. Bruijn, Eyck van Heslinga E. S. van (eds.): Muiterij: 
oproer en berechting op schepen van de VOC (Haarlem: de Boer Maritime, 1980), 67-83. 
Meurs, I. van: “’Courage, Francois’: een samenzwering op de ‘Duinenburg’ in 1766,” 
in Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij, 68-84. Gesner van der Voort, P: “’Oproer 
en geweld’ op de rede van Texel in 1782” in Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij, 
85-97. “’Luxembourg en haut’: muiterij  aan boord van de ‘Barbestein ‘in 1786” in 
Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij, 98-111. Additional details have been 
gathered from archival sources in each case. 
410 Lammers’ other two classifications are the work stoppage or strike, a form of 
negotiation intended to lead to different working conditions within the same 
fundamental structures, and the mutiny of acquisition, the goal of which is to seize 
and hold the ship for the mutineers’ own purposes, which frequently involve piracy. 
Lammers, C. J: “Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational 
Conflicts between Rulers and Ruled,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (1969), 558- 
72. Lammers, C. J: “Review Essay: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective,” lnternationaal 
lnstituut voor sociale Geschiedenis, 48 (2003), 473-82. 
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of any clear plans for their distribution among the mutineers.411 Such thefts 
were instead always tied to aiding the primary goal of desertion: to return to a 
life on land in Europe, from which many mutineers felt they had been 
unlawfully snatched. Among the 51 deponents accused of mutiny in the 
Nijenburg trials, 28 (i.e. 54%) complained that they had been forced into 
Company service through violence or trickery, via networks of zielverkopers or 
via unlawful contracts enacted outside their control.412 The means of 
recruitment and the VOC’s monopoly charter may explain why desertion was 
preferred to negotiating with the Company through work stoppages or 
strikes: the latter proved effective in competitive labor markets, but the VOC 
stood as a monolithic opponent capable of forcing labor, more akin to a state’s 
Navy than a commercial institution.413 
                                                
411 On the Barbestein the first officer appears to have made use of this lack of planning 
to delay the mutineers and contribute to their eventual capture, by rendering 
confusing accounts of how much money there was and how it might be divided 
equally among the mutineers, and by encouraging the mutineers to open the chests 
and divide the money aboard, while dawn approached and their chances of escaping 
undetected by other craft dwindled, rather than escaping quickly with the chests and 
reaching land under cover of night. The five prospective mutineers on the Duinenberg 
aimed to dupe those they recruited by sneaking the Company’s money ashore in 
sugar barrels, leaving the rest of the mutineers to negotiate the sale of the ship and 
cargo to Genoese authorities. Although the money chests play a large role in the 
Nijenburg mutiny, the mutineers appear to have taken them opportunistically as 
spoils once control had been secured: there is no indication that they had any plans 
for sharing the money out before they took possession of it. Bruijn & Van Eyck van 
Heslinga: Muiterij. 
412 It is unfortunately impossible to state with any certainty what percentage of the 
Nijenburg’s crew had been forced into service, since each trial court only asked a small 
subset of deponents whether they had been so forced. Crimineele Procedures by, 
mitsgaders voor en ten overstaan van de Hogen Scheeps Krygsraad in Texel gehouden, tegens 
sommige der Muitelingen van het O. I. Schip Neyenburg… (Amsterdam, 1764). AN Staten 
Generaal 9404-7, Societeit van Suriname 929. 
413 Rediker cites several successful strikes aboard British merchant ships, where 
officers abused crewmen and the crew responded with work stoppages and re-
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Lammers’ model further assumes that in any successful mutiny an initially 
small group of determined mutineers forms the core of a larger movement or 
uprising among the crew: the actions of mutiny prompt sympathetic action 
and a shift of loyalties among the larger group, leading to a tipping point 
where control of the ship is seized from the officers.414 The cases studied 
complicate this picture in several ways, including the means by which the core 
group was formed, the division between that core and a larger group that was 
willing to take opportunistic advantage of the mutiny, and the troublesome 
fact that in each case the largest group aboard consisted of men aligned 
neither with the mutineers nor with the overthrown officers, who continued 
merely to operate the ship regardless of whether Company officers or 
mutineers were in command. 
 
The mutinies listed above do, however, show that the core group required to 
wrest control of the ship from the officers was surprisingly small, provided 
the men in the group acted in concert: that is, provided their networks of trust 
and command were well prepared. The largest uprising, that on the Barbestein, 
                                                                                                                                       
negotiation which might affect the officers’ status aboard. The VOC, however, 
supported its hierarchy first, made no secret of statements from high officers such as 
Both and Coen that held the Company’s mariners in the lowest contempt, and 
operated like a repressive state in the Indies. Rediker, M. B; Between the Devil and the 
Deep Blue Sea: merchant seamen, pirates, and the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-
1750. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 100-102. 
Rietbergen, P. J. A. N: De Eerste Landvoogd Pieter Both, 1568-1615: Gouverneur-Generaal 
Van Nederlands-Indië, 1609-1614 (Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging, 
86-87;  Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1987). Colenbrander, H. T. (ed):  Jan Pietersz. Coen: 
Bescheiden Omtrent Zijn Bedrijf in Indië ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff & KITLV, 1919), 
485-6 
414 Lammers, C. J: “Strikes and Mutinies.” 
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involved 20 mutineers out of a total complement of 361. In other mutinies a 
core of only 12 trusted men was considered sufficient to take over the ship. 
Deserters on the Venus stated that they would not have gone ahead with their 
plan if they had not been able to recruit 12 accomplices, while the one mutiny 
that was nipped in the bud, that on the Duinenburg, failed during the 
recruiting stage because one of the men invited to join informed the officers 
before the 12 men required by the mutineers’ plan could be gathered 
together.415 On the Gerechtigheid the core group that planned the desertion 
consisted of only four men out of a complement of roughly 300.416 This was an 
exceptional case in several ways, however: seizing the opportunity presented 
by a poorly guarded supply lighter that was bringing food and cargo to the 
ship, the mutineers were able to short-cut their initial plan and rely on speed 
                                                
415 Meurs, I. van: “Courage, Francois.” It is unfortunately not recorded whether later 
mutineers based their actions on published accounts of the Nijenburg mutiny: 
although the courts that tried the Duinenberg and Barbestein mutinies both referred to 
the Nijenburg’s precedent, the prisoners made no mention of it in either trial. 
416 The complement of the Gerechtigheid at the time of the mutiny is uncertain because 
the problem of desertion  was so severe at the time that stable numbers were not 
maintained: Gesner van der Voort states that, of all those names entered on the 
paybooks of the Gerechtigheid during its long stay at Texel, 80% were listed as having 
left the ship without a proper closure of accounts. Gesner van der Voort: “Oproer en 
geweld.” The ship eventually sailed in 1783 with 296 persons aboard. Figures are also 
not available for the complement of the Venus at the time of its mutiny:  following the 
mutiny the ship was renamed Oostereem and wrecked on its next voyage without 
reaching its first port of call: no records of its paybooks have been retained. Bruijn, J. 
R, Gaastra, F. S, Schoeffer, I: Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
Centuries (The Hague, 1979), II (hereafter DAS II), 4406.2. Since both ships were first 
rates it is reasonable to assume that the complement was also around 300. The 
Barbestein carried a large contingent of soldiers bound for garrisons in the Indies: its 
active crew totaled 262 men, the mutineers were counted among 99 others, being 
soldiers, passengers and any other persons not engaged in sailing the ship. DAS II 
online: Huygens Institute of Netherlands History website, "The Dutch East India 
Company's Shipping Between the Netherlands and Asia 1595-1795;" 
http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/DAS  Accessed 12/1/2011. 
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and stealth to reach the shore with 18 other deserters before their absence was 
noticed aboard.417 
 
Actor-Network Theory, and more particularly John Law’s idea of 
heterogeneous engineering, can help elucidate both the formation of the core 
group of mutineers and the issue of tipping points for command.418 In Actor-
Network terms a mutiny represents an attempt by two networks—the 
Company and the would-be rebels—to reinforce themselves while disabling 
one another, each preventing the other network from taking action by pulling 
apart, or disaggregating, the elements that compose it. The elements in 
question are the labor power of the men involved, the tools of coercion, 
including weapons, shackles and spaces of confinement, the spaces and 
equipment used for control of the ship and, ultimately the most difficult and 
mysterious factor to track, the assent of the crew to be governed and directed. 
In order to challenge the Company’s aggregation of all these elements into its 
own network, the mutineers must construct their own network, composed of a 
plan proposing an alternative to the Company’s agenda, a leadership structure 
for executing the plan and, most importantly, a common identity or network 
                                                
417 The Gerechtigheid’s deserters were detected and apprehended ashore by people 
who took them to be English spies. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: “Luxembourg en 
haut.” 
418 Law, J: “On the Social Explanation of Technical Change: The Case of the 
Portuguese Maritime Expansion” Technology and Culture, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), 
227-252. Law, J. “Notes on the theory of the Actor-Network” Systems Practice 5. 4 
(1992), 379-392. Law, J: “”Technology, Closure and Heterogeneous Engineering: the 
case of the Portuguese expansion” in Bijker, W. E, Hughes, T. P.  & Pinch, T. J. (eds.): 
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of trust binding the mutineers together. Mutiny is avoided through the 
disaggregation of any potentially rebellious alternative networks among the 
men and most of all, of communal identities, social categories and bases for 
loyalty except those founded on VOC functional categories.  
 
The Company’s primary tools for disaggregating rebellious networks aboard 
were terror, spread through severe physical punishments even for minor 
infractions, and the standard strategies identified by Goffman for isolating or 
“atomizing” new inmates used by “total institutions.”419 These included taking 
away personal possessions and other markers of individual character, 
sequestering the inmates without the possibility of contact beyond the ship, 
canceling status and wealth differences that related to the world outside and 
imposing standardized living, sleeping and eating arrangements.420 The 
Company’s main response to the threat of mutiny likewise showed an 
“atomized” conception of the crew: instead of using the officers and petty 
                                                                                                                                       
The Social Construction of Technological Systems, New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology (MIT Press, Cambridge 1987).  
419 Erving Goffman has noted that “total institutions” such as prisons and mental 
hospitals commonly aim to disaggregate the identities of their inmates in order to 
mould them to their new roles within the institutional order. Such institutions 
therefore work first to take away the means by which inmates reinforce their 
personalities: isolating them, canceling their prior attachments to statuses and roles 
outside the institution and defining their primary meaningful relationships as being 
with the institutional hierarchy. The goal is to “atomize” the inmates: to take away 
their prior social identities and to provide them with no options for forming new 
identities but the institution itself. Goffman, E: “the characteristics of total 
institutions,” in Asylums (1961), 14-28, 148-9. 
420 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk En Rebellie Aan Boord Van Oost-Indiëvaarders (1595-
±1650). (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002).  
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officers to keep a close watch on the men as a group it relied on turning the 
men against one another, through a substantial reward offered to 
whistleblowers, of 20 ducats if the informant was himself a mutineer or 50 
ducats if he had no prior involvement.421 In 1782, when desertion was 
unusually rife, it was regularly read out to crews and posted on the 
mainmasts of all VOC ships.422 Mutiny trials also contributed to the 
disaggregation of mutinous impulses or elements among the crews they 
examined: the primary purpose of such trials was to separate and punish a 
subset of “ringleaders,” so as to be able to rehabilitate the majority of the crew. 
The men identified as instigators of mutinies were executed in spectacularly 
gruesome ways, while those who denounced the instigators and managed to 
minimize their own roles frequently faced lesser punishments or were merely 
fined the costs of the court. Prisoners were therefore required to state in public 
their antipathy for the mutineers’ cause in order to preserve their own lives.423 
 
The outward-bound mutinies show how such atomizing strategies could fail; 
in each case the core group of mutineers was able to find a source for common 
                                                
421 This reward was written into the Company’s first Articles in 1617: it remained in 
effect until the Company’s dissolution. Hoogenberk, H: De Rechtsvoorschriften Voor De 
Vaart Op Oost-Indië, 1595-1620. (Utrecht: Kemink, 1940). VOC 4952. 
422 Hoogenberk: Rechtsvoorschriften. Gesner van der Voort: “Oproer en geweld”. 
423 The Nijenburg mutineers were variously hanged, broken on the wheel, and 
beheaded. Arguably “lesser” punishments could be worse: these involved some 
combination of hundreds of lashes, with or without attendant strangulation, with 
keel-hauling (usually repeated three times) or partial drowning through being bound 
and dropped into the sea from the foreyard. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: “De 
scheepvaart van de Oost-Indische Compagnie en het verschijnsel muiterij” in Bruijn 
& van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij, 9-26. 
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identity, which in turn allowed them to resist the Company’s methods of 
terror and abjection and instead to derive common cause from their common 
grievances. Where they retained a basis for a shared, separate social identity 
from their former lives on land, they found a strong basis for collective action 
against the foreign and demanding environment aboard. On the Barbestein the 
mutineers’ common identity was well established ashore: they were all 
members of the “Prince of Luxembourg” regiment, which had been hired by 
the VOC for garrison work in the East. While still ashore they objected to their 
new appointment in the Indies, which constituted a major change to their 
contracts.424 Aboard they found their new employer treated them with less 
respect than they were accustomed to, providing poor accommodation and 
inadequate food, and concluded that they were being treated worse than the 
sailors who, as true Company servants, were given better quarters and 
rations.425 On the Nijenburg the mutineers were also soldiers, recently 
dismissed from the various armies involved in the Seven Years War, which 
had ended a few months before the Nijenburg set sail. Their basis for collective 
identity, however, was that they had all been tricked or forced into joining the 
Company by the same organization of zielverkopers, and that most of them had 
                                                
424 The Barbestein mutineers were kept together as a military unit in a depot building 
in Vlissingen, rented by the Company for the purpose. They were therefore provided 
before their transportation to the ship with both the opportunity to plot and a motive: 
their shifting contractual terms and poor treatment. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: 
“Luxembourg en haut.” 
425 Bruijn and van Eyck van Heslinga remark that the soldiers were kept forward on 
the lower deck, in “the worst place aboard” and that they were routinely scolded by 
the sailors, who received cheese rations in addition to the “bad peas and meat” the 
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been made the same fraudulent promise before embarking, that they were 
going to serve in regiments on land in the Republic.426 It was while they were 
being held together, prior to being transported to the ship,  in an unofficial 
zielverkopers’ prison in Amsterdam that they formed themselves into the 
zwavelband or “match gang” and first discussed deserting as a group.427 
 
The architecture and organization of the ship played an active role at every 
stage in the unfolding of mutinies. Prospective mutineers needed 
                                                                                                                                       
Luxemburgers had to eat. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: “Luxembourg en haut,” 
114-5. 
426 The ending of the Seven Years’ War shortly before the Nijenburg’s departure lead 
to a massive increase in the numbers of loose, discharged and deserting soldiers 
passing through the Netherlands, and an unusual level of opportunity for 
zielverkopers: most of the Germans testified that they had entered the Company’s 
service in this way. One sailor, Fredrik Mentel, was captured en route from Bremen 
to London, where he had been offered a job at the sugar mill where his brother 
worked; while sleeping at an inn in Amsterdam he was locked in his room, 
fraudulent debts were concocted in his name and he was forced aboard a VOC 
lighter. Mentel’s case appears typical, and shows a system of capture and enlistment 
in the VOC that seems as cruel and haphazard as the impressment practiced in 
England. Crimineele Procedures, 38.  
427 There is some room for doubt in the court records as to who exactly among the 
mutineers eventually charged was a zwavelbender and who was not. The term 
zwavelband was used among the mutineers after their seizure of the ship to identify 
themselves, and is sometimes used in the court records as a synonym for members of 
the core group of mutineers, also called muiterofficiers (mutineer-officers) or simply 
muiters (mutineers). Some deponents stated that they had been zwavelbenders but had 
taken no part in the mutiny. The courts were never able to establish an exact division 
between the categories of zwavelbender and mutineer, however, and were in any case 
more concerned with identifying and punishing the mutineers than separating these 
categories. Of the 27 persons punished for mutiny, 18 we know to have been the 
victims of zielverkopers. Of the list of original mutineers given by Croos, one of the 
mutiny’s two leaders, all but one were identified as zwavelbenders. The reason for the 
name is unclear, but may be linked to  a land-based military identity, since 
musketeers, grenadiers and artillerymen all carried matches but seamen did not 
except during combat. Crimineele Procedures. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. 
(eds.): Echt Relaas en Dagverhaal Wegens den Opstand en… de Muiterij op het Oostindisch 
Compagnieschip Nijenburg, 1764 (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1992). 
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opportunities to form social bonds and discuss plans outside the Company’s 
gaze. They uniformly found these opportunities on the lower deck, relying on 
periods of low surveillance during night watches or in the sick bay in order to 
form and circulate detailed plans, involving multiple actions to be carried out 
simultaneously by different groups of men.428 The arrangement of shipboard 
spaces also clarified the mutineers’ targets. The number of mutineers required 
to carry out an uprising does not seem to have depended on the size of the 
ship or crew but on the tasks to be carried out and especially the spaces to be 
claimed.429 In cases where the ships still lay at anchor in the roadstead (the 
Gerechtigheid and Venus) it was necessary only to steal a lighter: this could be 
achieved with a few men, and involved only the temporary holding of access 
ways between the lower deck, the deck and the escape boat, the most difficult 
part of the mutiny then being to reach land undetected.430 After the ship had 
                                                
428 None of the mutinies appear to have been spontaneous, requiring instead several 
weeks for recruitment, debate and planning. The Duinenburg mutiny even made use 
of written documents, calling the crew to rebellion and stating the mutineers’ main 
objectives and proposed destination. Meurs, I. van: “Courage, Francois.” 
429 The plans and numbers assigned were the same on first rates with over 300 
persons aboard as on the Nijenburg with its crew of 198. The reason for this 
invariability may be related to the architecture of the ship, which was fundamentally 
the same between first and second rates, or to the number of senior officers, which 
was also the same.  
430 The surveillance of other ships was one of the gravest problems mutineers faced: it 
effectively removed the option of seizing and holding the mutineers’ ship. Deserters 
from the Venus were seen boarding the lighter by an officer on the Gerechtigheid, a few 
months after that ship’s own mutiny. They were apprehended by boats from several 
nearby ships before reaching shore. Ships would frequently spend weeks in the roads 
between den Helder and the island of Texel, taking on supplies, men and the Texel 
water, which was prized for its long usable life once placed in barrels. In 1782 these 
weeks stretched into many months, as the efforts of the Royal Navy during the fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War kept VOC ships from entering or leaving Dutch waters. The long 
wait by Texel was evidently a major contributing factor to the Genrechtigheid and 
 248 
set sail however, the difficulty of desertion increased: the mutineers needed to 
seize and maintain control of the vessel long enough either to steer it to a 
friendly port or to make off in the ships’ boats, an operation that required 
preparing and lowering the boats, loading them and preventing retaliatory 
action from the ship after departing.431 Seizing the ship always led to the same 
first objectives, expressed as seizing particular spaces aboard. These were the 
quarterdeck, possession of which would mean overpowering the senior 
officers and depriving them of their command, and the saloon, possession of 
which would mean possession of the swords, pistols and muskets stored 
there.432 Six or seven men always proved sufficient for each task. Shipboard 
time also played an important role: almost all the mutinies were launched at 
the changing of the watch, as one set of seamen were relieved of their duties 
by another. The reason for this might have been simply the ease of ensuring 
synchronization: since men lacked individual timepieces, the ship’s bell 
regulated the communal day. Such moments were also relaxations of the usual 
order, however, when jenever might be distributed and when groups of men 
                                                                                                                                       
Venus mutinies, which occurred amid a wave of desertions, from land-based depots, 
from ships and from the Company’s hospital ship at Den Helder. Gesner van der 
Voort: “Oproer en geweld.” 
431 In the case of the Barbestein the boats were chosen, since the ship was within a few 
miles of Britain, the mutineers’ goal. The Nijenburg’s mutineers hoped to desert using 
the boats at the Cape Verde islands, expecting the ship to stop there to take on fresh 
water. Only after they became aware that the ship had passed the archipelago 
without stopping did their plans stretch to commanding the ship for an extended 
period. Crimineele Procedures. 
432 Firearms are generally referred to as “snaphanen” (snaphaunces, referring to a 
seventeenth century firing mechanism) in their trial records. Their numbers and 
attributes are not closely described. 
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might move from below onto the decks together without attracting 
suspicion.433 The fact that any guards stationed about the ships were always 
surprised and disarmed by the mutineers, and that none of the mutinies faced 
very much opposition once launched, may be partly due to this camouflaging 
effect.  
 
In all cases power appears to have transferred from the officers to the 
mutineers fairly easily and, most surprisingly, with minimal violence, one or 
two officers generally being killed or wounded, but no resistance being 
offered once possession of the weapons had been achieved and the 
quarterdeck had been claimed. This common moment, when control was 
conceded to the mutineers, is one of the most striking aspects of all the 
mutinies, and is difficult to explain in terms of tipping points in the wider 
crew’s  loyalty or interests, since in every trial many crewmen testified that 
they did not know who was in command of the ship during the moment of 
uprising. In all cases but that of the Nijenburg neither the petty officers on the 
foredeck nor the Constable in the gun room attempted to oppose the 
mutineers after the saloon and quarterdeck had fallen. Mutineers were 
therefore generally able to gain control of the ship within minutes and 
progress to their next goals. From an Actor-Network standpoint it appears 
                                                
433 “Jenever” and “brandewyn” both describe the strong liquor provided to the men. 
The Barbestein mutineers specifically chose “jenever time,” being the 4 am watch 
change, for their uprising. It is not recorded whether or not they received their jenever 
before the mutiny began. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: "Luxembourg en haut,” 
115. 
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that this moment demonstrated that the officers’ network of control had been 
disaggregated: to restore their order it would be necessary to form a new 
network strong enough to oppose that of the mutineers, who were already 
joined to the spaces of command. Such networks might be found aboard other 
ships, and for this reason the mutineers feared encounters with other vessels, 
but they were never found among the lower officers and men aboard the 
mutineers’ ship.  
 
Among all the mutinies, only on the Nijenburg did the mutineers subsequently 
remain aboard to command the ship for an extended period. The Nijenburg 
therefore tests several further categories that remain impossible to examine in 
the other cases, in particular that of Lammers’ wider “movement” of mutiny, 
called into existence by the actions of the “core” mutineers. Mutineers 
themselves do not seem to have had great confidence in such movements: it is 
notable that in all cases they called upon the rest of the crew to join them in 
deserting only after they had secured the means for doing so.434 Unfortunately 
it is difficult to assess the degree of willingness or loyalty among these, the 
vast majority of the crewmen, who uniformly neither hindered nor aided the 
mutiny in progress. It is not safe to assume that those who joined the core 
mutineers in deserting the ship formed such a “wider” movement. The 
number of deserters in most cases appears to have been limited by the 
                                                
434 Theft of the Company’s money chests occurred in every case except the 
Gerechtigheid and Venus desertions, where money had not yet been loaded onto the 
ships. 
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available boats, which were filled with between 60 and 70 men.435 Where these 
deserters were recaptured they proffered confusing stories, however, claiming 
to have been forced into the boats or not to have understood the situation, and 
courts were frequently lenient regarding such claims, being principally 
concerned, as noted above, to separate ringleaders and limit the loss of 
crewmen judged capable of rehabilitation.436 Those who remained behind on 
the ships of course never offered testimony stating that they wished to desert: 
they were accordingly presumed loyal to the Company.  
 
With the exception, again, of the Nijenburg the departure of the core mutineers 
allowed for the authority of the officers to be quickly restored. The officers 
then acted quickly to thwart the departing mutineers’ plans for escape, 
succeeding in the case of the Barbestein by alerting nearby ships to give chase. 
There is no evidence from the trial records to suggest that the subsequent 
ability of the officers to command was compromised by the mutinies: once the 
mutineers’ network had been removed from the picture, the social order 
aboard seems to have gone back to normal. 
 
                                                
435 The exception to this rule is, again, the Gerechtigheid, where only 18 men joined the 
core mutineers in the lighter. It seems likely that the need for speed and surprise was 
the limiting factor in this case. Gesner van der Voort: “Oproer en geweld.” 
436 In each trial the first concern of the court was to separate leader of the mutiny and 
those who carried out specific acts of violence from mere followers. The separation 
between death sentences and “lesser” sentences is generally predicated on this point. 
Most of the trials ended with between four and nine death sentences and rather fewer 
“lesser” punishments. In each case the majority of deserters were fined and then 
pardoned, or sometimes required only to pay their legal costs.  
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The final part of each mutiny plan involved landing in some foreign port, 
assumed to lie beyond the reach of the VOC, and using the Company’s money 
to purchase impunity and further transport from there, relying on either the 
laxity or the cupidity of local authorities to provide a safe haven.437 The 
mutineers appear in general to have underestimated the extent of the 
Company’s influence, however, and overestimated the hospitality of foreign 
authorities. Both Britain and Brazil proved unwilling to accept renegades from 
the VOC, imprisoning them and alerting the Company as soon as their 
identities became known. In each case the former Company men seemed to 
have trouble integrating at their chosen destinations: although they had 
resisted the imposition of a Company identity aboard, they remained marked 
as Company men and deserters ashore. 
 
The story of the Nijenburg mutiny 
On May 8, 1763, the Nijenburg set sail from the Texel roadstead, bound for 
Batavia, closely following the routes of the Eendracht and Oranjezaal, which 
had departed two days earlier.438 Like all outward-bound ships, it was heavily 
                                                
437 In each case the destination was identified as a place where authorities might be 
fooled or bought off: the Nijenburg mutineers chose Portuguese Brazil because of its 
historical enmity for the Netherlands, while those on the Duinenburg chose Genoa as 
a place where buyers could be found for the VOC’s stolen ship and goods. Two of the 
Barbestein mutineers had been wrecked on Cornwall aboard the ship Ganges earlier in 
the same year (1786). They had spent one month in prison, then been released, 
without having to hand over some bullion they had stolen from the wreck. Other 
destinations discussed by the mutineers included “a free republic” in the Channel 
Islands, and the Barbary Coast, where the ship would be sold to corsairs. Bruijn & 
Van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij. 
438 Crimineele Procedures.  
 253 
loaded with men and supplies to replenish the Company’s factories in Asia, 
carrying a complement of roughly 200 crewmen, including a contingent of 29 
soldiers, destined for the garrison at Batavia, and, beside a full cargo of 
supplies for the factories in the Indies, two chests of ducats and unminted 
bullion, with which the Company intended to pay the wages of its servants in 
the east and to buy a return cargo of Asian products.439  
 
At midnight, between June 14 and 15, 1763, when the Nijenburg had been at 
sea for a little over five weeks and had just passed the Cape Verde islands, a 
band of 14 men seized control of the ship. 440  The uprising was remarkably 
bloodless: only eight persons were wounded in the whole action, and the sole 
killing (of the second mate) seems to have been the result of a personal 
vendetta.441 The mutineers faced little opposition, apparently because there 
was very little solidarity between the officers and the bulk of the crew; a few 
of the junior officers rushed to defend their superiors, but for the most part the 
ship’s ordinary seamen and soldiers either fled or hid from the mutineers, or 
meekly submitted to their orders when confronted. In particular the captain 
and first mate offered no resistance: at first sight of the mutineers on the 
                                                
439 DAS I. Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, ''’Allons Duytsche Broeders.'” 
440 Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, ''’Allons Duytsche Broeders.'” 
441 Three men were associated with the killing of second mate Pieterson, who was 
deliberately killed in his cabin having been incapacitated by previous multiple stab 
wounds. According to Valk, a Catholic sailor, Pieterson had victimized the German 
Catholics aboard, throwing a “roozekrans or paternoster” overboard together with 
prayer books, and had mocked and beaten Catholics, treating them “like Turks, not 
Christian men.” Crimineele Procedures II, 12. VOC 2407. 
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quarterdeck both fled. According to the popular account, the first mate cast 
down his pistol in his haste to escape into the captain’s cabin: from there both 
he and the captain, who had been lying sick in bed, climbed out of the 
window of the gallery, over the officers’ privy, and hid under the chain-wales 
mounted on the exterior of the hull, where they clung until coaxed back 
inboard some hours later by the mutineers’ promises that no harm would 
come to them.442  
 
Having gained control, and under the threat that they would kill the officers 
or blow up the ship if their wishes were not met, the mutineers demanded to 
be taken to Brazil, where they hoped to escape the VOC’s authority with the 
Company’s bullion in hand, to sell the ship, and to live off the combined 
proceeds. None of the mutineers had any seafaring experience prior to their 
enlistment, nor were they capable of sailing the ship or navigating to Brazil. 
They were therefore forced to rely on the ship’s officers, the only persons 
aboard skilled in navigation, to direct the ship and crew on their behalf.  
 
For the next seven weeks, under the mutineers’ command, the ship made slow 
and anxious progress across the windless equatorial region known as the 
                                                
442 Here the “popular account” is the “Echt Relaas”. A note of caution should be 
sounded regarding the comical scene of the captain’s flight, which may have been 
embellished for its paying audience. The fact that the captain and first officer hid 
beneath the chain wale is confirmed, however, in reports received by the Suriname 
court. In other aspects the “Echt Relaas” appears remarkably faithful to the 
testimonies given during the West-Stellingwerf trial and that of the Opperchirurgijn. 
De Jonge, Kuijk & Oskamp: Echt Relaas. Societeit van Suriname 929. 
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doldrums. During this period the mutineers’ threats against the officers were 
tested twice. The first was when the Nijenburg was hailed by the Oranjezaal, 
prompting the mutineers to prepare the ship’s guns for combat and the 
powder barrels in the hold, in case the fight should go against them. A fight 
was avoided, however, by the captain, who successfully averted the 
suspicions of the Oranjezaal’s commander, parting company with the other 
ship during the night. The second was when the mutineers, unnerved by the 
apparent lack of progress in the mid Atlantic, accused the captain of 
attempting to trick them, either preventing the ship from moving forward or 
steering for some other destination. On this occasion the mutineers threatened 
to execute the captain and officers unless land was sighted within two weeks. 
Again according to the popular account the captain’s life was spared by a 
matter of hours, as the third mate in the mast-top sighted the coast of Brazil on 
August 2, just before the deadline. While the crew were still celebrating the 
sight of land the Nijenburg ran aground on a reef some miles off Cape Roque, 
Pernambuco, Brazil. At this point roughly 62 men rowed to shore in the ship’s 
two boats, believing the ship itself to be hopelessly stranded and in imminent 
danger of sinking, and taking some share of the Company’s money with them. 
These men included the bulk of the mutineers and two officers—the first mate 
and one of the two third mates—who were forced into the boats because the 
mutineers themselves did not know how to row. Shortly thereafter, however, 
the ship floated off the reef. Its signal guns, intended to recall the mutineers in 
the boats, were misinterpreted as attacks: the men who left in the boats made 
shore and never attempted again to contact the Nijenburg.  
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The few mutineers left aboard, under the leadership of one Johannes Brand, 
offered the captain his command back, which, however, he refused. After this 
blow, by a public vote conducted on the quarterdeck, the ship limped 
northward up the coast, in the direction of French Cayenne, on the report of 
one sailor who had previously served there that the French would accept 
willing laborers. At this point the ship had lost its boats and one anchor; it 
could no longer land the men safely nor stand off the coast indefinitely, while 
the rafts built by the ship’s carpenters and sent to scout the shore failed to 
bring any news of civilization on land. Faced by a deserted coast, dwindling 
supplies and the loss of the boats, on arrival at French Cayenne the remaining 
mutineers were willing to hand over the ship in exchange for a guarantee of 
safe conduct from the French colonial governor. On August 30 the Nijenburg 
entered Cayenne harbor where the crew left the ship en masse, to be held in a 
secure building and interrogated by French authorities.443 
 
Unfortunately for the mutineers, but fortunately for the present work, most of 
the core mutineers were subsequently returned to Dutch authorities.444 The 
group that had left in the boats was imprisoned by the Portuguese governor at 
Pernambuco (now Olinda) and returned by way of Lisbon to the Dutch 
                                                
443 De Jonge, Kuijk & Oskamp: Echt Relaas. Staten General 6836, 7029, 7040. 
444 A few of the core mutineers died before they could face trial: notably Johann 
Wolnar, a leader of the mutiny and perhaps the first to suggest it, was found hanged 
in his prison cell in Pernambuco. Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, ''’Allons 
Duytsche Broeders.'” 
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Republic. These arrived and were tried in two batches in 1764. Because the 
VOC had no sovereign authority in Dutch territorial waters they were tried by 
officers of the Amsterdam Admiralty with VOC fiscaals acting as advisers, 
aboard two warships anchored in the Texel roadstead.445 Of those who were 
captured at Cayenne, 54 were tried by the nearest Dutch colonial court, at Fort 
Zeelandia (now Paramaribo), Suriname, arriving there almost a year later on 
July 31, 1764.446 There is a serious discrepancy in the records of the Nijenburg’s 
crew between Cayenne and Suriname, however; up to 70 men disappear from 
the Company’s records by the time of the Suriname trial, including Brand, 
who had negotiated safe conduct for the crew at Cayenne. We know that 
some, like the captain, died after landing at Cayenne, and we may assume that 
diseases accounted for more.447 According to the testimonies given at 
                                                
445 This legal procedure was followed in all cases of trials of VOC personnel outside 
the Company’s specified area of monopoly control, which excluded the Atlantic 
realm, being set in the VOC’s charter “beyond the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits 
of Magellan.” The warships were those that had transported the Nijenburg’s men 
from Portugal to the Netherlands; the Zeepaard and West Stellingwerf, both operated 
by the Amsterdam Admiralty.  The Amsterdam and Rotterdam Admiralties 
conducted the trials following all subsequent VOC mutinies until the Company’s 
dissolution in 1795. Hoogenberk: Rechtsvoorschriften, Bruijn & Van Eyck van Heslinga: 
Muiterij. 
446 Ten others were exonerated by letters from Patria, including the merchant and his 
wife. Suriname was governed by the Society of Suriname, a chartered entity 
composed of Amsterdam merchants and the Dutch West India Company. Its courts 
were invested with sovereign authority to conduct trials and mete out punishments 
independently of Patria. The mutineers tried at Suriname therefore did not face either 
VOC or Admiralty justice, but rather that of a comparable, mercantilist institution. 
Nonetheless, the sentences handed down appear in general more lenient than those 
handed down in Patria. Staten Generaal 9407. 
447 New recruits to any of the East India Companies faced an alarming mortality rate 
on their first voyage outside Europe: VOC  recruits in the eighteenth century had a 
less than one in three chance of returning to Europe. Batavia was a famously deadly 
destination, killing more than half of all new arrivals within their first six months, but 
figures were hardly better for English soldiers serving in India in the same period. 
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Suriname others were, as they had expected, offered work by the French 
governor, as well as the chance to return one day to their homes, via France.448 
It appears that many may have succeeded in deserting from the Company at 
this point and made new lives in South America, without, however, the aid of 
the Company’s bullion, which was largely accounted for.449  
 
The VOC supplied the Suriname court with testimony from the first trial at 
Texel, from the captain’s diary and from a report by the senior surgeon, along 
with an advisor to suggest sentences.450 Between the three trials a total of 121 
men were questioned, and 79 testimonies collected. In all 25 men were 
                                                                                                                                       
Schnurmann, C: 'Wherever Profit Leads Us, to Every Sea and Shore . . .’ the VOC, the 
WIC, and Dutch Methods of Globalization in the seventeenth Century. Renaissance 
Studies 17.3 (2003), 474-493. Heijer, H. den, & Enthoven, V: “Nederland en de 
Atlantische Wereld, 1600-1800. Een historiografisch overzicht,” Tijdschrift voor 
Zeegeschiedenis 24, no. 2 (2005), 147-166. Brug, P. H. Van der: Malaria en Malaise: de 
VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994).   
448 Johann Otto Liep and Frederik Schneider testified at Suriname that they had been 
given paid work at the Cayenne magazine and offered a permanent appointment 
there. Staten Generaal 2407. 
449 The goals of the French colonial authorities in the events at Cayenne and Suriname 
remains somewhat mysterious. On the one hand , they offered work and freedom to 
the VOC’s servants. On the other, they evidently sent the captain’s diary to the 
Company’s headquarters in Amsterdam, and much of the VOC’s money seems to 
have been collected at Cayenne from the Nijenburg’s crewmen. Several deponents at 
Suriname stated that they were willing to stay at Cayenne, but nevertheless found 
themselves loaded back onto the ship and sent to the Dutch colony. It seems likely 
that some men managed to strike deals with the French authorities and others did 
not. The criteria for such deals are not known, however. Johannes Brand, or Brants, 
widely credited with leading the mutineers after the flight of the boats at Cape 
Roque, disappears from the record at Cayenne: he is recorded as having died in 
January 1764 in VOC paybooks, but no record of his death is to be found in the 
Cayenne papers. Societeit van Suriname 205, 323, 324, 929. 
450 Even though multiple copies of the captain’s diary were evidently made and used 
at the courts in Suriname and on the Zeepaard, no copy survives. 
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sentenced to death: their remains were displayed, on pikes at Suriname, and 
on massive, specially-constructed gallows by the Texel roadstead, erected by 
the VOC to provide a warning in perpetuity to all sailors leaving from the 
Company’s three northern Chambers.451 A further 11 men faced lesser 
sentences ranging from keel-hauling and imprisonment (punishments 
considered less severe than death, but often fatal in fact) to fines and dismissal 
from Company service, while all 62 men who abandoned the ship at Cape 
Roque had their wages stopped at the moment they left.452 Those crewmen 
who had not died or deserted were held at Surinam until the arrival of a relief 
captain and crew from Patria. The Nijenburg finally arrived at Batavia on 
August 30, 1765 with a crew of 163, of which only 40 had departed Texel on 
the same ship.453 
                                                
451 “…om aan de intente van den Hoog Mogende Heren door het opregten van een permanent 
teeken en spectacul tot een affschrick voor alle zeevarende persoonen to beantwoorden,” or 
“with the intention of the Heren XVII to make of their punishment a permanent sign 
and terrifying spectacle with which to warn all seafarers.” AN Collectie Van 
wassenaar Van Duivenvoorde 1475. The trial papers contain drawings and 
correspondence pertaining to the gallows, which were constructed over the objections 
of the Westfriesland authorities close to Den Helder. Staten Generaal 2404. 
452 “Appendix I,” Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij 155-6. The Company 
paybooks show that all those who left the ship on August 2 forfeited pay from that 
moment, including the first and third mates, and the loyal Indies hand Jan Meijer 
a.k.a. Jan  Oostindien whom the mutineers had pressed into service as oarsmen. The 
names, ranks or job titles, and towns of origin for the Nijenburg’s crew are recorded in 
the Company’s pay books, which have been made partially available via an online 
database: Velzen, A. J. M. van, Gaastra, F.S. & Parmentier, J, Nationaal Archief, 
Archiefdiensten van Delft en Rotterdam, Zeeuws Archief, Westfries Archief & 
Universiteiten Leiden en Gent: VOC – Seafarers online database. 
http://vocopvarenden.nationaalarchief.nl Accessed 1/22/2011. 
453 The totals for crew given above are rather vague because accounts differ regarding 
the number of men who departed Patria on the Nijenburg. The Company’s paybooks 
fail to distinguish between the members of the original crew and those of the relief 
crew, who are recorded as joining Company service on the date of the ship’s 
departure. The total crew associated with the Nijenburg’s 1763 voyage therefore 
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Sources on the mutiny  
The capture and trial of the Nijenburg’s crew drew a great deal of popular 
attention in the Republic. The first news of the mutiny was quickly followed in 
1764 by a “true account of the mutiny on the VOC ship Nijenburg,” which 
purported to be the diary of an anonymous officer who was forced to operate 
the ship under the mutineers’ command.454 This was followed by two further 
publications, both credited to the captain, one telling the story of those 
mutineers who landed in Brazil, up to their capture and repatriation, the other 
purporting to be the captain’s diary through the whole ordeal.455 The events of 
these accounts were summarized in the popular annual Nieuwe Nederlandsche 
Jaarboeken for 1764, together with engravings showing the executed mutineers’ 
bodies on the Company’s monumental gibbets at Kijkduin by the Texel 
roadstead (Figure 3.1: Design for gibbets erected at Kijkduin, 1764; Figure 3.2 
                                                                                                                                       
includes two captains (the ill-fated captain Ketel and captain Christoph Hartz, sent to 
relieve him) and a total of 371 men. Mollema gives a total of 238 crew on the original 
departure but does not cite his source for this figure, while DAS II gives 198. I have 
followed DAS II throughout, as the more accountable source. VOC – Seafarers online 
database. Mollema, J. C: Een Muiterij in de achtiende Eeuw: het afloopen van het Oost-
Indische Compagnieschip Nijenborg in 1763 (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink,, 1933). 
454 The “Echt Relaas” appears to have been based on a combination of the captain’s 
diary, the surgeon’s report and the testimony from the trial on the West Stellingwerf. 
Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. 
455 Ketel, J: Eerste Vervolg van het Echt Relaas en Dagverhaal, wegens het Afloopen van ‘t 
Oost-Indisch Compagnie-schip Nyenburg… (Amsterdam: Dirck Swart, 1764). Ketel, J: 
Echt Journal van het Voorgevallene op de Reize met het Oostindische Compagnie-Schip 
Nyenburg… (Amsterdam, 1764). 
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Design for how the gibbets should appear to vessels in the Texel roadstead).456 
Finally, the proceedings from the trials conducted in Patria were themselves 
printed, making available the full testimony of all prisoners brought before the 
court and their sentences.457 News of the punishment of the mutineers was 
spread actively by the Company, not only through prints of the gibbets but 
also in mariners’ songbooks, printed and distributed by the VOC.458 The 
infamy of the Nijenburg mutiny spread so widely that when a mutiny broke 
out aboard the Netherlands’ warship Zeven Provincieen in 1933, historian J. C. 
Mollema was moved to write a new account of it, as an archetypal case of the 
breakdown of order at sea, while the ship is remembered today with a 
gevelsteen, a commemorative stone set in a wall to mark the site of the captain’s 
house in Amsterdam.459 
                                                
456Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken, 22 (Leiden, Amsterdam: P. van der Eyk en D. 
Vygh, J. van der Burgh, 1764). The design and proposed location for the gibbets were 
included with the sentences of the West Stellingwerf trial. AN Staten Generaal 9407. 
457 Crimineele Procedures. 
458 A copy of the Nijenburg song is reproduced in Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. 
(eds.): Echt Relaas. 
459 Mollema: Een muiterij. Details of the gevelsteen are recorded at 
http://gevelsteen.blogspot.com last accessed 1/8/2011. 
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Figure 3.1: Design for a monumental gibbet, to be erected at Kijkduin, 1764. 
AN Staten Generaal 9407. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Proposed placement of the gibbets, to ensure visibility to vessels in 
the Texel roadstead. AN Staten Generaal 9407. 
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All records of the mutiny show some problems as sources. The popular 
accounts were clearly written for consumption by audiences in the Republic, 
and share some of the conventions of the popular genre of “disaster literature” 
explored by Blackmore, Mentz and Lamb. 460 The trial records on which they 
are based are hardly less problematic, however, being edited, abbreviated 
reports rather than complete court minutes, with testimony paraphrased into 
reported speech, with frequent use of the formula niet te weeten: “not known,” 
rendering the court’s ignorance indistinguishable from that of the prisoners.461 
The result is a group of records that shows a coherence and concern for logical 
progression toward the sentences with which they conclude. These cannot be 
read simply as records of “what really happened,” in the courtroom, much 
less on the ship.  
 
In addition, the various courts shaped the testimonies they received through 
their manner of questioning. The Admiralty courts were based on ship’s “war 
councils” of seven men, consisting exclusively of admirals and captains of 
warships of the Amsterdam Admiralty assisted by Company fiscaals who 
                                                
460 Blackmore, J., Manifest Perdition: Shipwreck Narrative and the Disruption of Empire 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Brito, B. G. de: The Tragic History 
of the Sea [ed. And trans. Boxer, C. R. foreword and additional translation by Josiah 
Blackmore] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). Blackmore, J: “The 
Shattered Carrack: voice and submersion in Early Modern Portuguese shipwreck 
literature” and Mentz, S: “God’s Storms: shipwreck and the meanings of ocean, 1550-
1750,” papers presented at The Semiotics of Shipwreck: a symposium on the representation 
and resonance of maritime disaster, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 19-20 
November 2010. Lamb, J., Preserving the Self in the South Seas 1680–1840 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
461 Crimineele Procedures, Staten Generaal 9404-7, Societeit van Suriname 929. 
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acted as “secretaries,” maintaining records, ordering the testimonies and 
procedures of the court, and suggesting punishments.462 They appear 
overwhelmingly concerned with matters of disciplinary order and of 
adherence to the Company Articles.463 Abandoning the ship in peril was 
explicitly forbidden by VOC Article 44, which stated that in case of fire or 
sinking the men were to remain with the ship and work together to overcome 
their danger, rather than fleeing in the boats.464 Both Admiralty courts 
therefore concentrated heavily on the question of whose orders their prisoners 
were following when they left the ship for the boats at Cape Roque. Similar 
matters concerning the chain of command were of no account to the Surinam 
court, which instead was primarily concerned with the violence done on the 
night of the mutiny, and which sought to verify the reports it had been sent by 
the VOC, line by line. The collective abandoning of the ship to French 
authorities at Cayenne was not even remarked upon by the court, and the 
issue of who was in command during the abandonment—mutineer or rightful 
captain—was likewise not a matter of discussion. Each court framed its own 
                                                
462 Crimineele Procedures. The same court composition was repeated at all trials. Bruijn 
& van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij. 
463 Maritime Articles were well known to Admiralty judges; the VOC’s Articles of 
Employment were based on Articles of War drawn up for the command of land and 
sea forces during the 80 Years War, and still in effect in the Amsterdam Admiralty. 
Standard punishments for their infraction were also well-known in the Admiralties, 
and since Admiralty courts were empowered to judge VOC mariners, the dividing 
lines between military and Company order are blurred in these cases. Nicolaes 
Witsen provides sets of Admiralty and mercantile Articles. Nicolaas Witsen. 
Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum. Ofte Aaloude en; Aaloude en hedendaagsche 
scheeps-bouw en bestier (Amsterdam, 1690, reprinted Franeker: Van Wijnen, 1994), 443-
468. 
464 Hoogenberk: Rechtsvoorschriften, VOC 4952. 
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standard list of questions, from which, however, each also wandered as 
surprising answers diverted it from its goals, without ever returning to 
previous prisoners in order to investigate these surprising answers. The most 
striking example of this regards how men were recruited and what they knew 
of the Company’s regulations: each court began under the assumption that the 
crew were volunteers who had heard the Articles read aloud several times. 
Each court eventually came to learn that many of the crewmen had been 
effectively impressed into VOC service, and that many had not attended the 
“branding of the chests” that marked their formal inculcation into the 
Company, at which the Articles were read prior to embarkation.465 In each 
court’s records, however, these facts appear as mere curios, and the 
circumstances of recruitment, although of interest, do not seem to have 
affected the courts’ decisions regarding sentencing.  
 
The testimony itself is, of course, strongly colored by the deponents’ memories 
and reconstructions of events, their efforts to exonerate themselves, sometimes 
by casting suspicion on their fellows, and their attempts to communicate with 
panels of officials that had their own, evidently interested interpretations of 
                                                
465 Although the VOC never operated press gangs nor officially sanctioned the work 
of zielverkopers, from the courts’ attitude we may conclude that their methods were 
tacitly approved by Company, Admiralty and colonial authority alike. Hullu, J. de, 
Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. Schaeffer, R. K: The Chains of Bondage Broke: the 
proletarianization of seafaring labor, 1600-1800 (unpublished diss., SUNY Binghamton, 
1984). 
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shipboard order and conduct.466 In each trial “facts” tend to follow from 
multiple deponents in chains: matters once established as being of interest to 
the court are repeated by the next several prisoners in sequence, suggesting 
that there was some communication between prisoners during the trial either 
in communal cells or in the courtroom itself.467  
 
Testimony about spatial orientation is often imprecise and requires careful 
interpretation. Both prisoners and court officers tend toward rather “thick” 
description, assuming a great deal of familiarity with the layout and workings 
of East Indiamen. Only unusual deviations from the norm are commented on, 
while vague, short-hand expressions such as “achter op” and “beneden” (“up 
at the stern” and “below,” respectively) are used to explain where mariners 
were and what they could witness, without these terms ever being closely 
defined. Different mariners use different terms for the same spaces aboard, 
while simple disagreements in testimony render some spatial relationships 
                                                
466 The strong agreement between the trial papers and the Echt Relaas had lead de 
Jonge, Kuijk and Oskamp to speculate that the latter volume might have been 
compiled from the former. Regarding the role of collective memory and preparation 
against the event of trial,  Lauren Benton describes how pirates and other criminal 
seamen would rehearse their stories after each action, in anticipation of being called 
at some later date singly and collectively to account. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. and 
Oskamp, L. (eds): Echt Relaas. Benton, L: “Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the 
Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History  47 (2005), 
700-724.  
467 One of the most striking cases of this sequential repetition concerns whether the 
prisoner heard the Article of Employment at the “branding of the chests,” a ceremony 
that immediately preceded the embarkation of crew, which involved their “swearing 
into” service. Once this court began asking the prisoners whether they had sworn to 
uphold the Articles, it transpired that many of the prisoners either had not been 
present, or had not heard the Articles because their fellows were being too loud, or 
had not understood them because they did not speak Dutch. Crimineele Procedures. 
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uncertain. The following reconstruction is therefore tentative. It has the 
advantage, however, of revealing how the space of the ship was perceived by 
various soldiers and sailors, the slippages and gaps between their perceptions 
suggesting multiple readings that greatly complicate the canonical image of 
the typical ship laid out in previous chapters. In particular the question of how 
each prisoner came to abandon the ship for the boats—whether on direct 
order from the captain, by the rumor  of such an order or because of the 
actions of others nearby, or even by being forced into the boats at sword 
point—reveals a contingent, uncertain environment of command and action, 
very different from that suggested by the Company’s pseudo-military ranks 
and the explicit statements of the Articles. 
 
Reconstructing the space of the Nijenburg 
 For charting the socio-spatial order of the ship, the trial records allow three 
separate conditions to be identified: the “normal” running of the ship before 
the mutiny, the moment of mutiny itself, when the Company’s order was 
challenged and control seized by the mutineers, and the mutineers’ 
subsequent ordering of the ship, until its seizure by French authorities.  
 
The pre-mutiny condition must be largely reconstructed out of rather partial 
accounts: the story of the ship explored during the trials begins on the night of 
the mutiny and refers to the situation that preceded it only in order to clarify 
subsequent events. In addition, the principal document that might have given 
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information as to the pre-mutiny state of the ship, the logbook, has been lost.468 
There is therefore no account to be had of the normal running of the  ship that 
is not colored by the events of the mutiny and trials. Nonetheless, the picture 
that emerges of the pre-mutiny condition shows several deviations from 
Company norms, which are examined in depth in the following pages.  
 
Regarding the night of the mutiny, issues of orientation became paramount: 
seamen’s testimonies identify where they and others were, providing a 
remarkably fine-grained description of particular critical parts of the ship: in 
accounting for their actions or inaction, the ship on the night of the mutiny is 
frequently recast into a collection of discrete spaces, only tenuously connected.  
 
Finally, after the mutiny the social and spatial order were reconfigured in 
various ways by the mutineers. The mutineers’ spatial interventions were 
aimed more at repurposing the power structures of the ship than 
appropriating the spaces that expressed those structures, however. Popular 
stories of mutinies emphasized the overturning of power and the resulting 
                                                
468 The whereabouts of the log remain a mystery. That it was available to the court in 
preparing for the trial is certain: it is mentioned in the briefing documents given to 
the court at Suriname by the authorities in Patria, and we may assume that 
authorities in Suriname had access to it while conducting the trial. Log books were 
considered extremely important and jealously guarded by the Company, partly 
because of any information they might contain that would be of interest to corporate 
spies or foreign powers, including cartographic revisions, trade data and prices for 
goods in various ports. The Articles stated that they were to be kept confidential until 
they were handed in to the Company’s record keepers at the end of each voyage. 
Crimineele Procedures. VOC 4952. Davids, K: Zeewezen en Wetenschap: de wetenschap en 
de ontwikkeling van de navigatietechniek in Nederland tussen 1585 en 1815 (Amsterdam: 
Dieren, 1986). 
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disorder among mutinous crews producing a Saturnalia where officers were 
humiliated and supplies (especially of alcoholic drink) wasted, where the 
captain’s cabin was despoiled by the mutineers and the captain himself 
executed or imprisoned.469 On the Nijenburg, however, there was little 
destruction and the officers were permitted to remain in their positions of 
power, provided they worked inside the novel order created by the mutineers 
and according to their demands.  
 
De Bruin and van der Wal contend that a second mutiny took place aboard the 
Nijenburg after the bulk of the mutineers left at Cape Roque. It is not clear, 
however, if this second mutiny entailed any changes to the spatial order 
aboard, and I have not attempted to draw conclusions from the very scant 
evidence given. 
 
Visual sources for the construction of the ship 
We are extremely fortunate that a drawing of the Nijenburg itself exists.470 The 
drawing confirms that the ship, built at Hoorn in 1757, was a standard second-
rate retourschip, 140 Amsterdam feet in length, with a cargo capacity of 880 
tons, following the design of 1749.471 This rate appears to be described by the 
                                                
469 Johnson, Captain C. & Cordingly, D: A General History of the Robberies and Murders 
of the Most Notorious Pirates (New York: Lions Press, 1998). Rediker, M. B: Villains of 
All Nations: Atlantic pirates in the golden age. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004). 
470 De Jonge, Kuijk & Oskamp: Echt Relaas. The drawing of the Nijenburg is in the 
collection of the Nederlandse Scheepvaartmuseum: NSM A.0145(160) [nr 0003]. 
471 See chapter 1: The typical ship. 
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plan of the Noord Nieuw Landt, drawn up by VOC shipwright Pieter van 
Zwijndrecht in 1750, which conforms to the 1749 rate’s specifications and 
proportions (Figure 3.3: P. van Zwijndrecht: VOC ship Noord Nieuw Landt, 
deck plans, 1750).472 
 
 
Figure 3.3: P. van Zwijndrecht: plans for the upper and lower (termed Second 
and First) decks of the VOC ship Noord Nieuw Landt, 1750. Maritiem Museum 
Prins Hendrick, Rotterdam, Netherlands. MMPH T1127-15 and T1127-16. 
 
                                                
472 Image provided by Maritiem Museum Prins Hendrick, Rotterdam, Netherlands: 
T1127-15; 16. In reconstructing the spaces of the mutiny, as far as possible the general 
outline of the Noord Nieuw Landt plan has been used, except that the trial papers 
contain no evidence of the spiral staircase shown in the gallery on the plan linking the 
officers’ saloon on the upper deck with the captain’s cabin on the quarterdeck. I have 
assumed that this staircase was absent from the Nijenburg since, had it been available 
it would have been used by officers seeking to escape the mutineers or by John Saxen, 
one of the captain’s boys, in avoiding the mutineers while scouting the officers’ 
quarters on the night of the mutiny. Crimineele Procedures. 
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The general layout of the Nijenburg seems to have conformed to that given in 
Chapter 2 for the post-Bentam retourschip, with a single large, open space on 
the lower deck occupied by hammocks and bak tables but free of cannons, and 
the officers’ cabins on the quarterdeck arranged in a horseshoe behind the 
wheel. Sources for the physical form of the vessel are far from complete, 
however, especially regarding the interior division of the hull space, which 
would likely have been adjusted for each voyage as the demands of carrying 
crew and cargo fluctuated. It therefore remains impossible to draw a definitive 
plan of the vessel at the time of the mutiny, while the trial testimony contains 
some tantalizing suggestions regarding physical deviations from the standard 
model, including mention of a “small” bottelarij (steward’s supply room) 
mounted in the open air on the upper deck and a stairway joining the 
quarterdeck with the voorkajuit, immediately in front of the saloon.473 
 
Before the mutiny  
Viewed from the quarterdeck or the bookkeeper’s desk, the socio-spatial 
organization of the Nijenburg appears generally to have conformed to the 
typical model; no gross deviations from the Company’s protocols appear in 
the testimonies. Below decks, however, the informal, unofficial norms that 
helped to form the typical ship appear to have been largely absent: in 
particular the organization of the lower deck on the Nijenburg was very unlike 
that described by de Hullu and Ketting as characteristic of the VOC ship. 
                                                
473 Crimineele Procedures. Staten Generaal 2407. 
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As noted in chapter two the lower deck was canonically the site of a strong 
‘lower class’ social order and identity, which helped to organize the ordinary 
seamen and soldiers. This identity helped to define a field of competition, 
which disciplined and socialized individuals to work within the power 
structures aboard and to invest their own identities in their own proper 
subdivision of the crew. One of the most important subdivisions, according to 
Ketting, was that between the sailors and soldiers.474 The inferior station of the 
soldiers on the orlop helped create solidarity among the members of both 
groups, since it gave the sailors someone to look down on and the soldiers an 
intimate enemy. In each case resentment and violent impulses were directed 
by each group toward the other, and away from the officers and the Company 
as a whole.475 
 
The image of the social situation on the Nijenburg is very different: there is no 
hint of any collective rituals or other means for promoting social cohesion 
beyond the Company’s functional divisions of watches and baks. Moreover, 
the field in which crewmen were supposed to compete was never effectively 
established: the very few experienced Indies hands, although respected 
among the crew for their expertise, were shown to have little influence over 
their crewmates and did not manage to instill in them the attitudes and 
                                                
474 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk, 252-255. 
475 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk. 
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worldview characteristic of Jan Compagnie.476 There is also no sign of the orlop 
being used for accommodation. Instead soldiers and sailors were mixed 
together on the lower deck without any clear separation between them. The 
common soldier’s complaint, that his food was inferior to that of the sailors, 
also cannot be maintained in the case of the Nijenburg. Several of the baks 
contained soldiers, sailors and craftsmen together; as bak mates they would 
have received their food communally. In short, there is no evidence that the 
structures for reproducing the Company’s typical shipboard social order were 
themselves being reproduced.477 
 
It is an open question how much difference the lack of rituals and structures 
made to the social cohesion and working effectiveness of the crew: none of the 
ships that underwent mutinies in the latter part of the eighteenth century 
showed marked cohesiveness, and in most cases the records of life on those 
ships are not detailed enough to provide any conclusions regarding rituals. It 
is clear, however, that without the usual divisions and rivalries between 
Company-defined groups, other sources of communal identity flourished on 
the Nijenburg. Where social divisions were between Company-defined 
categories, they all served to reinforce the unifying umbrella identity of Jan 
                                                
476 The most visible of the old Indies hands, one Jan Meijer, known to all as Jan 
Oostindien, was deferred to and consulted on matters of operating and repairing the 
ship. He was unable, however, to prevent his fellow sailors from taking the 
mutineers’ money, or the ejection of Coenraad Palm, both of which acts he spoke out 
against. Crimineele Procedures. 
477 On the structures for reproducing the identity of Jan Compagnie, see Chapter 2: 
the space of the typical ship. 
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Compagnie, which would serve to separate the men as Europeans from the 
environment of the Indies. Without these novel divisions, however, the men 
retained identities based on nationality or common languages and on 
experiences prior to their enlistment. These other bases of identity became 
extremely important in defining social groups and loyalties during and after 
the mutiny. They were also reflected, however, in the pre-mutiny arrangement 
of the lower deck. 
 
Watches, baks, and the mutineers’ self-organization  
Against typical practice, it seems likely that the Nijenburg’s crew had some 
influence over the baks to which they were assigned on embarking.478 The crew 
were divided into two watches rather than the more common three: each 
watch was accordingly assigned one side of the ship, the baks that made it up 
subdividing the length of that side.479 The prospective mutineers of the 
                                                
478 The VOC had no formal policy regarding how baks should be assigned and there is 
no equivalent to the watch and quarter bills used by the Royal Navy, which recorded 
the duties to which particular men were assigned and the allocation of messes and 
hammock space on warships. Rodger, N. A. M: The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the 
Georgian Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 25-7. Lavery, B: Shipboard Life 
and Organization 1731-1815 (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998) 23, 270. According to de Jonge, 
Kuijk & Oskamp the steward was charged with assigning baks, this is not confirmed 
in the case of the Nijenburg, however. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt 
Relaas 
479 Since the ship’s log is missing it has been impossible to confirm this inference 
conclusively. However, there is considerable reason to believe it to be true. No 
deponent in any trial mentioned any but the Prince’s and Graaf Maurits watch, while 
one deponent, Eksteyn, stated that he was not familiar with the mutineers because 
they belonged to the starboard watch. Finally, when the mutineers took over the ship 
they operated only two watches and no reorganizing of the crew was recorded to fit 
them into this work structure. Working from Bentam’s model for a first rate ship, and 
adjusting the scale to fit the 1749 second rate, each bak would have had, at maximum, 
a share of the lower deck roughly 8 and a half by 18 Amsterdam feet. That is, one 
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zwavelband all managed to be allocated to the “Prince’s watch,” which was 
berthed on the starboard side of the lower deck.  
 
They further concentrated themselves on four baks, which became known as 
the zwavelbenders hoek or “match gang’s corner” (hereafter “hoek”). This 
concentration would have aided planning the mutiny considerably: the 
members of a watch ate, slept and worked on the same schedule. The watch 
might therefore be assumed to define a sailor’s social opportunities, while the 
members of a bak were generally assigned to the same duties and were 
assumed to support one another.480 The Admiralty courts paid close attention 
to the baks as important social institutions, expecting members of the same bak 
both to confide in and to watch over one another. Some deponents offered that 
they were never the mutineers’ baksgasten or “bak guests” as evidence that they 
were not involved in the mutiny.481 The courts’ questioning regarding 
                                                                                                                                       
tenth of the length of the habitable portion of the lower deck, excluding the gun room 
and cable tiers, by half the width of the ship. Interior partitions for the galley, 
steward’s cupboard and other storage would have reduced this in practice. We know 
that a number of “boys” and favorites were allowed berths in officers’ cabins and 
other spaces aboard. The total hammock count might therefore be up to 10% lower 
than the roughly160 men who were entitled to eat at their baks on the lower deck. 
Crimineele Procedures. DAS II, Kist, B: “VOC shipbuilding Policy 1740-1750” in 
Gawronski et al: Hollandia Compendium: a contribution to the history, archeology, 
classification and lexicography of a 150 ft. Dutch East Indiaman (1740-1750). (Amsterdam: 
Rijksmuseum, 1992), 34-75. 
480 de Hullu notes that this support extended to caring for the sick, which was 
organized at the watch and bak levels, and ensuring that all members of each bak 
received provisions. Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. 
481 Jacob Boos claimed, unsuccessfully, never to have been a guest at the mutineers’ 
baks. Taleau, another convicted mutineer, claimed that he never mixed with the 
mutineers because he was a carpenter and they were all soldiers and sailors. 
Crimineele Procedures I, 107, 135. 
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deponents’ baks revealed that they indeed played a significant role in ordering 
the ship both before the mutiny and after, when the mutineers created new 
baks around which to organize themselves.482  
 
Not enough information is given in the trial testimonies to allow for a full 
reconstruction of the disposition of baks aboard. A partial reconstruction, 
however, allows for some conclusions to be drawn regarding the social 
environment of the lower deck and the level of surveillance in operation there. 
179 of the men aboard would have been assigned to baks. If each bak contained 
the typical seven or eight men, there should have been a total of 23-26 baks.483 
The trial records provide names for 23 baks, of which we know three were 
located on the upper deck, under the quarterdeck, crowded into the space that 
contained the pumps, water vats and some sailing equipment.  Of the 20-23 
baks on the lower deck only a few can be placed. These include the corporal’s 
bak, which was used by the mutineers on the night of the uprising, and two of 
the zwavelbenders’ baks. All of these were adjacent to the bottelier’s (steward’s) 
bak, which stood by the mainmast, right in the middle of the ship. This placed 
the mutineers not only in one of the busiest, most heavily trafficked spaces of 
the lower deck, squeezed between the bottelarij, or steward’s pantry, and the 
galley, but also under the watchful eye of the steward himself, one of the men 
                                                
482 Crimineele Procedures.  
483 De Hullu provides this standard size for a bak: nothing in the Nijenburg trial 
evidence contradicts this figure. One of the baks formed after the mutiny to contain 
the two “battalions” of “mutineer officers” consisted of seven men, the other of eight. 
Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. Crimineele Procedures. 
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most closely associated with policing the space below.484 Despite this 
apparently quite public location, the zwavelbenders’ hoek was the site of 
several activities that imply a low level of supervision, including recruiting 
and planning for the mutiny and, one day before the uprising, a meeting of all 
14 core mutineers. It is possible that there was less supervision of this space on 
the Nijenburg than on a typical ship: the steward’s bak usually stood opposite 
that of the cook and the kitchen gang, who were exempt from the watch 
system and who, unlike the sailors, spent much of their waking time below.485 
On the Nijenburg, however, the cook’s bak was located on the upper deck, its 
space below taken by seamen who followed the watch schedule. In any event, 
there seems to have been little surveillance of the lower deck in general: the 
zwavelband was known to exist, but officers took no pains to discover what it 
was or why it had formed.  
 
If the carpenter and convicted mutineer Taleau is to be believed, rumors of an 
imminent rebellion spread around the lower deck some days before the 
uprising but fear prevented its being reported to the officers, suggesting first a 
considerable social distance between the general crew and any figures of 
                                                
484 The steward was responsible for keeping track of all provisions used; he was held 
personally accountable for any that went missing. Like supply masters in military 
services, stewards generally had a reputation both for tight-fistedness and for making 
an illicit profit out of “spoiled” rations on the side. Hoogenberk: Rechtsvoorschriften. 
Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk. 
485 The cook and his assistants had separate pay schedules from the sailors and were 
required to keep hours dictated by the preparation of food. The steward’s team were 
collectively termed the ruimwerkers or “hold-workers” and were charged with 
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authority, and second that alternative structures of power and coercion held 
sway on the lower deck, outside the Company’s gaze.486 
 
The hoek first became a place of covert, collective resistance to Company order 
a few weeks before the uprising with the theft of the officers’ wine, which was 
stored on the lower deck, sealed away behind specially constructed 
partitions.487 Working together, the men secretly levered open the partitions, 
removed bottles of wine and distributed them among both the zwavelbenders 
and other crewmen, all without attracting the attention of the nearby steward 
or his mate.488 Empties were passed sternward, to be disposed of between 
watches by whichever man was charged with swabbing below decks. This 
collective action against the Company’s laws no doubt helped to bolster 
solidarity among the mutineers.  
 
The discovery of the theft also determined the moment of uprising. The 
steward’s mate appears to have had a personal vendetta against several 
zwavelbenders: his insults, cruelty and propensity for withholding food and 
water were cited as primary causes for the mutiny: in particular he repeatedly 
                                                                                                                                       
retrieving provisions from the hold under strict supervision. Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, 
Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. 
486 Crimineele Procedures II, 39. 
487 Testimonies conflict regarding the exact placement of these partitions. The most 
detailed account is given by Jacob Selner, who stated that they were at the forward 
end of the lower deck, near the  cable locker. Staten Generaal 2407. 
488 Staten Generaal 2407. 
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withheld the daily ration of drinking water from several zwavelbenders, who 
were therefore forced to find other sources.489 The theft both of wine and of 
drinking water from the communal water vats was discovered on the evening 
of June 14: armed guards were immediately stationed at the water vats, and an 
investigation was slated to begin the next day. The mutineers could not risk 
losing members to the imprisonment that would inevitably follow, so they 
struck that same night. 
 
Sources of social identity on the lower deck 
Beyond the collective identity of the zwavelband, as noted above, divisions in 
nationality and religion played large roles in structuring the society of the 
crew and in determining a seaman’s prospects. These divisions loomed large 
in the causes and events of all the mutinies studied. In attempting to recruit 
men to their cause, would-be mutineers frequently appealed to their ties of 
common origin or “national” identity: the rallying cry for the Nijenburg 
mutineers was “come, German brothers,” that of the Barbestein, “Luxembourg 
arise!”490  
                                                
489 The term used in the trial papers is standwater. The meaning of this term in context 
is not clear: it may refer to collected rainwater or runoff taken opportunistically. 
Staten Generaal 2407. 
490 The polyglot form of the Nijenburg mutineers’ cry, “Allons Duytsche broeders valt 
aen, hout, smijt en steekt” (“come, German brothers, join us, strike them”) indicates 
something of the complexity of the question of emergent nationality, containing 
French, German and Dutch elements. The cry of the Barbestein mutineers, 
“Luxembourg en haut” was likely the cry of their regiment. It may be objected that 
the nation and national identity  are anachronistic concepts for the period and people 
under discussion. Nonetheless, distinctions of origin between the mutineers, whether 
they were French, German or Luxemburger, and officers, generally Hollanders, 
appear extremely important to the mutineers. Most of these terms are also shown to 
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The mutineers were overwhelmingly foreigners, predominantly of German 
origin, and very often recruited through zielverkopers.  Conversely, on the 
Nijenburg the officers and ‘loyal crew’ were mostly Hollanders. Both 
mutineers and later the officers of the courts seem to have felt that nationality 
should determine the side one took in the mutiny: men identified as 
“Germans” by the mutineers were accused of treachery if they refused to 
assist in the uprising, while the Dutch sailor Paulus de Ruyter was singled out 
by several deponents and denounced by the Admiralty courts as the only 
“untrue Hollander,” for telling the mutineers about valuables aboard such 
that they might loot them.491 After the uprising the mutineers further played 
on national identities in order to drive a wedge between the bulk of the crew 
and the officers, fostering distrust of the Hollanders. 
 
Before the mutiny the division between Hollanders and other “nationals” on 
the Nijenburg seems to have been tied to the opportunities for training and 
socialization into the company that were offered. While the VOC recruited 
ordinary seamen from across Europe and even from Asia, aboard the  
Nijenburg the officers and the few ordinary seamen who had maritime 
                                                                                                                                       
be matters of active negotiation during the mutiny, however, with mutineers 
accusing Germans who failed to respond to their call of being “Hollanders” 
regardless of their origins. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: Muiterij. 
491 Jan Pietersz, the boatswain’s boy, described de Ruyter as ontrouwe 
(“untrustworthy” or “untrue”), a charge that was repeated in the Echt Relaas. 
Crimineele Procedures II, 141. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. 
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backgrounds and experience were overwhelmingly Dutchmen. Likewise, the 
great majority of trainees aboard, who served as the officers’ “mates” and 
“boys,” were Dutch.492 This was partly a result of nepotism: the captain’s son 
appears in the pay books as the gunner’s mate, while the master gunner’s son 
was listed as a boy-trainee.493 Such favored youngsters tended to form a 
separate class, being groomed for positions as officers.494 The status of “boy” 
conferred immediate advantages at any level, however: the “boys” of officers 
on the quarterdeck would typically lodge with their sponsors in their cabins.495 
The boys of junior officers were guaranteed a place beside that officer, even if 
it was only at his bak. Thus, wherever a specialist lodged, whether a cabin, bak, 
the gunroom or some other space, would become a site of apprenticeship and 
                                                
492 The position of “boy” was not an official one, and is therefore not listed in the pay 
books. Those ‘boys’ who testified, however, were all of Dutch origin, including one of 
the Captain’s boys, John Saxen, the first mate’s boy, Lambert de Groot, the dominee’s 
boy, Dirk Kleynhout and the boatswain’s boy, Hendricks. Crimineele Procedures. VOC 
– Seafarers online database. 
493 In these cases the Dutch convention of fathers bestowing their own patronymics on 
their sons is clearly helpful: captain Jacob Ketel’s son  was called Ketel Jacobsz., while 
constable Willem Muus’ son was Muus Willemsz. Other family ties likely existed 
aboard, but the names do not allow for such easy identification. The presence of both 
the captain’s and constable’s sons aboard is also noted in Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & 
Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. 
494 Crimineele Procedures. Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. 
495 Boys were keen to defend their spatial and social separation from the general crew, 
even when that separation brought no physical comforts. Johan Saxen, one of the 
three captain’s boys, did not lodge with the captain in his cabin but in the heavily-
trafficked voorkajuit—effectively a corner of the crowded and multifunctional space 
under the quarterdeck separated from the baks, capstan, water vats, steward’s 
cupboard and many other ship’s systems only by the stairs leading down to the lower 
deck. Nonetheless, Saxen’s corner becomes a privileged position in his account of the 
mutiny, by the saloon door where he could witness the theft of the weapons and 
under the stair to the quarterdeck, where he could hear the noise of the mutineers; a 
corner that became a hiding place on the night of the uprising and a theater of power 
afterward. Crimineele Procedures. 
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preferment for that specialist’s profession, contributing to the sense of the ship 
as a collection of discrete fiefdoms.496  
 
The result was a division between career seamen, mostly Hollanders, who 
enlisted freely at an early age and often received training and promotion, and 
those who fell into VOC service through desperation or through the 
machinations of the zielverkopers, who predominantly spoke languages other 
than Dutch, and who rarely rose to ranks of authority. These last, without 
sponsors, were liable to suffer the worst of the punishments that were daily 
handed out and that were, according to quartermaster Adolff, a VOC of hand 
of long standing, unusually severe on the Nijenburg.497 They could find their 
places threatened even in the general run of the baks. Two of the primary 
instigators of the mutiny, Johann Wolnar and George Cremer, were ejected 
from their baks for unknown reasons in the first weeks of the voyage. While 
Wolnar quickly found a place at an alternative bak and suffered no ill effects, 
Cremer spent three days without any bak and consequently received no food 
during that time from the kitchen gang, until the members of another bak took 
pity on him.498 
                                                
496 The association of certain spaces with particular kinds of training may also be the 
reason for the surgeon’s medicine chest or the navigator’s tool chest being used as 
landmarks aboard, the chests acting as the sites of instruction, marking those who 
gathered around them as potential future doctors or steersmen. 
497 Staten Generaal 9407. 
498 Both men were instrumental in the organization of the muiterofficiers baks after the 
mutiny. Crimineele Procedures. 
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Regarding the small group of experienced ordinary seamen aboard, there is 
little evidence for the role they played among the larger group of novices. One 
Jan Meijer, known generally as Jan Oostindien, was clearly a seasoned VOC 
man and enjoyed an exceptional reputation for wisdom and experience among 
the crew.499 The other experienced hands attracted no such praise and seem to 
have kept to themselves. Before and after the mutiny the cable locker appears 
to have functioned as a kind of private haven for some of these old hands. 
This deep, cramped space, filled with ropes and other sailing supplies, was the 
permanent lodging and exclusive domain of two seasoned mariners, the 
boatswain and the hold man. The latter, Pieter Smit, seems to have 
communicated only with a few of the more experienced seamen aboard, and 
to have been left substantially alone both by the Company’s officers and by 
the mutineers to administer his own affairs and to carry out his duties, 
undisturbed by the bulk of the crew.500 On the night of the uprising, Smit 
remained in his refuge: he testified that he was asked for handspikes – the 
long wooden poles used to turn the capstan – for use as weapons. Smit threw 
these up to the foredeck, without himself emerging to see who claimed them. 
                                                
499 Jan Oostindien’s good reputation is mentioned in the Echt Relaas and repeatedly in 
the Crimineele Procedures. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. 
500 Smit’s affectless testimony is rendered all the stranger by the incurious reception it 
received from the court. During the mutiny, asked for weapons, he tossed handspikes 
out of his cable locker refuge, without wondering to whom he was passing them. 
When the boatswain returned to his bunk in the locker, bleeding from injuries, Smit 
appears to have asked no questions. The court, and the Company, nonetheless appear 
entirely satisfied with his conduct. Crimineele Procedures I,  17-19.  
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Seamen who attempted to hide in and above the locker were neither helped 
nor hindered: Smit only tended the wounded boatswain when the latter 
returned to his bunk. After the mutiny the cable locker seems to have been 
identified by the mutineers as a loyalist centre: it was placed under continuous 
guard but otherwise left undisturbed.501  
 
The night of the uprising 
The first hint of trouble the officers received on the night of the uprising was 
at the moment the mutineers charged up onto the quarterdeck. The guards 
posted earlier that day at the water vats, medicine chest and gun room door 
seem to have been entirely ineffective: all were disabled without raising the 
alarm, while their swords became the mutineers’ first weapons.502 Finding the 
first mate and captain fled and the senior surgeon in the act of fleeing, the 
mutineers attacked second mate Pieterson, ignoring the three sailors at the 
wheel, who continued to steer until diverted to guard duty by Wolnar. There 
was no concerted resistance from any of the officers or their boys: the master 
gunner and dominee, or preacher, were wounded when their individual 
quarters were broken into, while the boys uniformly hid behind chests or 
bunks in the cabins until the clamor was over. The greatest opposition to the 
                                                
501 Smit appears to have maintained his own, unique order aboard to an extraordinary 
degree. This may reflect his status as the holder of specialized knowledge or as a 
respected older seaman with no pretensions to authority. Jan Oostindien alone 
appears to have had the trust and respect of both the VOC officers and the mutineers, 
partly because of his steadfast refusal either to take any privileges over his fellow 
seamen or to deny help to anyone. Crimineele Procedures II, 17-19. 
502 Staten generaal 9405. 
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mutiny occurred  when the boatswain and the third carpenter carried the fight 
to the mutineers, running from the forecastle to the afterdeck in order to 
attack; both were driven back, having wounded a mutineer each, while also 
receiving wounds.503 The carpenter deserves special mention for having had 
his own reasons for fearing a mutiny: he had been instrumental in capturing, 
imprisoning and presenting a number of the mutineers for recruitment while 
working for zielverkopers ashore. After the mutiny he was ostracized and 
victimized by his former captives.504  
 
The Echt Relaas presents the events of the mutiny with an unmistakably ironic 
tone, the confusion of the officers being shown to verge on farce, with third 
mate Hendrick Cogh barricading himself in the saloon to escape the mob of 
mutineers, yet being unable to hinder the mutineers who broke down the door 
and seized and distributed the weapons under his nose, while his superiors 
clung onto the outside of the ship, as though they, and only they, had been 
shipwrecked by the uprising.505 The trial papers show a series of more 
structural problems in the arrangement of the ship and relations between the 
officers and crew that made defense against mutiny impossible. 
 
                                                
503 Staten generaal 9405. 
504 Crimineele Procedures I, 16. 
505 Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas, 17. The testimonies of 
seamen Ihle and Selner given at Suriname present an alternative, but hardly less 
flattering, account of the first officer’s flight, claiming that he hid in the chicken coop 
on the poop deck and had to be coaxed out of it. Staten Generaal 9405. 
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Boundaries  
Mutinies necessarily involve the breaking of boundaries aboard, in particular 
between the spaces of officers and men. A concern for boundaries 
unsurprisingly recurs throughout the testimonies. The overturning of the pre-
mutiny order and establishment of a mutineers’ order aboard involved the 
crossing, deletion and reinscription of boundaries, commented on both by 
deponents and by the officers of the court, who repeatedly asked the prisoners 
who among them had entered and “played the boss” in the forbidden places 
of the cabins and saloon, in order to establish both active involvement in the 
mutiny and authority among the mutineers. Boundaries also played an 
important role in enabling the mutineers and preventing unity among the 
crew on the night of the uprising.  
 
With only 14 men the mutineers were directly outnumbered by the ship’s 20 
senior and junior officers.506 These were unable to face the mutineers as a 
group, however, largely because of the organization of space aboard. The 
dispersal of the officers among cabins, rooms and baks  on three decks meant 
that no one location had a substantial body of men of known loyalty, who 
                                                
506 As noted above, the Company’s paybooks do not provide the exact number of the 
officers and crew on the Nijenburg in 1763. From the trial proceedings I have been 
able to confirm the presence of 16 officers: the captain, first and second mates, and 
two third mates, the constable and his mate, the provost, the corporal, the boatswain 
and mate, the schieman and mate and the steward and mate. The merchant, although 
not directly involved in the ship’s order, was also a high-ranking officer in the VOC 
and is counted as an officer here. In addition I have inferred that the three 
quartermasters and sergeant listed in the pay books were present on departure in 
1763, since this would follow Company protocol. Crimineele Procedures, Staten 
Generaal 2405, VOC – Seafarers online database. 
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would be capable of co-coordinating a defense of any part of the ship. Where 
the spaces “before the mast” were communal and interconnected, those 
“achter op” were separated, without means of access between them that did 
not pass through the spaces open to the mutineers. Most isolated of all was the 
gun room, which had no access to the saloon despite being located directly 
beneath it: even though the room was theoretically quite defensible, with 
strong partitions and access to cannons and powder, the master gunner and 
his two companions had no recourse but to surrender when they discovered 
that the saloon had fallen.  
 
The organization of weapons and the means to fire them also prevented 
opposition to the mutiny. Third mate de Kok stated that the boatswain had a 
pair of pistols at his bak but no powder to charge them. He describes climbing 
to the foremast top, intending to use the grenades stored there, only to 
discover that no fuse was available to light them. Both the atomizing of the 
officers and the separation of firearms from powder seem to have been 
features that were more marked on the later eighteenth century VOC ship than 
on those of the seventeenth century: the plan for a mutiny in 1667 required the 
simultaneous seizure of the saloon and the gun room during meal time, when 
all of the officers would be guaranteed to be present in those rooms.507 Such a 
plan would necessarily involve a very hazardous confrontation with the 
                                                
507 Roeper, V & Gelder, R. van (eds.): In Dienst van de Compagnie: leven bij de VOC in 
honderd getuigenissen (1602-1799) (Amsterdam: Athenaeum—Polack & Van Gennep, 
2002), 63-67. 
 288 
senior officers in a single group, in the room where their weapons were 
stored. The mutineers therefore reportedly considered it necessary to recruit 
40 men to their cause before taking action.508 
 
Boundaries also seem more subtly to have limited the flow of information 
around the ship during the mutiny. Much has been written regarding the lack 
of privacy on ships, the degree to which sound traveled between decks, and 
the consequent intimate knowledge available to all crewmen regarding all 
goings-on aboard.509 Against this popular wisdom the Nijenburg testimony 
contains a strong sense of separation between the different spaces of the ship, 
each seeming to form its own self-contained realm, while only a few 
individuals, notably the boatswain and second boatswain, seem to have been 
alert for trouble outside their own nook. Describing the night of the mutiny, 
several mariners stated that they learned that a struggle was under way only 
when an officer or a mutineer burst into their part of the ship, suggesting that 
they did not know about or could not react to events elsewhere, even when 
the physical distances involved were not great. Sounds may have traveled 
between these regions, but they seem to have arrived largely stripped of 
meaning: many men even stated that they slept through the mutiny, 
awakening only after the mutineers returned below as masters of the ship.  
 
                                                
508 Roeper & van Gelder: In dienst, 64. 
509 Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, werk, Dening: Mr. Bligh’s Bad Language, Melville: White 
Jacket. 
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This distance between the spaces of the ship appears to coincide with a certain 
distance in command structure and visibility between the fore-deck and the 
quarterdeck, and between upper and lower decks. One of the main concerns 
of the Admiralty officers at the trials was to establish how and why various 
crew members left the ship to enter the boats, when the ship later grounded 
off Brazil. The court repeatedly asked if those testifying had heard any order 
from the captain to leave the ship, to establish whether the prisoners were 
guilty of disobeying the Company’s Articles.510 Most deponents freely 
admitted that they had heard no such order, but said they had heard orders 
from junior officers or other minor figures, or had inferred such an order, 
seeing others jumping into the boats, and did not remain on deck waiting for 
the right voice to speak up.  
 
The picture that emerges from these accounts is of a space where no single 
voice commanded. Both in accounts of the lowering of the boats, and in those 
of the night of the mutiny, it is clear that those at the front of the ship, on the 
forecastle, in the rigging, or amidships, in the waist, did not wait for or expect 
orders from the after-deck. Rather, they looked to the petty officers nearby, 
and followed their examples. Indeed the trial papers reveal how important the 
junior officers on the fore-deck were to the running of the ship, and just how 
distant the captain could be from the ordinary seamen, against the 
expectations of the Admiralty officers in court, since many sailors could not 
                                                
510 The question whether prisoners had heard the Articles read out is repeated at each 
trial. At each trial some prisoners complained that they had never heard them. 
 290 
name the captain or senior officers at all.511 
 
The mutineers took great advantage of the confusion during the night of the 
uprising to divide the ship into manageable sections and to command the 
situation by keeping potentially troublesome crewmen busy. One tactic they 
used was to set men who had played no direct role in seizing the ship to 
guard various spaces aboard, including the saloon, where the officers were 
imprisoned and the voorkajuit just outside it, where the looted weapons were 
piled. Many deponents stated that even while keeping guard at one of these 
critical points they had no idea of the larger situation unfolding, only that they 
had been charged with holding a staircase or guarding weapons to prevent 
anyone except those that had set them to the task from using them.  
 
The ritual transfer of power 
Finally, boundaries clearly defined the transfer of power from the officers to 
the mutineers, highlighting the spatial nature, both of the mutiny and of 
control aboard in general. The mutineers relied on the separation of upper and 
lower decks to stage the uprising and its resolution. They first made 
themselves masters of the quarterdeck and foredeck, then secured the 
weapons and the officers in the saloon, before finally returning below to 
                                                
511 After the first batch of seamen had been questioned and these gaps in expected 
knowledge had come to light, the standard roster of questions grew to include “do 
you know the name of the ship on which you served?” “do you know where you 
were going?” and detailed questions regarding the circumstances of the deponents’ 
recruitment. Crimineele Procedures. Staten Generaal 2405.  
 291 
announce to the rest of the crew that, having seized these spaces, they had 
taken over the ship. The process of claiming the decks was achieved by 
sweeping opposition off them: with a few exceptions the officers and men 
withdrew before the mutineers, vacating the upper deck to take refuge in the 
rigging and other hiding places. The ceding of these decks to the mutineers 
opened a space from which Wolnar was able to invite first the officers and 
then the crewmen back into a new hierarchy, with himself at the top. The 
process of clearing and inviting had something of the character of a ritual of 
transfer, with all parties signaling the reality and force of the hand-over of 
power in a highly formal way. Indeed, understood as a ritual for inaugurating 
a new order of power aboard, the progress of the mutiny shows strong 
similarities with Arnold van Gennep’s and Victor Turner’s descriptions of the 
rite of passage, following the classic three-phase scheme including suspension 
of the usual order, separation of ritual actors in a liminal phase, and finally 
reintegration of the crew with the mutineers in command.512  
 
The separation of the officers was achieved either by their flight from the 
mutineers or by imprisonment in the cabins. After returning to the deck under 
                                                
512 van Gennep described the rite of passage as a ritual means for effecting status 
changes on its participants. In order for this change to be effected the subject must 
first be removed from society (phase 1), entering a state of indeterminate status 
(liminality; phase 2), and at the end of the ritual must be reintegrated with society, 
and confirmed in a new status (phase 3). Effectively the ritual suspends the normal 
social order, allowing changes to that order may be wrought; the closure of the ritual 
reinstates the normal rules of society, modified by the changes. Gennep, A. van: The 
Rites of Passage (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960). Turner, V: The Ritual 
Process: structure and anti-structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). 
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Wolnar’s guarantee of safety the captain and first mate were sequestered with 
the other senior officer in the saloon and merchant’s cabin for several hours. 
The officers’ imprisonment presents a classically liminal phase; the officers 
were shorn of their ranks, becoming equals among themselves and 
subordinate in relation to the mutineers, who forced them to remain silent and 
eventually individually to swear loyal service to Wolnar and the other 
mutineers. The next morning the officers were conditionally reintegrated with 
the rest of the crew, returning to their previous positions in the status 
hierarchy with respect to each other and the general crewmen, but in a 
subordinate position relative to the mutineers.513 The officers remained tainted 
with a residual liminality, however: they were subject to renewed 
imprisonment in their cabins whenever the mutineers faced threats to their 
own authority; their full reintegration depended on their successfully steering 
the ship to Brazil.514 The captain in particular, as the chief officer in charge of 
navigation, found his fate repeatedly suspended by the mutineers, who 
threatened to kill him unless he produced land within a series of deadlines.515  
 
                                                
513 Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas, 19-23. 
514 Staten generaal 2405, Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. 
515 The apparent lack of progress of the ship after the mutiny was a typical feature of 
crossing the equatorial zone, where no trade winds blew. These “doldrums” were 
known and feared by sailors; the VOC sailing instructions included a special method 
for crossing them that would ensure that ships would catch the south Atlantic current 
and be propelled down the coast of Brazil and eventually to the Cape of Good Hope. 
DAS I. It is possible, however, that the mutineers interpreted the lack of progress 
after the mutiny as a sign of their loss of control of the ship. Loss of progress and 
destination are typical features of disaster narratives where the disaster follows a 
breakdown in shipboard order. See chapter 4.  
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The junior officers likewise passed through a period of seclusion and 
liminality, being tied up and kept at the corporal’s bak for some hours. They 
were reintegrated after the swearing in of the senior officers, on whose status 
their own depended.516 Little is recorded regarding this moment, when the 
mutineers’ control acquired on deck was displayed below. But the spectacle of 
the junior officers first being mortified by the mutineers and then swearing to 
cooperate with their captors before the crew, in their communal living space, 
effectively collapsed the distance in command, in space and in communication 
that defined the night of the uprising and hampered resistance: it confronted 
the crew with the mutineers’ victory and made it public.517 
 
The mutineers themselves did not have the luxury of withdrawing after the 
inception of the mutiny to resolve their changes in status because they were all 
needed to maintain direct control over the ship, officers and crew. They did, 
however, pass through a period of weakened social structure immediately 
after seizing power, in which they showed little social hierarchy among 
themselves, suggesting something like a liminal phase. During this period 
                                                
516 The corporal’s bak appears to have been associated with discipline before the 
mutiny; its appropriation as a place for holding the junior officers does not seem to 
have been accidental. The officers imprisoned here were tied up by the provoost, or 
ship’s corporal, the junior officer charged with maintaining discipline below: whether 
the mutineers enjoyed this as a bit of irony at the expense of the officers, or whether 
they simply appointed the provoost to this duty because they knew he was competent 
at it, remains unclear. I have retained the Dutch provoost here to avoid confusion with 
the soldiers holding the rank corporal that were also carried aboard. 
517 “Mortification” is the term Goffman applies to the process of depersonalization, 
degradation and humiliation undergone by prisoners and mental patients on arrival 
at their institutions. Goffman: Asylums. 
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Wolnar and Johannes Croos, who remained the instigators throughout, 
attempted to attract other German-speakers to join the mutiny through 
appeals to nationality and brotherhood. Otherwise the mutineers merely held 
onto the gains of the night until morning; they kept the officers and junior 
officers tied up, the decks clear and large numbers of the general crew on 
guard duty around the ship.  
 
After the mutiny 
According to Lammers’ model of mutinies we should expect the completion of 
the seizure of power to swell the mutineers’ ranks, revealing a broad 
penumbra of supporters who would be willing to participate in the 
possibilities of the new situation aboard, even if they were not trusted with the 
uprising itself. This did not happen on the Nijenburg, however. Despite the 
mutineers’ initial attempts to find supporters among the general crew, very 
few of the latter appear to have been eager to align either with their former 
commanders or their new ones, yielding three distinct camps among the crew. 
The mutineers therefore formalized their separation both from the VOC 
officers and from the general crew on the morning after the uprising by 
announcing, from the quarterdeck, a new shipboard order.  
 
This order made the mutineers of the zwavelband into a separate cadre of 
muiterofficiers (mutineer-officers), who would command the ship and the crew 
over the heads of the Company’s appointed officers, and who would, as it 
turned out, bear the brunt of punishment when all were recaptured by the 
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VOC.518 The creation of this new group had large implications both for the 
progress of the mutiny and for the spatial order that developed aboard. 
Indeed, the formal distinction between the mutineers and the crew makes the 
Nijenburg mutiny appear much like a hijacking: a temporary seizure of the 
ship by a small group in pursuit of its own separate aims and identity.  
 
Viewing the mutineers as hijackers helps to explain their actions and 
shipboard order after the uprising: unable to rely on goodwill or 
‘brotherhood’ from the general crew, they found themselves in a position 
rather like that of the officers before them, having to direct and subordinate 
the crew in order to achieve their aims. The mutineers faced two challenges 
that the officers had not had to deal with, however. First, they were forced to 
rely on the officers for navigation and had to act through them to command 
the ship. Their authority was therefore always to some degree dependent on 
the group they had recently ousted. The mutineers were accordingly 
concerned to disrupt the operation of the ship as little as possible, reinforcing 
the crew’s obedience to the officers through immediate and harsh corporal 
punishment or the threat of death by stabbing or being thrown overboard, 
fearing that excessive disruption could threaten the ship or their own 
                                                
518 The announcement delivered the morning after the uprising appears to have 
marked the formal end of the ‘seizure’ phase of the mutiny, and the beginning of the 
regularized business of running the ship under the mutineers, with the purpose of 
making landfall at Bahia. There is little discussion in any of the sources regarding this 
event. The Echt Relaas, however, states that the crew were called individually to 
pledge loyalty, and that the officers were separately required to swear, in the 
merchant’s cabin, that they would bring the mutineers to a safe port. Jonge, N. de, 
Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas, 29. 
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precarious positions as its commanders. Apart from helping to project a sense 
of normality, the use of the officers as a filter between the mutineers and the 
general crew may also have helped calm crewmen who were fearful of what 
might happen to them if they were brought to justice: deponents successfully 
exonerated themselves at trial by stating that they continued to obey their 
officers’ orders, regardless of how those orders might have been subverted.519 
Second, they faced potential competition for command from the officers. Even 
though there is no direct evidence of remaining loyalty to the VOC officers 
among the general crew, the potential for an officer-led counterplot clearly 
haunted the mutineers, who were acutely aware of the vulnerability of their 
position, having so recently seized it from the Company’s men. After the 
uprising, therefore, except when issuing commands and directing the ship, the 
officers were isolated from the crew, being kept either in their cabins or 
spatially separated from the men, under close watch by the mutineers, to 
prevent any secret messages being passed.  
 
Most of all, the mutineers maintained firm control over the rights of both 
officers and crewmen to access sensitive spaces on the ship, keeping guards 
stationed, as they had on the night of the uprising, at what they had identified 
as the critical control points of the ship: the staircases between decks, the 
doors that led to the officers’ quarters and the gunroom, and the entrance to 
                                                
519 Despite their later actions aimed at implicating individual seamen in their cause, 
the mutineers here appear to have wished to avoid implicating the crew collectively 
by issuing commands in conflict with those of the officers. Crimineele Procedures. 
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the foredeck and cable locker, which continued to host the few experienced 
sailors aboard.520 In addition, two cannons were hauled out of the saloon and 
set up on either side of the voorkajuit facing forward, loaded with “sharp 
shot.” On the day after the uprising these were manned by guards told to 
shoot anyone who excited their suspicion: they were later rearmed at 
moments when the mutineers suspected counter-rebellion.521 
 
The result was that the mutineers capitalized on the shipboard order already 
established, while changing how and what that structure communicated 
through a series of interventions that recast the space to fit their own ends. 
The spatial organization of the ship remained superficially the same, while the 
meanings of the spaces were subverted or inverted at every level. The 
mutineers continued to lodge on the lower deck among the general crew, 
while the officers were permitted to keep their cabins and the saloon. The 
cabins were transformed effectively into prisons, however, by stationing 
guards at their doors, while the zwavelbenders hoek was clearly separated from 
the general crew’s space and transformed into a theater of command for the 
ship.  
 
                                                
520 Staten Generaal 2407. 
521 Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas. The trial papers give no 
direct information on this remarkable point.  
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Theaters of power  
I have chosen to describe the mutineers’ interventions in the ship’s spaces as 
“theaters,” of action and power, because they were clearly intended to 
communicate the new order to the crew. The mutineers were repeatedly 
mocked and criticized in the popular accounts and at the trials for a certain 
theatricality in their presentation. They distinguished themselves from the rest 
of the crew by adopting elevated military titles and extravagant uniforms, 
which were sewn for them by the sail makers and the merchant’s wife out of 
expensive cloths taken from the officers’ private stores.522 They participated in 
drunken revels on the quarterdeck, held court on the lower deck and 
threatened to throw crewmen they distrusted overboard, in public displays 
that appeared to teeter on disorder. In each of these cases, however, 
underlying the theatricality there seem to have been practical motives, related 
to the reworking of the shipboard space. Taken together the mutineers’ 
theaters encapsulated the rules and promise of their new order, just as the 
spatial organization of the Company ship encapsulated its hierarchy and 
means of operation. 
 
                                                
522 The doctor’s report given to the Suriname court stated that the muiterofficiers wore 
hats trimmed with gold borders. One muiterofficier, Valk, testified that these had been 
made with cloth bought from the officers, and that the merchant’s wife and corporal 
had sewn gold borders onto them. Croos in particular had been concerned with being 
dressed in a distinctive costume appropriate to his rank. In addition, after landing in 
Brazil the mutineers adopted a lordly bearing, riding horses and drinking, while 
forcing those VOC officers they had brought ashore with them to walk and beg them 
for food. Crimineele Procedures II, 15. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt 
Relaas. 
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The muiterofficiers’ baks 
On the lower deck the muiterofficiers expressed strict discipline among 
themselves, turning their hoek into a place from where they could 
continuously supervise the general crew, and preventing its use as a centre for 
plotting counter-mutinies. The formal order of military-style ranks that the 
muiterofficiers created for themselves was ridiculed in the Jaarboeken and other 
popular publications as a sign of vainglory.523 These ranks served two 
functions, however, which appear to have been very important to the 
mutineers. First, they contained no duplicates, denoting a strict hierarchy 
among the mutineers without ambiguity or overlap, from “general” Wolnar 
and his junior partner Croos at the top to the “boys” at the bottom. Such a 
strict, explicit determination of hierarchy may have been necessary for the 
reintegration of social order among the mutineers and for clarifying their 
division from the rest of the crew, who had previously been their peers.524 
Second, the titles asserted the mutineers’ separate identity from the order of 
VOC officers, borrowing from the systems of ranks used in land armies, and 
therefore recalling the structures of order associated with the mutineers’ lives 
                                                
523 De Bruin and Van Der Wal note that the muiterofficiers awarded themselves the 
fraaiest  (“finest” or “richest”) ranks possible. An undercurrent of ironic humor at the 
mutineers’ expense runs through the Echt Relaas: from their attempts to shoot whales 
with snaphaunces to their inability to execute Palm, a sailor accused of conspiracy 
against the muiterofficiers, the mutineers are presented as arbitrary, bellicose and 
stupid. The researcher is accordingly faced with a strong ‘grain’ in such sources, to 
read across. Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, ''’Allons Duytsche Broeders,'” 69. 
Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas, 31. 
524 The order of ranks appears to have been effective in preventing disorder among 
the mutineers, with only one fight, between two of the men, being reported among 
them after the uprising. 
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prior to their embarkation. With a strict separation of land- and sea-based 
rank structures, there was no danger of confusion over ranks with the VOC 
officers who continued to be charged with running the ship: these would 
retain their own hierarchy and functions, but would have no authority over 
the mutineers’ alternative order. 
 
The muiterofficiers’ separation and order was expressed spatially in two newly 
created baks, reserved exclusively for their use.525 Each bak was dedicated to a 
“battalion” of muiterofficiers, which commanded and policed one of the ship’s 
two watches. These baks were placed somewhat further forward on the lower 
deck than the old hoek had been, near the fore-hatch.526 Crewmen who joined 
the mutineers after the uprising were given places at the baks, always at the 
bottom of the muiterofficers’ rank structure: the first such recruits were taken 
on as “boys” and served as bak guards.527 Admission to the baks conferred 
privileges far above those of the rest of the crew, however, and Wolnar 
specifically reached out to the lowest-status workers aboard to illustrate this 
                                                
525 These new baks were called the Batavier and Johannes baks: one was devoted to each 
battalion. Heydigsvelt, later himself condemned as a mutineer, testified that during 
the first two days after the uprising the crew had access to the mutineers but that 
following the formation of the two new baks  the mutineers drew apart, eating by 
themselves. Crimineele Procedures, 114.  
526 Crimineele Procedures, 122. 
527 These men were Stijssel, Eksteyn and “two other boys.” All had held very junior 
ranks in the previous order. Their new positions as “boys” to the muiterofficiers 
improved their shipboard status considerably and ended their mistreatment by the 
officers. Crimineele Procedures. 
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point.528 As muiterofficiers they were entitled to call for extra rations and drink 
whenever they wished, and to grant extra rations to the general crew, which 
was done frequently, to the consternation of the steward who feared the 
rations would run out.  
 
As the exclusive space of the muiterofficiers, the hoek became a place for 
“private” audiences: crewmen were summoned to the hoek when the 
muiterofficiers wanted to question them or to invite them to join the baks. At 
trial, to be identified as a bak-guest of the mutineers was almost tantamount to 
being named a mutineer oneself. Third mate Theunis de Kok, who appears to 
have acted as a conduit for information between the muiterofficiers and the 
Company’s officers, was held in grave suspicion of mutiny by the court 
because of his frequent invitations to dine and drink with the mutineers: the 
support of the first mate, who bore no such taint of association, was required 
to clear his name.529 
 
                                                
528 These low-status positions were known by ironic honorifics, as zwabber-kapiteins 
and pluimgraafs, that is, “captains of deck-swabbing” and “lords of the chickens,” i.e. 
livestock-tenders. Crimineele Procedures I, 104. 
529 Crimineele Procedures. The Echt Relaas paints an ambivalent picture of de Kok, 
suggesting that nobody aboard was sure of where he stood. The third mate is 
exonerated in the narrative, however, by his keeping a days-long vigil in the mast top 
in order to sight land before the expiration of the mutineers’ ultimatum,  thereby 
preventing the captain’s execution,. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt 
Relaas. 
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The quarterdeck 
Whereas the hoek was used to signal affiliation, the quarterdeck became a site 
for soliciting recruits among the crew. In the popular accounts, drunken revels 
on the quarterdeck are presented as typical behaviors of maritime lawlessness, 
classified with thefts and violent and arbitrary punishments as signs of 
dangerous disorder.530 Such revels were an important aspect of the mutineers’ 
relations with the general crew, however. Under the Company the 
quarterdeck served as a place of annunciation, from which the officers would 
address the crew assembled below them in the pit. Crewmen were allowed 
onto the quarterdeck only when summoned by the officers, principally to 
operate the wheel or the mizzenmast rigging. In contrast the mutineers 
frequently invited individual crewmen to join them on the quarterdeck, where 
they could be seen enjoying the mutineers’ largesse, receiving wine or a share 
of the Company’s money. Such invitations were a daily spectacle, serving both 
to show the crew collectively that the mutineers would treat them better than 
the Company had done, and to gain, if not the explicit support of individual 
crewmen, then at least the suspicion of their fellows. 
 
The public nature of the quarterdeck was strictly delimited, however. It has 
already been noted that the officers’ cabins remained closed to the crew. Apart 
from maintaining the officers’ positions and their seclusion, another purpose 
                                                
530 On the characteristic behaviors of sea criminals, see Rediker, M. B: “The Red 
Atlantic, or, ‘a terrible blast swept over the heaving sea,’” in Klein, B. & Mackenthun, 
G. (eds.): Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean (New York, Routledge, 2004). Johnson, 
C: Robberies and Murders.  
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was served by this: the muiterofficiers discussed the ship’s position and 
consulted the charts only in the captain’s cabin, well out of the crew’s sight. In 
this regard the muiterofficiers and the VOC’s officers acted alike: they argued 
about navigation and long term plans behind closed doors, only bringing their 
decisions out onto the deck.531 For some major decisions the mutineers would 
call councils of the whole crew onto the quarterdeck. Such councils were not 
held, however, when the captain revealed to the muiterofficiers that he was not 
sure of the ship’s position, or when the ship appeared not to have moved for 
some weeks.532 According to the Echt Relaas, in counsels held in the officers’ 
quarters the mutineers appeared much more desperate and unruly than they 
did before the crew. On one occasion, while some of the muiterofficiers 
entertained crewmen with wine on the quarterdeck, the officers in the 
                                                
531 This function of the captain’s cabin (separated even from the common spaces of the 
officers), of a navigational “kitchen “ in which information was “cooked” into a 
course, later to be presented in public, appears analogous to the function of the 
chemistry lab’s famously observed by Owen Hannaway: it certifies results and in 
making them public, presents them as a form of service. Hannaway, O: "Laboratory 
Design and the Aim of Science: Andreas Libavius versus Tycho Brahe," Isis 77 (1986), 
585-610. 
532 The mutineers’ consultations in the captain’s cabin are recounted in detail in the 
Echt Relaas. It is noteworthy that under the VOC’s order the authority attached to the 
quarterdeck rested on a network of factors including the captain’s expertise, 
cartographic knowledge and the presence of navigational instruments together with 
that of the steering gear. Under the mutineers’ order the expertise of the captain was 
veiled and the mutineers had direct command only of the steering gear. Their 
suspicion  that the captain was misleading them regarding navigation therefore 
presented two distinct threats: first that they would be hindered in deserting or led 
into a trap and second that if it became known that they did not command the 
captain’s network of expertise, then their authority aboard would be undermined. 
This last consideration likely lay behind the mutineers’ threats to kill the officers: 
although this act would itself invite disaster, it would at least remove them as 
competing holders of authority. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt 
Relaas. 
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merchant’s cabin were being told that if there was any trouble or if the ship 
did not make good progress toward a friendly port the mutineers would have 
no compunction in using the gunpowder to “make the ship spring in the air,” 
having already hidden casks of powder around the hold against just such a 
need.533 
 
The pit and punishment 
When making public displays of coercive force the mutineers used the pit as 
their theater of punishment, threatening to throw seamen or officers off the 
ship from this location. In this they followed Company precedent, since 
ejection from the pit was the way the VOC disposed of murderers and  
refuse.534 Only one man was ever actually thrown off, however: Coenraad 
Palm, a sailor accused of fomenting a counter-rebellion. Palm proved 
extremely difficult to get rid of, however, surviving gunshots and stab 
wounds, and becoming tangled in the rigging during his ejection: he was 
eventually pardoned and reintegrated with the crew in response to pleading 
from the preacher.535 The officers were threatened repeatedly with ejection 
because of the lack of apparent progress toward Brazil. On each occasion, 
however, the preacher’s pleading persuaded the mutineers to relent, allowing 
                                                
533 Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas 27. 
534 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. 
535 The incident in question is reproduced in detail in the Echt Relaas but only 
mentioned briefly in the Crimineele Procedures. Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. 
(eds.): Echt Relaas, 31. 
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just one more chance for land to be produced. Only once did the mutineers 
employ the spectacle of violence against crewmen as the Company was wont 
to do, by lashing them before the crew over a cannon: this was done to the 
first mate when he was suspected of attempting to organize a counter-
rebellion. Otherwise casual beatings reportedly were more common under the 
mutineers than under the officers, but no cases of the public humiliation of 
lashing a crewman were recorded aboard the mutineers’ ship.536 
 
Theater of promise: the voorkajuit 
The mutineers’ theatrical method is revealed most clearly at the center of the 
ship, however, in the voorkajuit, or kerk.537 This space was not a focus of 
regulations and taboos like the quarterdeck, but it was an extremely important 
location aboard, standing at the nexus of many of the routes crewmen took to 
navigate around the ship and at the boundary between the crew’s and the 
officers’ space. On the Nijenburg, and possibly on other ships, in addition to 
serving as the place from which prayer was led, it was associated with the care 
of the crew, containing the medicine chest and access to the drinking water 
vats.538 After the mutiny, guarded by men with swords and cannons, the 
                                                
536 Hullu, J. de, Bruijn J. R, Lucassen J: Op de Schepen. Schaeffer: The Chains of Bondage 
Broke. 
537 “Kerk” in Beylen, J. van: Zeilvaart Lexicon: Viertalig Maritiem Woordenboek. (Weesp: 
De Boer Maritiem, 1985). 
538 The medicine chest appears to have been an important landmark aboard: several 
deponents described events as taking place “by the medicine chest.” Medicines, many 
of them expensive tropical food products or containing alcohol, were looted from the 
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vookrkajuit was repeatedly used for displaying the mutineers’ power and 
promise, first in the form of weapons looted from the saloon, later in the form 
of the Company’s money and bullion looted from the merchant’s cabin.  
 
The Company’s money played a central role in ordering the mutineers and the 
ship after the uprising. After taking command, the mutineers were careful 
always to distinguish between the Company’s property, which they looted 
freely, and the personal possessions of the crewmen and officers. Many 
officers had brought luxury goods aboard for their own use or for private 
trade at Batavia. These included wine, foods and fine clothing, stored either in 
the officers’ cabins or in compartments accessible to the steward, who would 
bring them to the officers on request. Whenever the mutineers wished to take 
from these personal stores, they paid the owners for their goods—albeit at 
prices they dictated, and with the VOC’s stores of coin.  
 
It seems likely that this practice was aimed at demonstrating that the 
mutineers were not pirates or oppressors with regard to the other people on 
the ship, but fundamentally decent and reasonable men forced to take extreme 
action against an unjust situation. Their free appropriation of goods belonging 
to the Company but not to those aboard implicitly separated all those on the 
ship from whom the goods were bought or to whom they were given from the 
VOC as an institution. The mutineers subsequently used the Company’s 
                                                                                                                                       
chest on the night of the uprising and during the period of the mutineers’ command. 
Crimineele Procedures. 
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money to further separate the crewmen, by aligning individuals with the 
mutineers, or at least separating them from hope of reintegrating with the 
Company’s order.  
 
The morning after the uprising, the VOC’s chests of gold bars and coin were 
hauled up onto the quarterdeck and broken open, the contents being counted 
in front of the crew. The gold bars were taken below to the smithy, between 
the mast and the corporal’s bak, to be hacked into convenient pieces. The 
chests were then re-sealed and stored in common sight on the voorkajuit, under 
guard. Over the next two weeks the money was shared out among the crew, 
who were often not eager to receive it. Croos first offered the money publicly, 
tying it explicitly to affiliation with the mutineers, saying: “Let him who wants 
money and to go ashore with us come up.”539 When only a few crewmen 
responded, the mutineers resorted to calling on them for individual, private 
interviews. At these meetings between 20 and 200 ducats would be pledged to 
each crewman, together with a piece of gold deemed to be in proportion, on a 
scheme that seems to have indicated alignment with the mutineers’ cause: 
muiterofficiers received the largest shares, members of the non-aligned crew 
received graded amounts, which seem to have implied a hierarchy of favor in 
the new order, while the known VOC loyalists received nothing.540 According 
                                                
539 Crimineele Procedures. 
540 The shares given to muiterofficiers were considerably larger: according to Croos he 
received 800 ducats, while Wolnar took 1100. In each case coins were accompanied by 
a piece of gold, of a value unknown to the mutineers. Crimineele Procedures. 
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to boatswain Haak, only about 30 men aboard, including all the officers, did 
not receive any of the money. Hoeber, a Swiss soldier, testified that he tried to 
refuse the money, but Wolnar told him that if he did he would “be weighed in 
the scale along with the Hollander dogs,” and struck him with his sword: he 
accordingly took the money.541 When this process had been completed, the 
chests were opened again and the money divided into bags bearing the 
crewmen’s names; these were then resealed in the chests.542  
 
The symbolism of the money chests, kept visible and behind guard, is not 
difficult to divine: they showed the shared nature of the enterprise that the 
mutineers had launched. On the one hand , the money was critical to the 
mutineers’ plan: alongside the ship itself and the stores it carried, it was to 
serve as a means for buying collective freedom in Brazil for the entire crew. It 
was therefore to be kept together until the secession was achieved. On the 
other hand, the named “pepper bags” containing each man’s share acted as 
incriminating evidence of collaboration, should the ship be overhauled before 
it managed to reach a safe harbor.543  
                                                
541 Crimineele Procedures. 
542 The mutineers’ bookkeeper, Ihle, kept careful records of this division and 
continued to maintain records of further sharing out of money, which happened at 
least twice more with certain crewmen, presumably as  negotiations and affiliations 
changed aboard. Staten Generaal 2407. 
543 The symbolism does not seem to have been exactly borne out in fact. It is notable 
that Croos, in particular, kept most of his share in a small white box inside his sea 
chest in the hoek: he sent his “boy” to retrieve it before abandoning the ship at Cape 
Roque. Many of the other muiterofficiers who went ashore at Cape Roque also had 
supplies of money and gold with them. Crimineele Procedures. 
 309 
 
The amounts of money dispensed also served to sow doubts and insecurity 
between the members of the general crew: they signaled status and affiliation 
in the new order, even if the recipients of larger sums did not go to lodge on 
the muiterofficiers baks. The effect was that they acted rather like the 
Company’s own reward scheme for men who exposed mutiny plots, to 
discourage the trust needed for any combination against the mutineers. Jacob 
Boos stated that the mutineers’ power lay in an atmosphere of general distrust 
and fear, remarking: “Nobody could trust his neighbor; in fact, we didn’t even 
dare to speak with each other about [resisting the mutineers].”544 The quantity 
of money each man received was certainly taken by the courts as a sign of his 
importance to the mutineers’ order. In this way the coercive aspect of sharing 
out the money proved effective in the end, with all the men who faced death 
sentences or severe physical punishment being among those who had 
received the largest sums. 
 
After Cape Roque 
Little is recorded regarding spatial changes aboard after the flight of most of 
the mutineers at Cape Roque. Those who left in the boats appear to have 
defected from the common cause and, indeed, left the symbolic chests behind. 
The chief consequence aboard the ship seems to have been an increased 
openness among those muiterofficiers who remained and a more consultative 
                                                
544 Crimineele Procedures I, 143. 
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method of leadership, with counsels of the whole crew being mustered on 
deck to decide collectively on the ship’s new destination. The separation 
between mutineers, officers and general crew remained in effect: the first and 
third mates, taken in the boats by the fleeing mutineers, were replaced from 
the depleted ranks of officers and declared Company loyalists: the preacher 
and a quartermaster were promoted to navigation positions and given cabins, 
regardless of their competence to hold such posts, while the new chief 
mutineer, Johann Brand, remained below. 
 
The most significant change to the ship came from the loss of its boats, 
however. This made the ship into a floating prison, even within sight of shore, 
since the ship would certainly ground long before it reached a point where the 
crew could escape without boats. It also fundamentally changed any 
negotiation the Nijenburg’s men could conduct with shore-based authorities, 
since the men could no longer reach land without the cooperation of such 
authorities.  
 
Addressing this problem led to the creation of one new theater, in the form of 
a carpenter’s workroom on deck, which produced one small boat and a raft for 
exploring the shore while sailing from Pernambuco to Cayenne.545 On arrival 
at Cayenne, however, Brand appears to have abandoned the mutineers’ 
                                                
545 The boat was lost during its explorations with all crew: unbeknownst to the men 
on the ship it had been captured by French authorities and the crew imprisoned. 
Jonge, N. de, Kuijk, L. & Oskamp L. (eds.): Echt Relaas.  
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theaters of action altogether, surrendering the crew, the money and the guns 
to French lighters and submitting to incarceration in a dockside building 
ashore. 
 
With some irony, the authorities at Cayenne reinstated the Company’s 
division of the Nijenburg’s crew on land, lodging the officers, and particularly 
the captain, the doctor, the merchant and his wife on an upper floor of the 
building and the rest of the men, including the muiterofficiers who had 
negotiated the surrender, together below. The colonial governor had been 
forewarned both of the situation aboard the Nijenburg and of the powder kegs 
primed to blow it up, having intercepted the scouting boat sent ahead of the 
ship and imprisoned its crew.546 The spatial separation in the building allowed 
for the officers to be questioned individually, apart from the men, with the 
result that the Company was contacted and most of its money recovered 
before the bulk of the crew were asked about their version of events. 
 
Conclusion  
It can be seen from the reconstruction above that space and power were 
intimately connected on the Nijenburg, both before and after the mutiny. It can 
also be seen that the men created and arranged their own spaces aboard in 
                                                
546 In a further irony the details of the mutiny were obtained not by interrogation but 
by intercepting a letter the men from the raft had attempted to send to the ship, via 
their prison guards. This letter stated that all was lost, that the Cayenne authorities 
could not be trusted, and that, should those on the ship fall into French hands, their 
only recourse would be to blow up the ship. Bruin, G. de & Wal, A. J. J. van der, 
''’Allons Duytsche Broeders.'” 
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order to serve their own social agendas, below the Company’s gaze and 
alongside its standardized structures. The Company’s Articles and ship plans 
formed a kind of loose cage for captains and crews: they allowed for a great 
deal of freedom and variation in shipboard order, inside a firmly codified 
system of routines and punishments. Indeed, they assumed and depended on 
secondary orders, initiated both by the officers and by the men, which have 
been set out in their ideal form in Ketting’s description of below-decks 
practices. Where the secondary orders were produced outside the Company’s 
idiom and expectations, however, they could easily undercut Company 
authority and support rebellion. In short, the Company had formal means for 
punishing mutineers once they had been caught and used rewards to make 
the recruitment of mutineers more difficult, but it left the reproduction of a 
social order that would prevent mutinies in the unreliable hands of tradition. 
 
Further, the same elements of shipboard space and social structure that the 
Company used to communicate its own order could be recombined, in a kind 
of bricolage, by mutineers to support and communicate alternative orders and 
meanings. This bricolage made use simultaneously of the meanings previously 
assigned by the Company and of the mutineers’ own novel practices and 
performances; under their order the quarterdeck became simultaneously an 
exclusive place of privilege and a theater where the Company’s order was 
overturned. Likewise the voorkajuit relied for its function as a display case on 
its prior use as a center of medical and possibly pastoral care. In actor-network 
terms, the spaces retained or perhaps remembered their places in the 
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Company’s networks. The mutineers were therefore able to appropriate and 
redeploy their network associations, fitting themselves into the places in the 
network previously occupied by the Company’s appointed officers. The result 
was not only that the mutineers derived a form of legitimacy from using the 
spaces of power aboard, but also that they were able to employ those spaces to 
adjust selectively the statuses and social networks of other crewmen, whom 
the mutineers bound to themselves by circumstance and association, even if 
they could not extract loyal support from them individually.  
 
The mutineers’ order in “workrooms” 
As noted in Chapter 2, the space of the Nijenburg during and after the mutiny 
is also amenable to an analysis in terms of cognitive and communicative 
“workrooms” and “distances,” as described by Arisaka in her commentary on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time.547 
 
Associations of use, based on expertise, can be seen in operation before the 
mutiny – the distance experienced by the members of the zwavelband from the 
ship’s normative order, made evident by their treatment by junior officers, 
their restricted access to water and their prospects for training - is cited during 
the trial as a cause for rebellion. The mutineers expressed this distance as one 
based on national identity; the ship was a Hollander institution run by and for 
                                                
547 Arisaka, Y: “On Heidegger's Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus” Inquiry 38: 4 
(December 1995), 455-467. For the full discussion of workrooms, see Chapter 2: the 
space of the typical ship. 
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Hollanders, according to Hollander expertise: as Germans they were 
excluded. The junior officers, on the other hand, addressed the zwavelbenders, 
as ignorant novices to Company order, calling them lazy gallows-birds, 
rascals and animals; anything but seamen and soldiers.548 The zwavelband also 
succeeded in generating a workroom that was distant from the gaze of the 
steward and other junior officers, the interior workings of which were 
unknown except by its members. 
 
During the uprising the combination of status distance between the officers 
and men with a spatially expressed distance between workrooms, based more 
on restrictions of access than on the actual lengths of travel between them, 
played an important role in the mutineers’ favor. The widespread ignorance 
professed by crewmen on the lower deck regarding fighting on the 
quarterdeck and in the saloon seems to have relied on an idea that such events 
were “too far away” to be heard, even though they were noted and reacted to 
by the foredeck’s junior officers: men who were physically further removed 
but socially and functionally closer.  
 
Further, the mutineers’ strategy of taking control of the ship’s systems by 
placing themselves between the officers and men made ingenious use of the 
ship’s workrooms and separations. The officers’ spaces, set apart from the 
                                                
548 It is notable that throughout all the trial documents the mutineers are referred to 
principally as spitsboeven, that is “rascals” or “brigands,” avoiding the connotation of 
valid grievances that “mutineer” might entail. 
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crew and arranged to clarify their status and relationships, aided the 
mutineers in finding and isolating the captain and mates. The cabins on the 
quarterdeck in particular, which served to separate the officers for the 
captain’s use, allowing them to be called individually to duty, also worked as 
readymade prison cells: their radial arrangement at the stern of the 
quarterdeck even resembled a kind of reverse Panopticon, ordinarily allowing 
all the officers to check the status of the wheel, but on the night of the uprising 
allowing a single guard at the wheel to control all the officers at once.549  
 
By severing the navigation officers from the junior officers, the mutineers 
decapitated the Company’s social order, interposing themselves effectively 
between the functions of head and hand, planning and execution, navigation 
and sailing. The critical spatial element in effecting this separation was not the 
quarterdeck or the saloon itself, but the space that connected these officers’ 
domains with the rest of the ship: the voorkajuit. It was here that the mutineers 
made their first base aboard on the night of the uprising, stationing guards 
and piling their weapons to claim the one place where the quarterdeck, upper 
deck and lower deck all met. Once they had silenced the captain and secured 
this junction they benefited from the arrangement of the ship’s systems, which 
                                                
549 On the Barbestein the vulnerability of the cabins was made even more apparent: the 
officers were effectively sealed inside them by the use of iron stakes driven into the 
deck to close the doors. Bruijn & van Eyck van Heslinga: “Luxembourg en haut.” 
Regarding the Panopticon, I follow Foucault’s and Markus’ discussions. Foucault, M: 
Discipline and Punish (New York, Pantheon, 1978). Markus, T: Buildings and Power: 
Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
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were divided among interdependent workrooms ready to be coordinated by 
the captain’s command, but unready to collectively resist a usurper in the 
captain’s position. In particular the objects needed to defend the ship were 
arranged in such a way as to be safely separate from one another until the 
captain ordered them united for action, the powder and fuses being kept 
below in the gunroom, while the handguns and grenades were kept above in 
the saloon and tops and all dependent on the voorkajuit that linked them 
together.  
 
After the uprising 
After the uprising the mutineers’ theaters of control showed their own 
workrooms clearly, displaying both to the crew and to the muiterofficiers 
themselves the mutineers’ preoccupations and priorities, their goals and the 
basis of their authority. The mutineers’ workrooms rearranged the spaces of 
the ship beyond their own bounds as well. By moving the center of control to 
the hoek they kept the bulk of the unaligned crew close at hand, while pushing 
those elements that represented Jan Compagnie literally to the margins, the 
junior officers being sequestered away from the men and behind guard in the 
cable locker, under the foredeck and in the gun room, the senior officers 
likewise isolated in their cabins. Access to food, drink, and the means of 
destroying the ship were kept close at hand in the person of the steward, who 
alone held the key to the hold and stayed beside the muiterofficiers’ baks at their 
constant call. 
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By using both the hoek and the quarterdeck as spaces of resident authority, the 
mutineers could use both ends of their status, as quondam crewmen and 
present masters, in their negotiations with the crew. A meeting conducted 
below meant an informal presentation of the mutineers that recalled the 
personal patronage of the great hall: it showed an alignment of interests 
between the mutineers and their fellow crewmen as opposed to the officers 
who, emphasizing their status distance from the men, had withdrawn achter 
op.550 The mutineers thus dressed in the guise of proletarian co-conspirators to 
share the wine they’d liberated from the officers and, in theory, cement their 
gemeinschaft with those they invited as guests and confidants. On the 
quarterdeck they dressed in their uniforms and presented their public, 
disciplinary faces in promises and proclamations, accusations of treachery and 
threats of retribution.551 An invitation to revels on the quarterdeck, however, 
meant a carnival relief from the status of crewman for those invited. There the 
mutineers sat in barbaric state, “playing the boss” indeed, surrounded by the 
vista of the horizon, commanding the ship’s progress toward Brazil, freedom 
and wealth ashore. The drinking and dancing during these revels, aided by 
the Company’s looted money and profligate use of the officers’ food and drink 
promised something rather akin to the “lord of six weeks” experience of the 
                                                
550 Girouard, M: Life in the English Country House: A Social and Architectural History. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).  
551 Melville notes the practice of US naval officers putting on their impassive, 
unreachable “quarterdeck faces” whenever a crewman was lashed before the mast, 
these faces contrasting with their more personable, sympathetic and socially engaged 
self-presentation at other times. Melville, H: White-jacket or, The World in a Man-of-war 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
 318 
return to Amsterdam, this license being the proper reward of the hardworking 
seaman.552 The mutineers’ ability to bestow this relief on those they favored 
presented them as kinder masters, with better contract terms, than the VOC.  
 
The mutineers and the Company as masters 
It is a tenet of actor-network theory that macro-actors—large institutions, 
states and companies, which present themselves as monolithic entities—exist 
through a process of “translating” smaller actors’ wills into a single will for 
which they speak.553 Callon and Latour have further argued that such a large 
actor must necessarily have a simpler nature than the smaller networks and 
actors that make it up, helping it to successfully communicate its 
representations or “translations” to wider and more varied “audiences” of 
network-elements, in order to aggregate them all into its own frame.554 The 
Company’s shipboard order, consisting of a loose institutional framework 
formed by the VOC Articles embellished by local actors aboard each ship, 
seems to bear out this argument. Likewise, the shipboard order that the 
                                                
552 “Lords of six weeks” was a disparaging term used in the Republic to describe the 
wasteful and outrageous behavior of returning VOC seafarers, who were reputedly 
inclined to spend all of their accumulated wages from their five year contracts in 
binges of eating, drinking and employing prostitutes. Boxer, C. R: “The Dutch East-
Indiamen: Their Sailors, Their Navigators and Life on Board, 1602-1795,” Mariner’s 
Mirror 49.2 (May 1963), 81-104.  
553 “By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of 
persuasion and violence, thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be 
conferred on itself~ authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force: 'Our 
interests are the same', 'do what I want', 'you cannot succeed without going through 
me'.” Callon, M. & Latour, B: “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan.” 
554 Callon, M. & Latour, B: “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan.” 
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mutineers created, being composed of elements of VOC order overlaid with 
the mutineers’ own agendas, appears to support Callon and Latour’s 
argument by being more complex than the order it replaced and, moreover, 
aiming at an obscuring complexity with regard to who exactly it purported to 
“translate.” In some regards, however, the mutineers’ order seems simpler, or 
at least more direct in its communication, than the Company’s. 
 
Between the hoek and the quarterdeck, at the crossing point of the ship, the 
mutineers kept their most obvious means of influence and violence ready to 
hand, in the chapel/fortress of the voorkajuit. It was here that the vulnerability 
of the mutineers and the instability of their enterprise were most clearly 
revealed, in the price the mutineers had already paid for their freedom, visible 
in the Company’s stolen goods, and the weapons the mutineers would be 
forced to use on the crew in the event their order failed. This display of riches 
and weapons also exposed another order before the crew, however, one which 
the Company’s officers kept concealed behind the saloon door: it showed both 
the profit to be gained from the Indies voyage and the coercion needed to 
make it happen. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
During the past few decades a great deal has been written about a “spatial 
turn” in historiography and in the humanities generally.555 The globalization 
of capitalism and resistance to it have been important topics in this literature, 
while displacement and “placelessness,” related to globalization, have been 
major themes in the works of, for example, Henri Lefebvre, Marc Auge and 
Homi Bhabha.556 By their natures such discussions rarely deal with the 
qualities of specific places: they are as a whole notably free of diagrams or 
plans or other means of visualizing and discussing with precision the spaces 
they cover. I have attempted here to write a history of the VOC retourschip that 
relates its spatial arrangement to the society that operated aboard it, the 
various programs it served, and ideologies in which it was involved. This 
work, then, represents a contribution to “spatialized” history, but one that 
takes a different tack from the aforementioned authors, being tied to a specific 
group of spaces, using plans and diagrams to explore those spaces in detail. 
Moreover, this study attempts to show a particular place important to 
globalization, rather than dealing with placelessness, even though the ships it 
                                                
555 Warf, B & Arias, S (eds.): The Spatial Turn: interdisciplinary perspectives (London, 
New York: Routledge, 2009). Ethington, P. J: “Placing the Past: ‘Groundwork’ for a 
Spatial Theory of History,” Rethinking History 11.4 (December 2007), 465–530. Thrift, 
N: "Space," Theory, Culture & Society, 23.2-3 (2006): 139-146. Jessop, R: "Theorizing 
Sociospatial Relations," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26 (2008), 389-
401. 
556 Lefebvre, H: The production of space, trans. Nicholson-Smith, D. (Malden: Blackwell, 
2007). Augé, M: Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity (London: 
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addresses went everywhere: becoming in the process, as Marcus Rediker has 
observed, the “longest arms” of empire.557 Through shipping networks both 
the production of and markets for sugar, coffee, tea, cotton and other 
commodities became globalized, as did the maritime labor market that made 
such global transfer possible.558  
 
I have clung to a place-based approach partly for reasons of disciplinary 
orientation and partly from a personal inclination toward the concrete and 
attestable. Case studies form an indispensable part of the architectural 
historian’s arsenal: they invariably complicate clear theoretical arguments and 
reach out in multiple, often inconvenient directions, prompting investigations 
that must address the particularity of each case as well as whatever general 
point the case was supposed to illustrate. A number of other reasons for 
investigating the spaces of the ship have become clear to me through my 
researching, discussing and writing about the topic, which I can state as 
historical propositions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Verso, 2006)., Bhabha, H. K: The Location of Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 
1994). Harvey, D: Spaces of Global Capitalism (London, New York: Verso, 2006). 
557 Rediker, M. B: “Mutiny and Maritime Radicalism,” keynote speech delivered at the 
conference Mutiny & Maritime Radicalism in the Age of Revolution, A Global Survey, 
IISG, Amsterdam, 16-18 June, 2011. 
558 Ewald, J. J: “Crossers of the Sea: Slaves, Freedmen, and Other Migrants in the 
Northwestern Indian Ocean, c. 1750-1914” American Historical Review, 105. 1 (Feb. 
2000) 69-91.  
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The first is that no matter how placeless or abstract the spaces of global 
capitalism may appear, the wheels of commerce are always physical and 
literal, and their physical reality is vitally important to understanding the 
cultural and economic systems they support. In order for global capital to 
work, the ship had to work as a machine and a social system. When the 
society of the ship and the authority of its officers broke down, fault lines in 
the larger engines it supported became apparent.  
 
Second, the history of global shipping can offer a window into the ways in 
which capitalist institutions produce their working spaces, in particular the 
ways in which capitalist enterprises incorporate and reconfigure other, 
traditional social forms and relations. North European seafaring had been 
involved in commerce and adaptive labor networks for centuries before the 
advent of the joint stock corporations. Nonetheless, seafarers reproduced (in 
memory if not always in practice) a set of traditions and a social hierarchy that 
was based on solidarity around the individual vessel, paternalism between the 
master and his crew, and labor relations characterized by partnership and 
profit sharing.559 The VOC’s first ships could not have operated without these 
traditions: its Articles  were built atop them, as a pre-existing social order. The 
blanket of tradition grew ever more threadbare through the Company’s 
                                                
559 Davis, R: The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
Centuries (London, Macmillan, 1962). Jackson, R. P: “From Profit-Sailing to Wage-
Sailing: Mediterranean Owner-Captains and their Crews during the Medieval 
Commercial Revolution,” Journal of European Economic History, 18. 3 (Winter, 1989),  
605-628. Rediker, M. B: Between the devil and the deep blue sea: merchant seamen, pirates, 
and the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, 1987).  
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lifespan, however, as the Company increasingly recruited men with no 
maritime background and relied on an ever-smaller cadre of experienced 
mariners. Indeed, in the case of the Nijenburg, it was so reduced that it failed 
to provide the ex-soldiers of the zwavelband with any kind of shipshape 
identity, out of which they might refashion themselves as Company servants.  
 
Third, I propose that those social conditions characteristic of colonialism, 
involving inflexible hierarchies and the formation of “third cultures” adapted 
to the working world of the colony, did not originate only in ethnized or 
racialized encounters between European colonists and non-European 
colonized populations: instead the structures of colonialism might be found 
replicated throughout the VOC’s expropriative enterprise, particularly aboard 
ships where, traditionally, neither desertion nor renegotiation of labor terms 
was tolerated.560 
 
These propositions might have been tested through investigations of many 
different times and situations in the development of commercial shipping or 
of colonial exploitation, from the Genoese trading-post empire of the fifteenth 
century to the plantation colonies of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, or even through an investigation of contemporary international 
                                                
560 On the importance of desertion as a means of collective bargaining, see Rediker, M. 
B: Between the devil and the deep blue sea. 
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shipping.561 Retourschepen might be termed the “charismatic megafauna” of 
early efforts at globalization, however: combining a discrete shipboard polity 
with the quest narrative inherent to the voyage, they have served as the basis 
for stories of adventure, colonial encounters, and exploitation.562 As active 
agents of colonial expansion, they reveal aspects of the VOC’s operational 
reality and its self-image that are not manifested by its office buildings or the 
street plans of its colonial enclaves, or by the stories the Company told 
regarding its colonies and its purposes. Retourschepen are also both historically 
and architecturally interesting: on the one hand , they were clearly 
instrumental in furthering European expansion between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, on the other, they were unusually large and 
sociospatially complicated—enough to sustain a detailed architectural 
                                                
561 Curtin, P. D: Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 119. 
562 The term “charismatic megafauna” has been used since the 1980s to describe those 
well-known animal species, such as giant pandas and whales, that are used by 
environmental organizations to stir up interest and attract funding. “Species inflation: 
Hail Linnaeus. Conservationists—and polar bears—should heed the lessons of 
economics,” The Economist, May 17, 2007. Ann Rigney has noted the inherent 
teleology of the ship at sea and its resulting popularity among storytelling historians 
and politicians. Rigney, A: The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative 
Histories of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 43-
47. Rigney, A: “The Point of Stories: On Narrative Communication and Its Cognitive 
Functions” Poetics Today, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1992), pp. 263-283. Gilroy, Bose, 
Rediker and Linebaugh have all argued for the active role of ships in provoking and 
fostering regional or global ties of thought. Colin Dewey has offered an alternative 
view, on the ways East India ships brought the price of Empire back home. Gilroy, P: 
The Black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). Bose, S: A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Linebaugh, P & Rediker, M. B: The 
Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the 
Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). Dewey, C. D: In Deep Water: The 
Oceanic in the British Imaginary, 1666-1805 (unpublished diss. Cornell, 2011). 
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analysis, with differentiated spaces and functions tied to a variety of social 
positions and conditions, in a way that smaller or less well described vessels 
cannot.563  
 
The retourschip in somewhat longer durée 
The relevance of the retourschip and its development might best be seen by 
placing it into a longer historical context than the lifespan of the VOC: it 
represented a particular moment in the histories of Indian Ocean trade and 
European imperialism. The period between 1500 and 1800 in the Indian Ocean 
and Southeast Asia saw an exceptionally high rate of seaborne violence, 
introduced by European powers, together with a reconfiguration of trade and 
production in several commodities, leading ultimately to the formation of 
colonial empires.564 Contests for dominance between European states and 
policies of “armed trade” generated a novel “frontier” environment at sea for 
which the retourschip, with its mixture of protection and cargo capacity, was 
                                                
563 This may be a failing on my part: Pierre Bourdieu was able to discern a whole 
world in two partially-separated rooms in the Kabyle house. I may state two points in 
my defense, however. First, the archival records from which I have drawn are neither 
as plentiful nor as pointed as Bourdieu’s interview evidence. Second, both the type or 
class of the normative Berber house and the intercession of memory operate in 
unanalyzed, ways, submerged in Bourdieu’s study. To pursue my topic as Bourdieu 
did, and to the same generalizing conclusions, would therefore be to negate the 
methodological task I set myself. Bourdieu, P: "The Kabyle House or The World 
Reversed," in Bourdieu, P: The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 271-283. Goodman, J. E: “The Proverbial Bourdieu: Habitus and the Politics of 
Representation in the Ethnography of Kabylia” American Anthropologist (2003) 
105(4):782-793. 
564 Pearson, M. N: The Indian Ocean (London, New York: Routledge, 2003). Furber, H: 
Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1976). Smith, W. D: Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800 
(New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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well adapted.565 In contrast the period before the arrival of Vasco da Gama has 
been characterized as one of relative commercial peace and partnership in the 
Indian Ocean, while the nineteenth century saw a significant reduction in 
armed conflict between colonial powers and the spread of a more consistent 
legal maritime space, offering a safer environment for trade and shipping 
overall.566  
                                                
565 Pearson: The Indian Ocean ,ch 5. On the creation of a frontier discourse in a space 
where previously there had been recognized settled polities, see Tsing, A. L:  Friction: 
an ethnography of global communication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
566 Such at least is the general orthodoxy among Indian Ocean historians. For the 
earlier period there are no firm figures, and rates of violence are difficult to assess. 
Goitein’s studies of merchants’ letters among the documents of the Cairo Geniza 
reveals a law-abiding maritime space in the Indian Ocean in the twelfth and fifteenth 
centuries. In this space the threats to trade principally involved contests of power and 
succession on land, and interpretations in land-based courts of the natural hazards 
and contingencies of sea travel. Goitein, S. D: "From the Mediterranean to India: 
Documents on the Trade to India, South Arabia and East Africa from the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Centuries," Speculum, 29.2, part 1 (Apr. 1954) 181-197. Goitein, S. D: 
"Portrait of a Medieval India Trader: three letters from the Cairo Geniza" BSOAS 50.3 
(1987), 449-464. Goitein, S. D et al: A Mediterranean society; the Jewish communities of the 
Arab world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkeley, University of 
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view. Anthony Reid suggests that the trading oecumene of island Southeast Asia was 
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Claude Guillot has likewise noted a significant shift from trading ship to warfleet 
production in Banten  and several other Southeast Asian cities during the fifteenth 
century, suggesting that Europeans were not entirely to blame for disrupting an 
otherwise idyllic situation. Reid, A: "Introduction: a time and a place" in Reid, A. 
(ed.): Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era, Trade, Power and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell, 
1993). Guillot C: “Urban Patterns and Polities in Malay Trading Cities”, Indonesia, 80 
(Oct 2005). There were certainly disturbances, including maritime violence from 
expansionist polities and various kinds of “pirates“ in the seas off East African and 
Southeast Asia after 1800. Nonetheless, large, unarmed commercial shipping and 
passenger lines were able to operate freely by the 1840s, an eventuality that would 
have been unthinkable in the seventeenth century. Naqīb, K: Society and State in the 
Gulf and Arab Peninsula: a different perspective (London, New York: Routledge and the 
Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1990). Risso “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: 
Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a 
Long Eighteenth Century” Journal of World History 12.2 (2001) 293-319. S. 
Bhattacharya. “The Indian Ocean in the nineteenth and Early twentieth Centuries” in 
Chandra, S (ed.): The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics (New 
Delhi, Newbury Park; Sage, 1987). 
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This violent moment, or mode, of capitalist expansion was born out of inter-
state warfare. The VOC and its sister organization the WIC were created 
during the 80 years war of Netherlands independence from Spain, to serve in 
the first instance as instruments for prosecuting that war. Although they were 
formed from private capital and (eventually) yielded profits to private 
citizens, these instruments served the ends of the state, their successes being 
taken as national victories. The war against Spain was conducted both 
through the use of arms and, at a more structural level, through a form of 
economic assault on Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires, with the aim 
of depriving Spain of its income from Asian and American trade while 
establishing the Dutch Republic as the sole provider and entrepot for Indies 
goods in Europe.567 During the first half of the seventeenth century the armed 
trading galleons that came to be called retourschepen had no rival as tools for 
conducting this form of warfare.  
 
Ideational and ideological backing for the mode of armed trade on a chaotic, 
wartime frontier was constructed, in different aspects, in the writings of 
Godefried Udemans and Hugo Grotius. Udemans identified the Spaniards as 
the enemies of all mankind: he excused all forms of violence and 
expropriation, including piracy, plunder and the enslavement of native 
populations in the Indies, as the acceptable consequences of a “just war” 
                                                
567 Israel, J: Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740. (Oxford, New York: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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against Spain, which was moreover part of a necessary, great work in the 
service of God.568 In his celebrated doctrine of mare librum, or free trade and 
access over the seas for all, Grotius, on the other hand, identified the ocean 
and its trading potential as universal goods fit for general exploitation.569 
Grotius’ mare librum appears to support a kind of equalizing, democratic 
attitude to the use of the sea. The impetus for it, however, was justifying the 
VOC’s seizure of the Portuguese carrack Santa Catarina and its extraordinarily 
rich cargo.570 According to Grotius the freedom to trade was a right that had to 
be guaranteed by force: the Portuguese, who denied the Dutch their rights, 
were therefore justly punished by Dutch seizure of their assets.571 More 
generally, Grotius’ doctrine favored whichever power could bring the greatest 
capacity for shipping and violence to bear on the seas of the Wild East. It was 
not a coincidence that in the seventeenth century the Netherlands dominated 
European shipbuilding, nor that, in the retourschip, it had optimized the 
combination of protection and cargo carrying capacity.572 
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The closure of the 80 years war in 1648 changed the Netherlands’ primary 
antagonist from Spain to England and the methods of naval warfare from 
favoring retourschepen to purpose-built “ships of the line.” As a result, 
retourschepen lost their military role in the Atlantic. Further, Lauren Benton has 
described how, during the subsequent century, a regime of spreading British 
legal power over the Atlantic space brought previously wild colonial frontiers 
into a legal oecumene.573 Where the Dutch cited Grotius’ mare librum, the 
English favored his contemporary John Selden’s mare clausum, or the extension 
of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the seas.574 As mare clausum spread, 
through the expanding efforts of warships, the retourschip’s peculiar mixture 
of cargo and protection costs became a liability rather than an asset: whichever 
power could guarantee protection in the Atlantic (through direct state 
involvement) could afford to separate the cost of protection from shipping 
and, instead of supporting expensive armed trader galleons, operate cheaper 
and more efficient single-purpose freighters, such as the fluits and hoekers that 
the Dutch had pioneered in the Baltic since the sixteenth century.575  
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The difference in operating costs between a retourschip and a fluit or hoeker was 
substantial, and can be seen vividly in the shipping registers of the Company’s 
final decade. Throughout the VOC’s history its outward bound ships left port 
packed to the gunwales with men and supplies, and returned equally packed 
with Asian cargoes, their homecoming crews greatly reduced by diseases, 
war, desertion and in the eighteenth century especially by malaria.576 
Outward-bound vessels bore the whole weight of the colonial enterprise. 
Homecoming vessels carried the whole profit potential of the Company in 
their hulls. The space given over to the crews of retourschepen was therefore a 
calculated compromise between efficiency and safety: a small crew could 
place a ship in jeopardy if disease or bad weather reduced it further en route, 
but every man carried aboard represented cargo space lost to his hammock, 
his food and his water. In the Company’s final year, the retourschip Makassar 
made it back to the Netherlands from Batavia with a crew of only 45, 
demonstrating that such a feat was possible.577  In general, however, between 
100 and 130 persons was considered a safe return crew, numbers frequently 
being made up in the Company’s last decades by the addition of Chinese 
                                                
576 Brug, P. H. van der: Malaria en Malaise: de VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw 
(Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994).   
577 DAS II. The return of the first rate Makassar with such a skeleton crew was clearly a 
sign of desperation: most of the other returning ships in its fleet were seized by 
English forces, and the Company ceased trading that same year. Nonetheless, it 
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recruits.578 This crew total was true both for retourschepen in the Company’s 
first decades, which had a cargo capacity of between 500 and 600 tons, and for 
eighteenth century first rates with a capacity of 1150 tons. Jaap Bruijn has 
explained this curious constancy as an increase in efficiency, the tonnage-to-
weight ratio of a late eighteenth century retourschip being comparable with 
that of an early seventeenth century fluit.579 Equally constantly, however, fluits 
and hoekers remained more efficient, regularly operating with crews of around 
30 men in the eighteenth century, whether their hulls could hold 400 or 1000 
tons of cargo.580 Part of this difference may be attributed to the presence or 
absence of guns and the concomitant need for gunners. Part must be related, 
however, to the form and rig of the ships, fluits being in general less 
demanding on their crews than retourschepen.581 
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Despite their inefficiency for cargo carriage in the Atlantic, retourschepen 
remained effective east of the Cape,  where English claims to mare clausum 
were much more tenuous, as the free operation of pirates Henry Everie and 
William Kidd demonstrated.582 A mode of continuous warfare and state 
competition through trade continued through the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, such that retourschepen justified their dual role as fighting 
traders by engaging the forces of other companies, of Indies rulers and of 
seaborne diasporas, displaced by the VOC’s own mercantilist actions.583  
 
A series of setbacks, principally within Europe, changed the fortunes of the 
Dutch Republic in the first half of the eighteenth century, however, setting the 
stage for Anglo-French rivalry in the second half. Jaap Bruijn has described 
how the Dutch Admiralties were reduced to the status of a “second rate 
power” by the War of Spanish Succession and chronic underfunding after 
1713.584 Jonathan Israel has further described how a loss of state power and 
                                                
582 Ritchie, R. C: Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986). 
583 Philip Curtin credits the Dutch invasion of Makassar as one important cause of the 
rise of the Bugis diaspora, noting: “by the early eighteenth century, the [Bugis] 
migration had become a set of interconnected, militarized trade diasporas of a size 
and complexity at least as great as that of the Dutch intruders who had set it in 
motion.” Curtin, P. D: Cross-Cultural Trade, 163. 
584 Bruijn, J. R: The Dutch navy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Brandon, P: "To Defend Trade and be 
Masters at Sea at One and the Same Time’. The Evolution of the Early Modern Dutch 
System of Naval Protection" Paper presented at the Eniugh Congress 2011, session: 
War, State and Capital: European Connections and Global Repercussions in the Early 
Modern Period, 16 April 2011. http://wwwdup.uni-
leipzig.de/~eniugh/congress2011/programme/event/?tx_seminars_pi1[showUid]=
81 Accessed 7 July 2011. 
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market control allowed for the signing of new international treaties and 
agreements, in Europe and beyond, that steadily excluded the Dutch.585 In 
addition, the collapse of the spice market at the end of the seventeenth century 
significantly reduced VOC profits and the retourschip’s prestige, since it no 
longer bore the most valuable Indies cargoes (a position yielded to English 
East Indiamen, with their Indian cloths and tea). The penetration of massive 
British and French naval forces into the Indian Ocean during the Seven Years’ 
War, in the 1750s, rendered the retourschip as obsolete militarily on the seas 
east of the Cape as it had been for a century in the Atlantic. With growing 
naval support the English East India Company was able slowly to spread mare 
clausum across the Indian Ocean. During the fourth Anglo-Dutch war, in the 
early 1780s, retourschepen were seized by British navy vessels in the Sunda 
Strait, and it could be said that the mode of armed trade using retourschepen 
had definitively been brought to a close, the future belonging instead to the 
faster, lighter-armed and more specialized Blackwall frigates of the English 
East India Company.586  
 
The VOC fell to persistent debts and shortage of capital; its ships arguably fell 
to a persistent protection deficit, which was demonstrated decisively by 
British forces, first during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war, and second during the 
                                                
585 Israel: Dutch primacy, 377-405. 
586 DAS I offers a variation on this argument, while emphasizing that, for all of the 
VOC’s other problems, its shipbuilding capacity and quality were undiminished, 
even as the Company collapsed. DAS I. 
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early phase of the Napoleonic wars, when Dutch ships were impounded en 
masse. The retourschip had represented an efficient and effective response to 
the requirements of armed trade. As the relevance of this paradigm was 
reduced, so the retourschip lost its role. Nonetheless, the VOC could not afford 
to abandon the retourschip, first because it did not operate any separate fleet of 
warships to protect its cargo carriers, and second because it had to maintain its 
prestige and military power among its Indies clients and allies. After the 
restitution of the Netherlands East Indies and re-establishment of regular 
shipping, the vessels that carried the colonial trade were no longer associated 
with war or the fortunes of states: their spatial divisions were simpler, their 
crews smaller and their forms less standardized, reflecting a more open 
market in shipping than the mercantilist mode.587 The loss of standardization 
makes these vessels less interesting for the kind of analysis conducted in this 
dissertation. 
 
This narrative rehearses a rather old-fashioned view of the decline of the 
VOC’s sea power, which nonetheless in its broad outlines appears to be valid. 
Such an old-fashioned view has generally been allied to a number of other 
decline narratives that have been applied both to the VOC and to the society 
and culture of the Netherlands in the eighteenth century: a loss of trading 
spirit, a decadent “periwig period” in the Republic, and a generalized stasis in 
                                                
587 Eyck van Heslinga, E. S. van: Van Compagnie Naar Koopvaardij: De 
Scheepvaartverbinding Van De Bataafse Republiek Met De Koloniën in Azië 1795-1806. 
Hollandse historische reeks 9. (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988). 
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the Company.588 These narratives have been called into question or adjusted 
by a number of more recent authors.589 The image of the Dutch retourschip as a 
fossilized, backward form, expressing a company that had abandoned 
innovation for the comforts of routine, requires a similar revision.590 The 
qualitative differences between the Dutch retourschip and English, Danish or 
Swedish East Indiaman in the 1780s were not great. Blaise Ollivier criticized 
Dutch shipbuilding as “old-fashioned” in the 1730s, but the well-respected 
designs for British and Swedish East Indiamen published by Fredrik af 
Chapman in the 1770s were generally in line with Dutch shipbuilding of the 
same period.591 The VOC retourschip did not, then, stand still during the 
eighteenth century. Instead, pains were taken to simplify it and in every way 
to render it more efficient.  
 
                                                
588 Adams, J: The Familial State: ruling families and merchant capitalism in early modern 
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
589 Gaastra relates the decline of the VOC to a crisis of capitalization and debt. Adams 
attributes the supposed “malaise” of the “periwig period” to  increased cooperation 
between burgher families in the Republic. Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
Adams, J: The Familial State. 
590 DAS I attempts to account for the slowness and lack of safety of Dutch ships at the 
end of the eighteenth century, relative to the ships of the Swedish and Danish East 
India Companies, with the conclusion that poor training of Dutch navigators, lack of 
coppering on Dutch hulls and the refusal to adopt three-deck or gladdeck (continuous 
deck) designs were contributing factors. DAS I, 93-106. 
591 Ollivier, B & Roberts, D. H: Eighteenth Century Shipbuilding: remarks on the navies of 
the dockyards in 1737 (Rotherfield: Jean Boudriot Publications, 1992). Chapman, F. 
Architectura Navalis Mercatoria (Stockholm: Tryckt hos J. Pfeiffer, 1775, reprinted 
Berlin: Delius/Klasing, 1968).   
 336 
Efficiency has been a byword of Dutch historical studies: in the VOC’s case it 
generally meant a constant effort to reduce costs, increase the reliability of its 
deliveries, and maintain a constant flow of Indies products to Europe.592 
Within the bounds of the paradigm under which it operated, the Company 
worked incrementally to make the retourschip as efficient and cost-effective as 
possible. In the 1740s its armament was significantly reduced and rationalized 
to occupy only the upper decks and gun room. Working and living 
environments were likewise rationalized, by moving the capstan and 
containing the cable tiers, to reduce that clutter necessary to carrying men and 
proportionally increase the part of the ship given over to cargo. The whole 
fleet was standardized in 1697 and the 1740s to three rates (only two of which 
were actually used) and a higher overall tonnage, reducing the proportional 
cost of carrying crewmen.593  
 
Ironically, the attempts at cost reduction on the retourschip may partially 
account for the sense that the VOC’s seafaring declined during the eighteenth 
century. We may say that the Company also exercised a cost-control policy 
over its manning. Wages and crew complements remained largely constant 
through the Company’s history, despite ever growing labor scarcity and 
                                                
592 Israel, J: Dutch Primacy. 
593 Gaastra has demonstrated that although the total number of ships sent from Patria 
in the seventeenth century was similar to that of the eighteenth, the overall tonnage 
was greatly increased, Gaastra, F. S. Dutch East India Company. 
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recruitment problems.594 Men became harder to find at all levels, but none 
more so than experienced ordinary seamen. While complaints against the 
VOC’s seamen in the seventeenth century had concerned their moral 
character, by the end of the eighteenth century the greatest concern was over 
competence.595 The simplification of living and working spaces to produce an 
environment that was rationally rather than traditionally ordered might be 
seen as part of an effort to reduce training costs. The late eighteenth century 
mutinies suggest at least that social “training” was being neglected, even to 
the point of ceasing to read the Articles regularly before the crew, if 
mutineers’ testimony is to be believed.596  
 
Nonetheless, the ships continued to run with low accident rates and VOC 
crews continued to serve five years or more in the Indies networks before 
returning to Patria. During the Company’s final decade large numbers of 
hired ships and crews were used, presumably including experienced 
mariners. These had significantly higher rates of wrecking on the return 
                                                
594 Davids, K: “Maritime labour in the Netherlands, 1570-1870,” in Royen, P. C. van, 
Bruijn, J. R. & Lucassen, J. (eds.), “Those Emblems of Hell”? European sailors and the 
maritime labour market, 1570-1870, Research in Maritime History 13 (St. John’s, 
Newfoundland 1997) 1-9; 41-71. 
595 Both Admiral van Kinsbergen and VOC Governor Isaak Titsingh published 
proposals for improving the quality of Dutch seamen in the late eighteenth century, 
calling for improvements to the “seamen’s nurseries” of the fishing and trading fleets, 
responding to a general lack of experience in the workforce: Kinsbergen, J. H. van: 
Myne Droomen (Amsterdam: s.n. 1800). Titsingh, I: "Bedenking over de Schaarsheid 
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Verbetering van Neerlands Zee-weezen... (Amsterdam:  Dirk Schuurman, 1779). 
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journey from the Indies than VOC operated ships, even those on which a 
quarter of the crewmen on the latter were Chinese hands who (again 
presumably) had not sailed into the Atlantic before.597 
 
The topic of training is difficult to assess: no direct evidence for shipboard 
training regimens is available from any period of the Company’s history. 
Infrequent mutinies aside, however, we may conclude that the reduction in 
quality and sailing experience of the men did not significantly change the 
ships’ ability to deliver cargoes, and thus that those aspects of training 
necessary to the ship’s mission were not compromised, even if cherished 
social traditions were abandoned.  
 
If the costs of training were indeed reduced, this fact would be of value in 
studies of later, colonial shipping and world systems theory. The retourschip 
occupies a place in world systems theory on both sides of Wallerstein’s divide 
between luxury and bulk goods.598 In the seventeenth century it transported 
bullion, spices and high-priced piece goods; in the eighteenth century the 
value of the goods decreased. In Wallerstein’s argument the distinctive 
contribution of the Dutch was to bring cheap bulk carriage methods to bear on 
rich Indies trades. Jonathan Israel has observed that luxury goods acted as a 
lever for the introduction of global shipping to lower-value goods, resulting in 
                                                
597 DAS III. 
598 Wallerstein, I. M: The modern world-system II: mercantilism and the consolidation of the 
European world-economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 
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the adoption of novel staples in Europe, including sugar, tea and coffee.599 
Many changes in the world economic system were necessary in order to allow 
this transformation to happen. The VOC certainly played a significant role in 
effecting these changes, not only by forming networks for exchange, but also 
by regularizing long-distance shipping and developing systems for organizing 
cargoes, ships and crews, thereby moving shipping far down the ladder of 
costs.  
 
The decreasing “quality” of crewmen may also be expressed as part of a 
longer-term dynamic. Through the period of the Company’s operation the 
general status and power of European mariners sank decisively.600 Where 
sailors were frequently participants in profit- and capital-sharing enterprises 
in the sixteenth century, they were uniformly waged in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.601 Seamen in the East India Companies were initially 
courted with some residual profit-sharing, represented by a space in the cargo 
hold and a share in prizes.602 This share was steadily reduced, however, and 
eliminated in the eighteenth century, rendering VOC seamen proletarianized 
                                                
599 Israel, J: Dutch Primacy. 
600 Schaeffer, R. K: The Chains of Bondage Broke: the proletarianization of seafaring labor, 
1600-1800 (unpublished diss., SUNY Binghamton, 1984).  
601 Pérez-Mallaína, P. E: Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the 
Sixteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,1998). 
602 Ketting, H: Leven, Werk & Rebellie aan Boord van Oost-Indiëvaarders (1595-1650) 
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industrial laborers.603 At the same time Asian slaves and extra-European 
lascars became a regular part of the VOC’s crews and the emergent, European-
operated global maritime labor market generally, forming a multi-ethnic, 
mobile seafaring proletariat that would flourish together with global bulk 
freight shipping in the nineteenth century.604 During that century lascars saw a 
secular drop in wages, setting a new floor for maritime workers’ status: Janet 
Ewald notes that under nineteenth century British Asiatic Articles they 
received only a half to a fifth of the money paid to European mariners on the 
same vessels, which were themselves extremely low.605 The retourschip, as a 
machine for turning unskilled landsmen into subsistence-level specialized 
labor, played a critical role in enabling the new reality of the global mariner in 
European shipping concerns. 
                                                
603 Rediker, M: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. 
604 The British East India Company employed many ‘Asiatics’ in Asia from an early 
date: the stereotypical image of the English private trader is of an English captain 
commanding an entirely Indian or Asian crew, generally via an interpreter who 
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presented at Mutiny and Maritime Radicalism during the Age of Revolution: A Global 
Survey, Amsterdam, June 16-18, 2011. Lucassen, J: “The International Maritime 
Labour Market (sixteenth-nineteenth centuries) in Bruijn, J. R, Lucassen, J & van 
Royen, P: Those Emblems of Hell? European Sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570-
1870 (Newfoundland 1997). 
605 Ewald, J. J: “Crossers of the Sea: Slaves, Freedmen, and Other Migrants in the 
Northwestern Indian Ocean, c. 1750-1914” American Historical Review, 105. 1 (Feb. 
2000) 69-91. 
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APPENDIX 1: RANKS AND POSITIONS ABOARD VOC SHIPS 
 
At least five distinct professional divisions or career ladders coexisted aboard 
VOC ships, comprising merchants and administrators; sailors, sailing officers 
and ship-borne support staff; surgeons and sick-visitors; soldiers; and 
craftsmen. Each division had its own systems of ranks and preferment. The 
rank titles and functions that constituted the explicit shipboard social order 
are listed below, as an aid to the reader.606 
 
Merchants held the highest status aboard. In descending rank order, they 
included the opperkoopman (senior merchant), koopman (merchant), 
onderkoopman (junior merchant) and assistent, secretaris or scrijver (clerk). 
 
Next came the navigation officers. Chief among these was the schipper 
(master), later termed a captein. Then in descending order the opperstuurman 
(first mate), onderstuurman (second mate) and two or more derdewaaks (third 
mates). 
 
Junior officers were divided by function as well as by rank order. The 
hoogbootsman (boatswain) and his maat (mate) were in overall charge of the 
                                                
606 The list presented here broadly follows that given by Ketting. Translations are 
provided, where possible, from  van Beylen. Ketting, H. (Jr.): Leven, Werk En Rebellie 
Aan Boord Van Oost-Indiëvaarders (1595-±1650) (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), bookmark. 
Beylen, J. van: Zeilvaart Lexicon: Viertalig Maritiem Woordenboek. (Weesp: De Boer 
Maritiem, 1985).  
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sailors and of the sailing equipment, ropes and other gear. He alternated 
watches with his second-in-command, the schieman (second boatswain) and 
his mate, assisted on each watch by a kwartiermeester (quartermaster). These 
officers might also be assisted in keeping the equipment ready by a kabelgast 
(hold man). Collectively these junior officers controlled the sailors, who had 
their own social divisions and pay scales, from the experienced Matroos or 
bootsgezel (seaman) to the novice hooploper (apprentice) or jongmatroos or 
simply jongen (boy). The junior officer in charge of food and drink, the bottelier 
(steward) and his mate were directly senior to the kok (cook), his mates and 
assistants, including the versebalie (“refresher” of salted meats and fish), and 
the ruimwerkers (men charged with fetching supplies from the hold).  The 
Konstabel (Chief gunner) and his mate were in charge of all ordnance and 
weapons aboard, as well as the bosschieters (gunners) and the provoost (ship’s 
corporal), who maintained order, preventing gambling, consumption of 
alcohol, and unsanitary behavior below, and tended any prisoners in boeien 
(shackles). Ordinary sailors might also serve as a trompetter (musician, for 
passing signals between ships) or pluimgraaf (livestock herder): neither 
position conferred any improvement in status. 
 
Surgeons were something of a social anomaly aboard ship, cutting across 
sailors’ and merchants’ organizations. The oppermeester, opperchirurgijn or 
opperbarbier (senior barber/surgeon) occupied a cabin on the quarterdeck. The 
onderbarbier or chirurgijnknecht (second surgeon), derde chirurgijn and other 
surgeons had no special place aboard, however: they lodged on the lower 
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deck or in the gun room. The ziekentrooster (sick-visitor) on retourschepen was 
likely also to be the dominee (preacher), and was afforded a place in the saloon 
or a cabin beside it.  
 
Soldiers were organized under a sergeant and one or more korporaals. These 
were senior to the landspassaat and adelborst (officers in training), who in turn 
were senior to the general soldaat (soldier) or tamboer (drummer or signalman). 
 
Craftsmen carried aboard ships ranged from carpenters and smiths to 
sailmakers, coopers, rope makers, swordsmiths, masons and bricklayers. 
Where multiple professionals in a single craft were found aboard the same 
ship they were inevitably ordered by seniority, being the opper- (“first”), onder- 
(“second”) or derde- (“third”) in their profession aboard the ship.
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